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ART. I.—CIVIL INTOLERANCE OF RELIGIOUS  
ERROR.—PROFESSOR MIVART\* ON LIBERTY  
OF CONSCIENCE.

*Liberty of Conscience.* By ST. GEORGE MIVART. (DUBLIN REVIEW, Oct.,  
1876.) London : Burns & Oates.

WE must avow, that Dr. Mivart's reply to our article of last July has given us considerable pain. No doubt, in that work of his which we criticised, he had virtually committed himself to a doctrine, which we regard as at once shallow in theory and deadly in practical result. He had committed himself to the doctrine, that (at all events under the circumstances of modern society) a State cannot, without tyranny and injustice, prohibit any given citizen from freely propagating any given tenets concerning religion or morality, which he sincerely believes to be true. But we hoped that Dr. Mivart had by no means fully realized all which is contained in this doctrine, and that he would shrink from following it into its legitimate applications. In this hope we have been disappointed. We entirely admit indeed, that his paper contains several statements which appear to conflict with his fundamental position. But when we come to examine these statements,—either they are found to mean much less than at first sight appeared,—or else they are left by him in unexplained contradiction to his general view, without at all leading him to abandon that view.

It is always an honourable characteristic of Dr. Mivart, that he abstains from whatever even distantly approaches to personal invective or aspersion. But as regards the *position* which we defended, we have been much surprised by the strength of language with which he assails it. One statement of ours (p. 558) "deserves extreme reprobation"; while another, which is in fact almost a truism, "would be repudiated with horror by the overwhelming majority of English Catholics" (p. 557, note). And so passim. These severe

comments do not rest on a careful consideration of what we had said; for he shows in every page, that he has not once given his mind to the mastery of our argument as a whole. Nor again can it be alleged, that we had committed ourselves to something extreme and paradoxical, which justly excites his indignation; for we on our side have but trodden the one recognized Catholic path, while he has occupied entirely new ground of his own. The ground which he occupies, we say, is entirely new. The extremest Christian advocates of tolerance had hitherto recognized the State's obligation, of protecting against assault those fundamental moral and religious truths, on which society reposes;\* whereas Dr. Mivart is really more emphatic and unmistakable in denouncing all modern repression of atheism, than in denouncing the mediæval repression of heresy.

We deeply regret, both on public and private grounds, the controversy in which we are obliged to engage. We regret to find ourselves in such serious issue with one, for whom we feel warm personal regard. We regret still more that an author, who has done such very important intellectual work in the Church's cause, should mar the completeness and symmetry of that work, by treating this momentous theme in a manner so grievously out of harmony with her teaching. On the entire uprightness of his motives and heartily loyal *intentions* towards the Church, no shadow of doubt (we need hardly say) can for a moment cross our mind. And as he is straightforward in his intentions towards the Church, so he is also straightforward in his dealings with an opponent. For when we pointed out to him, that he had misunderstood our meaning on a matter of considerable and immediate practical bearing,—he most readily and very handsomely assented to our appending a few paragraphs of explanation, which would obviate any temporary false interpretation of our words. On the present occasion indeed we cannot better commence our argument, than by again inserting those few paragraphs of explanation. They ran as follows:—

In the preceding paper Dr. Mivart has seriously misunderstood us on a matter of some little importance; and on finding that such is the case, he has very handsomely permitted us so far to transgress our engagement with

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\* Thus the "Saturday Review" of Oct. 28th, 1876—while objecting to the Spanish repression of Protestantism—explains "that the plea of toleration cannot be stretched to include every conceivable scheme of life which shelters itself under a religious sanction." The writer holds, that tenets in which "grave moral and social issues are involved"—he mentions in particular those of the Mormons—may well be external to the sphere of legitimate toleration.



him, as to insert a few words of explanation. His misconception relates to the *kind* of atheistical propagandism, which (we think), if attempted, ought to be repressed by law.

We first (p. 26) supposed a knot of atheists to combine, for the purpose of diffusing among the masses a conviction, that free love,—and again, that murder of the sick, the infirm, the suffering, and the old—are laudable practices. We are sure the vast majority of Englishmen will agree with us as a matter of course in holding, that such propagandism should be “visited with precisely that degree of severity which may be found most successful” in crushing it.

Secondly (pp. 30–32) we supposed a different case. We supposed a knot of atheists to combine,—not as yet for the purpose of recommending particular practices of immorality,—but for the purpose of diffusing among the masses a conviction, that no such verities are cognizable as the existence of God or of moral obligation; and that man’s only reasonable pursuit on earth is to obtain for himself the greatest amount he can of pleasure and enjoyment. We hold that this is virtually equivalent to the former case. If (which God forbid!) such tenets really penetrated and sank into and obtained possession of the popular mind, they would quite unspeakably debase the national character, they would engender every kind of hideous immorality, and would produce the rapid disorganization and dissolution of society. If any such propagandism then were attempted as we are here supposing,—and if it assumed such dimensions as to render it really formidable—it would be of extreme moment, that that hatred of atheism, which we believe still to animate the great body of Englishmen, should be stimulated to the very uttermost by every legitimate method; that their heart no less than their head should be earnestly enlisted on the side of God; and that the irreligious agitation should be vigorously repressed by the strong hand of the law. Moreover, we have a firm belief that such would be the wish and feeling of Englishmen in general.

But it is an entirely different question, whether the law could wisely interfere with the freest discussion, *among philosophically cultured men*, of whatever theories may be broached, favourable or adverse to religion and morality. Dr. Mivart credits us with an affirmative answer to this question; but on the contrary we are convinced that, in the present most unhappy condition of philosophical thought, vastly more harm than good would accrue from any attempt at such interference.

We think the whole course of our argument implied, that we did not in any way protest against the existent freedom of philosophical discussion. We were dealing throughout with cases of combined aggression against “the religious instinct and feeling now prevalent in England” (p. 32); and we were supposing some body of active proselytizers to aim, in vigorous and widely-extended concert, at direct influence over the popular mind. Had it once occurred to us that we might be laying ourselves open to such a misconception as that which we are here rectifying, we should have taken care to add an express explanatory sentence.

It seems to us that the misapprehension, here corrected,

must have largely coloured Dr. Mivart's criticism of our proposals. He says e.g. (p. 562), that "such publications" as our July article "bring ill-will upon the innocent mass of our co-religionists, who are far indeed from sympathizing with such extreme opinions." He adds, that sober-minded Catholic prelates, priests, religious, professional men, labourers, and servants "have to pay in different measures" for our extravagant utterances. He ascribes to us "wild words and overbearing deeds"; and numbers us among those who, in his opinion, "state truths in the most paradoxical form, and stretch principles till they are close upon snapping" (ib.). Nay he stigmatizes one of our proposals, as not only "unjust" but "revolting" (p. 566). Surely, even had we advocated what he supposed, these would have been strong comments. But when the truth comes to be understood, it appears that our practical proposals were merely what would be accepted, quite as a matter of course, by the great majority of Englishmen, Protestant no less than Catholic.

And now to enter on the discussion before us. We explained more than once in our July article, that our exclusive purpose was a criticism of Dr. Mivart's position; and that we would attempt no further exhibition of *our own*, than was absolutely necessary for the purpose of contrasting it with his. We reserved for a later article the *constructive* part of our undertaking; that is, the methodical exposition of what we account true principles on the matter, together with the argumentative defence of those principles. This part of our work we still reserve. We shall content ourselves on the present occasion with a reply to Dr. Mivart; and when we set forth any part of our own doctrine, it will only be so far as is necessary for meeting this or that portion of his criticism. Even with so limited a scope, it is by no means easy to arrange and co-ordinate all we desire to say. Dr. Mivart's short paper suggests so many comments—there is hardly a sentence in it which does not challenge criticism—that we have experienced much difficulty in devising some argumentative thread, on which we may most intelligibly string together our remarks. On the whole we have thought it best to begin with the most extreme of Dr. Mivart's statements, and to examine its foundation. So much having been done, the rest of our observations (we hope) will proceed in a sufficiently smooth and natural order. We may add, that this opening portion of our comment is mainly occupied with a detailed reply to the two fundamental arguments adduced by Dr. Mivart; arguments which we account entirely—nay (as he exhibits them) extravagantly—fallacious.

Those readers who do not care for a necessarily somewhat minute and tedious logical duel, may omit the few following pages, and proceed at once to p. 15; where we commence a discussion of real breadth and magnitude. For ourselves however, we must of course begin at the beginning. We must begin our criticism of Dr. Mivart's structure, by a criticism of its foundation.

The most extreme then of our author's statements originated thus. In July (p. 26) we drew attention to his affirmation, that certain contemporary atheists have "already openly advocated the murder of the infirm, the sick, the suffering, and the old"; moreover that, among them, "free love has not only its advocates but its avowed votaries." We proceeded as follows:—

A number of men—let us suppose—choose to form themselves into an association of their own, based on that ethical principle, which regards as admirable the practice of free love, of suicide, of murdering the infirm, the sick, the suffering, and the old. Firmly persuaded of their principle, they use every effort to propagate it among their countrymen, and to obtain for it a hold over public opinion. The theory [of civicism, as advocated by Dr. Mivart,] seems on the surface to require, not only that they should not be molested on that account,—which surely would be monstrous enough—but that they should be placed on a footing of perfect equality with their fellow-citizens. We suppose Dr. Mivart cannot intend this; but we wish we knew what he does intend.

It appears alas! that he does intend, what we supposed *could* not be his intention. Not only he does not ever so remotely disavow that doctrine on the subject, which we mentioned as conceivably his,—but he speaks affirmatively. He quotes (p. 559) various statements of ours; and inclusively our strong language concerning the State's proper action towards those miscreants, who should labour to propagate among their fellow-countrymen a belief, that free love and occasional murder are laudable practices. And what is his comment on these statements? He says (*ib.*) that "the practical and logical carrying out of this teaching would be . . . the bringing back to us only the worst and most odious features of the middle ages."\* Certainly the middle age must have been the very age of gold, if its "worst and most odious feature" were, that it severely punished the

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\* The author does indeed exhibit a certain unconscious misgiving, as to his own position. He does not remind his readers in *so many words*, that the tenets to which he is referring recommend free love and occasional murder; but says vaguely, that the said tenets are certain "monstrous doctrines justly reprobated."

atheistic advocates of free love and murder. At all events, Dr. Mivart has made it impossible for us to doubt what it is which he himself maintains. Let it be supposed that a body of atheists try to diffuse among the mass of Englishmen a belief, that free love and murder of the sick and old are laudable habits. Dr. Mivart holds, that the State cannot, without tyranny and injustice, offer any impediment in the way of such an enterprise. This, we say, is certainly Dr. Mivart's most extreme statement in the direction of civil tolerance. It is difficult indeed to imagine one *more* extreme; or one which would more promptly be repudiated by the great mass of sober and reasonable men.

What *reasons* does he adduce for it? He adduces what we have already described as the two fundamental arguments, on which he bases his whole speculative structure. In his present paper there is but one of these, on which he lays very prominent stress. He rests his thesis on "an intuitively evident proposition" (p. 564); viz. "that a citizen cannot justly deny to another as a citizen a right, which he as a citizen claims for himself." And he regards this axiom as sufficient to establish his own thesis; viz. that the English law could not now justly punish persons, for conspiring to propagate among the population a belief, that free love and murder of the sick and old are laudable practices. We suppose our readers will experience the same difficulty which *we* have experienced, in imagining by what extraordinary tour de force such a premiss can be represented as involving such a conclusion. We unhesitatingly accept his axiom. The proposition, "that a citizen cannot justly deny to another citizen a right, which he as a citizen claims for himself,"—is not only "an intuitively evident proposition," but almost a truism. If I claim a certain right precisely on the ground of my being a peer, I claim it ipso facto for all peers. If I claim a certain right precisely on the ground of my being a barrister, I claim it ipso facto for all barristers. And in like manner if I claim a right precisely on the ground of my being a citizen, I claim it ipso facto for all citizens. But what possible relevance has this axiom to the present case? Certainly we claim a right to maintain on occasion, and to impress on Englishmen, that free love and murder are abominable sins. We will further, if Dr. Mivart wishes, concede for argument's sake, that we claim this right precisely on the ground of our being citizens.\* We claim

\* "For argument's sake." We do not see *in fact* how the same right is not possessed by a Frenchman or German, who should be spending a month or two in England.

then for every citizen a right of impressing on Englishmen, that free love and murder are abominable sins. But how does it follow from this, that every citizen has a right of impressing on Englishmen *the opposite tenet*? We do not claim for *ourselves*—either as citizens or otherwise—any right of teaching Englishmen, that free love and occasional murder are laudable; and neither therefore do we claim any such right for citizens in general.

We repeat our statement. We claim for ourselves—as citizens, if Dr. Mivart likes—the right of impressing on Englishmen, that free love and murder are abominations. Dr. Mivart seems to think that, in claiming this right for all citizens, we claim for them the right of propagating *whatever tenet they may sincerely hold*. But we claim no such right, either for citizens in general or for ourselves in particular: on the contrary, we emphatically deny that citizens possess it. The very utmost right we claim for them on the matter is, to propagate any tenet, which on the one hand they sincerely hold, while on the other hand *the civil ruler does not for just reasons prohibit its propagation*.\* Dr. Mivart's axiom then has absolutely no tendency to establish his conclusion, unless he assume that there is no tenet, of which the State may for just reasons prohibit the propagation. But this is precisely what we on our side deny. Dr. Mivart's axiom then has not so much as the remotest tendency to establish his conclusion, unless he first *assumes* the very conclusion which he *has* to establish. And it is the really puerile fallacy here exposed, which (strange to say) has so imposed upon Dr. Mivart, that in his view (p. 564) the Church herself would be demonstrably “stultified,” if she refused to accept it as a sound argument.

For the purpose of illustrating his axiom, Dr. Mivart adds that “it is idle to attempt to treat the ruler any longer as a distinct entity”; because “the communities themselves are becoming or have become the rulers.” This statement is a perfect riddle. As far as we can make out what Dr. Mivart is driving at, he seems to imply, that under constitutional governments there is no real distinction between sovereign and subject. In other words Dr. Mivart seems to say, that the relation which exists between a constitutional government and private citizens, is identical with that which exists between

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\* Of course we do not simply claim for them even *this* right. Not to speak of the Church's just claim,—they have no right to propagate any religious or moral doctrine, which they have not received on sufficient grounds of reason or authority, &c. &c. But we speak, in the text, of rights *a* *against the State*.

the elected administrators of a free association and the individual members of that association. We are slow to credit our opponent with a doctrine, so outrageously opposed both to reason and to fact; but we do not see how, even were it tenable, it would mend his position. All which could possibly be inferred from such a doctrine would be, that any one who desires to diffuse abominable tenets among the people,—and who is prohibited by the State from doing so,—is at liberty to *separate himself* from the State; just as any member of a free association, who does not like its rules, may at any time separate himself from that association. Such a view of the State's authority is (we need hardly say) unspeakably absurd; but were it ever so true, in no way whatever does it tend to support Dr. Mivart's thesis.

One question however is at once suggested by the words we have quoted. Those words may be understood as implying, that a *constitutional government* indeed cannot, without injustice, interfere with the propagation of any tenet however detestable; but that under absolute monarchies the case is different. Is this really Dr. Mivart's meaning?

Then as to the force of his general axiom, concerning the rights of the individual citizen. In p. 564 he represents this axiom as "an intuitively evident proposition"; and parallels it with the proposition, that the whole is greater than its part. But in p. 556 he speaks of the axiom rather as a practical maxim, which may usefully be adopted under modern circumstances. And in p. 557 he says that "were it possible by force to eliminate evil from a nation or the world, we ought so to eliminate it." Now the apparent meaning of this latter affirmation is, that if, by the State's repression of doctrinal error, such error could be eliminated from a nation,—repression of doctrinal error would be the State's duty. Yet surely, if the State's repression of doctrinal error be an intrinsically unjust and tyrannical course, no considerations of moral expediency could possibly justify its adoption. In this and in several other passages Dr. Mivart makes it abundantly clear, that he has really not been at the pains of thinking out any consistent theory whatsoever.

So much then on the axiom, which Dr. Mivart in his present paper so prominently enforces. In the volume however on "*Contemporary Evolution*," Dr. Mivart laid greater stress on a different argument altogether; an argument which at least has the merit, of not being seen on the surface to be futile. He described "*liberty of conscience*" (p. 133), or "*individual freedom reposing upon conscience*" (p. 119), as being "*the most fundamental and sacred of all liberties.*"



"The supreme and indefeasible rights of conscience" he said "have never perhaps been more admirably defended, than in F. Newman's letter to the Duke of Norfolk." And he added, that F. Newman "makes plain by references and quotations," how entirely accordant is his teaching with "the traditions and authorities of the Church." Indeed Dr. Mivart thought F. Newman's quotations of so much importance for his own purpose, that he transferred a certain number of them bodily into his pages (pp. 33, 34). They are one and all to the effect, that under no possible circumstances can an individual be justified in acting against the dictate of his conscience. These quotations supplied the foundation of Dr. Mivart's argument. But how did he make them *available* for the said argument? As we explained in July (p. 6), he did so by assuming a thesis of extremely wide extent, on which his reasoning from first to last entirely depended. He assumed the thesis, that *the State's obligation, of not interfering with a citizen's acts, is co-extensive with the citizen's obligation of performing them.* This thesis seems to us entirely untenable; and we contended against it in detail from p. 5 to p. 12. Neither however does Dr. Mivart make the slightest attempt to answer our reasoning, nor yet does he withdraw the argument in question.

We have reminded our readers of the stress which Dr. Mivart originally laid on the testimony of theologians. We have done so, because he seems surprised (p. 556) at our taking for granted, that he had intended to use the word "conscience" in the same sense in which theologians use it. But he might rather, and indeed with much justice, have accused us of intolerable discourtesy, if we had expressed a *doubt* of his having so intended. The whole body of testimony, which he adduces from theologians with so much emphasis, would have been of course grotesquely irrelevant, if he had meant one thing by "conscience" and they another. As to the phrase "*liberty of conscience,*" indeed — this is another question on which we shall presently speak. Now however to resume the thread of our remarks.

Dr. Mivart, we say, in his new paper repeats his original statement—just as though we had not adduced one single argument against it—that "all the citizens of a State save one are morally culpable, if they try to force that one to perform acts against his conscience" (p. 561). But what can be more extravagantly paradoxical, than such a statement as thus crudely put forth? The State forsooth is morally culpable, if it tries to force a Thug to spare some victim, whom the omens summon him to slay; or to force a fanatical Mussul-



man to abstain from murdering Lord Mayo; or to force some married woman to desert her paramour, who has persuaded her that she is "his wife in the sight of God"; or to force some brother of "the peculiar people" to obtain medical help for his sick child;\* or to force a reluctant parent to vaccinate his infant;† or to force those persons to abstain from killing the sick and old, whose conscience may on occasion dictate the doing so. Of course Dr. Mivart does not mean all this: but what *does* he mean?

We wished to rescue Dr. Mivart from the intolerable paradox, which his words would involve in their naked unqualified form. We suggested therefore in July (pp. 9-13) a certain important distinction. We suggested a distinction, between those laws on the one hand which "militate" against a citizen's conscience,—and those on the other hand which "acquit" it, even while they "disregard" it. By the former term we designated those laws, which put serious pressure on me towards my doing what my conscience *under existing circumstances* disapproves. By the latter term we designated those laws, which I have no conscientious difficulty in obeying, *when they have been passed* and when the government forcibly carries them into execution; though they may forbid what *otherwise* my conscience would have commanded me to do. So the Hindoo widow (as we pointed out) thought herself bound in conscience to be burnt alive. But when that consummation became to her—by the law's prohibition—a matter of physical impossibility,—she did not think herself conscientiously bound to exert her whole strength, for the purpose of pressing her way towards the funeral pile against the combined resistance of English officials; but her conscience entirely acquiesced in her passive submission to the English law. On the other hand if I sincerely think that God prohibits all oaths—and yet some law threatens me with serious penalties in the event of my refusing to be sworn—such a law "militates" against my conscience: it tries to force me to do what *under existing circumstances* my conscience disapproves. Now (as we proceeded

\* The "peculiar people," as our readers may probably know, are a sect, who consider it forbidden by Christianity to obtain medical help for the sick. Their conscience sincerely dictates, that they are bound to place their exclusive trust in prayer.

† "The defendant [parent of the infant] said his mind was fully made up that vaccination was a highly dangerous practice. It seemed to him to be a cruel law against parents *who had conscientious objections*. Mr. Marshall [the magistrate] said it would be a cruel thing of the law to allow small-pox to spread."—Hampstead Police Report, Nov. 2, 1876.

to argue) it is only as applying to laws of this *latter* kind—to laws which actually *militate* against my conscience—that Dr. Mivart's thesis possesses even a momentary or *primâ facie* appearance of plausibility. But when the thesis is thus limited, it is of no service whatever to the very purpose for which he invented it. As we pointed out in pp. 10, 11—without putting forth any militation whatever against conscience, an enemy of Catholicity, who should possess civil sovereignty, might exercise a more detestable and crushing tyranny over the Church, even than that now rampant in Germany. Dr. Mivart devised a certain thesis, for the purpose of throwing an inviolable ægis over religious liberty. We replied (1) that it is only in one particular sense, that this thesis possesses the faintest appearance of plausibility; and (2) that if it be *limited* to that sense, it does not offer so much as the frailest barrier against the very extremity of religious tyranny.

Now, as we have already said, Dr. Mivart does not make so much as a momentary or incidental attempt, to look this argument in the face and answer it. He most strangely affirms (p. 563), that our reasoning entirely depended on our "ignoring the common meaning of 'liberty of conscience,' and adopting" another "peculiar and singularly misleading use of the term." But if he will only have the patience to re-peruse that passage of ours (pp. 10, 11) to which he is referring,—he will find that the phrase "liberty of conscience" is not once found therein from beginning to end. The word "conscience" itself no doubt occurs at every turn: and as regards that word,—for the reasons already mentioned,—we assumed as a matter of course, that Dr. Mivart employed it in the sense in which theologians use it. But apart from theological usage altogether, we could not otherwise interpret his language. He complains (p. 556) that we "have taken him to mean by 'conscience' either an innate power of apprehending the Natural Law, or an act of ethical judgment in a particular case." But we may safely challenge him to mention any *other* sense of the word, which we could possibly have ascribed to him, without rendering his whole argument simply nonsensical. And certainly even now he does not give the remotest hint, as to *what* was the sense which he intended.

At this point—lest otherwise our readers become perplexed and bewildered—we will sum up our argument, so far as it has hitherto proceeded. Dr. Mivart maintains a more extreme doctrine on toleration, than any other Christian writer we ever heard of. We supposed a knot of atheists

to combine, for the purpose of persuading the mass of Englishmen, that free love and murder of the sick and old are laudable habits. Our author holds, that the State could not, without injustice and tyranny, interfere with the freest propagation of that tenet. We inquire with natural curiosity, what reasons he can give for so amazing an affirmation. He gives two, and two only, direct reasons. That on which his present paper mainly insists, is derived from the intuitively evident axiom, "that a citizen cannot justly deny to another as a citizen a right, which he as a citizen claims for himself." We have replied, that this axiom, is no doubt intuitively evident; but that it has not so much as a remote tendency towards establishing Dr. Mivart's conclusion, unless he begins by *assuming* that conclusion. The *other* direct reason which he adduces, is one on which he laid much more stress in his original volume than he does in his present paper. It may be thus stated. "To any one who regards free love and occasional murder as laudable, his conscience will often dictate, that he should propagate that tenet among the mass of his countrymen. But the State is morally culpable, if it try to prevent any one from doing what his conscience dictates: ergo, &c." We replied in July, by denouncing the latter (major) premiss, as undeniably and most manifestly false; nor has our author so much as attempted any rejoinder on this reply.

Before proceeding further however with our general argument, this will be the most convenient place for considering Dr. Mivart's severe strictures, on our use of the term "liberty of conscience."\* The term "conscience" has no doubt an established and most definite meaning, in Catholic terminology: but the term "*liberty* of conscience"—as we pointed out in p. 13—is "vaguely used in a hundred different senses." Dr. Mivart employs it as substantially identical, with what is commonly called "religious liberty"; but for which in this instance a more appropriate name would be "*doctrinal liberty*."† No part whatever of our argument turned on

\* "Such a perversion of language" he says (p. 558) "deserves extreme reprobation."

† The phrase "*religious liberty*" is not so appropriate, because Dr. Mivart includes liberty of *irreligious* doctrines in his scheme of toleration.

We must observe however, that even in defining the term "*liberty of conscience*," which gives its name to his paper, Dr. Mivart does not express himself very intelligibly. He implies (p. 557) that any acts of any citizen may justly be punished, which "endanger . . . the prosperity" of other citizens. Why Torquemada himself did not punish any acts, except those which in his judgment grievously "endangered"—or rather certainly and seriously injured—the true "*prosperity*" of other citizens.

this verbal question; on the question, what would be most correctly understood by "liberty of conscience." We only said (p. 13), that we "could not understand any *grammatical* sense of the term," except that which we adopted; viz. as signifying "exemption from militations against conscience." To say that I enjoy "liberty of conscience," is to say that my conscience is free from adverse aggression. And this being understood as the only grammatical sense of the phrase,—we argued that "liberty of conscience" is in very many respects impeded rather than promoted by the civil tolerance of religious error. In this sense of the term indeed, it is almost a truism to affirm, as we affirmed, that a "Catholic's freedom of conscience is grievously impaired by the toleration of other religions." And when Dr. Mivart protests (p. 557 note) that such a sentiment "would be repudiated with horror by the overwhelming majority of English Catholics,"—he merely shows that he has not taken the trouble to apprehend what we said. These were our words:—

There is no more sacred and prominent dictate of the Catholic's conscience, than that it is mortally sinful to entertain so much as one fully-deliberate doubt on the truth of Catholicity. How grievous are the temptations to violating this dictate which attack him on every side, wherever the freedom is permitted of non-Catholic publications! We do not speak of grave controversy; in fact there is much less danger in this. But he cannot open a newspaper, or magazine, or novel, without encountering at every turn some flippant suggestion, or plausible sophism, or ingeniously-distorted fact, which inevitably perhaps engenders a momentary indeliberate doubt as to the truth of his religion; and which tempts him to commit mortal sin of the gravest kind, by giving that doubt deliberate harbour. We are not for a moment denying, that on the other hand a sincere Protestant might have *his* freedom of conscience impaired, under an exclusively Catholic régime. Still less are we implying that the civil ruler acts otherwise than as he is actually bound to do, when he permits liberty of worships in a mixed population. We are only pointing out how profoundly fallacious it is, to identify the civil tolerance of religious error with that most different phenomenon, political freedom of conscience. Political freedom of conscience cannot largely exist, except so far as there is strict civil intolerance of religious diversity.

If Dr. Mivart will but dispassionately read these sentences, he will see that—instead of their filling him with horror—he agrees entirely with the whole thought therein expressed. His only difference from us is, that—whereas he uses the term "liberty of conscience" in one sense—we think we express ourselves more "*grammatically*" by using it in another.

The same verbal explanation—which we are amazed that

Dr. Mivart can need—fully explains what we said in July (pp. 13, 14), on the "liberty of conscience" enjoyed by sincere Protestants, who might have been sojourning at Rome under the Pope's rule. Nor again (see Dr. Mivart's remarks in p. 558) is it any paradox, but rather almost a truism, to say that the Inquisition secured large "liberty of conscience" (in our sense of the term) to Spanish Catholics. Whether that priceless boon might not have been as thoroughly conferred by means far less violent and far less otherwise objectionable,—this is a question entirely irrelevant to our present issue. But if any one cares to know our view on the matter, we would refer him to an article in our number of July, 1867.

In one word. Dr. Mivart had based his argument for the civil toleration of religious error, on the inviolableness of the individual conscience. We agreed with him that, since the individual conscience is thus inviolable, laws which militate against conscience are extremely great evils, though on occasion (we added) they are necessary evils. But we argued in detail, that laws, prohibiting the propagation of religious error, are by no means necessarily laws militating against conscience: in many instances very much the reverse. We will not merely observe that Dr. Mivart has not replied to this argument; for we should rather say (as we have already said) that he has not once looked it in the face. But as to the purely verbal question,—on the more correct sense of the term "liberty of conscience,"—this question has not the remotest bearing on any one portion of the controversy. At the same time we think that our own way of using the term has one great practical superiority over Dr. Mivart's. We think that to employ the phrase "liberty of conscience" as synonymous with "religious" or "doctrinal" liberty—is to give an impression, that there is an immeasurably closer connection than really exists, between respect for the sacredness of conscience on one side, and civil toleration of religious error on the other.

Reverting, from this digression, to the case of those miscreants, who advocate free love and murder of the old and infirm,—we will conclude the first portion of our argument, by extracting from our July number our whole statement concerning them, just as it stood. We supposed (p. 26) that "a number of men choose to form themselves into an association of their own" based on these detestable principles; and that, "firmly persuaded" of their truth, "they use every effort to propagate those principles among their countrymen." What measures should be taken by the sound part of society?

Catholics, Christians of every denomination, right-minded Theists, should combine as one man to uphold the existent true ethical basis of society.

They should account it their sacred duty, to stimulate and intensify by every legitimate means the detestation and abhorrence with which such tenets are now regarded. Then as to the State's corporate action. Children of every Government school should be carefully trained in such detestation and abhorrence of these tenets; and the law should visit any one who attempts to propagate them with precisely that degree of severity, which may be found most successful in discrediting and repressing them. A person, who approves and sympathizes with such practices, is not to be (so far) accounted a fellow-citizen, but a public enemy of the most dangerous kind. He should be visited by the law (as we have said) with just that amount of severity, which the public sentiment will bear. And the infliction should not be carried further than this—not because he does not richly deserve a much severer punishment—but because public morality would be injured and not benefited, if he were made an object of compassion to the weak-minded and half-hearted. Certainly, as Dr. Mivart points out, it is not legitimate to use force for the purpose of promoting a return to Catholic unity; but it is most legitimate, and indeed the State's sacred duty, to use force for the purpose of upholding the existent true ethical basis of society (pp. 27, 28).

So far from being ashamed of these statements, we have been amazed to find that Dr. Mivart dissents from them. We believe there is hardly a Theistic thinker in the world except him, who will not applaud them with both hands.

But a few pages later in our article we went somewhat further. We supposed (p. 32), some sect to "start up in vigour and attempt proselytism" among the mass of the people, which—though not as yet inculcating open immorality,—yet should "manifestly rest on an atheistic basis"; "on the assumption, that no such verities are cognizable, as the existence of God and of duty" (p. 30). We maintained that such a sect as this—in the event of its becoming really formidable—should be vigorously repressed by the strong arm of the law; and that every effort should be made, for awakening Englishmen to a full sense of its odious and fatal character. This is a more immediately practical question than the former; and indeed it is difficult to say, how soon its consideration may be urgent and imperative. We will therefore treat it at a length somewhat disproportionate to the general dimensions of our article.

We will begin by a few words on the character and tendencies of modern atheism\*; and that Dr. Mivart may not

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\* Dr. Mivart distinguishes between "atheism" and "antitheism": "agnosticism" being included in the latter. We are the last to undervalue the philosophical importance of this distinction, because we believe we were the



suspect us of exaggeration, we will derive our description entirely from his own statements. The "agnostic philosophy" he says "is absolutely fatal to every germ of morality" ("Lessons from Nature," p. 418). "The agnostic philosopher, who should really simply deprive himself of a pleasure, would be acting irrationally" (p. 411). Professor Huxley (Mivart, *ib.* p. 392) describes "*the good of mankind*" as simply identical with "*the happiness which*" man "can enjoy"; of course exclusively in this world. A less distinguished atheist (p. 393) says openly, that "no pleasure is bad, except when it means pain"; and that "the good is pleasure." Indeed it is notorious, that the whole body of atheistic philosophers (so far as theory goes) deny all intrinsic distinction between virtuousness and pleasurable-ness;\* nor is there wanting indication of such tenets already bearing appropriate fruit. Among certain atheists of the day, "marriage is the constant object of attack, and unrestrained licentiousness theoretically justified" (*ib.* pp. 403). One atheist of Dr. Mivart's acquaintance "deliberately maintains, that it would be a great benefit to propagate in modern society customs of Pagan Greece and Rome, *which are generally looked on as specially revolting*" (*ib.* p. 404).† This fearful picture powerfully illustrates S. Paul's well-known language, on the intimate connection between atheism and every foulest immorality. And though Dr. Mivart does not imply that atheists (in England at least) are for

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first to introduce it. See our number for October, 1871, p. 308. Here however, as we are not writing on philosophy, we shall discard a phraseology, which has no bearing on our present theme. We shall denote, by the common name "atheists," all who think that the theory of God's Existence is one, for which reason is incapable of seeing any ground whatever; and that men would act with simple absurdity by resting any part of their conduct on such a theory. So the atheistic catechism, which we quoted last July, p. 207. Q. "Is there a God?" A. "The negative and affirmative replies are alike mere suppositions, and therefore worthless."

\* In fact, if there were any existent atheists who do *not* deny this distinction, they would not belong to the class of which we were speaking in July. But we entirely agree with Dr. Mivart, that there are none such. From this it follows that, in Dr. Mivart's judgment as in our own, no existent atheist can do even one good act, except by being unfaithful to his own principles. "The idea of moral good," says Dr. Mivart excellently ("Lessons from Nature," p. 118), "must be influencing the man at the time, otherwise the action is not moral."

† Even so grave a writer as Dr. Bain has the following shameless remark, when engaged in illustrating the tendency to raise "strong antipathies" into the rank of "moral rules." "There has been a very prevailing disposition to restrict the indulgences of sex. Some practices are so violently abhorred, that they are not permitted even to be named." ("Emotions and Will," p. 309 of first edition.)



the most part what is commonly called immoral,—yet he points out that this fact by no means lessens the fearful injury they inflict on mankind. Rather the contrary indeed; as he vigorously expresses, in the following most noteworthy paragraphs. We italicize a few words.

If leaders or propagators of the Non-theistic philosophy are men who lead a life materially moral, it is only *so much the worse*. It is so much the worse, because such a life is the means of giving far greater currency to dangerous views, the very danger of which such a life more or less disguises. Of two men, one leading a life of this moral kind, but influentially propagating the agnostic philosophy, and another simply leading a grossly sensual one, which does the most harm to others? There cannot be a moment's dispute about it. The most profligate of men can by his personal conduct corrupt but a few; but, the agnostic who, by his publications, tends to sap the basis of *all* morality, spreads corruption far and wide, not only in his own, but in succeeding generations also. However warm may be our personal regard for such an agnostic, however much we may enjoy his society or appreciate his warm-heartedness, we must none the less confess that, absolutely and in fact, he is *one of the worst enemies of the human race*. Regret it as we may, there is no rational way of avoiding such a judgment.

Again, let us suppose, for argument's sake, that Christianity is true; let it be granted for the same reason, *per impossibile* or *per absurdum*, that there is a living personification of the principle of evil. Would such a being for a moment allow serious temptation to come in our agnostic philosopher's way? Would he not scrupulously guard him from any such peril, lest perchance a shameful fall might develop some latent germ of humility in him, the existence of which might be discernible by such preternaturally acute vision? ("Lessons from Nature," pp. 404, 405.)

In his work on "Contemporary Evolution," as we pointed out in July, Dr. Mivart emphatically sums up the preceding details.

The Christianity which yet remains diffused amongst us and the refinement of modern manners render the open practice of licentious and sanguinary rites as yet impossible; but the spirit which prompted them finds in this system [the system of contemporary antitheists] its complete and logical justification, as it has found in a contemporary poet its distinct lyrical expression. The tendency of this movement is to approach little by little to this worst phase of paganism, as the corruption of morals gradually increases through the temporarily decreasing influence of Christianity upon the outer surface of society. Already we have openly advocated the murder of the infirm, the sick, the suffering, and the old, as well as self-murder. Free-love has not only its advocates, but its avowed votaries; and a hatred of marriage and the family is one of the sentiments common to those political enthusiasts, who claim for themselves *par excellence* the title of "advanced" (pp. 43, 44).

On the other hand, in his present paper, Dr. Mivart ex-  
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presses (p. 555), "a strong sense of the estimable qualities of many" living atheists, and testifies to their "self-denying philanthropy and purity of life." He had declared indeed before, and does not now deny, that, notwithstanding all this, they are "among the worst enemies of the human race": moreover that their "materially moral life" may be partially explained, by the probable absence of diabolic temptation. Nor need we suppose him to forget, that those who do not recognize God are (as St. Paul says) "unexcusable"; and that atheism therefore implies grievous sin by its very existence.

As we shall explain hereafter, we think that the tone towards atheists adopted by Dr. Mivart in his present paper—as on one hand it differs essentially from that found in his earlier volumes,—so on the other hand is grating and justly offensive in no small degree to Catholic ears. But as regards bare facts, our own view of the matter is substantially accordant with what we understand to be his. The existence of God and of morality are truths so firmly rooted by God Himself in the conviction of every reasonable creature, that practically to leaven the human mind with belief of their contradictories, is (even under the circumstances most favourable to that purpose) a slow and up-hill process. In the early stages indeed of atheistic conviction, there is a vast gulf between the atheist's speculative theory and his practical realization of that theory. The idea of virtuousness e.g. in one shape or other is by nature so constantly recurring and importunate, that only by a long course of laborious discipline (so to speak) will he be able practically to realize, even in approximate measure, his speculative doctrine; his doctrine, that the one only reasonable purpose of his life is to enjoy himself as much as he can. Let us briefly sketch then the process of his declension, as it may ideally be conceived, and as it is more or less practically realized in this or that individual.

The first noteworthy step of his downward course will be best explained by a preliminary remark. In the case of ordinary men, virtue is not reached by great and heroic efforts, but by little acts of self-restraint and self-sacrifice, constantly succeeding each other and so generating a habit. Many a man indeed, who cannot be called consistently virtuous, yet performs no very small number of such acts in this or that particular direction. The motive of such acts, we need hardly say, is a sense of duty or again the desire of obeying and pleasing God. The first noteworthy lesson which a consistent atheist has practically to learn is, that such motives are a pure delusion; and that he is acting with simple unreasonableness, so

far as he allows them to influence him in the slightest degree. If it be replied, that *the pursuit of his own happiness* will legitimately prompt him to a life of self-restraint and self-sacrifice, we rejoin that such a thesis is not less than extravagantly unsustainable. If I am not to have the strength impetrated by prayer, nor to be cheered by the thought of God's approval—if I may not have the gratification of looking forward to future reward—if I am to be exempt from the feeling of remorse and the dread of divinely inflicted punishment for evil-doing—it is absurdly untrue to say, that my happiness will be promoted by attempting a life of self-restraint and self-sacrifice. Such a life will be morally impossible; and the sustained attempt at leading at it will but issue in disappointment and anguish. The consistent atheist's one reasonable course of conduct will be that described in the paragraph of Mr. Froude's, which we appended (pp. 36, 37) to our July article. He will labour to make this world as comfortable a place as he can, by bringing every possible prudential calculation to bear on his purpose. Before all things he will keep his digestion in good order. He will keep at arm's length (indeed at *many* arms' length) every disquieting consideration: such e.g. as might arise from a remembrance of other men's misery, or from a thought of that repulsive spectre which the superstitious call moral obligation. All this will be found a very effective process, in carrying him downwards to depravity.

The second noteworthy step in his declension will follow inevitably from the first, and will separate him much more sharply from his fellow-men. Ordinary persons, who practise ever so little self-restraint and self-sacrifice, respect and admire nevertheless those who do; nay regard such habits as the very constituent elements of virtue. But how will our consistent atheist regard them? It happens not very rarely, that some foolish and reckless spendthrift so squanders a large fortune as hardly to reap from it any substantial enjoyment, and is then reduced to the miseries of squalid penury. The good regard him with disapproval indeed, but with keen commiseration; while the ill-natured and cruel visit him with unutterable contempt and scorn. Such unutterable contempt and scorn is the atheist's reasonable feeling towards those, who are diverted in any degree by self-restraint and self-sacrifice from undivided attention to their personal enjoyment.

We have been contrasting, in the case of an *individual atheist*, the practical result in which his convictions may ultimately issue, with the initial stages of his course. But a parallel contrast will of course be much more marked and pronounced, as regards the *atheistic school* itself:

because, in the case of a continuously living school, the intrinsic tendency of doctrine will have far more extended scope for exhibition and development; and will be far less interfered with by individual accidents. Nothing then is more easily intelligible, than the position which we apprehend to be Dr. Mivart's. Certain men, viz. the contemporary atheists, are committed to a certain speculative theory: a theory which—in proportion as it is practically realized and applied—will carry its disciples downwards to this and that exhibition of hideous immorality. In the early stages however of their course—while as yet their disgusting principle has had little time to sink into their practical conviction, and while they are surrounded on every side by a Theistic and ethical\* atmosphere—they may even practise in some degree “self-denying philanthropy and purity of life.” But this only takes place by means of their happy inconsistency; and (unless they repent and start back from the path they have entered) the end of their school will be in some such gulf of frightful and degrading depravity, as Dr. Mivart has so vigorously depicted. Mr. Fitzjames Stephen would not be disposed by his philosophy to take by any means so stern a view of this matter, as Dr. Mivart and ourselves; but he makes nevertheless a very important remark. “We cannot judge of the effects of atheism,” he says, “from the conduct of persons, who have been educated as believers in God, and in the midst of a nation which believes in God. If we should ever see a generation of men, especially a generation of Englishmen, to whom the word God had no meaning at all, we should get a light upon the subject which might be lurid enough.” (“Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity,” p. 326 of second edition.)

Now there is a second growth of atheism, distinct from what we have been mentioning, but which will proceed with it *pari passu*: we mean its zeal for proselytism. At this moment no inconsiderable number of “advanced thinkers” are even unfeignedly terrified, at the thought of their tenets spreading largely through the mass of society. But in proportion as such unhappy men come to realize their theory in practice, they will become more and more impatient at the restraints imposed upon them both by law and public opinion; more and more infuriated at the disgust felt by the world against them for their practices; more and more ardently desirous, that others be brought down to their own level. They will affect (and persuade themselves that they

\* We do not mean of course, that those with whom they live universally *practise* morality; but that the public opinion which surrounds them *recognizes* morality as distinct from pleasure.

feel) a public-spirited desire, to rescue mankind from the miseries inflicted by an obsolete superstition; and to open the road for a more rapturous enjoyment of life, than can possibly be obtained, so long as the pursuit of that enjoyment is hampered by fantastic obstacles and scruples. At this moment, in France and Belgium propagandism of this kind is much more forward than in England; as we pointed out last July (pp. 206-213). In England itself, Mr. Bradlaugh and his co-operators have not been unsuccessful in doing very serious mischief; though their small agitation bears no more appreciable proportion to the great atheistic aggression we are supposing, than a few local drops of rain bear to some violent tempest sweeping over the whole land.

Let us suppose then that, at some given epoch, the atheistic leaders set themselves in concert to the work of diffusing atheism among the English people. We are far from meaning, that the speedy inauguration of such a movement would be an unmixed evil; for on the contrary we are by no means sure that under present circumstances it might not be the best thing which could happen. What is just now to be feared is, that the mind of Englishmen be *gradually and imperceptibly* imbued with an atheistic leaven; that the enemy may sow cockle *while men sleep*; that the heart and life may be eaten out of existent beliefs, before it is understood that those beliefs are in peril. At one period of Church history—it has been epigrammatically said—the Christian world started with wonder to find itself Arian. There is danger, lest some day England may wake up, and start with wonder to find herself atheistical. A hearty straightforward overt atheistical propagandism may just now be the very thing best suited for rousing her from her slumbers, and for awakening Englishmen to a keen sense of what is really in progress. That detestation of atheism, which (thank God!) we are confident still exists in the national mind, would be at once roused into consciousness and stimulated into intensity; and the pestilence would be checked, as soon as its advance ceased to be insidious. For we are very confident that, in the hour of actual conflict, Dr. Mivart's paradoxical theories would be thrown to the wind; and that the nation's religious feeling, thus violently outraged, would clamour for forcible repression of the aggressive blasphemy.

Under the present circumstances of England however—more tranquil though more dangerous—it is our business, not to pooh-pooh Dr. Mivart's theories, but to refute them. In order to do this, we must begin with the union of two hypotheses. We must suppose (1) that a vigorous atheistic

propagandism, such as we have been suggesting, is set on foot among the masses, by the ablest and most influential adherents of the party. And we must suppose (2) that the law interposed no obstacle to the free course and action of this propagandism.

At some given epoch then—such is to be our supposition—the ablest and most influential atheists of the day devote themselves, in concert and in right-down earnest, to the task of diffusing among the English people a conviction, that no such verities are cognizable as the existence of God or of virtuousness; that the notion of moral elevation or degradation, as characterizing one or other type of character, is a pure illusion, to which no objective truth corresponds; that each man's one reasonable pursuit on earth is to get for himself as much comfort and enjoyment as he can. It is not a merely speculative and verbal acceptance of this doctrine, that they desire to secure. By every available machinery,—of popular catechism or essay and of public addresses and of private conversation,—they labour so to indoctrinate Englishmen, that these shall carry out the doctrine into every detail of practical application. Nor indeed can any one deny, that there is a very powerful element of human nature, to which such teaching would appeal with great promise of success. We are further to suppose, that the atheistical leaders are permitted to prosecute their enterprise, without let or hindrance from the law; and we are then to aim at presenting some faint sketch at least of the inevitable result. If the few following paragraphs impress our readers as intensely unreal and chimerical, we adduce that fact as conclusive in our own favour. The details we are going to give will appear so intensely unreal and chimerical, precisely because the supposition itself is so intensely unreal and chimerical, that the Government would follow Dr. Mivart's prescription, and allow the plague a free and unfettered course. We may add also, that our purpose requires us to speak openly and undisguisedly of matters, which are generally far better kept in the background. We have only a choice of evils. And we think it far better that a certain violence be done to Christian delicacy of sentiment, than that inquirers should fail to realize the hideous character which atheism must display, if left to the unchecked development of its intrinsic tendencies.

We will submit our picture, under two only of its manifold aspects. And firstly, as to those lower animal impulses, which occupy so very influential a place in man's organization. Let any man—say e.g. in humble life—learn to accept and realize the tenet, that his only reasonable pursuit on earth is to obtain



the greatest quantity he can of pleasure;—that the Moral Voice is a delusion;—that there is no Supreme Being to whom he is accountable;—that there is absolutely nothing to hope or fear beyond the grave;—what inference will he inevitably draw? And we may add by the way that, if he is himself slow in drawing the legitimate inference, his teachers will not be backward in stimulating, what is at once the legitimate operation of his reason, and the acceptable suggestion of his passions. The disciples of this teaching then will practise unscrupulous sensuality, limited only by a well-devised and cleverly-adjusted regard to the interests of ultimate gratification. They will account a female e.g. who leads a life of well-calculated licentiousness, not only as in no way degraded, but as emphatically fulfilling the end of her existence. This view of things will rapidly spread. As things are now, there is rivalry in many a country parish between Anglicans and Dissenters. Under the new régime, there will be a third candidate for popular favour. In such parishes there will be created what we may call the carnal synagogue; the place where those persons meet and encourage each other by mutual sympathy, who have no other end of life except to maximize their own enjoyment, and who flock to be taught by the ministers of their (ir)religion how this result can best be attained. As time advances—on one hand the lower part of their nature will be more unreservedly in the ascendant; while on the other hand the art of carnal living will be more scientifically mastered and apprehended. As Dr. Mivart himself suggests, a revival of heathen abominations will come into fashion and grow; while the very existence of the family will be largely rendered impossible, by the toleration of incest. All the black sheep in every household will enrol themselves in the nearest carnal synagogue, and protect themselves against the reprobation of right-minded men by each other's countenance and assistance. England, throughout her length and breadth, will be distracted by her division between two mutually hostile camps; the camp of God and the camp of Belial.

Next come a different class of offences. If there is no existence beyond the grave—and if it is every one's business simply to promote his own enjoyment—what reason is there for attaching importance to *human life*? Why should a woman trouble herself with the labour and anxiety so often involved in having children, when she can so easily put an end to them either before or after their birth? Why should any one endure the torments of agonizing disease or the anguish of hopeless penury, when "he himself might his quietus make with a bare bodkin"? Why should I inflict on myself the



intolerable annoyance and self-sacrifice of tending the old and the hopelessly sick, when their painless extinction is so much more comfortable both for them and me? These various inferences—we know on Dr. Mivart's authority—have already been deduced by the atheistic philosophy from its premisses. And such notions—even if they did not occur to the neophyte—would be diligently inculcated by the able and experienced professors and preachers of carnal-mindedness.

Dr. Mivart's proposal, be it observed, is this. Such thinkers as we have described shall be placed on precisely the same footing with the rest of the community, as regards every possible facility for disseminating their opinions. They shall be permitted to found and support schools, wherein children of both sexes shall be taught (perhaps in mutual companionship) that God, duty, purity, the sacredness of human life are antiquated superstitions; and wherein they shall be carefully trained in the cleverest methods hitherto devised by science, for the purpose of regulating enjoyment so prudently as to maximize its degree and duration. The immoral atheist, who bequeaths some large legacy for the purpose of propagating his hideous creed, shall have his intentions as sacredly respected, as though they had been for the highest ends of religion and charity. Teachers in a state school shall be forbidden under stringent penalties from uttering a word of instruction, which may imply the excellence of self-restraint and self-sacrifice; or which may suggest any preference for religion over atheism, for purity over licentiousness.

Then at last—whatever Dr. Mivart may wish—the law cannot be *absolutely* neutral. A person who thinks it permissible to murder the old and the infirm, will under particular circumstances account this his one "conscientious" course. But either the law must protect the lives of the old and infirm, or it must renounce the pretence of protecting them. In either case, how can Dr. Mivart say that dissentients enjoy "liberty of conscience"? If the law avowedly declines to punish murderers of the old and infirm—we need not fill up the apostrophe. If the law does take them in hand, it perpetrates the inexcusable offence, of persecuting those who follow the dictates of their conscience.\*

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\* Dr. Mivart indeed might reply with much justice on this last head, that these wretches do not elicit acts of conscience at all, in the sense in which a Theist elicits them. We suggested this consideration in July (p. 27); and we urged accordingly that the argument, based by Dr. Mivart on the sacredness of conscience, can have no possible application to the case of atheists. Dr. Mivart (p. 566) repudiates our remark, though without giving reasons for his repudiation.

Dr. Mivart thinks that the State's concession of unlimited doctrinal liberty—such liberty as we have attempted to describe in the preceding paragraphs—may probably be God's providential arrangement, for raising mankind into a far higher condition of religion and morality, than has hitherto been known on the face of the earth.\* We must be allowed on our side to hold, that it would involve a horrible and internecine conflict, absolutely unparalleled in any time or place, absolutely unknown in history;† and that very speedily the whole fabric of society must crumble under its pressure. Some energetic despot would in due course step forward to the relief of suffering humanity; and would re-establish order,—as by other methods,—so in particular by peremptorily repressing the atheistic propagandism.

To say that the law cannot without injustice interfere from the first to arrest this foul movement, is (we must take leave to say) unspeakably absurd on the face of it. All sober-minded persons would regard any such conclusion, as the *reductio ad absurdum* of any principle, from which such a conclusion could legitimately be deduced. As we have already mentioned, we are not here writing methodically on the origin and rights of civil society, but only saying so much as is necessary for our reply to Dr. Mivart. We will not here then attempt any general discussion of the question, what those acts are which the State can justly punish. We will only point out, that all the answers which have been given to this question would (assuming the truth of Theism) include, among such punishable acts, the attempt to indoctrinate a population with atheistical tenets. Some say that the civil ruler can justly punish, whatever directly and urgently tends to the dissolution of society: but nothing (as we have seen) tends more directly and urgently to the dissolution of society, than any popular acceptance of atheism. Others say—as e.g. Montalembert—that it is the State's duty to conserve the Natural Law: but to propagate

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\* "Though it is extremely unlikely that my ideal should ever be fully realized, yet I regard the eighteen centuries of the Christian past as but a very brief period. It may not be impossible therefore, that in but a very few thousand years to come the mass of citizens will be . . . wonderfully improved ethically" (p. 563). "We may even now see how the movement" towards absolute doctrinal liberty "can hereafter result in a development of Christianity, such as the world has not seen" (p. 565).

† As Catholics have often pointed out, the early Fathers, living in the midst of polytheistic populations, declared nevertheless—speaking of what was before their eyes—that the knowledge of God was found established in the mass of men; or, in other words, that it was really present, veiled under the forms of polytheism.

atheism, is of course to assail the Natural Law at its very foundation. We entirely agree with both the above statements; but there is a third aspect of the matter, on which we here prefer to insist.

It is very manifest, that the enormous majority of mankind are utterly and grotesquely unable to estimate for themselves the value of those arguments which philosophers adduce, for and against the cognizableness of God's Existence; to weigh the reasonings of S. Thomas and Suarez, or again of Kant and Hamilton, against those of Hegel and Hume and Huxley. One of two alternative conclusions inevitably follows from this manifest truth. Either the enormous majority of mankind are unable reasonably to have a firm belief in God; or else the reasoning, on which their conviction of His Existence rests, is entirely implicit in its character. Catholics of course, and (we suppose) Theists in general, hold most earnestly the latter alternative.\* God implants in all adults, through the latent operation of their reason, a certain and most intimate knowledge of Himself. Doubtless He has left them the miserable power of stifling that knowledge by their own sin; and external temptations may easily be offered to that sin, as to a thousand others. Any one therefore, who presents a process of atheistic reasoning to the mind of humble and simple Theists, is absolutely without excuse. Even from his own point of view, he is placing before them a course of argument, on the merits of which they are ludicrously incapable of forming any reasonable judgment. But from the Theist's point of view—which of course is Dr. Mivart's—he is as simply tempting them to sin, as though he placed before them licentious pictures for the purpose of inflaming their passions. Indeed he is tempting them very far more wickedly in this case than in the other, inasmuch as atheism is a very far graver sin than impurity.

Now in our humble judgment—as we said last April, pp. 359, 360—the State's immediate primary end is the conservation of those rights, which on the one hand God has conferred on mankind, while on the other hand they cannot be secured except by some authority having irresistible physical force at its command. We suppose Dr. Mivart will admit—though it is really very difficult to say what he may *not* refuse to admit—that the State should put down those licen-

\* "S. Paul does not treat the existence of God as a discovery, or as a scientific result, or as a consequence of premisses more certain than itself, but as a truth written on the face of nature antecedent to all sciences; and he declares those to be inexcusable who do not believe."—Cardinal Manning's Sermon "*Dominus illuminatio mea*," p. 14.

tious pictures or other publications, to which we have just referred. Yet on what ground can he consistently admit this? How can he argue that the people should be protected indeed by the State against temptations to impurity,—but not against those more disastrous temptations, which solicit to that far more grievous sin the denial of God? Again. If God have conferred on men a right to the peaceful possession of their property and their good name,—how is their right less undeniable to the peaceful possession of that indefinitely more precious possession, the divinely implanted knowledge of God Himself? And if this *be* their right,—it is plainly one of those rights (to repeat our former words) “which cannot be secured to men, except by some authority having irresistible force at its command.” A civil ruler, who should protect indeed earthly treasures but refuse protection to heavenly, could only be compared with a physician, who should sedulously tend those ailments which affect the patient’s extremities, while he does nothing to arrest a disease which is threatening the very life.

We do not of course forget, that great judgment and caution are necessary in reducing such principles to practice. If fearful evil may arise from the State doing less than is required, serious evil may also arise from its doing more than is prudent. There may here and there be feeble attempts at irreligious proselytism, which nevertheless it will be much wiser to disregard; because, the visiting them with severity might raise them to undue importance, or might fail to carry with it the sympathy of the nation.\* Indeed it is of the utmost importance (as we urged in July) that whatever is done, should be done in accordance with the national sentiment. For this reason—as well as for others—if any crisis should arrive, it would be a sacred duty for religiously-minded citizens to enlighten the public mind, on the full detestableness of this or that given irreligious tenet; or (as we expressed it in July, p. 32) to “stimulate and inflame” by every legitimate means “the existent national hatred of atheism.” Even before any crisis arises—even at this present moment—the fearful spread of atheism among philosophical thinkers should be far more practically taken to heart than it is. Dr. Mivart himself has done most important service towards “stimulating and inflaming the existent national hatred of atheism,” by pointing out, in his “Lessons from Nature,” how intimately connected is the atheistic tenet with extremest and

\* Dr. Mivart himself testifies (“Lessons from Nature,” pp. 406, 410) that as yet antitheists constitute in England but a “small” or “very inconsiderable” sect.

foulest immorality. And if this intense hatred of atheism were vigorously excited in the multitude of every rank who otherwise give little heed to the march of speculative thought,—practical results of very great importance would probably ensue. The vital cause of denominational education would receive vast additional strength and support, because the deplorable results of predominantly secular teaching would be apprehended with vastly greater vividness. In the last session of Parliament a certain small step was taken in the right direction.\* But indefinitely more progress could be made in that direction, if pious Christians would apply themselves earnestly and systematically to the task, of exhibiting before Englishmen that atheism with which they are threatened, in its genuine colours of odiousness and repulsiveness.

Now how will Dr. Mivart reply to all this? Firstly of course he will allege his two fundamental axioms, based respectively on the inviolability of conscience and on the rights of the individual citizen. But as regards these, we have already (we trust) abundantly exposed the fallaciousness of his reasoning. Next we may cite the following sentence from p. 566: a sentence which, as coming from a Catholic, suggests more than one exquisitely painful reflection.

As to the proselytizers of antitheistic sects, of which I suppose my friend (if he will allow me to call him so) Mr. F. Harrison may be taken as a type, I certainly should not dream of seeking to inflame the passions of an ignorant populace to "clamour for his total repression."

Our acquaintance with Mr. Harrison's writings and history is very imperfect, and we decline without further knowledge to stigmatize him as "the proselytizer of an antitheistic sect." As we have already explained,—we do not wish Englishmen to "clamour for the repression" of any one who may advocate atheism, so long as that advocacy is exclusively addressed to *philosophically cultured men*. But there are two particulars in the above sentence, to which, with whatever reluctance, we must solicit our readers' attention. Firstly, those most holy emotions—zeal for God's glory and indignation against impiety—are described by Dr. Mivart as "the passions of an ignorant populace." Such language might be appropriately applied e.g. to the frantic and bloodthirsty ravings of the multitude under the Reign of Terror, but is simply astounding in Dr. Mivart's context. When the Catholic laity clamoured against the blasphemy of some Arian teacher, we suppose Dr. Mivart would have discerned in such clamour nothing

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\* In our next number we hope to exhibit in detail the advantages gained by the recent ministerial measure of education.

more respectable, than "the passions of an ignorant populace." Secondly, and still more curiously, Dr. Mivart entirely inverts the position of those two parties whom he places in juxtaposition. He writes as though the Theists were the advocates of "ignorance," and the atheist of knowledge. The children of light passionately oppose the Apostle of darkness; and Dr. Mivart seems to represent the conflict, as the resistance of popular bigotry against philosophical illumination.\*

Further, Dr. Mivart complains (p. 560), that our language "puts weapons into the hands of those who oppose Theism, and renders a tolerant and humanitarian atheism in this respect relatively attractive." "The latter system" he adds "at least presents us with an ideal of men who, as the sport of an inscrutable power they cannot revere, at least cling together with fraternal tenderness, and do all they can to alleviate the common sufferings of life." These sentences might at first sight be understood as meaning, that atheists are as such "tolerant and humanitarian"; that their great aim is "to alleviate the common sufferings of life"; that they experience keen regret, at being unable to find ground for belief in some holy Creator, who should be to them an object of reverence. But such cannot possibly be his meaning. As we have seen, he had expressly testified that "the tendency" of the atheistic "movement is to approach little by little to the worst phase of paganism"; and had mentioned, as special instances of that tendency, the advocacy already existent of free love and occasional murder. So far as any individual atheist is out of harmony with this spirit,—we heartily admit that very many are as yet entirely out of harmony with it—this is only because he does not as yet practically realize his own doctrine. Now those can hardly lay claim to great "fraternal tenderness," who advocate the murder of their sick brethren; and even if they "alleviate the common sufferings of life" by the practice of free

\* We are bound emphatically to state, that Dr. Mivart's tone in his other works is diametrically opposed to this. Take one instance out of a thousand. In his "Lessons from Nature" (p. 380) occurs this noble remark: "If there is such a thing as morality, it is beyond comparison as to value with mere intellectual culture or capacity: and it necessarily follows, that a poor paralyzed old woman sitting in a chimney corner may, by her good aspirations and volitions, be repeatedly performing mental acts, compared with which the discovery by Newton of the law of gravitation is as nothing."

It is curious how often those who are defending (reasonably or unreasonably) the civil tolerance of this or that religious error, are led at the moment to forget the heinousness of such error. In the present paper e.g. Dr. Mivart declares (p. 559) that he "execrates without reserve Marian persecutions . . . and all similar acts"; but he entirely omits to state that he "execrates" heresy or even atheism.



love, this is no very attractive exhibition. As to any spirit of tolerance, Dr. Mivart ("Lessons from Nature," p. 400) dwells on "the natural and *necessary* alliance between atheism and the most extreme and hardest form of despotism." Moreover he had stated (ib. p. 397) that "the writings of recent or existing physical teachers contain enough to warn the world to prepare in time for the advent of an *atheistic persecution*"; and had proceeded to prosecute that theme at some length.

The only interpretation then, which we can give to the passage we have quoted, is this. Dr. Mivart, we suppose, means to say, that our language "puts weapons into the hands of those who oppose Theism," inasmuch as it gives them a superficial pretext for arrogating to themselves a superiority over Theists, which they do not really possess; for falsely representing, that atheists as such abound in charity towards each other, and in toleration towards Theists. In other words Dr. Mivart fears that moderate men may be shaken in their Theistic convictions, if they come to think that atheists are unjustly and savagely assailed. But if there *be* persons so shallow and thoughtless as to suppose that there can ever be peace between Theism and atheism when the two receive their legitimate development—we shall have done good service in waking them betimes from their dream. Such a dream is not foolish only, but full of fatal peril; as paralyzing the energy which every sincere Theist should put forth to the uttermost against those deadly and irreconcilable foes, who are aiming at the destruction of all which to him renders life endurable.

Lastly (p. 562), Dr. Mivart thinks that our doctrine "justifies Prince Bismarck and every other no-Popery zealot." We should say precisely the reverse. According to Dr. Mivart, Catholics cannot argue successfully against Bismarck, unless they are prepared to admit, that the State would act tyrannically and unjustly by silencing the advocates of free love and occasional murder. Is it the *assailants* or rather the *defenders* of Prince Bismarck, who would make capital out of such a position as this?

There are one or two other objections brought forward by Dr. Mivart. But these are levelled more directly against that *further* doctrine of ours, which concerns the due relation of Church and State; and they cannot therefore be treated at this stage of our exposition.

Dr. Mivart's view on the matters we have hitherto treated, taken as a whole, is remarkable enough. Certain atheists have developed their doctrine to its legitimate issue, by maintaining that free love and murder of the sick and old are on



occasion laudable practices. According to Dr. Mivart, (1) the State in modern times would act tyrannically, if it threw any impediment in the way of these men most freely advocating their tenet; (2) any Catholic, who thinks otherwise, is an extreme person, given to wild words, fond of overbearing deeds, recklessly involving his brother Catholics in the odium which he himself most justly deserves; (3) if Catholics in general agreed with such a thinker, they would richly deserve all that Bismarck inflicts. It may seem almost superfluous, to have argued gravely against such a position as this.

Our argument naturally divides itself into two parts. We have to speak (1) on that repression of error, which the State should practise under existent circumstances; and (2) on that which it should practise, where Catholic unity has been preserved. Before we proceed however to the latter case, a few more remarks are necessary to explain our general thesis.

And firstly we must mention, that by an accidental oversight we failed to express in July (p. 20) with entire accuracy all which we intended, by saying that "one momentous constituent of a nation's well-being is the extent of the true ethical basis on which its constitution rests." Our meaning indeed was very obvious: but it is better to point out expressly, that there are two different senses, in which some given moral or religious doctrine is part of a State's ethical basis. Very often laws proceed on the assumption that some doctrine is true, while nevertheless all citizens have full liberty to propagate (if they can) the contradictory of that doctrine. For instance, English legislation has of late proceeded on the assumption, that the divorce of Christians for adultery is morally permissible; and again on the assumption, that a predominantly secular education of the poor is beneficial. On the other hand it has long proceeded on the assumption, that the slave-trade is an abominable sin. Any one of these principles is part of the "ethical basis" on which English legislation now proceeds; yet every one is at liberty to propagate the opinion, that such principle is false and dangerous. As it is desirable to mark the distinction which we are here setting forth by some kind of technical name,—we will say that doctrines, so circumstanced as we have just described, are "assumed" indeed by the State, but not "protected" by it. And without speaking at the moment of "protected" doctrines—it is plain that the State suffers great detriment, so far as the doctrines "assumed" in its legislation are false; and that it derives great advantage,

so far as they are true. We will take for granted that, as regards this subordinate part of our thesis, there is no difference between Dr. Mivart and ourselves.

But over and above these doctrines "assumed" by the State,—there are one or two others, which England (not here to speak of other nations) would on occasion indubitably "protect": or in other words, the acceptance of which she in such sense identifies with her essential well-being, that she would at once repress any proselytism directed against them. We gave an instance in July, in reference to any attempt at *communistic* proselytism:—

The sovereign (it does not here concern us whether the sovereignty reside in one individual or more) is convinced, that his people's highest interest is indissolubly bound up with the institution of property. Suddenly, from some accidental cause, the tenet of communism springs up to quite a new degree of vitality; it is found infecting men in all directions; certain citizens are beginning a most effective course of combined action, with the view of spreading the conviction that, as Proudhon tersely said, "property is robbery." Every moment, during which their machinations are allowed free scope, increases the danger. By multitudes already theft is accounted a sacred duty; just as many a "patriot" has accounted it a sacred duty to rise in insurrection against those whom he accounts oppressors of his country. And the time seems close at hand, when society will be convulsed from its very foundations (p. 19, 20).

Under such circumstances, what would the English Government feel must be done?

All this communistic combination and public expression of communism must be summarily put down. Communistic meetings, the circulation of communistic tracts, the education of children in communistic principles, must be stringently prohibited; and if imprisonment and other penalties be necessary to enforce the prohibition,—the Government would basely fail of its duty, did it omit to impose those penalties in the full extent demanded by the crisis. A far-seeing and energetic civil ruler will wage war against communism, in the very same spirit in which some pious mediæval sovereign waged war against the special heresy of his time\* (p. 20).

Similarly let us suppose some most grave continental complication, in which the very continued existence of England depends on her putting forth her military strength in its most vigorous and concentrated shape. At this moment an active

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\* Dr. Mivart thinks (p. 567) that, under this pressure of communism, "safety" would be found "in the open air of liberty and free discussion." Few persons except himself can think this now: and we do not believe he would think it, if the circumstances arose; if he lived in presence of an aggressive, rapidly-spreading sect, animated by the conviction that theft is a sacred duty.

proselytism is inaugurated, and threatens to spread widely and influentially, in favour of the tenet that *war* is prohibited by Christianity and sound morality. Already the obtaining of military recruits is most seriously interfered with by the progress of this new sect. Measures of promptest and most stringent repression would be clamorously demanded by the nation at large, and hurriedly enacted by Parliament.

These two illustrations sufficiently show, how complete a mistake it is to think (as some persons really seem to think) that the principle of "protecting" doctrines is peculiar to the middle ages, or to such modern Catholic countries as Spain. No State can possibly preserve its own existence, except by acting on this principle: though of course the application of such principle is indefinitely different, according to differences of time and circumstance. We will say no more on the two doctrines we have named, viz. the right of property and the lawfulness of war. But for more than one reason, we shall speak at greater length of another matter, viz. monogamy.

Suppose some phase of Mormonism were to present a really aggressive and formidable front in England. In every quarter men are starting up—each with his two or three wives—claiming for those wives the full recognition of society as for respectable women; and endeavouring to stimulate the popular mind, against the "harsh and cruel" doctrine of monogamy. A vigorous proselytism is carried on by every available machinery, and with menacing effect. The sound part of the nation would at once supplicate the Government to protect the cause of morality; and most assuredly would not supplicate in vain. There are two grievous evils, from which England would be saved by such protective and coercive measures. She would be saved from that grievous internecine conflict which must result, if citizens found themselves divided on a large scale into two opposite camps, on so very fundamental a constituent of society. Still more importantly, she would be saved from that debasement and degradation of character which must ensue, if the national mind were no longer penetrated to the core by that standard of moral purity, which is practically engendered by the monogamistic doctrine. In the present state of things, that standard is woven into the very texture of Englishmen's natural and instinctive convictions. But this could no longer possibly be the case, if polygamy were admitted within the pale of social toleration, and if the alternative between it and monogamy were treated as an open question. Grievous indeed would be the calamity, if such proselytism were permitted; though we need hardly add that there is no immediate

fear of that calamity, in the present comparatively healthy state of English public opinion.

But now let us make a further hypothesis. Whether the fact arise from some deep corruption of national character hitherto latent, or from a deplorable absence of sufficient vigour in coercive measures,—at all events the fact (we are to suppose) does occur, that these measures fail of their purpose. The new tenet takes root among Englishmen, and by degrees asserts its place as importantly colouring English public opinion. The wife of a polygamist is no longer separated by an impassable barrier from respectable society, and the more sound-minded find it a hopeless task to contend longer for the maintenance of the earlier social standard. There may reasonably be much difference of opinion, as to the precise moment at which such a period arrives; but when it manifestly and undeniably *has* arrived, then the coercive laws not only are no longer beneficial, but have become an unmixed evil. We have mentioned two principal purposes, which they originally served. They no longer promote the *first* of these purposes: because—whatever be the internecine conflict necessarily resulting from the fact, that citizens are now largely divided into two opposite camps on so very fundamental a constituent of society—such conflict is now inevitable, and those laws cannot avert it. Neither do they longer fulfil their second and still more momentous function: because that degradation and debasement of character, which they were designed to avert, has already befallen the hapless nation. These laws therefore are exclusively mischievous, in that degraded condition to which the State has fallen. They perpetuate civil discord, heart-burning, disaffection to authority, while they subserve no one useful purpose.

We wish to fix Dr. Mivart's attention on this remark. There is not any approach to inconsistency (though he thinks there is) in the position which we assume. We do not speak at all inconsistently,—if we say on one hand, that the civil ruler does inestimable service by "protecting" this or that doctrine, which has full possession of the national mind; while nevertheless we say on the other hand, that he may inflict grievous injury if he attempts to "protect" the very same doctrine, when it has *not* full possession of the national mind. We do not of course deny, that there may be some tenets so absolutely subversive of society, that they must be exterminated—whatever evils may attend such extermination—on pain of the nation ceasing as a nation to exist. Such a tenet (as we have already said) is atheism. Perhaps some extreme forms of

communism may be in the same category. But the permissibility of polygamy is certainly not such a tenet. A nation partially polygamous can preserve existence, though in some most important respects such existence is sickly. And what we would here point out is this. We hold, as we have said, that any attempt at polygamistic proselytism in a monogamistic nation should be forcibly repressed. Again we hold that, in the mediæval period, any attempt at *heretical* proselytism was with great wisdom and justice—or rather as a matter of actual obligation—forcibly repressed. But it does not tend ever so remotely to follow from this our view,—as Dr. Mivart thinks it does (p. 559),—that we desire *under existent circumstances* the forcible repression of “all other heresies,” including “popular Protestantism.” Dr. Mivart admits (p. 557, note) that we expressed ourselves clearly on this head, but thinks our view “illogical and inconsistent.” We see in it no kind of inconsistency. We explained just now that, if polygamistic doctrine once took root among Englishmen, the attempt at its forcible repression would be an unmixed evil. And in like manner we feel from the bottom of our heart, that in any country where non-Catholic doctrine has fully and deeply taken root, nothing but omnigenous mischief could result from the attempt to repress it by civil penalties, however superior in numbers and strength Catholics might happen to be.

But then on the other hand, the calamity, inflicted on a State once Catholic by losing its unity of faith, is to our mind simply incalculable. In July we adduced, as illustrating this calamity, the grievous misfortune which would befall England, on the hypothesis we have just been supposing; on the hypothesis of Englishmen losing their firm grasp of monogamistic doctrine. These were our words.

Now let us, merely by way of illustration, suppose the purely hypothetical case, that these [lax] doctrines [concerning marriage] came to obtain continually increased acceptance in Protestant England, till they possessed a great majority of the people. As such a process went on, many a Protestant (we may reasonably infer) would take refuge in the one ark of salvation: still Catholics (we will suppose) continue to constitute but a comparatively small part of the population; and mix with externs, and read non-Catholic newspapers or light literature, just as at present. We need hardly say how grievous is the calamity in which they would be thus involved. Consider for a moment the effect of freely mixing with and visiting at their homes those, whose family life reposes on some basis different from that of monogamy: consider the effect of this on Catholic maidens; on Catholic youths; in other words, on those who in due course will become parents and educators. Consider, again, the effect on Catholics of a whole abundant literature and circumambient social atmosphere, in

which monogamy is not otherwise treated, than as a contemptible superstition of the past; condemned, derided, laughed at, just as men now laugh at the practice of taking the discipline, or at the various details of monastic life (p. 16).

Dr. Mivart,—who is opposed to the State's "protection" of monogamistic doctrine,—replies (p. 566), that under such circumstances "it is difficult to see why Christians should be less able to hold their own in this matter now, than during the first three centuries, when they were certainly not deficient in virtue." He could not easily have devised an argument more fatal to his own position. Not only the whole course of our reasoning implied, but we expressly stated, that we supposed the case of Catholics mixing with polygamists, as freely as they now mix with ordinary Protestants. Was this, or anything like this, the relation between heathens and primitive Christians? Notoriously the two classes were separated by an impassable social barrier. The one prominent cause of that barrier was the then prevalent idolatry; and the then prevalent idolatry was indissolubly connected, or rather actually identified, with the very particular here in question, the then prevalent sexual licentiousness.\* Isolation from the general community was felt by Christians to be their only reliable barrier, against proximate occasions of sin. Perhaps it was natural that Dr. Mivart should fail for the moment to realize how deep was the social chasm between Christians and heathens; because certainly his own language towards con-

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\* We have space for only a few words on a large subject; a subject indeed, which the present writer is very far from having sufficient historical knowledge to treat duly. But take the two following quotations, from Gibbon's well-known fifteenth chapter. "It was the first but arduous duty of a Christian to preserve himself pure and undefiled from the practice of idolatry. . . The innumerable deities and rites of polytheism were closely interwoven with every circumstance of business or pleasure, of public or private life, and it seemed impossible to escape the observance of them, without renouncing the commerce of mankind and all the offices and amusements of society." "The serious and sequestered life" of Christians "inured them to the sober and domestic virtues. . . The contempt of the world exercised them in the habits of humility, meekness, and patience. The more they were persecuted, the more closely they adhered to each other." And on the other hand it is well known, that when persecution was for a time relaxed, very many Christians largely imbibed the heathen contagion, and very many prepared themselves for subsequent apostasy. As to the connection of idolatry with licentiousness, take the following from F. Newman's "Callista." If "you were determined to reject all the appliances and objects of idolatry," "you would rejoice that it was night when you arrived there; and in particular, that darkness swallowed up other appliances and objects of pagan worship, which to darkness were due by a peculiar title, and by darkness were best shrouded" (Edition of 1873, p. 40).



temporary atheists is couched in a very different spirit. A Christian of the first three centuries would not have "borne most willing testimony to the self-denying philanthropy and purity of life of" certain Pagans (Mivart, p. 555); nor proclaimed himself as "looking up" to them "with sincere admiration" (p. 556); nor seemed to compare favourably their "tolerant humanitarianism" with the intolerance of his brother Catholics (p. 561); nor hoped that prominent enemies of Christianity "would allow him to call them his friends" (p. 566).\*

Very different from this was the conduct of zealous Christians. They "held their own," precisely by standing aloof from heathens; and those weaker spirits, who were less energetic in standing aloof, did *not* "hold their own." Indeed the permanent political and social amalgamation of Christians with heathens was more simply impossible, than that of monogamists with polygamists. A nation, consisting of monogamists and polygamists living in the relation of social equality, might (as we said just now) preserve its existence. But a nation, consisting of Christians and heathens living permanently in such relation of equality, would be an impossibility. The struggle in those early ages was, whether Christianity should on the one hand revolutionize the Empire, or on the other hand be itself repressed and gradually exterminated. Clear-sighted politicians, says F. Newman ("Callista," p. 70), "saw more and more clearly, that if Christianity were not to revolutionize the Empire, they must follow out the law of action which Trajan and Antonine had pointed out."

Dr. Mivart further replies to us as follows (p. 566): "If it should at any time happen" he says "that the social relations as to sex of Greece and Rome for a time reappear. . . . I should really expect that the prevailing licence would stimulate and intensify the feelings of those who remained Christians, in opposition to the more common practice of their day. And though of course many individuals would fall into habits which, under a system of severe sexual morality, they would avoid, nevertheless the state of the then existing moral atmosphere would render their actions less culpable as more excusable; and the amount of real virtue on the whole be no jot or tittle less. Moreover we should never forget that there would ultimately come into play the great effect of vigorous

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\* We should add, that in such language Dr. Mivart (we are most firmly persuaded) is as far as possible from representing the ordinary mental attitude of contemporary Catholics towards atheists. Indeed such language is very far indeed from representing Dr. Mivart's own ordinary mental attitude towards them. As we have already pointed out, his whole spirit and rhetoric in the "Lessons from Nature" is most different.

reaction" (p. 566). Such language shows only how entirely Dr. Mivart has failed to place before himself in the concrete, what is contained in his general propositions. On the same principle he might say, that no injury would be done to a piously-educated youth, by his mixing ever so freely with impure profligates. "The licence prevailing" around him "would stimulate and intensify his feelings in opposition" thereto; and "though of course" he might "fall into" bad "habits which," otherwise "he would avoid," "the state of the" surrounding "moral atmosphere would render his actions less culpable as more excusable, and the amount of his real virtue be on the whole no jot or tittle less. Moreover, there would ultimately come into play the great effect of vigorous reaction." What comment can be necessary on all this, in addressing Catholics?

And now one further remark,—and one to which we attach much importance—before we quit finally this illustration, drawn from monogamistic doctrine. There is no more healthy circumstance in the national life of England, than the spontaneous abhorrence of Englishmen against those debasing tenets, which would overthrow Christian family life. This abhorrence illustrates what we mean by saying, that at this moment the national sentiment is intensely monogamistic. We do not merely mean by this, that there is a monogamistic sentiment diffused through a large portion of the community,—but also that there is no opposite sentiment whatever. Nay, we mean more even than this. The monogamistic sentiment is not only (morally speaking) universal, but (thank God!) it is exclusive and intolerant; insomuch that, if any polygamistic proselytism were attempted, the execration of that proselytism and clamour for its forcible repression would be (morally speaking) universal, except among the proselytizers themselves. It is this very exclusiveness and intolerance of the sentiment, taken in connection with its universality, which makes the sentiment itself so unspeakably precious an element in English national life. And in like manner—so we earnestly maintain—it was the exclusiveness and intolerance of Catholic sentiment universally prevailing in the mediæval period, which gave to that period its special and unapproachable elevation. If pious English Protestants will reflect on what their own convictions and emotions would be in the presence of a polygamistic propaganda, they will far more clearly understand the phenomena of mediæval intolerance. They will apprehend better than they do, both what was the true character of that Catholic sentiment which characterized the

middle ages,—and also what is the true character of that *enthusiasm* for the middle ages, which is just now so rapidly advancing among thoughtful Catholics.

We are thus naturally landed in the final and crowning portion of our theme. Protestants, as we have just said, do not of course agree with us on the purely religious part of the question: but Dr. Mivart does thereon agree with us. In his view no less than in ours,—the one religion which Christ revealed is simply and precisely that religion which is taught by the Holy See and by the Bishops who are in communion with that See. A large number of persons, external to the Catholic Church, may be called Christians with much propriety, because they believe in our Lord's divine mission: but they are Christians in doctrine, only *so far as* they agree in doctrine with the Holy See. Mediæval society was profoundly penetrated with this truth. The degree of religious *excellence* prevalent in different times or places was of course indefinitely various; but the moral *standard* was one and the same. Belief in (what Catholics account) the one exclusively true body of Christian dogma was supernaturally woven into the very texture of men's instinctive convictions. Such a blessing was inappreciable. It would have been a kind of ingratitude and treachery to Jesus Christ Himself—we may almost say it would have exhibited the implicit spirit of apostasy—had the hideousness of sectarianism been permitted to sully the fair form of Catholic unity, had heresy been permitted to poison the pure air of Catholic truth. Whatever reason exists now for forbidding the propagation of polygamistic tenets, existed then in a degree one hundred times greater, for peremptorily suppressing all pullulation of revolt against the Church. So far is any apology from being needed for the then existent intolerance of heretics, that on the contrary an apology would be now needed for the mediæval Church—and would indeed not very easily be forthcoming,—had she tolerated the *neglect* of such intolerance. We refer of course to the *principle* of intolerance, and not to this or that practical excess with which such principle may from time to time have been carried out. And we need hardly add—though we will not dwell on this—that the same principle, which applied to mediæval Europe, applies in its measure to any contemporary country, such as Spain, in which Catholicity has still entire possession of the national mind.\* Such was the position which we assumed in

\* Dr. Mivart urges (p. 560) that a "large number of Spaniards are violent anti-Catholics," being either "deists or atheists." We suppose individual deists and atheists may not be comparatively very few, within that extremely small

July; and we have now to consider Dr. Mivart's view of that position.

But the preliminary inquiry is no very easy one, whether at last he agrees or disagrees with it. In the work which we were criticising, he said (p. 30) that the Church "asserts the legitimacy of the use of the sword for purposes of defence"; i.e. for the purpose of defending existent Catholic unity. And he had just expressed his conviction, that "the Christian Church ever officially respected the rights of conscience"; or in other words, that nothing, officially sanctioned by the Church of any period, could be justly accounted to violate the rights of conscience. We asked him in July (p. 24), how he reconciles this statement with his own doctrine concerning the rights of conscience and of individual citizens. On this head he makes an explanation in p. 557, which we must not fail to reproduce. "I am by no means clear," he says, "that even under the mediæval system religious persecution had a really good effect; while I am convinced that matters in which the conscience was concerned were most cruelly ignored, as also that grievous harm has come of it to the cause of morality and religion." Nevertheless,—since in p. 563 he refers to his original statement without professing in any respect to modify or retract it,—it would seem that his words of p. 557 should be interpreted accordantly with that statement. Nor is it difficult so to interpret them. He may easily be understood, as defending, indeed the general and broad principles of the mediæval legislation against heresy; but as expressing at the same time his opinion, that from time to time in particular places those principles were abused and perverted into what may truly be called persecution. If this be his meaning, we have no objection to make. No one has ever claimed, either for the middle or any other age of the Church, exemption from serious practical abuses.

How then does Dr. Mivart answer our question? How does he reconcile the mediæval Church's teaching and practical action with his own theories? His answer is this.

If once the population of a whole nation become sincerely and earnestly Catholic, the closest union between Church and State would follow as a matter of course, without such union inflicting injustice on any one; and of course the citizens of such a country could, without injustice, employ

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sphere, the educated class. But is not the *national mind* in Spain as unmixedly and intolerantly Catholic, as the national mind in England is unmixedly and intolerantly monogamistic? We do not think that Dr. Mivart or any one else will venture to answer this question in the negative. The whole course of recent Spanish politics irrefragably proves it.

the sword to resist the introduction of unwelcome principles from without (p. 563).

Now after many efforts, we find ourselves entirely unable to conjecture what Dr. Mivart can possibly mean by those last words, on which his whole argument turns,—“*from without.*” If we took them in their obvious sense, we should have to credit him with a truly amazing misconception of fact. We should have to understand him as supposing, that any given mediæval State punished *externs* indeed if they attempted to introduce heresy, but allowed to its own *citizens* the free right of doing so. Dr. Mivart of course knows, that nothing ever so distantly resembling this was the case: and we are still therefore left in our perplexity.

Whereas then we find ourselves unequal to the task of reconciling Dr. Mivart with himself on this particular—our only course is to credit him with that doctrine, which best harmonizes with the general drift of his paper. Now since he undeniably considers that the State would act tyrannically and unjustly if it punished the proselytizing advocates of free-love and occasional murder,—much more (we suppose) he must hold, that any mediæval State acted tyrannically and unjustly when it punished heretics. Yet, being a Catholic, surely he ought to account this a *reductio ad absurdum*: for he is obliged to hold, that the Church’s avowed and consistent usage of many centuries was in principle—not merely in occasional details—tyrannical and unjust.

Our readers will see, that our space warns us at this point to hurry towards a conclusion. We much regret this. We regret it however the less, because what we have already said will (we trust) have placed the meaning of our thesis in so full a light, that those objections of Dr. Mivart’s, which we have not yet expressly encountered, will hardly be felt as needing a reply. We will once more therefore state that thesis, making clearer the points on which Dr. Mivart has misunderstood it.

*Cæteris paribus*, we said, every State is more healthily and happily circumstanced, in proportion as the true ethical basis is larger, on which its constitution or legislation rests. Now there are two different senses, in which legislation may be said to rest on the basis of certain doctrines. Firstly the legislature may “assume” various doctrines as its own, and carry them into practice; without however prohibiting the freest discussion of their truth. Other doctrines however the State not only “assumes,” but “protects”; in such sense that no organized

attempt would be permitted, to disseminate among the people any disbelief of them. It is on the latter head, as we understand the matter, and not on the former, that Dr. Mivart dissents from us. What we maintain against him is this. Let it be supposed that one or other doctrine, importantly bearing on religion and morality, while cognizable as certainly true, is sanctioned in some given country by a national sentiment, which on the one hand is (morally speaking) universal, and on the other hand is exclusive and intolerant. Such national sentiment is an unspeakable national blessing. It is the State's august and sacred duty to preserve it securely inviolate against attack, and to put down with a strong hand any organized attempt to destroy its hold upon the people.

As we said at starting, we have not professed in our present article to put forth methodically and systematically an argumentative establishment of this thesis; or even to enter into such details, as may guard it from possible misconception.\* This task we have reserved for a future occasion. On that occasion we will treat, one by one, those adverse arguments adduced by Dr. Mivart, of which we are here obliged to omit the express consideration. They may be divided into two classes. In pp. 559, 560, 561, he alleges various evil consequences, as legitimately following from our thesis; while in pp. 564, 565, he argues that the blessing of Catholic unity is far less than we suppose.† We think (as we have said) that a reply to them all is implicitly contained in our preceding remarks; but he may reasonably claim at our hands their explicit treatment.

We must not however conclude our present article, without entering an earnest and emphatic protest against three broad principles of the gravest moment, interjected by Dr. Mivart (we may almost say) in the way of parenthesis. Either of these principles would require an article to itself for its satisfactory discussion, and we must perforce content ourselves with the very briefest indication of what we would say concerning them.

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\* There is one momentous consideration in particular, to be carefully borne in mind throughout, on which we have not found room to enlarge. We mean that the civil ruler, though he may know with absolute certainty the fundamental truths of natural religion, does not possess the gift of doctrinal infallibility.

† Dr. Mivart thinks (p. 558, note) that as a matter of experienced fact, religion is purer in those countries where toleration is more effectively practised. In our next article on the subject we shall maintain the direct opposite; we shall maintain that *facts* are more conclusively in our favour, even than *theory*. Meanwhile we refer our readers to F. Ramière's admirable remarks, translated in our number of last July, from p. 219 to p. 228.



1. "In the conditions of modern times, it is only in the bracing air of free religious opposition and controversy, that religious life can generally attain its full vigour" (p. 565). "In the open air of liberty and free discussion there is safety; it is by the closing down and shutting in of noxious exhalations from free access to atmospheric influences, that those malignant forces are generated which may decimate our citizens" (p. 567). Indeed? Take then some one individual of "our citizens." Let him be one of that incalculably preponderating majority, who are entirely destitute of leisure or ability for intellectual investigation; but one to whom (not the less on that account) the knowledge of those principles, which shall securely direct him to his true end, is an unspeakably more precious possession than any earthly treasure. Dr. Mivart thinks that this person's "safety" consists, in his being surrounded by every variety of religious and irreligious doctrine: in receiving indeed religious advice and exhortation from one set of men: but in being told with equal confidence by another set—who enforce their opinions moreover with much variety of sophistic plausibility—that no such verities are cognizable or presumable as the existence of God and of moral obligation; that prayer is a self-evident absurdity; that the only reasonable end of his life is to get as much enjoyment as he can out of it; and that the practice of free love will marvelously assist him towards this purpose.

Of course a figure of speech is no argument; but surely we can retort against Dr. Mivart even his own figure of speech. We would say then, that it is the fresh air of truth which alone is bracing; and that an atmosphere, tainted in various degrees with the malaria of error, will generate debility, or grievous malady, or death itself. The community, we would add, is more healthy, in proportion as "noxious exhalations" are confined underground; in proportion as they are carefully precluded all access to that upper air, which the mass of citizens breathe.

We must further point out that, if Dr. Mivart were consistent, it would not be the *civil toleration* of heresy and unbelief, but the *existence* of those fearful evils, which he would regard as generally necessary to the "full vigour of religious life." Of course he would shrink from such a notion with abhorrence; but surely it is involved in his principle.

2. "It seems to me," says the author (p. 565) "that a movement, which has continued uninterruptedly progressing for six hundred years and extending over the whole area of Christendom, in spite of the most persevering and zealous efforts of the most various kinds to reverse or repress it, can-

not by any but a Manichean be deemed other than one in the order of God's providence, and permitted for a wise and good end." No doubt every depravity, which has ever defiled the face of the earth, has been "permitted for a wise and good end." But Dr. Mivart evidently means, that the civil toleration of misbelief is a result which every Theist is bound to regard as beneficial, because for six hundred years there has been an unrepressed tendency in that direction. On the same principle surely, the disruption of Catholic unity, —accompanied as such disruption has been by the gradual growth of every religious and irreligious portent—would have to be regarded by all Theists as a blessing to mankind. The argumentative defence of Theism would become an arduous task indeed, if whoever undertakes it were required to maintain, that every tendency which has been unrepressed for six centuries has been a beneficial one. According to Dr. Mivart, if we rightly understand him, every Theist is bound to hold, that the movement of human society is always substantially a movement of genuine progress. S. Paul however says (2 Tim. iii. 1) that "in the last days perilous times shall be at hand," of which he proceeds to draw a very awful picture. Was *he* a Manichean and no Theist? Nay our Blessed Lord asks: "Shall the Son of Man when He comes find faith on the earth?" (Luke xviii. 8), implying that the truly faithful will then be very few.

3. But to our mind all Dr. Mivart's other errors put together are as nothing, compared with a statement implied by him in p. 564. He there says most truly, that "if authority and intuitive truth could and did come into collision . . . then authority would stultify itself." From this momentous verity, every rightly-instructed Catholic draws an obvious inference. Whenever a proposition is condemned by the Church, he knows at once with the certainty of faith, that what the said proposition expresses is not an intuitive truth, but on the contrary is a censurable error. Dr. Mivart's inference is very different; as those will see, who read the entire passage. He claims to decide *by his own private judgment*, that some given proposition expresses an intuitive truth; and he claims on that ground to abstain from even *inquiring*, whether the Church has or has not condemned it. On precisely the same principle, he might deny Transubstantiation.
- "It is an intuitive truth," he might say, "that a body cannot be in two places at once; and I will not therefore even ask the question, what Councils may pronounce to the contrary." Or the Blessed Trinity. "It is an intuitive truth, that there cannot be Three distinct Persons with but one

Individual Will: ergo, &c." Or Original Sin. "It is an intuitive truth, that one man cannot be justly punished for another's sin: ergo, &c." Where is this to end? We are as far as possible from wishing to use unnecessarily hard words, and we well know that Dr. Mivart's *intentions* are orthodox; but we do not see how we can say less, than that the principle which he implies involves *constructive heresy*. No doubt the case is easily supposable of some authority, which shall claim infallibility, and shall nevertheless teach some doctrine manifestly opposed to reason. But then the said authority is thereby convicted of imposture. Protestants, with perfect consistency, bring this very accusation against the Church; and by the very fact of bringing it, prove themselves to be (formal or material) heretics.

So much on these three broad principles; against which we must be here content with entering an earnest protest, but which we may possibly treat at greater length on some future occasion. As to Dr. Mivart's paper on the whole, it is in some sense the most painful composition we ever read: for we cannot call to mind any other, in which a writer, honestly full of loyal intentions towards the Church and the Holy See, has said so much that violates Catholic principle and grates on Catholic feeling. Our main comfort lies in the fact, that what he has now put forth evidently expresses his first impressions, rather than his deliberate and well-digested judgment. And we shall hail with great pleasure his next enterprise in that special direction, wherein he has already done such signal service, and wherein so much more of extreme moment remains a desideratum.

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Since the preceding was in type, an article by Mr. Goldwin Smith, on "The Ascent of Man," has appeared in the "Macmillan" of January. The readers of that article will see how fundamentally Mr. Smith differs from Catholics, both on matters of doctrine and as to the course of human events. But for that very reason it will be even more pertinent to cite Mr. Smith's concluding remarks, as importantly illustrating what we have said in our article, on the moral results of consistent atheism.

Materialism has in fact already begun to show its effects on human conduct and on society. They may perhaps be more visible in communities where social conduct depends greatly on individual conviction and motive, than in communities which are more ruled by tradition and bound together by strong class organizations; though the decay of morality will perhaps be

ultimately more complete and disastrous in the latter than in the former. God and future retribution being out of the question, it is difficult to see what can restrain the selfishness of an ordinary man, and induce him, in the absence of actual coercion, to sacrifice his personal desires to the public good. The service of Humanity is the sentiment of a refined mind conversant with history ; within no calculable time is it likely to overrule the passions and direct the conduct of the mass. And after all, without God or spirit, what is "Humanity" ? One school of science reckons a hundred and fifty different species of man. What is the bond of unity between all these species, and wherein consists the obligation to mutual love and help ? A zealous servant of science told Agassiz that the age of real civilization would have begun, when you could go out and shoot a man for scientific purposes ; and in the controversy respecting the Jamaica massacre we had proof enough, that the ascendancy of science and a strong sense of human brotherhood might be very different things. "Apparent diræ facies." We begin to perceive, looming through the mist, the lineaments of an epoch of selfishness compressed by a government of force.

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## ART. II.—SAINT JOSAPHAT, MARTYR OF CATHOLIC UNITY.

*Saint Josaphat, Archevêque de Polock, Martyr de l'Unité Catholique.* Par le R. P. Dom ALPHONSE GUÉPIN, Bénédictin de la Congrégation de France. Poitiers : Oudin, 1874.

**T**HERE are men, if indeed we should not rather call them angels, in whose life the history of a whole epoch is resumed, but the effect of whose actions extends far beyond it, and will be felt to the end of time. They have not led armies to the field, nor sat in the councils of nations, but neither warrior nor statesman has ever done, or could have done, for the glory of God and the highest interests of humanity, what they did. Heroes and rulers of men have had their own gifts, but they were of a lower order, and employed in the prosecution of lower aims. These aims were always limited to temporal concerns, and generally to the furtherance of personal ambition, and therefore they were contracted within the span of a single life, and were as ephemeral in their influence as they were puny in their conception. The mightiest achievements of such men left no permanent mark on the moral face of the world. It remained

what it was before they were born, as if they had never existed. A few cities were called by their name, a few monuments were raised to their memory. But their career had not enriched the world with a single truth, nor aided it to acquire a single virtue. It was too purely human. As a rule, their work died with them, and no one was found to perpetuate its unprofitable grandeur. When Alexander fell, his empire was a burden too heavy for a single heir, and lasted for a brief space only by being divided among many. It had no principle of life, because it was void of the supernatural. Great Rome of the Cæsars is only great at this hour because, as S. Columban said, "it is the Rome of the Popes and the Chair of Peter." Whatever does not proceed from nor tend to God hurries to swift oblivion. It is far otherwise with the works of those who were truly great because they did *His* work, and scorned to employ their incomparable gifts in any meaner toil. They had genius, but used it only to His glory and the manifestation of the highest truth; learning, but deemed only that knowledge precious which leads to Christ; valour and fortitude surpassing all human courage, but displayed it in accepting sacrifice and braving death. Of each of them it may be said, as S. Bernard said of one of his brethren whom he presented to Pope Eugenius, "Be sure, Holy Father, that whatever he is, he is full of the Holy Ghost." Called by the loving election of the Most High to do His work and not their own, they received the gifts which He imparts only to such chosen ministers of His will. What they say is but the echo of His creative voice; what they do, the creature's nearest approach to the perfections of the Creator. Their special mission is to bear witness to those eternal truths which God has revealed, and without which the soul of man cannot live, and most of all to those which the world refuses to learn. In one age it was the sacred mystery of the Incarnation, in another the Duality of Natures in the Person of the God-Man, in a third the true doctrine of the Sacraments, in a fourth the divine authority of the Church. Whatever dogma of the faith is denied, it is their sublime mission to proclaim. In later times the two truths which such men have been inspired by the Holy Ghost to announce, in spite of the clamour of the gainsayer and the prevaricator, have been the unity of the Church and the majesty of the Holy See. None have been more furiously assailed by the enemy, because none are dearer to God or more salutary to man. And therefore His omnipotent grace has fashioned in modern ages apostles and evangelists, prodigies of wisdom and sanctity, true heirs

of S. Cyril, S. Chrysostom, and S. Athanasius, whose special office it should be to witness in life and death to the supreme authority of the Apostolic Throne and the imperishable unity of the Catholic Church. Such a man, glorious in virtue and most dear to the Heart of Jesus, was S. Josaphat, Archbishop of Polock, who was slain by barbarous schismatics on the 12th of November, 1623, because he never ceased to admonish them, by the grace of God, of those two primary doctrines of the Christian religion, the necessity of communion with the Roman Church, and the sacred supremacy of the Roman Pontiff.

It is one of the glories of the Pontificate of Pius IX. to have presented this great servant of God to the veneration of the faithful. Beatified by Urban VIII., after the usual searching process, his Feast was kept for the first time on the 16th of May, 1643; but the prayers of his contemporaries, and the earnest supplications of the Church of Poland, were not finally accomplished till the 29th of June, 1867, when the Saint was canonized by the Pontiff now seated in the Chair of Peter. But why, it may be asked, does a learned member of the great Benedictine order, with immense labour and research, and aided by the indispensable co-operation of eminent Slavonic scholars, offer to the Church at this date the life of one whose career ended two hundred and fifty years ago? and why do we invite the attention of our readers to his narrative? The Benedictine would probably reply that, besides the intrinsic value of a life in which all the marvels of divine grace were visibly displayed, it was well to show to such a generation as ours what manner of men the Greek schism has formed, and what sublime combatants the Holy Spirit has summoned to oppose it. Our own reply to the same question is this. The story of S. Josaphat contains a lesson for all times, and especially for our own. In his day, as in ours, the world was divided into two camps,—the tents of unity, which are God's, on the one side, and the tents of division, which are Satan's, on the other. No man can read the life of S. Josaphat without seeing the condemnation of God upon the Greek schism. This was so well understood even by the Russian Government of our day, that its agents, as we shall notice more fully hereafter, vainly solicited Pius IX. not to issue the decree which numbered him with the saints, and gave to Poland a new advocate in the court of heaven, a new defender against the horrors of Muscovite despotism. The Russians understood that S. Josaphat was as formidable a witness against their pretended orthodoxy and their impious nationalism, as S. Ignatius of Constantinople, whom they still



profess to revere, was against the founder of their schism. It is by the mouth of saints, echoes on earth of truths proclaimed in heaven, that the judgments of God on schism have often been promulgated. When S. Catherine of Bologna, who walked with God as Adam did in paradise, and heard, like S. Paul, sounds which rarely fall on human ears, lifted up her supplication against the advancing Ottoman hosts, she was admonished by our Divine Lord that they were the appointed ministers of His vengeance against Greek perfidy and revolt, and that her petition, which traversed His judicial decree, could not be heard. "She foresaw," we read in the life of this admirable virgin, "the ruin and destruction of the Eastern Empire, and the taking of the city of Constantinople, for the which, while she prayed that the Christian Empire might not fall under the power of the Turk, she was admonished by God to leave her prayer for that end, and that for the sins and impieties of the Greeks that empire should be cut off from the Christian body; and the success of the Turks did manifestly declare that her prophecy was true."\* It was the appointed mission of S. Josaphat to announce the judgment of the Most High upon the same schismatics in a northern land, who have fallen under a despot more savage than the Turk, and a more unscrupulous oppressor of the Spouse of Christ. How he discharged that mission we shall now consider, until the hour when, like Isaias and Jeremias, he fell under the blows of the barbarians, to thousands of whom his life had not preached in vain, while his very murderers were finally converted by his death, with the blood of the martyr still dripping from their hands.

"Almost from the beginning," observes the Benedictine biographer of the saint, "there was a diversity between the churches of the East and the West in respect of rites, discipline, and the language of the divine office. In the East the Greek prevailed, in the West the Latin alone was employed; but this difference had no effect whatever on the unity of the Church. The East, like the West, confessed that the Bishop of Rome was the sole head of the Church,"—even Photius confessed it by soliciting from the Roman Pontiff the confirmation of his usurped dignity,—"*and that this incommunicable privilege came to him immediately from Jesus Christ through S. Peter, of whom he was the successor.*" All the Oriental Councils proclaimed it, and the habitual form in which the Greek and Oriental patriarchs expressed the autho-

\* The admirable "Life of the Holy Virgin S. Catherine of Bologna," p. 111 (1621).

city of the Apostolic Throne was the constantly-recurring phrase, "*by the sentence of the Lord.*" "At Alexandria for Egypt," continues Dom Guépin, "at Antioch for the East properly so called, at Ephesus, Heraclea, and Cæsarea, in Cappadocia for Asia, Thrace, and Pontus, sat Bishops placed above their brethren *as representatives of S. Peter*, and delegates of his power. . . . This organization of the Greek Churches dated from the time of the Apostles, and was recognized by the Œcumenical Council of Nicæa. No one had dared to dispute it before Constantine transferred the seat of empire to Byzantium; but from that moment the bishop of that city, a mere suffragan of Heraclea, aspired to the honours of the patriarchate."\* For centuries this ambitious project, though supported by the whole influence of the Byzantine emperor, of the senate, and of many Oriental bishops, was crushed by the reiterated censures of the heirs of Peter, to whose judgment Greek emperors and prelates submitted themselves; and as late as the time of S. Gregory the Great that Pontiff could say that, in spite of the increasing worldliness and sycophancy of the bishops of Byzantium, his apostolic authority was everywhere obeyed, and that "my brother of Constantinople admits it every day." But the decay of faith and virtue in the East, the multiplication of heresies, the growth of an antichristian nationalism, and the restless jealousy and hatred of the Latin world, finally carried the East into formal schism, of which the Turk has been God's avenger in the South, and the more brutal autocracy of the Tsar in the North. In both the Greek schism has been punished by that abject slavery, of soul and body, which is all the compensation the evil one has to give to those whom he persuades to renounce the Christian liberty to which obedience is the only title, and of which communion with the Chair of Peter is the eternal condition.

The lot of S. Josaphat was cast in a land to which the emissaries of the Greek schism had found their way. Muscovy and the Ukraine, both inhabited by lawless brigands, were already the home of fierce and cruel sectaries, whose nominal religion only furnished a new motive to their passions, and gave a keener edge to their ferocity. These savages had the same fanatical preference for what they had been taught to call "orthodoxy" as they now display, under the modern name of Russians, for its later equivalent, "tsarodoxy." In dealing with these ignorant barbarians, as with their more crafty but more corrupt teachers, S. Josaphat refuted them,

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\* "Saint Josaphat," *Introd.*, p. xxxv.

not only by the supernatural majesty of his life, but by arguments drawn from the history of religion in their own land, and by the formal teaching of their own liturgical books. The testimony of both was decisive. When Charlemagne had completed the conversion of Germany, a path was opened to the evangelists who sought an entrance into Slavonic lands. They were Latin missionaries who led the way. With the arrival of the monks Cyril and Methodius, both devout subjects of the Holy See, in the province of Moravia, began a new era for the Slavs. They composed an alphabet capable of rendering Slavonic sounds, translated the Scriptures, and even offered the Holy Mysteries in an idiom hitherto reputed barbarous. Returning to Rome to receive the blessing of the heir of Peter, Cyril died in that city, but Methodius was consecrated bishop by Adrian II., and the two brothers are at this day honoured as their apostles even by the very populations who have fallen into schism; while the only Slavonic provinces which were preserved from it—Croatia, Dalmatia, Moravia, and Bohemia—are also the only regions which have retained Christian liberty, and are subject neither to the Tsar nor the Sultan, but to God alone and His Vicar.

During the whole of the eleventh century the metropolitan of Kieff was in communion with the Roman Pontiffs, and it was not till the thirteenth that the dependence of that Russian see on the Chair of Peter was finally closed, the Ruthenian Church being at that date effectually depraved by the demoralizing influence of Byzantine emissaries, and the new forms of vice and corruption which those degenerate Greeks brought with them. Chastised by Mongol invasions, they owed their deliverance to the Christian chivalry of Catholic Poland, as in the decisive battle of Liegnitza, where Duke Henry the Pious, the son of S. Hedvig, died in the moment of victory. In the sixteenth century a new evil arose for the Ruthenian Church in the invasion of the Protestant heresy. The schismatical Greek clergy had neither the learning nor piety by which alone it could be resisted, and the higher classes, immersed in ignorance, and weary of professing a faith which they did not understand, and belonging to a church which they could not respect, fell away in such numbers that, by the end of the century, the celebrated Jesuit Skarga calculated that, in the palatinate of Novogrodek, there were only sixteen out of six hundred noble families of the Greek rite who had not embraced Protestantism. The peasants alone persevered in the profession of a religion which, for them as for others, consisted mainly in the observance of fasts, and of purely external forms, from which faith derived no nutriment and

virtue no support. Even in the monasteries, as John Rutski, afterwards the Catholic metropolitan of Ruthenia and the illustrious colleague of S. Josaphat, reported, learning and piety were unknown. In all ranks and orders, under the fatal influence of the Greek schism, true spiritual life was extinct. It was to reform this dead church, by re-uniting it with the Chair of Peter, and restore it to membership with the household of God, that His Providence raised up the apostle of whose life and death, under the guidance of the Benedictine author, we shall now attempt to offer a condensed narrative. The Ruthenian Church was dead, but the saint at whose voice it was to rise from the grave was now at hand.

Born at Wlodomir in 1580, under the reign of Stephen Batory, of devout parents, once noble, but who had been reduced by reverses to a humble estate, John Kuncewicz was baptized in the church of the martyr S. Praxedes, in which he was to receive, while yet a child, one of those marks of divine favour by which it has so often pleased God to announce the future destiny of His elect ministers. It was from his own lips that one of his companions in the Basilian monastery of Wilna received the report. Observing an image of the crucified Saviour, he asked his mother who it was. He had hardly received the reply, "when I felt," said Josaphat to me, "as it were a spark of fire fall on my heart"; and from that moment the flame of divine charity, of zeal for the Church and for souls, was kindled in it. Separating himself thenceforth from his youthful companions and the amusements of his age, his whole delight was "to dwell at the foot of the altar, to hear the cry of praise, and sing the marvels of the Lord." His days were spent in prayer, and when his parents missed him, they were sure to find the child in the church, pouring out his soul, like Samuel, to Him by whose grace it was already inundated. At school, where he was instructed in the elements of the Slavonic and Polish languages, his favourite study was the liturgical books of the Ruthenian Church. Having learned the whole of the divine office by heart, he never failed to recite it every day, to the praise and glory of God, and was already proposed by other parents to their children as a model of piety. Yet, as his biographer remarks, he was so entirely without qualified instructors, that, "a son of the Catholic Church, he did not know his mother." It was at Wilna, the capital of Lithuania, that God was to reveal her to him. In that city almost every form of heresy had its temple, and it was a common thing in families for the father to be of one religion, the mother of another, and the children of a third. Already the Fathers of the Society of Jesus had restored many of the

nobles to the faith, but the future apostle of Ruthenia had not yet profited by their teaching. The sophisms of heresy reached his ears, but he was not beguiled. The enemies of the Ruthenian Union, the Greek Catholic rite, seemed to triumph, but the youth cried to God to show him the way of truth, and his prayer was answered. "From that moment," he said, "I was filled with such an abhorrence of schism, that every moment I was constrained to repeat the word of the prophet, '*I have hated the congregation of the wicked.*'" A Greek priest eminent for learning, Peter Arcudius, whom the Catholic Archbishop of Wilna had brought from Rome to teach in the Greek college of that city, became his guide, and soon after his decision was formed to forsake the world, and become a monk of the order of S. Basil. In 1604 he received from the Metropolitan, Hypatius Pociy, the monastic habit, and from that moment began the marvellous apostolate of which every effort was inspired by the grace of God, and every action dedicated to His glory.

"At the beginning," says John Rutski, who knew him so well, and was led by his example to aspire to perfection, "he had no master in the spiritual life; but the Holy Spirit became his guide, and in a little while he made such progress in the perfection of the monastic life that he was capable of teaching and directing others." "Night and day," says Susza, his earliest biographer, "he was absorbed in prayer"; and even in his sleep, as his companions attested, his lips still repeated the fervent supplications which he had uttered when awake. His austerities, which he continued to the day of his martyrdom, can only be compared with those of the Fathers of the Desert. In the middle of winter, heedless of ice and snow, he would prepare for saying Mass by hours of meditation in the cemetery attached to the church of the Holy Trinity, and a temperature which most men would have found insupportable did not even disturb his tranquil meditation. But with him, as with all saints, the most severe mortifications were only a means to an end, not, as with the darkened schismatics whom he was destined to convert, a superstitious substitute for more difficult and more profitable virtues. To continual prayer and self-discipline he added the daily study of the liturgical books of his Church, in which he found not only the evidences of Ruthenian faith and piety, but decisive proofs of Catholic truth, and the most effective refutation of schism and heresy. It was by this process that he was led by the Holy Spirit to a profound comprehension of the true place in the Divine counsels of those two fundamental Christian truths, the unity of the Church and the

authority of the Holy See. He collected all the passages which he found in the liturgies and other Slavonic books attesting the primacy of S. Peter; and in order to illustrate the most important question in the controversies of his day, the fact that the Ruthenian was a daughter of the Roman Church, he composed a work entitled "The Baptism of S. Vladimir." In preparing him for the apostolic mission upon which he was about to enter, and enriching him with the highest gifts of wisdom and sanctity, God planted in his soul the jealous love of dogmatic truth and vehement detestation of heresy which S. Basil, S. Cyril, and S. Athanasius, and all the lights of the Eastern Church, had displayed before him. If in the middle of the night, as Susza relates, amid the rigours of a Lithuanian winter, he secretly left his cell, clothed only in a hair shirt, and with naked feet planted in the deep snow, scourged himself to blood, it was only that he might bring his body "into subjection," and offer with greater efficacy the prayer which came from the depths of his heart: "Lord God, destroy schism, and give us unity."\* Alone in the monastery of the Holy Trinity, like S. John the Baptist in the desert, he had as yet neither human teacher nor human associate. The hour of his public ministry, for which he was being formed in secret by the hand of God, had not yet arrived. The first intruder upon his solitude was the celebrated John Rutski, attracted by his reputation for sanctity, and destined to enter the Basilian order, and be the companion of his spiritual toils and head of the Ruthenian Church. To restore that church to its primitive glory was their common aspiration, and the subject of their daily conferences. Ravaged by schism, to which the leading citizens of Wilna were devoted, every attempt to restore unity only awakened a fiercer opposition. The Archimandrite Samuel, of the church of the Holy Trinity, was himself a schismatic, whose violence at length brought him in conflict with the officers of the Crown, and led to his deposition. By order of the King, Sigismund III., a commission was appointed, of which the Chancellor Sapieha was the president, to examine the cause and restore the rightful authority of the Metropolitan Pociy. The sectaries replied by a pretended excommunication of Pociy for having "taken an oath of obedience to the Roman Pontiff," and Tupeka, one of the leading magistrates of the city, attempted to assassinate him in the open street. Severely wounded, the preservation of his life was attributed to a special intervention of Providence, and Tupeka, glorying in his crime, and only lamenting

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\* "Saint Josaphat," tome i. p. 26.



its incomplete execution, was condemned to death. It was this incident which furnished to Josaphat, who had recently been ordained priest, the first public occasion of manifesting his true character, and of proving that hatred of schism did not exclude a tender charity for the schismatic. While the Catholics of Wilna were singing a *Te Deum* in the cathedral, he hastened to the prison, and pleading with irresistible force and sweetness the sacred truths to which his own martyrdom was to be the final testimony, brought to repentance the malignant assassin, whose guilt only served to discredit the evil cause which he had attempted to promote. Samuel fled from Wilna, the schismatics were reduced to silence and inaction, and from that hour peace began to reign in Ruthenia.

Rutski was now, by the joint authority of the King and the Metropolitan, the Archimandrite of the Church of the Holy Trinity, and his first effort was to restore, with the aid of Josaphat, the true observance of the Basilian rule, and to kindle in the clergy, enfeebled by ignorance and the cares of a family, a new zeal and fervour in the discharge of their sacred office. Both comprehended that nothing could be done for the advancement of religion and the restoration of unity by a priesthood uninstructed in theology, and more absorbed by domestic duties than by zeal for souls. The eloquence of Josaphat as a preacher, and the power with which he treated all the points controverted between the Uniats and the schismatics,—facts afterwards presented to Urban VIII. as a motive for his canonization, since they proved that God alone had been his teacher,—diminished almost daily the number of the schismatics. Nor could they deny the presence of God with His servant, manifested by signs and prodigies. One day when he was saying Mass, “the God-Man was seen, in the radiant form of a child, to issue from the chalice which he held in his hands, while an angel, clothed in the habit of a deacon, stood by his side. This apparition was renewed on many subsequent occasions, attested by innumerable witnesses, and after his martyrdom it was the custom in Ruthenia to represent him in sacerdotal vestments, holding a chalice from which the child Jesus came forth, and the angel in a deacon’s dalmatic standing by his side.”\* Susza relates that whenever he said to a schismatic “You will be a Uniat,” his conversion always followed. His constant practice was to expound to them the texts of the Greek liturgy and the ancient Slavonic writers, a method of controversy which he may be said to have created, and which was always effective

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\* Tome i. p. 112.

with a people attached even to obstinacy to the customs and traditions of their fathers. The Catholics called him "the scourge of schism," while his impenitent adversaries confessed his apostolic victories by styling him "the ravisher of souls." Like the Pharisees, as Dom Guépin observes, they said of him, as the Jews said of our Divine Lord, "this man is a perverter of our nation." It was another point of resemblance between the saint and the Master whom he served.

Meanwhile, prodigies of every kind proclaimed his inseparable union with God. One evening some religious passing the door of his cell, saw it enveloped in flames. He was taking the discipline, absorbed in prayer, and evidently unconscious of the conflagration. As they were about to force open the door, the flames disappeared; they saw Josaphat with his face on the floor and his arms stretched in the form of a cross, and understood that what they had supposed to be an earthly light was an indication of the presence of God.\* By such communion with the Most High, he was daily advancing in the spiritual might which was to overcome the enemies of the Holy See and of Catholic unity. In April, 1610, while Sigismund was besieging the city of Smolensk, Ignatius, the patriarch of Moscow, arrived in his camp. He was a schismatic, but grace had already touched his heart, and he became one of the companions of Josaphat in the monastery of the Holy Trinity at Wilna. This conversion, which fortified the hopes of the Uniats, was a heavy discouragement to their adversaries. When, in 1565, the Muscovites took possession of Wilna, their first care was to seize the bodies of Ignatius and Rutski, buried side by side, and both were found to be flexible and without corruption. They dared not profane these venerable remains, which they are said to have removed to Moscow, and which Lithuania, now the victim of Russian despotism, has never recovered. With Ignatius came a young Greek, Emanuel Cantacuzene, of the imperial family of Constantinople, and of great wealth. He became a disciple of Josaphat, followed him to Polock when he became archbishop of that see, and bore a part in all his labours and trials till the supreme hour of his martyrdom. But if the year 1610 brought to the saint new consolations and precious fellow-workers, it saw also the arrival in Ruthenia of his most inveterate enemy, by whose arts he was to be delivered to death,—the worldly and ambitious Smotrycki, the restless champion of schism, and the pupil of Cyril Lucaris, the schismatical patriarch of Constantinople. Between this man,

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\* Tome i. p. 121.

eager only for his own personal interests, and the saint, occupied only with those of God, arose a conflict, in which the strife between the Church of God and the sect of Satan is typified, and of which we may so far anticipate the conclusion as to say that, having at length compassed the death of Josaphat, Smotrycki was himself converted by the intercession of the martyr, who purchased with his blood the soul to which the sanctity of his life had appealed in vain. The history of this mortal combat is full of instruction for the men of our own generation. On the one side they will see all the most deplorable infirmities of human nature,—vice, intrigue, ambition, and cruelty; on the other, all the choicest gifts of grace,—purity, meekness, contempt of self, and heroic sanctity. If the presence of God is most surely denoted by the abundance of His gifts, there is very seldom opening for doubt, to whatever period in the long conflict between the Church and the sects he may apply this crucial test, on which side the Most High is to be found. There was not more difference between Moses and the troop of Core, between Elias and the priests of Baal, than has been manifested in almost every age between the devout servants of the Holy See and of Catholic unity, and the impure adversaries of both. The contrast is God's own testimony to His Church. It has been renewed again and again. The combatants reveal themselves, on the one side as soldiers of God, clothed in the panoply of grace; on the other, as mercenaries of Satan, with the "mark of the beast" on their brow. To S. Athanasius are opposed the savage and blasphemous Arians; to S. Cyril, the false and impious Nestorians; to S. Augustine, the sanguinary and hateful Donatists; to S. Ignatius of Constantinople, the depraved adventurer Photius; to the treason and lubricity of the so-called reformers, the purity and holiness of a Fisher, and the "good confession" of Sir Thomas More, of whom Sir James Mackintosh says that he displayed "that union of perfect simplicity with moral grandeur, which perhaps no other human being has so uniformly reached"; and of whom Sir James adds that "he was the martyr of veracity, and perished only because he was sincere."\* The same contrast may be traced between the apostles of Catholic unity in Russia and the savage and licentious champions of the Greek schism, for whom murder and sacrilege were the only virtues, and whose warfare is summarized, in all its characteristic features, in the history which we shall now relate of the memorable conflict between S. Josaphat, the martyr

\* *Miscellaneous Works of Sir James Mackintosh*; "Life of Sir Thomas More," pp. 228, 235.

of Jesus Christ, and Maximus Smotrycki, the enemy of God, and the chief agent of the Photian conspiracy against the unity of His Church.

The theatre of the combat between these two men was the Ruthenian church, which the one wished to vivify, by bringing it into communion with the Vicar of Christ, and the other to paralyze, by retaining it in subjection to the sordid patriarch of Constantinople. The Church of Byzantium was itself a slave, and could only beget slaves. "At Constantinople," said Kreuza Rzewuski, who wrote under the dictation of S. Josaphat, "there is only one emperor, and in Muscovy only one grand duke; but in our land, every noble who retains a pope rules him as he pleases, makes him labour in the fields whenever he chooses, and sometimes pushes his insolence so far as to chastise him when the pope fails to obey."\* It was useless to appeal to the bishop, who was himself a simoniacal adventurer, like most Greek bishops of the present day, busy only in making his fortune, and seizing from the popes, who could hardly feed their families, the sums which the lord of the city or province had exacted from himself. There was no justice for the pope, and no tribunal to defend his rights. For him the priesthood was only a trade, which he had received from his father, and was to transmit to his son. His religion consisted in the observance of outward forms, and in an implacable hatred of Latins and the Latin Church. He hated them as a Jew hates a Christian, and for the same reason. Grovelling in poverty, ignorance, and abasement, the only active emotion of his soul was love of schism, which had ruined his fortunes in this world without doing anything to repair them in the next. It was of such a clergy that Smotrycki, specious, artful, and ambitious, with all the worst qualities of a Greek of the Lower Empire, and with a conscience wholly seared by his Byzantine training, became the leader, not for their profit but for his own. His theology had been acquired partly from Photian documents and partly in the schools of Germany, and was a compound of both; but among the schismatics dogma was of little value compared with undying hostility to the Catholic Church. Smotrycki had sucked in this venom with his mother's milk, and his contact with Lutherans had aggravated its intensity. He saw, as soon as he arrived at Wilna, that either he must conquer S. Josaphat, or accept inevitable defeat; and from that hour he concentrated all the resources of his mind, all the passions of his heart, and all

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\* "Saint Josaphat," *Introd.*, p. cxi.

the secular influences which he could command, in one scheme and purpose—the destruction of the apostle to whom God had committed the restoration of the Ruthenian Church.

In the first book which he published against the Uniats, entitled the “Lamentation of the Ruthenian Church,” were doctrines utterly at variance with the teaching and practice of the very church which he pretended to defend;\* but such was the blindness and ignorance of the schismatics, that they did not even perceive it. He was for them “the saviour of orthodoxy,” even while denying its formal doctrines. He reduced the seven sacraments of his church to two, in imitation of the Lutherans, rejected implicitly the value of good works, and especially of works of penance, which the Greek Church has always professed to hold in the highest honour. At a later day, when the prayers and the blood of S. Josaphat had won from the Divine bounty the miraculous conversion of this depraved soul, Smotrycki thus described this very book. “Its foundation was hate, its walls lies, and its roof calumnies: The author had done better to weep over himself and his brethren than over the Catholic Church.” It was answered, to the confusion of the writer, by the illustrious Jesuit Peter Skarga, and by Morochowski, the bishop of Wlodomir, who had no difficulty in showing that it was rather a refutation of the Slavonic liturgical books used by the schismatical church than of the Latin doctrines against which it was professedly aimed. To Smotrycki were joined in an eager alliance, not only all the Greek schismatics, but all the Protestants of Lithuania and Poland, who perceived that his cause was theirs, and who conspired with him against the restoration of Catholic unity, by the same arts and intrigues, and by deeds of violence, including pillage and assassination, against which S. Josaphat and his companion Rutski, who was now invested with the episcopal government of Kieff, and the office of Archimandrite of the Basilian monastery of Wilna, contended only by prayer, mortification, and confidence in the succour of God. The lists were opened, the combatants have taken their places, and the future of the Ruthenian Church depends on the issue of the combat.

The first care of the servants of God was to reform the Basilian institute, since little was to be expected in the apostolate to which they were called from the co-operation of the secular and married clergy. Poverty, chastity, and obedience, rendered easy by an ardent love of God and souls, soon flourished in the monasteries of the order, and an angelic

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\* “Saint Josaphat,” lib. i. ch. vii. t. i. p. 125.

life was the prelude to a triumphant death. No dangers arrested these dauntless soldiers of the Cross, no menaces disturbed their supernatural peace. One example in the life of S. Josaphat deserves special notice, and teaches us by luminous evidence how he fought and how he conquered. In the neighbourhood of Kieff was the great monastery of the Crypts, to which pilgrims flocked to venerate the remains of SS. Antony and Theodosius, and other Catholic athletes, whom the schismatics affected to regard as glories of their sect. To enter this monastery was to brave the enemies of the Church in their own fortress, and expose his life to their assaults. Even the courageous Rutski tried to dissuade S. Josaphat from an enterprise which he had too much reason to anticipate would prove fatal. But peril had only attractions for one already aspiring to martyrdom. Arrived at a short distance from the monastery, he met one of the so-called monks, who, with a train of dogs and valets, was engaged in hunting, and who inquired his name. An explosion of insults and invectives, to which was added the threat to fling him into the river, followed the announcement. "I have no evil design," was the soft answer of the saint, "against my brethren the monks of the Crypts, and if I had, how could I execute it? But it is a matter of surprise to me that I have never read in the Rule of S. Basil that it was permitted to a monk to hunt." His interlocutor was silenced, and retired with the seed of conversion in his heart. Entering the gate of the monastery, the man of God gave his name, and desired to see the superior. The first act of the latter was to cause the bell to be rung, to summon all the monks to the refectory. "The seducer of souls is here," was his address to them; "at length you will see him." More than a hundred had answered his call. All that hate and fanaticism could inspire was uttered with furious cries, which covered the voice of Josaphat, and the only sound which could be heard amid the tumult of execrations, was this: "Fling the traitor, the wretch, the destroyer of orthodoxy, into the Dnieper." Calm and unmoved, Josaphat contemplated these raging sectaries, and begged the superior to obtain a moment's silence. With gentle words and a persuasive charity which subdued even these darkened souls, he announced to them that the only object of his visit was to venerate so famous a sanctuary, salute them as brethren, and learn from them anything which they could teach him of the way of truth, the light of the Scriptures, and the teaching of the holy Fathers and ecclesiastical writers. Captivated by his meekness and charity, silence succeeds to uproar. They beg him to be seated, and offer him food,



which he declines. He asks them to show him their books, and now his object is attained. From those books he will convince them that they are false to the primitive traditions of their own church, and will preach the doctrine of Christian unity to its mortal adversaries. With the Slavonic writings in his hands, he plies them with irresistible arguments in favour of the dogmas professed by the Roman Church, and especially the sacred authority of the Apostolic See, so often proclaimed by Greeks and Orientals, and the indefectible unity of the true Church. His hearers are amazed to find in the liturgical prayers which they repeat every day, the condemnation of their own errors. Their surprise redoubles when he proves to them, by reciting the annals of the Ruthenian Church, how the long succession of Metropolitans of Kieff had been joyfully subject to the Roman Pontiff. Their intellect is convinced, but not their will. They honour the apostle, but reject his teaching. "Truly he merits the name of seducer of souls," they said one to another, "for what man ever attracted them by such gentle words?" They accompany him in a body to the city, with every mark of reverence, and, as his biographer observes, "he re-enters Kieff with all the symbols of a triumph, carrying in his train, so to speak, the schism which he has vanquished."\*

But if the supreme grace of conversion was not then granted to these monks, the visit of the saint was fruitful to others, even in this stronghold of schism. The chief magistrate of Kieff, Batilia, and two secular priests, entered the Catholic Church, and proved at a later period, by their zeal and fortitude, that they had become "Israelites indeed." The return of Josaphat to the capital of Lithuania, where he was received with enthusiasm, was the signal for a long train of conversions in the city of Wilna. Visiting a lady devoted to schism, he exhorted her to seek unity, without which it is impossible to find God; and when she outraged charity and decency by striking him, he replied with a smile, "I would not have come to see you, madam, if I had thought that I should give you the occasion of offending God by yielding to anger." He had hardly departed when grace touched her heart, and hurrying to the monastery, she cast herself at his feet; and Susza relates that, after her own conversion, she was successful in bringing many other women, and especially schismatical nuns, to the unity of the Church. His next conquests were the noble palatines of Polock and Novogrodek, the latter the chief of one of the most powerful houses of

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\* "Saint Josaphat," liv. ii. ch. iii. tome i. pp. 162-4.

Lithuania, devotedly attached to the Oriental rite, of which Josaphat was himself, in accordance with the earnest mandates of the Holy See, the most faithful observer. A great number of the nobility and friends of these magnates followed their example. One of the sons of the aged Tyszkiewicz, the palatine of Novogrodek, became a zealous priest of the Latin rite, and finally Bishop of Samogitia, and one of the glories of the Polish episcopate. It was to the omnipotence of Divine grace that the saint looked for the continuance of such spiritual victories, but he was too wise a steward of the house of God to neglect human means. Of these, preaching was not the least efficacious. He announced to the city that the monks of the Holy Trinity would deliver conferences, in which they would demonstrate the orthodoxy of the Uniat Church by citing the primitive Ruthenian traditions to which *it alone was faithful*. All the notables of the city responded to the invitation, without distinction of creed, and the schismatics were once more confounded by arguments derived exclusively from their own liturgical books. The main question, to which all others were subordinate, and to the elucidation of which the Holy Spirit had bidden this man devote his life, was the supremacy of the Apostolic See. Like all the saints of the Oriental Church, it was the most profound conviction of his soul, that in that supremacy alone, by an imperishable decree of our Divine Lord, was contained the secret both of the unfailing purity of Christian doctrine and of the maintenance for all time of Christian unity. Neither could exist without it. Truth torn to fragments, and the horrible multiplication of schisms, were the notes, in every age, of every community alien from the Roman Church. "Qui odit fratrem suum," said the beloved disciple, "in tenebris est, et in tenebris ambulat, et nescit quo eat";\* and S. Cyprian, who saw that this hate was the ruling passion of formal schismatics, as it is at this hour, denounced the fatal crime of separation from the centre of unity when he bequeathed this lesson to all who should come after him: "Ab arbore frange ramum, fractus germinare non poterit."† The apostle of the Ruthenian Church was penetrated with these fundamental truths, of which every new sect, in every land, furnishes a fresh proof; and for this reason he was inspired to dwell without ceasing on that sacred authority of the Chair of Peter to which the will of God has inseparably attached the perpetuity of His Church, the unalterable purity of His revelation, and one prominent test of the loyalty and obedience of His creatures.

\* John ii. 2.

† "De Unitate Ecclesiae."

It is not within the compass of human resources to amend the designs of God, and every substitute which man has framed for the Catholic Church has only let loose the torrent of maledictions against which that Church was founded as the sole impregnable bulwark,—hate, discord, heresy, and self-will. These are the fruits of schism, with which charity, truth, and unity cannot coexist. In the church of the Holy Trinity at Wilna, this doctrine was delivered with so much power, and especially the declaration of S. Jerome, “whoever is outside the Roman Church *profanus est*,” that while many schismatics were converted, others requested that what had been said might be reduced to writing, that so they might ponder it at their leisure. To meet this demand S. Josaphat composed in 1617, and published, the work entitled “Defence of the Unity of the Church, in which it is demonstrated that the Greek ought to be united to the Latin Church.” To this book the schismatics did not so much as attempt to make any reply, since to do so was impossible without denying the traditions of the Eastern Church.

On the 12th of November, 1617, amid the indescribable joy of the Ruthenian Catholics, Josaphat was consecrated Archbishop of Polock. His most dangerous adversary Smotrycki had been raised to the same nominal rank by Theophanes, the schismatical patriarch of Jerusalem, who had paid a visit to Muscovy, in order to collect money from the fanatical barbarians of the region and their savage neighbours the Cossacks of the Ukraine. Enriched beyond his expectation by their gifts, he concerted with Smotrycki, whose capacity was not unknown to him, a project for combating the Ruthenian Union, by instruments and measures which only such men could employ. Pillage, intrigue, and assassination were the arms which they used. Josaphat, who had accepted his new dignity with profound regret, and only in obedience to an authority which his convictions forbade him to resist, said of his rival: “If Maximus Smotrycki is willing to be converted, I will immediately resign my place to him, for he at least possesses the learning necessary for a bishop.” Probably he knew that Smotrycki, in whom the voice of conscience was not wholly dumb, had secret misgivings, and was only detained in schism by pride and ambition. He had already, convinced by the arguments which refuted that work, published a retraction of the heresies contained in his “Lamentation,” but he addressed it privately to the schismatical monks of Derman, by whom it was immediately burned. For years he was destined to vacillate between truth and error, between crime and remorse, and it was not till he had done

an act which seemed to make his salvation impossible, that the martyr whom he had delivered to death obtained it for him. Disgusted with the ignorance and brutality of the uneducated and licentious clergy whose leader he was, he knew how to admire the wisdom and purity of a Josaphat and a Rutski, and their devout companions, but, incapable of embracing the truth to which he already aspired, he vainly tried to soothe the anguish of his soul by penances which might have brought peace to another, but not to him. He even instructed others, by a monstrous contradiction, in the Catholic faith which he hesitated to profess himself.\* Relying only on the secular arm, and content to see his sect oppressed by the domination of the schismatical nobles, he was not insensible to the contrast between himself and S. Josaphat, who never ceased to resist the encroachments of the civil power by admonishing every petty Cæsar, that "as the Ruthenian Church was united to the Holy See, it had the same right to liberty as the Latin Church." In every point, except the natural gifts of reason and perspicacity, the contrast between these two men, as between their respective followers, was as wide as that which exists between the precepts of the Creator and the passions of the creature. While Smotrycki, the champion of schism, was vainly solicited by Divine grace to an efficacious repentance, and tormented with doubts and fears, Josaphat, the apostle of unity, was daily advancing to greater heights of perfection, and honoured by marks of divine favour as stupendous as any recorded in the mystical annals of hagiology. Often he was seen enveloped in a celestial light, and raised in the air in the moments of ecstasy which anticipated for him, as for so many saints, the future life of glory. His only ambition when elevated to the dignity of the Episcopate, was to redouble his austerities, and keep with more exactness than ever the Basilian Rule. Gennadius, who was his confessor, and kept the keys of the palace and the cathedral, relates that long before dawn the saint would enter his room, take the keys, and go forth in the dark to spend hours in prayer and terrible mortifications, and that out of humility he would himself ring the bells, which summoned the congregation to the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, and the monks to the recitation of the Divine Office. The archdeacon Dorotheus surprised him one day, kneeling in the snow, naked to the waist, and scourging himself till the blood flowed from him in streams. "Ah! my father," cried Dorotheus, unable to restrain his emotion, "spare a life so useful to the Church." "Leave me,"

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\* "Saint Josaphat," tom. i. p. 196.

was the calm reply, "and say nothing of what you have seen." Even the most obstinate schismatics spoke of him as "the Saint," and commonly said to one another; "If he belonged to us, we would drink the water with which he washes his feet."\*

In the spring of 1621, Poland being threatened by an invasion of the Turks, the schismatics, both Greek and Protestant, equally insensible to religion and patriotism, entered into negotiations with them; and Smotrycki, who had recently been condemned by a royal decree for incivism, made overtures to the barbarous Cossacks, to whom the Greek schism was as dear as rapine and murder, for which it gave them a new relish. All the schismatical bishops were compromised in these manœuvres, in which Sigismund III. saw a menace to the safety of Poland, and a motive for active support to the loyal Catholics of the Greek rite. The Sultan, who led an army of 300,000 men, brought to the schismatics the letters and injunctions of the patriarch Cyril Lucaris; but the projects of both were doomed to failure, and the campaign speedily terminated in favour of Poland. It had only furnished a new proof of the malignity of the schismatics. Already they were openly discussing a plan for the murder of S. Josaphat, of which many presages indicated the approach. On the day of Pentecost, 1622, as the Archbishop advanced in procession to the church of the Holy Ghost at Witepsk, Wasilewski, a leader of the schismatics, posted himself with a band of soldiers in his path, and threatened him with death if he did not retire. A little later this miscreant died himself of a shameful malady.† It was always the same: on the one side violence, impurity, and sedition; on the other, meekness, virtue, and resignation. Churches were sacked, houses pillaged, innocent victims slain for the profit of schism, of which cruelty and sacrilege were then, as now, the most powerful allies. It was not against S. Josaphat, as his biographer observes, that these agents of the evil one raged, but only against *the apostle of unity*. "He is a saint," they said, "and we will venerate him as an angel from the day in which he shall renounce the Union." They told him to his face that if he would recognize the depraved patriarch of Constantinople, they would all accept his spiritual authority. "Let the patriarch recognize the Pope," was his answer, "and I will immediately recognize the patriarch"; and when they offered to pay the costs of his journey to Constantinople, and to give him unalterable obedience on his return, "I will not go,"

\* Tome i. p. 264.

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† Tom. ii. p. 48.

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replied the man of God, "but will die, if necessary, for the holy Union, and for obedience to the Roman Pontiff." A little later, having preached on the Procession of the Holy Ghost, and the supremacy of the Apostolic See, he burst into tears, and with a voice stifled by emotion exclaimed: "Yes, this is the true faith, for which I will give my life, and joyfully accept death." Many schismatics were converted by this discourse, and when they warned the Archbishop to be on his guard against his enemies,—“I know,” he said, “that they desire to kill me; but I know also that the holy Fathers gladly died for the faith.”

We have already observed that, imposing and majestic as was the life of this great servant of God, it was by his death that he was destined to vanquish the serpent of schism, and by the prodigies which accompanied that death that he was to reveal the judgments of God upon all who are guilty of that crime. Our space does not permit us to dwell further on the incidents of his apostolic life, for which we refer our readers to the volumes of Dom Guépin, which are among the most instructive and fascinating contributions to Christian literature that our age has produced. It would be a mere indiscretion to say that every act in the life of the saint was like the separate notes of a ravishing harmony, in which, as his contemporaries, friends and enemies, concurred in proclaiming, an echo of the songs of heaven fell on human ears. The Jews slew the very man whom they reluctantly venerated as S. James the Just, because their hatred of truth was greater than their admiration of the apostle who preached it to them. “He is a saint,” said the Greek schismatics of S. Josaphat; “*let us kill him.*” Who can doubt under what inspiration they acted? Who can fail to see the presence of God with the apostle of unity; the malice of demons in the agents of schism? “You hate me unto death,” he was accustomed to say to them, “and you wish to take away my life; yet I bear you in my heart, and would gladly die for your good.”\* He knew that “the good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep,” and the hour was now at hand in which the life of the apostle was to be closed by the death of the martyr. Abundant consolations, of the only kind which he valued, had made easy to him the *via dolorosa* upon which he was about to enter. In July, 1623, four months before he received the crown of martyrdom, being on a visit at Ruta to the Metropolitan for a general chapter of the Basilians, he hears that a Calvinist nobleman in the neighbourhood is at

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\* “Saint Josaphat,” tome ii. p. 51.



the point of death. His charity understands that there is a soul to be saved; the dying man abjures his heresy, receives the last sacraments from the hands of the holy Archbishop, and expires with the words of S. Peter in his mouth: "Of a truth I know now that the Lord hath sent His angel to me." Returning home, he asks the hospitality of Joroka, another Calvinist of high rank. Unfolding to him and his three daughters the truths of faith with the persuasive power of a saint, the latter cast themselves at his feet, receive absolution, and implore their father also to seek reconciliation with the Church of God. He replies by driving the messenger of peace from his house with curses, and bidding his servants let loose a troop of dogs against him. He departs without a sign of emotion. The daughters remonstrate with their father on his brutality to such a guest with so much force, that he presently mounts his horse to offer the apology due from one gentleman to another. "You have done me no harm," was the soft reply, "and I only ask you to leave your daughters at liberty to profess the Catholic faith." Moved to tears by this unexpected gentleness, and touched by divine grace, the father entreats the Archbishop to return to his house and receive his abjuration. Other duties made this delay impossible, but the next moment the saint is seated on a stone by the wayside, the penitent on his knees before him, and the heretic goes back to his home a Catholic. Such was the life of the man of God to his last hour; and now let us speak of his death.

The city of Kieff, the stronghold of schism, had fallen into the hands of the Cossacks, then, as now, the ferocious instruments of the hate which schism inspires towards the Holy See and Catholic unity. Batilia and the two priests who had been converted by S. Josaphat, refusing to apostatize, were slain by these barbarians, as at this day, in obedience to the Russian Tsar, the same savages murder the Catholics of Poland. Josaphat had no need to go to Kieff, as he wished to do when the report of these martyrdoms reached him, to find the destroyers of his own life. The ignorant popes, and the meaner class of citizens, whose malice Smotrycki had skilfully stimulated, were thirsting for the blood of him whom they called "the ravisher of souls." At Witepsk they openly announced their intention of destroying at one blow the Archbishop and the Ruthenian Union. Entreated by the Catholic nobles and people of Polock not to enter Witepsk, as he had announced his intention to do, the Archbishop replied: "I fear not death. God grant that I may be happy enough to merit the crown of martyrdom." Perceiving that it was im-

possible to prevent his departure, the nobles proposed at least to accompany him, with an escort sufficiently large to overawe the schismatics. "I desire no human assistance," he replied, "God alone will be my defence. My only attendants will be the singers who accompany me in the Holy Sacrifice. I have need of no one. It would be to me a great joy to die for the faith. This grace I hope from God as the greatest which I can receive on earth." To his weeping priests and servants he said: "Take courage, my children; if any evil happens at Witepsk, it will be to me only. No one but myself will perish." On the journey from Polock he frequently observed to his companions: "What better death could I desire than martyrdom for the Sovereign Pontiff?" During the two weeks which he spent at Witepsk he reconciled enemies and abounded in other works of charity. Nahum Wolk, one of the chief magistrates, refusing to pardon an enemy, the saint said to him: "Beware! if you do not repent, you will perish soon, and by a violent death." A few weeks later, Wolk, who assisted in killing Josaphat, was executed by order of the king. The month of November had arrived. Already the attendants of the Archbishop could not appear in public without being insulted and menaced, while his own name was vociferated by the populace with a chorus of imprecations. On the morning of the 11th, returning to the palace from the cathedral, he is surrounded by a great multitude, whose shouts of "*Death!*" "*Kill him!*" announce that the end is near. Calm and unmoved he advances slowly through the raging crowd. Astonishment at his tranquillity, and perhaps a last feeling of respect for the double majesty of his sacred office and his well-known sanctity, arrest the hands of the murderers, and he enters his house uninjured. At dawn on the 12th the assault on the palace commenced. The doors are wrenched from their hinges, the savage cohort of sectaries, encouraged by the magistrates and exhorted by the popes, rush in. The archdeacon Dorotheus, Emmanuel Cantacuzene, and Gregory Kszacki, faithful to the last, offer their bodies as the sole rampart and defence of their beloved father and master. The next moment they are lying on the ground, mutilated by frightful wounds, from which they all miraculously recover, that the promise of the saint might be fulfilled. And now he comes forth from his chamber, where he had been offering his life to God. He presents himself with a cheerful air to the assassins. "God be with you, my children," he says; "why do you strike my servants? What harm have they done you? If you have anything against me, here I am! Leave my people in peace, and do not slay them." At

sight of their Archbishop the raging multitude recoil with awe. "One would have said," was the sworn deposition of Cantacuzene in the process of canonization, "that a mighty wind drove them back to the door: there was a moment of hesitation." Two men rush in from an adjoining chamber, and cry aloud: "Strike! kill this Latin, this Papist." One of them beats him with one blow to the earth, and the other, armed with a hatchet, buries it in his forehead. A third discharges a musket at his ear, and the deed is done. They drag his body into the street, and when a dog which had belonged to the palace attempted to defend him, they cut the animal in pieces, and mingle his blood, by a final outrage, with that of the martyr. From murder the sectaries proceed to pillage; everything in the episcopal residence,—gold, silver, vestments, furniture, and even the kitchen utensils, are appropriated by these ministers of "orthodoxy," and then they descend to the cellars, and in a few minutes are all buried in intoxication. Returning once more to the street, men, women, and children in the delirium of drunkenness, they use his mutilated body as a table on which they eat and drink. Then, lifting him by the feet, these adversaries of Christian unity cry to him: "Pastor! it is Sunday. Preach, then, preach. The people are waiting to hear you."

The martyr is crowned; but if no sound of complaint or reproach had issued from his own lips, the terrible wrath of the King of martyrs found a voice, and carried terror into the hearts of the murderous enemies of His Holy Church. It was said by S. Paulinus, as the Benedictine biographer of S. Josaphat remarks: "He who implored pardon for His own murderers could not tolerate the injury done to His confessor. He who would not exact vengeance for His own Passion, required prompt satisfaction for the wrongs done to His martyr." The prodigies which accompanied and followed the death of the Martyr of Unity, attested in every case *by the schismatics themselves*, were a manifestation of Divine power and judgment, in presence of which even these cruel reprobates fell on their faces and cried aloud for mercy. Rarely has the Most High glorified His saints by signs so many and wonderful as those which illumined the firmament at the coronation of S. Josaphat. Similar tokens of His acceptance were granted to some of the English martyrs, butchered by Anglican schismatics in the sixteenth century; but in the case of the Ruthenian saint, it may be said without exaggeration, that the fires of Divine vengeance blazed in the sight of angels and men, while they formed a robe of glory for him who asked from God, in the hour of his triumph, only the conversion of

his enemies, and obtained what he asked. We can only relate a few examples. A woman who had plucked the beard of the martyr was instantly smitten with blindness. When the commission arrived at Polock to investigate the miracles attributed to the saint, this woman presented herself before them, declaring with joy that though she had lost the sight of the body, she had recovered, by his intercession, the light of the soul. She was still blind, but she had obtained the grace of conversion.\* At the moment of his death a dark cloud arose from the river Widzba, and hung motionless over the court of the palace. From its centre a ray of dazzling light came forth, and rested on the sacred remains of the servant of God. Many came from places remote from the city to examine the nature of this prodigy, but a satanical fury still blinded the assassins. They fastened cords to the feet of the martyr, and dragged him through the streets. His head was dashed against a wall, and when the impure herd of sectaries had passed on, the features of the martyr were found to be imprinted on it. It was impossible to efface this portrait painted with his own blood, and as late as 1838 the Princess Zénaïde Wolkouska testified that she had often seen it.† They dragged the body to the top of a hill which was above the cathedral, and at the foot of which the Dwina flows. Filling his hair shirt with stones, they tied it round his neck, and when his body had reached the bank of the river, after falling from rock to rock, not a bone was broken. Embarking with it in a boat, they carried it up the river to the distance of a mile from Witepsk, and having attached to it a great stone, flung it into a deep gulf, known in the country by the name of *the sacred well*. Only then they deemed their work finished. But at this moment a column of light fell on the spot, the body of the Archbishop rose from the flood, and to their horror the assassins saw it follow them down the river. "Already," says his biographer, "they begin to tremble. The hand of God is about to touch them; but thanks to the prayers and the blood of Josaphat, they will not be chastised but converted. Even those whom human justice will not spare"—many of the murderers were executed by order of the king—"will not forfeit divine mercy, and the assassins of the martyr will obtain through him, after his death, the grace and the pardon which he vainly offered them in his life." Twenty-four expiated their crime on the scaffold, including Nahum Wolk, but all, with one exception, "penetrated with contrition, asked to be re-

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\* "Saint Josaphat," tome ii. p. 96.

† P. 97.

conciled before dying with the Catholic Church. The martyr had conquered his murderers, and opened to them, as if by force, the gate of salvation."\* Witepsk, the stronghold of schism, was converted; and at Polock, as Dziashilewicz testified fourteen years later, "we were all converted to the Union, and there was here, as at Witepsk, one fold under one shepherd."

Of the innumerable miracles of every kind worked at a later period by the martyr, who was seen one day by the terrified schismatics, whom the apparition converted, vested in his pontifical robes, and standing in the air above his own cathedral,—our limited space does not permit us to speak. We refer our readers to his life. But what had become of his rival Smotrycki, by whose arts and inflammatory discourses he had been brought to death? Fearing the sentence which he had merited, he fled to the East; but the martyr went with him, and brought even this criminal to repentance and conversion. Disgusted by the venality and immorality of the schismatical prelates, and finding that the Patriarch of Constantinople was in heart a Calvinist, he went to Jerusalem, but only to fall from one deception to another. Conversing with Theophanes, the false patriarch of that see, by whom he had been himself ordained, he learned from him the secret of the pretended miracle of the "holy fire," an imposture which the present representatives of the Greek schism still repeat every year on Holy Saturday, to the great satisfaction of their fanatical dupes. Theophanes confessed to him, in the freedom of private intercourse, that he lighted with his own hand the fire which he afterwards presented to the sectaries as miraculous.† Grief and pain possessed his soul, and, *by his own confession*, a voice, which was never silent day or night, appalled him with this incessant question, "Why persecutest thou Me? Consider what thou hast done. All thy writings have outraged the Roman Pontiff, the Catholic Faith, the Latin Church. Thou hast cast into hell thousands of souls. What shall be thy own lot?"‡ From that hour Smotrycki understood that "the only means of salvation for the Greek Church, as for himself, was reconciliation with the Church of Rome." He returned to Poland, was received into the Church, and spent the rest of his life, by order of the Sovereign Pontiff, in the monastery of Deiman, in Volhynia, where he endeavoured to atone, by writings in defence of Christian unity and the authority of the Holy See, and by unceasing austerities, for the offences of his life. He died

\* P. 120.

† Tome ii. p. 174.

‡ *Ibid.*

with the Brief of Urban VIII., which released him from all ecclesiastical censures, in his hand, having requested that he might be buried, "with this proof of his reconciliation with the Roman Church."\* It was reported to the Metropolitan Rutski that it was found impossible to remove the Brief from his grasp. "If this is a sign from heaven," said the illustrious colleague of S. Josaphat to himself, "he will obey the command of him who represents in Ruthenia the Catholic Church and the Vicar of Christ." At the word of the prelate the hand of the dead penitent opened, and gave up the Pontifical Letter. This scene occurred in the presence of many witnesses, and when the document was replaced, the dead hand closed over it once more. "Even in death," says his biographer, "Smotrycki manifested his filial submission to the Holy Apostolic See."

The life of S. Josaphat is a lesson for all time. The two truths which he was charged by our Divine Lord to proclaim, and which he was to seal with his blood,—the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff and the unity of the Church,—are denied in our own day by the same sectaries, and all who maintain them assailed by the same fiendish cruelty. Russia has done in Ruthenia, and is doing at this hour, exactly what the Most High God condemned by such terrible judgments in the day of His servant S. Josaphat. When in 1636 the schismatics obtained a church in Mohylew, and went in procession on the Dnieper in boats to celebrate their triumph, a tempest arose, every bark was sunk, and more than a thousand persons buried in the flood. "Five hundred corpses were recovered, but the divers dared not continue their attempt. They said, though schismatics themselves, that they saw frightful monsters who guarded the dead as their prey."† In our own day, the agents of Russian orthodoxy, still ferocious barbarians, to whom a national religion is only an incentive to malignant hatred of the Holy See and the Catholic Church, and who every week torture and slay, in obedience to their despotic ruler, the disciples of Jesus Christ, are exactly what they were whom S. Josaphat converted by his death. He is still for Russians "the ravisher of souls." When Pius IX. was preparing to issue the edict of canonization, the Russian journals were filled with execrations against the martyr, whom they represented as a monster, "whose cruelties scandalized even his co-religionists!" At the same time the Russian diplomatic agents at Rome were instructed to solicit from the Holy Father the abandonment

\* "Saint Josaphat," tome ii. p. 225.

† P. 314.



of his design. With this object they quoted a letter from the famous Chancellor Sapieha, in which he had replied rudely and indiscreetly to some observations of the saint. It was quite true. But these Russian sectaries forget to add that he bitterly repented his fault, and caused an inscription to be engraved in the great hall of his own castle, by which he dedicated himself and his race for ever "to the patronage and protection of S. Josaphat." The petition of the Poles to Pius IX., in which they implored the canonization of the martyr, bore the name of a Sapieha, as well as of Czartoryski, Sanguszko, Zamoyski, Rzewuski, and other illustrations of Catholic Poland, and contained these words: "We are, Holy Father, interpreters to you of the thoughts of thousands of persecuted Catholics, of every age, sex, and condition, who groan in the prisons of Russia and Poland, or are exiled to the frozen regions of Siberia. If they consented to be enrolled among the members of the pretended orthodox church, or even to hide their faith, they would recover immediately their liberty, their homes, and their property. They would be permitted to be Poles if they ceased to be Catholics. The canonization of the blessed Josaphat will augment their courage, and will be accepted by them as the recompense of their fidelity. In the midst of our calamities, Holy Father, while the enemies of the Church combine all their forces to rob us of our faith, on whichever side we turn we see no hope of human succour; but if your Holiness assures us the powerful protection in heaven which we ask, it will fortify the bond of faith which unites the population of Poland, and will procure the most efficacious of all consolations to souls crushed by sorrow."\*

We presume to offer no reflections upon a narrative of which we have offered to our readers only a weak and meagre sketch. Where God has spoken so plainly, there is no need of human comments. He has told us what is His judgment of schism. He has shown us what manner of apostles He creates to combat that monster. He has filled us with admiration of the gifts by which He adorns them. He has taught us that submission to the Holy See is a condition of salvation. If we should induce any of our readers to study for themselves the life of which these lines present only a faint outline, and to have recourse, in the conflict now raging between the Church and the sects, to the powerful intercession of S. Josaphat, our object will be attained. If we might dare to hope that words so feeble, and so unworthy of the saint whom we desire to honour, could contribute anything to a more ardent zeal for the unity so

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\* Tome ii. p. 481.

dear to God, and a more fervent and sustained prayer for the overthrow of all the enemies of His Holy Church, our dearest wish would be accomplished. May the incessant supplication of the martyr of unity, now reigning with God, be henceforth in every heart and on every tongue throughout the Catholic universe, and be echoed by those who are still outside the Church to their own salvation: "Domine Deus, tolle schismata, da Unionem!"

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### ART. III.—CARDINAL ANTONELLI.

*The Times*, Nov. 7 and Dec. 7, 1876.

*L'Univers*, Dec. 9, 1876.

**F**EW, if any names on the death-roll of 1876 are of such mark as that of Cardinal Antonelli. For thirty years he had been one of the most prominent figures in the field of European diplomacy, and he had earned for himself the esteem of all who knew him, and the respect even of his adversaries. His death was sudden at the last, but it surprised no one, for it had been known for some time that he was suffering from an illness against which a man of his years could not long contend. His indomitable energy enabled him to fulfil to the last the duties of his office, and he was actually engaged in a conference with the Pope when his agony began. His life of seventy years was not in the eyes of the world a success; future history will form a very different estimate of it.

Nowadays a man of any note is no sooner dead than a hundred self-appointed censors sit in judgment upon his life, and through the columns of the press give forth in no uncertain tone their ideas upon his life and character, his deeds, and their probable result. Such estimates of contemporaries must necessarily be imperfect, based as they are on insufficient, often scanty, data; written to serve the purpose of the moment and then forgotten. In the case of a man like Antonelli these imperfections must be especially marked. What do all but the Holy Father and a few of his friends know of the late Cardinal-Secretary of State? A few dates, some uncertain rumours, half-forgotten despatches, oft-insinuated slanders,—these are the materials on which most of

the published memoirs of Antonelli have been based. As for the multitude of leading articles, they have reflected for the most part the feelings of men who believe the conflict on the Roman question is settled for ever, and that they can therefore afford to be generous to the late Cardinal's memory. The Catholic press has given to Antonelli a well-deserved meed of praise. We have noted in particular, at the head of this article, M. Louis Veuillot's tribute of respect, which appeared in the "Univers" of December 9th. It is the best testimony on the part of the Catholic press to Antonelli's worth which we have seen, and this because it is not a mere panegyric, but a real criticism upon his career. Of that career but little can be known. Antonelli's life was not passed, like that of most European statesmen, in the open arena of parliamentary politics; he belonged to the sphere of diplomacy, and that only. But we know enough to form a satisfactory judgment on his place among the men of our time.

Giacomo Antonelli, the future Cardinal, was born on April 2, 1806, at Sonnino, near Terracina, on the northern frontier of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. His family was not a noble one, but of the class of respectable farmers.\* The popular belief in England appears to be that his father was a poor woodcutter,—in France, that he was a brigand; both accounts are equally untrue, but it is not difficult to trace their origin. The elder Antonelli owned a small patrimony, on which he had some olive plantations. He was a man of some influence in his district, and it appears that during the French occupation he was able to render important services to the cause of his exiled sovereign. The whole family was either secretly or openly opposed to the French, and one of his relatives was shot by the carbineers of Murat. In Italy opposition to the established government, especially if it takes the form of the *guerilla*, is commonly styled brigandage; and hence it is likely that this legend of the elder Antonelli having been a brigand, or leagued with brigands, arose from his having given assistance of one kind or another to the anti-French party in the kingdom of Naples. However this may be, it is certain that on the restoration of King Ferdinand

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\* There was a Cardinal Leonard Antonelli in the Sacred College during the pontificates of Pius VI. and Pius VII. He accompanied the latter to Paris. Some of the memoirs of the late Cardinal Antonelli stated that he claimed kinship with Leonard Antonelli. This, we believe, is incorrect. There was no connection between the families. That of the late Cardinal Antonelli belonged to Sonnino; that of Cardinal Leonard Antonelli to Sinegaglia, the birthplace of Pius IX. Leonard Antonelli was born in 1730, and died in 1811.

Antonelli was rewarded for his services by being granted the right of cutting wood in certain of the royal forests, and he and his two brothers were thus enabled to embark in a very lucrative traffic in timber. The father died while Giacomo was still a boy, and he and his brothers were left to the guardianship of their uncles, thrifty, industrious men, in whose hands the patrimony of the family was rapidly augmented. The mother lived to see her son many years Cardinal and Secretary of State. For her he manifested all the affection of a loving son. Every day, even at the busiest and most anxious periods of his life, when he was all but overwhelmed with state affairs, he found some time to visit her; and we find the last evidence of this filial attachment in his will, where he says: "I desire that my body may be interred in the burying-place of my chapel in the Church of S. Agata alla Suburra, *near my good mother.*" Throughout, indeed, his will testifies that he was a man of warm affections towards all related to him; and the chief value of this document is that it thus gives us a glimpse of his inner life, which adds to his character a pleasing feature of which we would otherwise have been ignorant.

While still a boy, his remarkable intelligence attracted the attention of a friend of the family, who proposed that he should be sent to Rome. On this suggestion his uncles acted, and accordingly he began his studies at the Grand Seminary, not for the priesthood, but for the Prelatura, or—to freely interpret the word—the higher civil and diplomatic service of the state. Most men in England have no idea of what the Prelatura is, or what is the ecclesiastical status of many of the prelates of the Roman Curia: it is a body of men trained in the canon and civil law, and educated mainly for a diplomatic career. Such was Antonelli, and for all practical purposes he was virtually a layman, though actually an ecclesiastic, and bound by his ecclesiastical status to the faithful service of the Pope. After he had completed his legal studies and received orders, he was made a prelate, and, as Mgr. Antonelli, rose rapidly in the service of the Pontifical State. His abilities early attracted the attention of Gregory XVI., and he was entrusted with various important offices. His first employment was in the department of finance, and he acted successively in the districts of Viterbo, Orvieto, and Macerata, as one of the assessors of the superior tribunal which had the control of certain branches of the expenditure of the provinces and communes; for the Pontifical Government watched carefully over the local expenditure, with a view to checking extravagance and guarding the munici-

palities from debt. It would be well for more than one Italian city if the present Government had followed this example. In 1841 he entered the sphere of politics by accepting the office of Under-Secretary of State for the Interior. It was an anxious time. The network of the *Giovine Italia* had spread through a large portion of the States of the Church; the year before there had been an abortive attempt at insurrection in the Romagna, and the Government was watching and counteracting the efforts of the conspiracy, which yearly threatened a new outbreak. At such a time it was that the fortunes of the States, so far as their internal government was concerned, was committed to this young prelate, only thirty-five years of age,—a good proof of the estimate which Gregory had formed of his administrative talents. He held the office three years. In 1844 he returned to the department of finance as Second Treasurer, and in the following year he was placed at the head of the department as Prefect of the Pontifical Treasury. The enemies of the Church and of the Holy See have honoured Antonelli by persistently libelling him. This has been done by every one of the tribe, from pamphleteers writing under Imperial patronage seventeen years ago down to some of the anonymous writers who sketched his life for the London papers last November. We have already referred to the myth that made him the son of a brigand; but this was not a matter of such serious importance or of such deliberate malice as the oft-repeated insinuation that as Prefect of the Treasury he had found means to divert some of the public funds under his charge to the increase of his private fortune, the libeller generally adding that there was the excuse of precedent for such speculation, as every Pontifical treasurer had regarded it as a kind of perquisite. The story is almost too absurd to need refutation. In the first place the small revenues of the Roman State left little room for such financial manoeuvres as would enrich an unworthy treasurer; in the second, quite apart from his character, we have documentary evidence that Antonelli never possessed the "colossal fortune" of which we have heard so much. He was, of course, a rich man, but his wealth was not extraordinary; the basis of his fortune, such as it was, had come from the industry of his father and uncles, and he had, as he acknowledges in his will, increased it, as a man can who has some capital, and invests it with ordinary prudence. His office of Secretary of State only brought him £500 a year,—less than many a head clerk in London receives from his employers. But he was, like his father, a thrifty man, of simple habits, nor did he spend much, therefore, on himself. For the rest

we have the best testimony to Antonelli's probity in the words of Pius IX., addressed to the consistory in which he raised him to the purple. On the death of Gregory, Antonelli was maintained in his office of Minister of Finance, till, a year after the accession of Pius IX., he was called to higher and more prominent dignities. In the consistory of June 11th he was made Cardinal,\* and in his address to the assembled Princes of the Church the Holy Father said of the new cardinal:—

"We feel sure that you will all give a warm reception to another member, whom we have resolved to add to your order. It is our beloved son, Giacomo Antonelli, a man distinguished by his character, his integrity, his virtue, and his zeal for religion, and who, after having displayed alike courage and ability in the discharge of many and grave functions, has filled the office of Prefect of our Pontifical Treasury. In the exercise of the office we have recognized his incorruptible fidelity, his indefatigable labours, his great talent, his skill and prudence in the management of affairs, so that in decorating him with the purple, we have in view not the importance of the office that he has filled, but the merits by which he has won our confidence and our especial goodwill."† With these words of Pius IX. we may close our brief sketch of the earlier part of Antonelli's career. Higher praise than this could not have been given to him; and no one can read the words without seeing that the Pontiff intended them to convey their full meaning, and that they expressed his feelings towards his faithful servant, and not a mere conventional compliment.

We can do little more than glance at the subsequent years of the late Cardinal, and endeavour to form an estimate of his character as a statesman. He took his part in the attempt which the Pope made to introduce into the Roman Government constitutional forms based to some extent on the English, or rather the French, model. The experiment was made, and failed. That it was made cannot be regretted. It proved conclusively that the Romans did not understand and could not work under a so-called constitutional *régime*, and that the personal government and local institutions of the Pontifical rule were far better adapted to the character and genius of the people; and whatever system had been adopted, the outbreak

\* The other prelates who were made cardinals on this occasion were Bofondi, Dean of the Rota; Giraud, Archbishop of Cambrai; and Dupont, Archbishop of Bourges. All the four are now dead.

† "Annales Ecclesiastiques," appended to last Paris edition of Rohrbach's "Histoire de l'Eglise."



of 1848 was inevitable—Rome could not possibly have escaped the contagion of revolt. Although, so far as we can judge, he was opposed in feeling to the inauguration of a Parliamentary régime, Antonelli loyally seconded the efforts of Pius IX. He was premier of the first ministry under the new constitution, and President of the Consulta, or Council of State. In the spring of 1848, seeing the tendency towards a revolution which was rapidly developing itself in Rome, he took the wise step of resigning his office. His resignation enabled him to act unofficially as one of the chief advisers of the Pope; and soon he virtually occupied the position he afterwards publicly attained—that of his most trusted friend and assistant in the administration of the States and in dealing with foreign powers. On the fall of Mamiani's ministry in August the cabinet of Count Rossi was formed, and it is said that the selection of the new minister was largely due to Antonelli's advice. Then came the November revolution, the attack on the Quirinal, the flight of the Pope, events which have been the theme of many pens, and which must be familiar to all who read these pages. Antonelli remained in Rome until the Pope was safe at Gaeta, then he followed him, and during his exile acted as his secretary in all affairs of State. It was he who drew up the protests against the usurpation of the Holy Father's rights by the Roman revolutionists, and the appeal for the armed intervention of Austria, France, Spain, and Naples, which was signed with his own name on the part of the Pope. Antonelli was always an able writer of State papers. M. Veuillot protests that he wrote too much.\* Few will agree with him. We have always regarded Antonelli's despatches as models of clearness, dignity, and solid argument upon the much-vexed Roman question. A collection of them would form a valuable addition to the historical literature of the day. Their value is recognized even by hostile critics. A writer in the "Pall Mall Gazette" justly remarked that "a young attaché could scarcely find a more profitable study than the long series of documents in which the crimes of the sub-Alpine Government against its unoffending neighbour were chronicled for the edification of Europe." And of all these despatches perhaps the most valuable was the appeal for intervention; taken with the previous protest of Pius IX. it forms a complete summary of the events which transpired in the Roman States from the accession of Pius IX. to the advent of the Republic. That appeal was promptly answered;

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\* "Trop de gout pour les négociations et les vaines écritures caractère marqué des gens de bureaux."—*Univers*, Dec. 9.

and but for the duplicity of the French President, the schemes of his agent Lesseps, and the overbearing conduct of the French commander, Rome would probably have been taken without firing a shot. As it was, the French troops did not know at first whether they came to maintain or to overthrow the Republic; and fruitless negotiations delayed the siege, till a strong revolutionary army had been assembled, and then Rome was taken by sheer hard fighting.

On April 12th, 1850, while the Pope was still at Gaeta, Antonelli was appointed Secretary of State, the chief civil dignity in the Pontifical States, and the highest which he could attain without being ordained a priest. As Secretary he returned to Rome with Pius IX., and this office he held till his death—that is, for a period of more than twenty-six years. We doubt if in any country in Europe there has been such a ministry, prolonged over so long a period. His continuance in office depended not on the varying votes of a Parliament, but on the confidence of his master; and that he won and kept for thirty years the friendship and confidence of Pius IX. is for us a sufficient testimony to his worth. Seldom, if ever, had a minister to deal with such a course of events as those which marked the administration of Antonelli. The capital, except for one short happy period, was held by the troops of a sovereign, who, with friendly words upon his lips, was secretly undermining the temporal dominion of the Sovereign Pontiff, while Italy was revolutionized from the Alps to Sicily, and there was scarcely a month for more than ten years when an invasion was not threatened or actually imminent. From the congress of Paris till the storming of the Porta Pia, from 1856 to 1870, the diplomatic campaign against the temporal rights of the Holy See never ceased for a moment. It filled up all the intervals of military aggression, and it did not give a truce for a single day. Throughout Antonelli did all that could be done to meet and foil the designs of the French emperor and his Piedmontese allies. When the idea of the Italian League was revived in 1859 he gave it his hearty support; and he was about to set out for the conference on the affairs of Italy when the Napoleonic pamphlet, "*Le Pape et Le Congres*," appeared, and he refused to have anything further to do with a proposal which evidently was only a mask for hostile designs. Protest after protest, despatch after despatch, issued from his pen; we cannot enumerate, far less analyze them here; to do so would be to write the history of Italy during the last seventeen years. Of the final result of his policy we can give no better estimate than that of a writer in a journal by no means friendly to his memory and to the

cause for which he struggled so manfully. Its only value is that it comes *ex ore inimici*. "We cannot be sure," said a writer in the "Standard" (of Nov. 9), "we cannot be sure that his policy may not bear fruit. Claims which have been preserved intact are ready at any moment for revival. Napoleon's dictum as to the hundred thousand men always at the back of the Pope is as true as ever; and, in the present state of Europe, there is no knowing but that some day the opportunity may come for the *révanche* for which Antonelli seemed always to be patiently waiting and working."

This is true, but that it is so is not due to Antonelli only. It is chiefly the result of the unflinchingly determined attitude maintained by the Pope himself. And here we must notice the error which appears to run through almost every article upon Antonelli which has appeared in the non-Catholic press. The writers, almost without exception, speak of Pius IX. as if he were a mere *roi fainéant*, while Antonelli is regarded as the prime mover in and the inspirer of every act of temporal policy, and even of the chief spiritual acts of the Holy Father. Antonelli was assuredly one of the ablest statesmen of the day; but without Pius IX. what would he have been? would his name have held a place in history? There is no need to answer the question. His one glory is that he faithfully served Pius IX. He did not lead him—he advised, and he obeyed. There were times when minister and sovereign disagreed upon questions of policy,\* there were times when Antonelli proposed concessions which Pius IX. rejected, but the faithful secretary never for a moment hesitated to adopt the line of action pointed out to him. A lesser man would have recoiled in fear from the task before him, but Antonelli knew not fear when his master pointed out the way. We have already referred to M. Veuillot's estimate of the Cardinal's career; we must quote now from that article words with which we thoroughly concur. They form a splendid tribute to his memory.

"Doubtless," says M. Veuillot, "while Pius IX. heroically pursued his course through this chaos, his minister, inspired by considerations of prudence, at times counselled retreat (*donna des conseils recalcitrants*). He had only the feet of a

\* It is supposed that the organization of the Papal army by Lamoricière and De Merode did not meet with Antonelli's full approval, and that the mixed foreign and native army was never a favourite institution with him, although but for that army the Vatican Council would never have met. Rome would have been occupied first by Garibaldi, then by Victor Emmanuel in September, 1867.

man with which to tread a path marked out for the footsteps of an angel. It is to his credit that he gave expression to his fears, and at the same time it is to his credit that he remained beside his master, who, without disregarding them, none the less refused to yield. He spoke as a Minister of State whose duty it was to follow the guidance of human reason. But as deacon he obeyed and followed his bishop, who was guided by light from God. Minister and sovereign were alike faithful each to his post and faithful to one another. But these are things which our age will not understand. A few months before his death, Cardinal Antonelli, feeling that his end was near, said to a French lady, 'Thanks be to God, I trust that I have never been found wanting in the respect I owe my master. When I could not go to offer him my salutations, I have had myself carried to him.' The man who, when about to appear before God, could bear such testimony to his own life, needs no other funeral oration."

This, then, was Cardinal Antonelli's position—he was the faithful servant and the trusted Minister of State of Pius IX., but he was not "the red Pope," governing the Church through the Pontiff, as it has been the fashion to represent him. One favourite idea of contemporary journalism appears to be that to Antonelli we owe the Vatican Council and the definition of the dogma of Papal Infallibility. The probability is that Antonelli took no further part in the preliminaries of the Council than to consider in what way it would be affected by and would influence the position of the Papacy in its relations with foreign powers. He secured for it a peaceful place of meeting, and he vindicated its freedom from diplomatic interference on the part of certain of the Catholic powers; this was his share in the inauguration of the great Council of 1869–70. He did the statesman's part: he never would have dreamed of intruding into the domain of the theologian. That he "conceived" the idea of Papal Infallibility, and put forward the dogma as a counterpoise to the coming loss of the Temporal Power, is a legend that could only have originated in the fertile field of English journalism, and among men who profoundly misunderstand the Church's principles.

It cannot be said that Antonelli ever enjoyed anything like popularity. His policy was too steadfastly faithful to the interests of the Holy See to make him anything but one of the *bêtes noires* of the Liberals, and not unfrequently even Catholics misjudged him. They wished to see him adopt a bolder policy; but they forgot the difficult position in which he stood, they overlooked the fact that the so-called protector of Rome was one of the worst enemies of the Temporal Power, and that

at any moment, by a single despatch from the Tuileries, the French garrison might have been converted into a menace instead of a defence. So it was that Antonelli heard himself calumniated by foes and misjudged by friends, even by those who stood with him at the foot of the Pontifical throne. But through good report and evil report he remained silent: to the world he left nothing in his own defence but a single paragraph in his will.\* With Pius IX. he trusted, and with good reason, to the great Pontiff's knowledge of men and of his own career. For the fleeting breath of popular applause or blame he cared nothing. He satisfied his master and his own conscience, and that was enough for him. For nearly thirty years he lived, we may say, under the eye of Pius IX.; more than twenty-five years of this period he lived in the Vatican, and since the day of Porta Pia he never left its walls. As a voluntary captive, he shared his master's imprisonment. This is the one great testimony to Antonelli's character which exceeds all others. One man in this world knew him thoroughly, that man was Pius IX., and Antonelli remained his friend and adviser to the end. Before this one fact all adverse criticism of his policy must be silent. His name will live in history associated with the Pontificate of Pius IX., as that of Consalvi is linked with the no less troubled years of Pius VII. Consalvi was more successful because he lived in a different age, when political forces existed in Europe which could be directed to attaining that success. Placed in the same circumstances Antonelli would have been as successful as Consalvi. Like him he was one of the great race of Roman Cardinal-statesmen. The "Times" suggests that he is almost the last. If so, the world must be near its end, for Rome will be a school of statesmanship to the end of time. We believe the world will see statesmen of the Sacred College as able as Antonelli, and more fortunate. Cast as his lot was in the most difficult of times, he was a perfect type of the Cardinal-statesman—a man well trained to govern men, and whose office was not regarded as the prize of party warfare, but was a high mission entrusted to him by God's Vicar on earth, and

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\* This one paragraph refers to the insinuations commonly made against his conduct as treasurer. "Before proceeding to dispose of my private fortune," he says, "I declare that I do not possess any other capital beyond that which came from the heritage of my excellent father, or which I have been able to acquire through the means left me by him. I protest, therefore, against all the calumnies which on that and on any other account whatsoever have been in so many ways circulated through the world, before God who is to judge me, and before Him I forgive from my heart all those who have tried to do me evil."

executed not in the fear of a critical press or a hostile platform, but in the fear of his God.

If Cardinal Antonelli was a good type of the statesman, another of the College of Cardinals has just passed away who was a type of the Cardinal-Priest—the Grand-Vicar Patrizi, the Dean of the Sacred College. He was a man whose saintly life and abundant charities made him the most popular and the most respected of the Roman Cardinals. More than four-fifths of his large income went to the poor and to the churches, and Prince of the Church as he was, he might often have been seen exploring courts and lanes, and ascending narrow stairs to sit at the bedside of some poor sick man. He was one of the few surviving Cardinals of the Pontificate of Gregory XVI.,\* and as Cardinal-Vicar it fell to his lot to preside at the conclave which elected Pius IX., to whom he was always warmly attached. In Antonelli and Patrizi the Holy Father has lost two of his best friends.

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\* Only six of the Cardinals created by Gregory XVI. now survive. These are Cardinals De Angelis, Casoni, Asquini, Di Traetto, Von Schwarzenberg, and Amat, now Dean of the Sacred College.

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#### ART. IV.—ROMAN HISTORY A FOREMOST BULWARK OF THE CHRISTIAN CAUSE AGAINST THE ANTICHRIST OF OUR TIMES.

[We do not necessarily identify ourselves with the following essay of Mr. Formby's, which is to be followed by one further paper. But we cannot but be doing service to the good cause by placing before our readers the matured speculation of a writer so profoundly imbued with Catholic principles.]

*The signs of the times portend the rise and growth of a dominant intellectual and political atheism common to all the nations, one powerful and providential defence against which consists in a right system of teaching Roman History.*

IT is of course a point of no little importance for the advocate in any public cause to gain the goodwill of his readers as quickly and as effectually as possible, by his being seen to apply himself in earnest to the task of economizing their time. However, as regards the matter which I have here to treat, I fully expect it will prove to be one which is exposed on so many sides to the danger

brevis esse laboro

obscurus fio,

that, with every desire to avoid prolixity, I fear it will not be possible to render adequate justice to the subject except upon the terms of a proximate observance only of the rule of brevity. But what is of more importance than the question of brevity is the still greater question, under what form do you propose to appear? Are we, it will be said to me, to look upon you as a lecturer, or as some professed essayist, or do you come forward, perchance, as a reformer, or as some terrible prophet of Israel to rebuke us for our backslidings and shortcomings; or are we to receive you only as some bold speculator in search of a platform for propounding some new and original views? In a word, what is the particular purpose for which you come before us, with what good and useful end in view do you propose to occupy our time, and in what character are we to receive you?

I am, then, neither a lecturer nor an essayist, for the subject that I have to treat concerns the welfare of the Catholic cause much too deeply, and, to use a familiar phrase, goes far too much into the quick to be treated after the manner of the

lecturer or the essayist. I am, again, neither a reformer nor still less a prophet, for the simple reason that I have no mission for either office, and as for wanting a mere platform for some new and original views, this I could neither ask nor succeed in obtaining from the DUBLIN REVIEW. However, if I am to disclaim all the above-mentioned characters, in any one of which it would at least be intelligible what I professed to be, my readers will naturally inquire, in what unknown character, then, do you intend to appear? And in reply I should wish to say to them that if they will kindly consent we may help ourselves out of a difficulty that would otherwise be mutual, by having recourse to that which is familiarly known to all jurists, as well those of the more ancient school of Roman law as that of their more modern brethren of the British courts, as their legal fiction. I do not know that our fiction will need to have any particular name invented for it, for we shall have recourse to it only so long and so far as we may find it useful to our mutual purpose, and we shall always be at perfect liberty to abandon and to throw it overboard whenever we find it to be to our advantage to do so. I think however that our fiction will, at any rate for a time, prove of very great service to us. At least, it will have one very signal good effect, it will set me quite right with my readers, as one who does not profess to claim the shadow of any authority for his words, more than what their intrinsic worth may appear to be in the eyes of those to whom they are addressed, while I cannot but likewise hope that all concerned will fully perceive and duly appreciate the excellent moral of the analogy of the Roman legion, which invariably entered hostile territory and stood confronting its adversaries on the condition of being honourably victorious over them, or otherwise, of being ignominiously and disastrously routed and defeated by them. His Eminence Cardinal Manning has publicly said at Nottingham "in the cause of education under God all is made to depend on ourselves," which, in other words, is to say, We Catholics are the Roman legion, surrounded by open enemies and doubtful spectators; if we act the true part of the Roman legion, with the help of God and His saints, we may hope for an honourable victory; if we act as idlers and cowards, and fail to understand the work that is before us, we shall beyond doubt have to sustain nothing but disaster and defeat. Surely in this is contained some extremely wholesome and serviceable truth.

But in this there is a little anticipation, for I have not as yet explained the nature of my proposed fiction, which is, that my readers should for the occasion join with me in supposing themselves to be the various officers in commission, tribunes,

centurions, and others of a Roman legion which is under its standards in its camp. We are holding a council of war on the prospects that are before us, for it has become generally known to us that we are about to be confronted with a number of new and formidable adversaries, with whose tactics and system of warfare we are but very imperfectly acquainted, having had extremely little actual experience of them, and having been indeed almost disposed to entertain doubts whether such adversaries had any other existence except in the brains of those who are always foremost, right or wrong, to sound the note of alarm.

Under protection, then, of the fiction, and in the character of the centurion to whose turn it has come to speak his mind, I may be supposed to say to my brother tribunes and centurions, "It does not become us to be alarmists; but, on the other hand, it is not for us to shut our eyes to what we have plainly placed before us. We have before us the fact, that the public legislature of the country has made a clean sweep of all Christianity out of the primary schools which receive aid from the public treasury for the four hours during which their former recognized private and citizen character is now legally abrogated, in order to constitute them, for these said four hours, public elementary schools, under the Act of Parliament, with their Christianity swept out of them, so far as this can be done by an Act of Parliament, as effectually as the most zealot Hebrew ever set himself to the task of sweeping his house clean of leaven to prepare for his Passover.

Unless we were to prefer not to see what is before us, we ought here to say to ourselves, there is one and one only power on earth that would desire to sweep the primary schools of any country clear of their Christianity for any imaginable motive, and this power is "Antichrist." When we have before us the fact that the primary schools of the country are thus swept clear of their Christianity by a public law, we come in presence of the fact that it is Antichrist who has prevailed for the making of the law. Illusion on this point is quite unworthy of those who, whether they will or no, must come in contact with facts. Besides, what have we to gain by indulging in illusions? Will illusions repeal the anti-Christian law? or will they stand in the way of its producing its anti-Christian fruits? It may be true that public legislation in the country where we are has not as yet advanced as far in its anti-Christian path as it has done in the neighbouring country of Germany, but then this raises nothing more than a question as to the time that may be required for the two legislations to become on a par with each other. They are both

fairly started in the one and the same anti-Christian path, and it is for the present moment only that one is partly in advance of the other. Would illusions be of any advantage to those who are in Germany? Would they release the bishops and the priests from the prisons into which the more advanced anti-Christian legislation of Germany has cast them? Will our illusions, should we be disposed to indulge in them, deliver us any the more from precisely the same enemy, because he has for the present failed to make himself fully as powerful, where we are, as he has succeeded in making himself in Germany?

It is plain then that there is nothing whatever to be gained from indulging in illusions. Polished and educated unbelief knows perfectly well what we are, and even could we be supposed to entertain the thought of making a truce with it, in order to try to live together in peace, it knows very much better than to be willing to tolerate and make common cause with such as we are. Let us go into Germany and ask why those who are in power there cannot live at peace with such as we are, and we shall very soon have our answer,—that German unbelief will simply not have such as we are close by itself. Is there any radical difference between English unbelief and German unbelief? Is there any nationality in Antichrist that anti-Christian power should be a different thing in one nation from what it is in another? If a Roman legion could perchance cease to be a Roman legion, deny itself, and become merged in the unbelief with which it is surrounded, then no doubt there might be a kind of peace; but what a disgrace would there not be here?

II. Between belief and unbelief then, we may take it to be an axiom that there never can be peace. The keen-witted infidel intelligence of our times is not only manifestly a growing power, but it is quite wide enough awake to know that it has only one real opponent in the world that is able to stand up against it. An Established Church, or as many forms of dissent as you like from an Established Church, these are things that are simple chaff before the wind. The Roman legion alone is a real power, and between this legion and the infidel cause peace is a simple impossibility.

The reason of this impossibility of peace is quite easy to understand. Both are powers that claim to have the right of forming and cultivating the human understanding. The Roman Church is a power that has claimed and exercised this right in a very undisputed manner from the very first, the infidel or anti-Christian cause is only in the first infancy, so to speak, of its asserting its rights in any organized form. Two such wholly

opposite powers, each claiming the same functions as their legitimate and special prerogatives, cannot but come into collision one with the other over the adjustment of their respective claims. "What society," says S. Paul, "is there between light and darkness?" and an earlier authority says, "what agreement has the earthen pot with the iron kettle; for if they come into contact with each other, it shall be broken" (Ecclus. xiii. 3). Both claimants assert their claim to have the direction and formation of the human understanding, and though it may be true that an experiment is being made to try if a sort of neutral territory designated as the three "R's" cannot be discovered, and applied to the exigencies of a precarious attempt at joint partnership, as regards primary schools, no one can entertain the least reasonable doubt but that in precisely the same proportion as the three "R's" pass from the discipline of acquiring mere capacities into the higher reality of obtaining positive knowledge even in the primary schools, all possibility of concord and agreement must come to an end. What possible mutual terms can there be between belief and unbelief,—"*Quæ conventio Christi ad Belial?*"\* (2 Cor. vi. 15).

All human knowledge either bears witness for Christ or against Him. By His being lifted up on the Cross He has, as He said He would do, "drawn all things to Himself," and hence, while there may be a sort of doubtful neutrality in capacities, the future use of which has yet in a great measure to be determined, there can be no neutrality in the positive knowledge which these capacities are by-and-by to be employed in acquiring. There is, however, one province of human knowledge to which so pre-eminent a part is given in forming the human mind and its intelligence, that the rising infidel power is certain to seek to lay its grasp upon it, and to try to wrest it out of our hands to whom it exclusively

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\* Should any one think the ideas expressed above to be exaggerated, let him read the following passage from a work recently published in Germany by the Pantheist Hartman, a zealous partizan of the German "*Kulturkampf*." His book, "*Die Religion der Zukunft*" (the Religion of the Future), has the following passage. "The true meaning of the *Kulturkampf* (the education battle) is the answer to the following question. 'Taking humanity as it is at the present day, ought we to give the first place to the future or to the present life, to the spiritual or to the temporal, to eternity or to the present world?' . . . . There are many who speak and write of the 'cry for, education,' but there are only a few who understand that this is the last desperate struggle that the Christian idea is making before it disappears from the stage, and that modern civilization is disposed to defend its conquests by having recourse to the most extreme measures . . . . Modern civilization and Christianity are in contradiction with each other, one of the two must disappear before the other" (p. 49).

belongs: this province is Roman History, and from this moment forward the entire sum of all that I have to say concentrates itself solely and exclusively upon this one question of Roman History, and the manner in which I shall contend we should from the present time forward study how to make use of Roman History as one of the foremost bulwarks of the Christian cause, which the providence of God places in our hands in the way of special defence against the continually advancing antagonist power of the infidel and anti-Christian cause. All, therefore, that I have said hitherto, has been directed to lead up to this one special subject, and to engage us to fix the whole of our undivided attention on this one all-important matter for deliberation.

III. Nothing then is more according to the way of life of the Roman legion than that it should have to expect and to be prepared for an attack, and we must indeed be fallen back into the condition of those to whom the very cackling of geese is necessary to rouse them to the perception of the presence of the enemy, if we could bring ourselves to think that the infidel and anti-Christian cause will leave us in peaceable possession of Roman History. I fancy to myself, indeed I already perceive the sound of their scaling ladders, and that I detect their war-cry.

"How come such as you," I think I already hear them exclaim, "to pretend to claim Roman History as yours, and profess to be its teachers. Was not this Roman power, of whose history you constitute yourselves the interpreters and set yourselves up as its teachers, the very power that on your own showing passed an unjust sentence of death upon the founder of your religion and your name as Christian. Has it not also on your own showing been the very deadliest and most irreconcilable adversary of your cause? Did it not publicly decree 'Non licet vos esse?' Did it not put in motion all the wonderful machinery of its law courts to exterminate and root you up from off the face of the earth? Was not its religion on your own showing, from the beginning to the end, the worship of the foulest demons, the most degrading and superstitious prostration of men before images of mere wood and stone, with the glorification into the bargain of every abominable vice in honour of the foul demons; to the chief of whom, Jupiter, such actions were publicly attributed without the least shame, that had he only been a citizen he would have been interdicted fire and water, but being the God before whom your great Romans fell down and worshipped, he had priests, temples, and sacrifices. Yet this is the power whose history you must needs insist that it is your prerogative to teach to your youth of both sexes, this is the power whose heroes you studiously set before them as examples and patterns, whose literature you treat as something almost sacred, and as if this was not enough you who are so loud in your professions of the direst horror for idolatry and impurity, actually claim the city which was the head-quarters of



the practice of all these abominations, as the seat of government for your religion. Nay, even more than this, you take the title of the man who was at the head of all these abominations, and you pass it on to your own head calling him 'Pontifex Maximus,' and so little shame and confusion have you for all the glaring vices and idolatries associated with Rome and the name of Roman, that you perpetuate the name Roman in connection with your religion which is called Roman Catholic all over the world. So far from Roman History belonging to you, or such as you, the wonder is how you come to have the hardihood and the effrontery to pretend to justify your having anything whatever to do with it. No, keep you to your prayers and your rosary beads, and leave things proper to men, to those who do not make it a principle, as you are well known to do, 'to confine the understanding and to enslave the soul.'"

To such words as the above we are already not such entire strangers as that we should think it in any degree a piece of superfluous caution to be prepared beforehand with our reply. But a Roman legion is not accustomed to wait to be attacked.

*Tu ne cede malis ced contra audentior ito*

is very much more like the true Roman way of dealing with an adversary.

"You infidel men then," I should say to them, "you cannot help yourselves, you are obliged, whether you will or no, to honour the poet Dante. You could not if you wished it ever so much dethrone him from his seat of eminence. Listen, then, to what he says of you and of such as you. You shall hear more of his words by-and-by, but listen you in the meantime to these, in which he is speaking specially of you: 'O ye most doltish and most vile beasts,' says Dante, 'who feed yourselves in the disguise of men, and presume to speak against our faith'—by-and-by you shall have a little more of Dante's mind, but in the meantime let me say to you, 'What right can you infidels have to pretend to teach Roman History. To you the whole career of the city from its first foundation to the dissolution of its Empire, is a meteor, for the appearance of which you have not a shred of reason to give. Its entire career of conquest is necessarily to you an insoluble enigma, for you do not believe in a Divine appointment which alone can explain it; and as to its final disappearance the most that you can attempt here, is to assign a few secondary and inadequate causes.

Then as to the Christian society having conquered and taken possession of the former Rome by its superhuman powers of endurance, and its having succeeded to the name of Roman, here your courage and your understanding both alike fail you. Here you stand convicted before the face of day, of not knowing what in the world you are to say of this. Accordingly this part of Roman History you think it the part of prudence to pass over in complete silence, though you cannot but know that it is real history quite as much as the first.

And lastly, how are you to be the teachers of a history that rebukes you,

and condemns you, in the most signal manner, at every step you take, even to its very details.

You, for example (1), have set up a principle which you say is necessary for the peace of the nations of the world, namely, that no nation is now to intervene or meddle in the affairs of its neighbour. This is your doctrine so-called of '*Non-intervention*.' And yet you pretend to be teachers of a history, the heroes and great men of which claim and exercise the right of invading and overthrowing all the nations of the world. If you teach this history you cannot teach it without proposing these heroes and great men as models to be imitated, and as examples to be admired. And yet, when you do this, what else will you be doing but proposing for imitation the examples of men, who are therefore commendable for their being seen never to cease doing the very thing which you now say never ought to be done.

Then (2), it is your settled and fixed principle to have no religion, but to set up your human law as supreme over everything that bears the name of Divine law in which you disbelieve. Being such as you are, had you lived under the Roman Empire you would have been interdicted fire and water, as enemies of the commonwealth, and you might even have been made out-laws whom any one might have killed with impunity, and yet you pretend to be teachers of Roman History?

Again (3), you claim the right to change the existing laws of Christian states, and to substitute in their stead other new laws of your own framing, by which you create and make it a crime under these your new laws, for in-offensive and virtuous citizens to practise their duty to God, as they have been in the habit of being taught the same blamelessly and without challenge for many generations; and thereby you come to make duty to God a crime under your new laws, when but for your new laws duty to God would have been no crime whatever against the state, but the same ground of solid merit which it has always been from the first beginning of Christian states. Who has authorized you to make such new laws against the law of God? Now, except you are as completely ignorant of Roman History as you plainly are of your duty to God, you could not fail to know that the Roman Empire never made a single new law or even materially modified any existing law in order to gain any new power of proceeding against the Christians of the Empire. The Roman courts of law never admitted a single proceeding against 'any Christian except' upon laws which already were in existence before Christianity was so much as known. It is of course perfectly true that tortures and death were inflicted upon the Christians in every variety of form, under the operation of these existing laws, but it is not the less true on this account, that it is impossible upon a calm examination of these laws, to do otherwise than readily admit that no blame whatever can attach to the laws themselves. They were one and all just and reasonable laws and necessary for the good government of the commonwealth. It arose inevitably out of the nature of the case, that the letter of the law should appear to be against the Christians, which indeed was what Christ himself foretold, in the words 'it shall come to pass that he who killeth you shall think he is rendering service to God.' The Christians were wrongly believed to be impious breakers of the laws, holders of secret meetings at night and con-

spirators, profane despisers of the existing religion, and dealers in witchcraft and forbidden arts. But you infidels go out of your way to abrogate existing Christian laws and to forge and create new anti-Christian and unknown laws for the avowed anti-Christian purpose of obtaining an entirely new power to oppress and outlaw those whose only crime in your eyes is that you know them to be men who fear God and keep His divine law. The Roman Empire was never chargeable with such guilt as yours, and yet you pretend that you are the teachers of Roman History!

Blind and infatuated men, the work of teaching Roman History is not yours, and never can belong in any sense to men who refuse to believe in God. You must abjure your infidelity, and embrace our faith, unless you wish to see your condemnation stamped and written on every page of it, from Romulus the founder of the city to the last Pope, who seated on S. Peter's Roman chair shall see the end of the world and Christ whose vicar he is come to summon you before His judgment-seat, there to receive the just reward of all your anti-Christian deeds and words. The reason of this is that Roman History in your hands can never be anything more than blind chaos and confusion. It relates the rise of a single city to an universal dominion over the nations of the world, the purpose of which you can never know, the enigma of which you can never solve, the benefits of which you can never dare to explain, for you would accuse yourselves. Its religious spirit condemns you, for you are the very opposite. Its respect for Divine law upbraids you, for on this you trample. You hear one universal voice from every part of the world, from the east and the west, the north and the south, calling Rome the 'Eternal City,' and the very name Eternal makes you turn pale, for none can know better than you do yourselves, that whatever may be your hopes for, and your contentment with the present world, eternity has a sentence of eternal reprobation awaiting you the moment you pass into it unchanged from what you now are.

What then can you, and such as you are, possibly have to do with the history of an Eternal City?"

Now words of this kind I am perfectly free to admit can have no other meaning than to declare war against the faction of the infidels, but against whom are the arms of the Roman legion to be better directed than against this selfsame infidel faction? In the course of the past summer even Archbishop Tait held a meeting at the Palace of Lambeth, to which Dissenting and Nonconformist ministers were invited, in order to consider the best means for opposing the progress of the insidious scepticism and unbelief of the present times, and therefore if there be anything chimerical in the perception of a danger springing from this quarter, at least the chimera is an object of solicitude to others besides ourselves.

IV. But war at once raises the question of armament, and forces us upon the inquiry how we are armed for the war, and particularly for the war with an adversary with whose mode of warfare we have (speaking in an ordinary way), so little

experience. If we have to rescue Roman History out of the grasp of the infidels, and to assert our right to be its only true teachers and interpreters, at least we must remember that in dealing with Roman History we are dealing with the world's history, and that it becomes indispensably incumbent upon us to be able to show not only how the hand of God has guided the whole course of human events in the world of which He is the Sovereign Ruler, but we must be able to give a complete and satisfactory account of the particular part which God has assigned to the city of Rome in shaping the destinies of the world which He never ceases to watch over and to govern.

Here lies the whole gist of the conflict between the respective representatives of the cause of faith and unbelief. The difference between the man of faith and the infidel, is that the one professes to have for his creed that an Almighty God created the earth, placed the human family upon it, having first prepared it for affording man a habitation upon it, and that He has never ceased to watch over and guide the course of events upon it. The infidel denies that God exists, and sees nothing in history but the doubtful record of the strife and wild confusion of men, in the midst of which he must in consequence for ever search in vain to come upon any traces of design or system. The two schools differ from each other as light differs from darkness. And yet if it should notwithstanding be the real state of the case, that those who belong by outward profession to the school of faith, are found in practice to be best satisfied with themselves in their mode of teaching Roman History when they have repeated and re-echoed the manner in which it is taught by the school of the infidels, what must we in this case have to say of the "*miles Romanus*," the Roman soldier of the Christian legion—but that

conjuge barbara

*Turpis maritus vixit, et hostium*

*Proh curia ! inversique mores !*

*Consenuit socerorum in arvis.—Odes, iii. v.*

History taught in the intelligent manner that alone is proper to faith, is the true nutriment of faith, the food of the Christian understanding, the formation of the Christian man. History taught as the infidels teach it, or what amounts to as nearly as possible the same thing (I fail to perceive where there can be any strict material difference), as those teach it, who, without being infidels, are nevertheless content to follow in dumb humility in the footsteps of the infidels, is the ruin of the understanding, and either the nurse of a chronic con-

dition of imbecile wavering between two opposites, or else the food of infidel pride and the gradual formation of the scoffing and sceptical man. Surely here are two very opposite issues.

In material war the main question must always be the armament of the soldier who has to bear the brunt of the battle, and who, if he sees himself to be inadequately armed can never stand up to his fight with the courage and energy necessary to obtain the victory. The Roman legions, again, who for the first time were opposed to the elephants of Pyrrhus, were routed and defeated, because here was an adversary of whom they had for the time being no experience. But then with the never-failing genius of the Roman army, it was not very long before they discovered the secret of coping successfully with their new adversary, and then they were the victors and no longer the vanquished.

The practical question as regards the true method of teaching Roman History must of course ultimately resolve itself into the question of a suitable manual presenting the whole course of the history to the student, so as clearly to lay before his mind the various stages in which the designs of God, as regards the city of Rome, have successively received their several degrees of accomplishment, from the time of the first foundation of the city by Romulus down to the times of the present reigning Sovereign Pontiff Pius IX.

There can be no one question in war of more sovereign importance than the question of the proper arms to put into the hands of the soldiers of the ranks, but at the same time no one maintains that this is a question to be left to the soldiers of the ranks to determine for themselves. On the contrary, it is one that occupies the minds more or less of all to whom the welfare of the army and the honour of the country is an object of solicitude, while, by their obligation of office, it of course appertains to the chief military authorities. And what has always been true of the science of material war, and what actually exhibits itself at the present day in experiments with the Henry-Martini rifle, armour-plating for ships of war, and eighty-one ton pieces of ordnance, is equally true of the warfare that belongs to the higher spiritual order. Hence S. Paul says to us "*Induite vos armaturam Dei ut possitis stare adversus insidias diaboli,*" and again, "*Propterea accipite armaturam Dei ut possitis resistere in die malo et in omnibus perfecti stare*" (Ephes. vi. 11 and 13). The armament of God for the needs of the Church will certainly vary in form and character with the ever-varying times and circumstances, and the same wide-awake creative energy which characterized the Roman army of ancient

Rome, and which procured for its legions the victory over all the various tribes and people whither they carried their arms, is equally a need of the Christian Roman legions. For are they not charged with the Christian mission of going into all the nations of the world to subdue their various populations to the yoke of Christ, "in captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi?" (2 Cor. x. 5).

I can here in no way pretend to assert that the time is by any means come for proceeding to the work of producing an improved manual of Roman History. Take the analogous case in the order of material warfare. How much careful experimenting has not preceded the choice of such a weapon as the Henry-Martini rifle for the British infantry, and yet the best informed military authorities are by no means satisfied that it may not after all be found necessary to throw it aside and to adopt a weapon of another construction. On the contrary, I merely maintain that we have first to come to the clear conviction that our existing system of teaching Roman History is radically defective, and absolutely fails to render Roman History the true "*armatura Dei adversus insidias diaboli*," which the Providence of God, as I contend, has designed that this history should prove in our hands. For of course if Divine Providence has designed that we should find an irresistible power in this history, not only for defence but also for attack against the adversaries of the latter days, the infidels and the sceptics, Divine Providence has certainly never designed that we should humbly learn from them the proper mode of teaching it.

If Roman History then is really designed in the Providence of God to serve the Christian cause in the manner in which I contend that it is designed, and if our manner of teaching it labours, as I further contend, under a radical defect, which completely annuls what God has designed, this it must be plain becomes a serious matter which will not bear to be trifled with. Any deliberate allegation to the effect that our system is thus seriously defective, undoubtedly merits to be made the subject of a most searching and elaborate inquiry. To the purposes then of such an inquiry I shall now devote the remainder of what I have here to say, regretting, however, what nevertheless cannot well be avoided, the necessarily brief and skeleton manner in which I must conduct it.

V. It has plainly appeared then from what has preceded, that the real question in debate between us on the one hand whose duty as the supposed Roman legion of our fiction, is to bring in our several localities the populations of the various nations to the faith of Jesus Christ and to preserve and



educate them in it, and on the other hand, the faction of the sceptics and infidels who reject all belief in Him, is the question of the visible proofs of the presence of God in the course of events, and in the actions of men. In other words, our contention against the infidels and the sceptics is, that while God manifests Himself generally in all history, which is the record of human actions, He manifests Himself in an especial manner in the history of the wonderful city, which, as a matter of fact, no one denies to be associated in a most singular manner with the destiny of the nations of the earth. While then it appertains, as I affirm, to the Christian side to contend, that the wonderful career of the city of Rome both has been from the beginning and will be to the end (which is not yet come), entirely ruled and governed by a special Divine appointment,—it must be perfectly plain, on the other side, that the faction of the sceptics and infidels, whose efforts are at all times directed to eliminate as much as possible any recognition of a Divine appointment from their pages of history, either already hold or very quickly will hold the doctrine of a special Divine appointment of the city of Rome as a mark for their deepest scorn and even execration.

Now I was brought up under a discipline and a system of schooling which was undoubtedly intended to make me a Christian. I learned the classics as all others do to whom the great privilege of a liberal education is given. I of course learned the history of the city of Rome, at first through a manual in the English language, and afterwards from the texts of Livy, Tacitus, and Polybius. Did I derive from passing through my course of studies, which, be it observed, were directly intended to make me a Christian (and a Christian is a man who is supposed to believe in God and in His government of the world), did I derive from my studies any conception, the most faint and remote that could be, that the city of Rome was constituted by Divine appointment to be the pivot and turning-point in the destinies of the various nations, tribes, and people of the earth? I may doubtless have heard the phrase, the "Eternal City" applied to Rome. Did my reputed Christian education afford me the slightest clue of any kind whatsoever, to understand what could be the reason of the city of Rome being called the "Eternal City"? "Eternal" is not a word to be bandied about as an idle compliment. I need not say that I came out of my studies as innocent as the new-born infant of any knowledge whatsoever as to the city of Rome having anything whatever to do with the present affairs of the world, in consequence of any Divine appoint-

ment, and no Hottentot fresh from his bush life could have his mind more absolutely blank than mine was on the question, for what good reason Rome could now bear the name of the "Eternal City"? Rome was associated in my mind with a large number of extraordinary notabilities, it is hard to say whether belonging most to the air, the earth, or the sea, which were said to be its gods, Faunus, Picus, and Janus, Egeria, Ceres, Juno, and Neptune. There were of course also wonderful examples of heroic virtue, the remembrance of which I hope never to lose, there being few and rare similar examples in any other history; but as to being taught to look for the presence of God in Roman History or for His having had anything whatever to do with the foundation of the city, with its career and rise to universal empire over the world, I never remember to have heard a single word to that effect from any teacher, and I certainly never met with so much as a hint of anything of the kind in any book that ever came in my way. When, therefore, later in life, I began, one after another, to come upon and to discover the marks and proofs of God having laid His hands upon the city of Rome, from its very first foundation, and of His having sent this city into the world to execute His own mission in it, I could only exclaim like Jacob, "Vere Dominus est in loco isto et ego nesciebam!"

I am not able to say how far and to what extent our Catholic youth who pass through their classical studies, and who receive substantially the same liberal education which I received, find themselves in the same predicament in which I found myself on coming out of mine. I hope they have all fared very much better, but as far as I have had evidence come in my way as to the state of the case with them, I do not easily see what it is that can have very greatly improved their condition over what mine then was.

Yet this absence of God from Roman History (how far and to what extent it is characteristic of Catholic places of education I will not attempt to determine) is at least not a Catholic tradition coming down from the ages of faith. In proof of this I will cite the following passage from a work in prose of the Catholic poet Dante. I prefer to cite this rather than any one or more of the numerous passages from the "*Commedia Divina*," which would equally serve my purpose, because Dante being perfectly well known as a representative man of his time, if ever there was one, and a proficient in Catholic philosophy and theology, as these were taught in the period of the middle ages, he may be considered as a more impartial and trustworthy witness when he speaks in his sober prose than he might be regarded as speaking in what might be perhaps

called his more transcendental poetry. There is a ring of the true metal of faith in the words I am about to quote that does good to the very soul, in these days of the contemptible inanity and emptiness of unbelief.

VI. O ineffable and incomprehensible wisdom of God (thus Dante writes), who for the time of Thy coming down upon earth, in Syria, madest such great preparation for Thyself, both there and likewise here in Italy. O ye most doltish and most vile beasts who feed yourselves in the disguise of men, and presume to speak against our faith, and who wish to know by your fine-drawn spinings and your excavatings, what God has ordered with such marvellous prudence; ill betide you and your presumption, and every one who believes in you. And, as has been said at the end of the preceding chapter, the Roman power not only derived its birth from God, but also the whole of its career. For, if we consider the seven kings who first governed the city, Romulus, Numa, Tullius, Ancus, and the three of the Tarquin family\* who became, as it were, the tutors and guardians of its childhood, we may find from the Roman historians, especially Livy, that they were of different dispositions exactly suited to the circumstances of their reign. Next, if we consider its adolescence and the manner in which it was emancipated from its tutorship under kings by Brutus the first Consul, up to Cæsar, its first supreme chief, we shall find that it was raised to its pre-eminence, not by mere human citizens, but by men of God, unto whom not a mere human love, but a love that came from God, was breathed, that they might love their city. And this neither could nor ought to have been, except for an end specially intended by God, in the heavenly pouring out of His gift. And who shall venture to say that Fabricius was without a holy inspiration, to enable him to refuse an untold amount of gold through the resolve not to give up his country. (Here follows a list of the names of great Romans: Curius, Torquatus, Brutus, Regulus, and others.)

Unquestionably it ought to be manifest, when we remember what the lives of these men were, not to mention many others more than ordinary men, that so many holy and marvellous operations could never have existed without a certain measure of the light of divine goodness, supervening over their naturally noble qualities.

For this reason, what more can or ought we to desire to see than that a special birth into existence, and a specially-appointed career, was that which was planned and ordained of God, for the Holy City, Rome?—(Dante, "*Il Convito*," ch. v. trattato iv.)

Where have we, I may ask, in the ordinary working system of teaching Roman History in our schools, I will not say the full and vigorous statement of the truth here set forth by Dante, but what may pass for a faint and subdued echo of it? What do the youth who come forth from our schools into the battle of life, where they have to confront and stand up un-

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\* Dante appears to count Servius Tullius as associated with the Tarquins through being the father-in-law of the last Tarquin.

abashed in the presence of the multitude of young sceptics and infidels who abound in our towns, learn about Rome having been a city "planned of God in its birth, and directed by Him during the whole of its career"? I hope, indeed, that they may learn a great deal more, *viva voce* to this effect than appears in the actual text of the manuals of Roman History in the English language that are accessible to them (as far as these are known to me). If Dante had to form his opinion of us from the literal text of such manuals as we possess in our language, it would be rather a critical point to have to speculate upon the judgment he would be likely to form about us; but then, as I contend, if defects exist in these manuals, we are not in any way bound to them, we have the future before us, and, like the Roman army, we can always improve both our tactics and our armament.

VII. However, before we could be reasonably summoned to surrender abruptly to the above ideas of the poet Dante, a very pregnant and important question occurs which ought first to be properly sifted and examined. "Will the above ideas of Dante bear to be weighed in the scales?" On a question of this weighty import, it must be evident that it is out of my power to give any decision; but nevertheless I think that the ideas of Dante are those which proceed from faith, and that they are consequently those that in the end will have to stand, and for this conviction I offer the following reasons.

My first appeal then, here, shall be to the common sense of men, for in any question as to whether the hand of God is or is not manifested in the affairs of men, God has commonly no surer or more reliable witness to Himself than the common sense of man which He has Himself created.

I may say, then, that the common sense of men must necessarily declare itself, at least in a general way, in favour of Dante's conclusions, and for this I offer the following grounds. Tertullian, S. Augustine, and S. Leo, among the ancients, and Bossuet, with a great number of recent writers of theological treatises for class-students, among the moderns, all distinctly recognize the special Providence of God making use of the existing union of all the nations of the world under the one supreme sceptre of the city of Rome in order to facilitate the spread of the Gospel. Now, I think there is little fear but that the common sense of mankind will be very apt to be invincibly persuaded that God Almighty is not at all likely to do anything by halves, or that there will be anything lame or fragmentary in that which is His work. Consequently, provided it be true that the existing union of the nations of

the world under the sceptre of the city of Rome really was applied by Him to the needs of His Church, the common sense of men will in all probability be irresistibly convinced that God Almighty did not allow Himself to be indebted to the mere chances and vicissitudes of human things, and that He did not leave to these the task of getting ready for His purposes the extraordinary and unprecedented empire which even we go so far as to admit that He really did apply to His own purposes. I think, again (II.), that the common sense of men will likewise be altogether with Dante on another of his pregnant conclusions, his estimate, that is, of the virtues of the great Roman citizens; namely, that God did not refuse to them a certain measure of the light of His Divine goodness, supervening over their naturally noble qualities. We cannot wish to deny the words of Christ, "*Spiritus ubi vult spirat*"; and however justly weight attaches to great theological authorities, their placita are never irreformable. No human intellect, however great, can have the right to prescribe to the Divine Person of the Holy Spirit the limits which He is not to transgress. If it was, therefore, His will to impart suitable gifts to the great Roman citizens, what created power is to stand in the way to prohibit Him from so doing? Considering the universal esteem in which the examples of the great Roman citizens have always been held among the Christian nations, and the persistent way in which they have been proposed for the study and imitation of Christian youth of both sexes, the common sense of mankind, I cannot but think, will again be irresistibly led to perceive the strongest reason of congruity for holding, with Dante, that their virtues were more than mere human virtues, and that the Holy Spirit, having in view the vast multitudes of Christian souls to whom these examples would be proposed, at least side by side with those of the Hebrew people, would not refuse to them "a certain measure of the light of the Divine goodness." Against the placitum of a certain school of theologians, who say that the nations of the world were only under the natural Providence of God (a proposition that lies open to the charge of being singularly indefinite as to its precise meaning), stand the express words of the Sacred Scripture, which speak of the Holy Spirit being sent from on High among the nations of the Gentile world, and that the fruits of His mission were then what they have ever been, and what they always will be, viz., "that the paths of those who live on the earth were corrected, and men came to learn the things that were pleasing to God" (*Wisd. ix.*).

And lastly (III.) why should the common sense of mankind

not also most cheerfully and gladly join heart and hand with Dante in according to the Gentile world before Christ the Divine gift of a Holy City, the central seat of their true reminiscences of God and of His creation and government of the world, and the home and head-quarters of the true traditions of His doctrines and worship inherited from the patriarch Noe. Because it pleased God, as undoubtedly it did, to form an especial choice of the Hebrew nation, and make this nation the subject of a perfectly peculiar treatment, the common sense of mankind will never agree to the monstrous thought, that by this special choice of one particular nation God thereby ceased to have any further care for the other nations. Rather the absolute contrary is the truth. God did not choose the Hebrew nation for its own sake, but in order to make this nation serve the purposes of His charity and solicitude for the welfare of the other nations, in the midst of whom He placed this one nation, that it might be to them, as it were, the candle of God, to give light to all that were in the house; that is to say, in the world.

The very choice of the Hebrew nation thus becomes the plain and obvious proof of the ever watchful solicitude of the Divine Creator for His creatures; and if God was provoked in the end to suffer the various nations one after another to wander away into ways of their own, this was merely the leaving them to themselves for a time, until He should Himself become a man, and should send His preachers among them to bring them to His gospel. But in the meantime even this temporary state of abandonment did not fail to receive many signal proofs of God's care for the nations, which, however, our space does not permit to be enumerated here.

Thus everything conspires together to warrant the conclusion that the common sense of mankind will, at least up to a certain point, sympathize with, and be in favour of Dante's name for Rome as the Holy City of the Gentile world before Christ. Not only will such a city in a manner speak for itself as a good gift of God to men, and as a worthy and most suitable proof of the provident care and love which the Almighty Creator has shown for His creation, but it also appeals in another way most forcibly to the common sense and right understanding of men, as we must proceed to explain.

After God had become a man, He would never, as He has plainly shown, suffer the city which up to this time had been His Holy City of the chosen Hebrew people, but which now forfeited its prerogative by clamouring for His crucifixion and publicly asking that His blood should rest upon it and its people, should become the Holy City and chief seat of govern-



ment for the people out of the nations of the earth who should accept His gospel. Yet if, notwithstanding a Holy City remains indispensable in the nature of things, as a seat for the central government of the Christian people, the common sense of men will undoubtedly firmly grasp hold of the belief that God could not fix upon any city which would be better prepared or more suited to His purposes, than the city which He had already given to the nations of the world to be their Holy City before He became a man. And if this pre-Christian Holy City of the Gentile world was Rome, the common sense of men will very readily perceive the reason why no better city could be chosen for His purposes than the same city Rome. Even mankind itself is plainly seen to prefer to go on in the same groove and to dislike change. If, consequently, Dante's title for Rome, as the Holy City, is really well founded in fact, nothing can better agree with the common sense of men than that the city of Rome, which was already known to all the nations as pre-eminently the religious city of the Gentile world, should be continued in its prerogatives as the Holy City of this world after it had become Christian.

So far then we may fairly claim, what in a question such as that under consideration, carries an almost incalculable weight, namely, the favourable verdict of the general common sense of mankind. Nevertheless, without prejudice to the immense value of such a verdict, we may still by no means scruple to acknowledge that it is rather a most satisfactory preliminary to the production of positive proof than the production itself of such proof. To this task then, I must now apply myself, but not without a second time expressing my regret for the unavoidably skeleton form in which the necessity for brevity compels me to produce it.

VIII. The city of Rome being the chief city of the world, and its history being in a certain sense the history of the entire world, I cannot help having to go for my line of proof to the earliest days of the world's history.

S. Augustine interpreting the sacred narrative of the book of Genesis in his fifteenth book of the "City of God," says that the citizens of the City of God brought upon themselves and the rest of the world the judgment of the Deluge by their falling away from God; and their falling away he attributes chiefly to the effect of their mixed marriages with the infidel people of those times, who of course were exactly the same as the infidels of our time, unless, indeed, they may be considered as much the more excusable of the two, since the traditions of Paradise would hardly convey the same rebuke to their

infidelity, which the traditions and example of the Christian society inflict upon our infidels of the present day. When the Deluge came, the City of God was reduced in numbers to the single family of Noe, but the city of the infidels was of course entirely brought to an end, not a representative of it remained, as the time will of course come again when also not a representative of it will be found.

The new generation which sprang from the family of Noe, in virtue of the blessing given to them, as before to Adam and Eve, to increase and multiply, continued to be the City of God, or, to use F. Thébaud's words, "a real patriarchal Catholicity of a truly civilized character coming directly from God."

The manner of the Divine dealing with the City of God is what we properly call the Supernatural. The "City of God" is the supernatural state of human society, and such was the state of the human society that increased and peopled the earth by natural propagation from the family of Noe. The same, according to S. Augustine's words, existed before the judgment of the Deluge, when the citizens of this city were "*fili hominum per naturam, sed aliud nomen coeperunt habere per gratiam*" *fili Dei*. Whence many took occasion to think that they were not men but angels; and, of course, the world derived from Noe was not in a worse condition than its predecessor.

This patriarchal Catholicity possessed all the sacrifices and the knowledge of God which its patriarch Noe bequeathed to them, and being constituted by grace the city of the Sons of God, it was capable of maintaining itself in the world, had its citizens only remained faithful until the time came for God to take a human nature and to show Himself upon the earth. The citizens, however, of the City of God did not remain faithful, and the first notable outbreak of their unfaithfulness was through a city and an ambitious monarch.

We have the account of the attempt that was made to begin and to carry into execution the design of building the city and fortress of Babel in the eleventh chapter of the book of Genesis, on which S. Augustine, commenting at length in the sixteenth book of his "*City of God*," describes it as the work of Nimrod, the first "*robustus venator contra Dominum*"; and that the intention of Nimrod was to found a state, "*quæ civitatum cæterarum gereret principatum ubi esset tamquam in metropoli habitaculum regni*."

Nimrod, according to S. Augustine, was the kind of statesman of whose class various examples have existed at different times of the world, and of which our particular generation has a specimen in the present German Chancellor Prince

Bismarck. There is, however, this important difference to be attended to, that at that time of the world, the earth was all of one speech and one religion. If, therefore, God had permitted the Bismarck of that time to establish his centralized despotism over the world by means of his city and its fortress, it would have been in his power to have enacted a series of Falk laws that would have affected simultaneously all the inhabitants of the earth. And thus the reigning tyrant of that day would have been able to have rooted up and to have suppressed all over the earth, by main force, the sacrifices and the worship inherited from the patriarch of the Deluge. The citizens of the City of God in this case would have been driven to the alternative of martyrdom ; and though, by martyrdom, those who might have had the courage to brave the fury of the reigning Bismarck of that day would have saved their souls, it by no means follows that at that time of the world even martyrdom would have gained the victory which it was reserved to it to gain in after-times, when it was advanced to the superior dignity of becoming an imitation of the Example set by God Himself when He had become a man.

Be this, however, as it may, it appeared good to the wisdom of God to take other measures for preserving His world, in the place of throwing upon the citizens of His city the necessity of braving the fury and of setting at nought the laws of the ambitious conspirator against the liberties of the men of those times, at the more than probable cost of having to pay with their lives for their yielding obedience to the laws of God derived from their patriarch rather than to the legislation of the tyrant. But to the measures which were about to be taken was annexed the necessity of inflicting a terrible wound upon the human creation, the effects of which would be long and lasting, and which would leave stamped upon the face of the human family marks far more visible than the deluge of water has left upon the outer surface of the material world. However, this is the inevitable consequence of the sin of man.

Here was now rapidly coming into being a central political power which would before very long be able to decree by law the suppression of the sacrifices of the City of God, and constitute the worship of the One God a crime of treason against the political state. This design of the builders of the rising city must be suppressed, once for all, and rendered impossible for the future, except upon such a limited and local scale here and there as the Sovereignty of God might tolerate for a time. The pride of man must be taught a signal lesson, that a Universal Sovereignty is the gift of God, and that He gives it

to whomsoever He pleases, but does not permit it to be seized by any mortal for the gratification of his own ambition.

The measures adopted by the wisdom of God for the entire frustration of the purpose of the builders of the city of Babel and its fortress, were the confusion of the speech of the earth, which up to this time, according to S. Augustine and the generally received opinion in the Church, was the Hebrew language, but which now became suddenly, by a direct act of the Divine intervention, changed into many languages. Not only did many actually different languages come suddenly into existence, but a principle appears to have been introduced, which has been fruitful of fresh diversity; so that the earth has now an infinitely greater diversity of speech than it had at the moment when by the act of God diversity in speech appeared for the first time.

God in His government over the world chooses, in dealing with His creatures, the lesser of two evils. And however signal and terrible have been the disastrous consequences of the division of the people of the earth into different languages, from which has arisen nationality or the separation and isolation of people from each other, the multiplication of false religions (for as F. Thébaud justly says, all false religions are national), with innumerable kindred calamities, nevertheless the main purpose of God has been served by the division. The great evil, which, could it have been consummated, would have called for the destruction of the whole world. I mean the despotism of a universal monarchy decreeing the total suppression of all the sacrifices and worship of the One true God, has been rendered impossible. And where God for His own purposes has permitted the subsequent formation and growth of imperial powers, possessing imperial sway over many different nations, He has, as we shall see, in due time taken His own measures to prevent the rise of any spiritual despotism in them.\*

Father Thébaud, in his already standard work on Gentilism, traces a very large share of the terrible corruption of the knowledge and worship of the true God, among the isolated and separated nations, to the consequences of the division into

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\* Even under the Christian religion God turns the division into different nationalities to His own account. For Christ says to His people, "if they persecute you in one state, flee into another." And no doubt but that if the persecuted Catholics of Germany were to begin to have faith in these words, and were to be seen to act upon them by selling their property in Germany, and quitting their country in crowds to seek a home on the great American continent, where they would be received with open arms, this one act of faith in the words of Christ would be all that is needed to baffle the present iniquitous laws of the German Nimrod.

languages. Images of dead men, and even of beasts, fish, birds, and creeping things, find their way into the temples, in order to receive divine honours; and, finally, fallen demons succeed in persuading men to believe that they are gods to whom sacrifices ought to be offered. God, to use S. Paul's words, allowed the nations to go into ways of their own—"dimisit inire vias suas." The knowledge of the Lord God of Heaven became obscured among the nations, "truths were diminished from the children of men," and the "*tempora hujus ignorantie*," to use again S. Paul's words, are allowed to run their course.

But then, if Divine Wisdom is willing, for sufficient reasons, to allow His creation to receive so great a wound, God, nevertheless, is not slow to justify Himself in the sight of His creation by being seen also to be the Author and Inventor of a sufficient remedy. And there is this peculiar characteristic in the remedies which have God for their author, as a sign by which they may be known to come from Him, that they are applied in a form precisely parallel to the way in which the wound was allowed to be inflicted. A virgin deceived by listening to the voice of a deceiving spirit brings death into the world, and a second virgin obedient to the voice of a messenger sent from God, brings life into the world. A fruit hanging upon a tree was the occasion of the first transgression, and God caused the Redemption of the transgression to hang upon the tree of the Cross. A garden witnessed the colloquy with the deceiving spirit that issued in the transgression, and a garden also witnessed the colloquy with the angel that issued in the resolve to offer the Sacrifice of Redemption. Separation into various nationalities wonderfully precipitated the downfall and corruption of the original knowledge and worship of God, and God made His own choice of a nation through which to maintain and preserve them, and finally to restore them to all the other nations, for "salvation is of the Jews" (John iv. 22). The pride of a city "*quæ civitatum cæterarum gereret principatum*," was the occasion of the division, and God has made choice of a city to give to it the "*civitatum cæterarum principatum*," and through this city of His choice also to restore their forfeited unity, in a very considerable measure, to the nations of the earth. The nation was the Hebrew nation, and the city was the city of Rome.

IX. The gifts of God are ever without repentance. And as we have said that it is impossible that God could do anything by halves and in an imperfect manner, as S. Anselm says, "*Quantumcumque inconveniens in Deo sequitur impossibile*," so if it has pleased God to choose the city of Rome to become

the city to which He would give the gift of acquiring the very principality over all other states, which the city of Babel was punished for its arrogant attempt to seize without authorization, it will follow also that this city will become His chosen instrument for applying the remedy not only to the evils of the division of the earth into separate languages and people, but likewise to all the other principal concomitant evils that owe either their origin or their aggravation to it. God Almighty, if He acts the part of a physician to the wounds of His creation, will not be like the surgeon who, supposing the case to be possible, if he were called to attend a case of complicated compound fracture of bones, would set and carefully dress one portion of the wounds, and leave the other to their fate. He will, if He acts at all, act with a certain completeness; and if Rome is the city, as we plainly see to be the case from its marvellous history, which has been called to restore the forfeited unity, to the nations and people punished through the pride of Babel, Rome will also serve, in the hands of God, as an instrument for preserving and maintaining the light of the original treasure of the knowledge of God. In other words, Rome, in conformity with Dante's estimate, will be the chief religious city of the Gentile world, and it will in this respect serve God as a power in numerous ways conservative of the original truths of the knowledge of God, which are hereafter to afford the foundation on which the preachers of the gospel will make their appeal to the nations of the world to accept the Christian covenant of salvation.

But then, if Rome is to be made the holy city of the Gentile world, Rome has appeared too late in the world's history to possess any light of her own, and from the surrounding nations she can obtain nothing but their already advanced and continually advancing errors. There is but one source from which she can obtain light. She must be brought into communication with the Hebrew people and the law of Moses. If Rome derives her light from Jerusalem, then she may become the Holy City of the Gentile world; but if not, she will only verify the words of Christ, "if the blind lead the blind, shall they not both fall into the ditch."

X. But here it at once becomes evident that no conclusions can properly follow as regards facts of history from *à priori* reasoning, and most certainly not as regards a fact of history involving such an untold number of important consequences as that the city of Rome became in religion the scholar and disciple of the city of Jerusalem. Facts, as we know, are said to be stubborn things. And then, besides this, it has to be borne in mind that the stronger the reasons are



*a priori*, that such and such things should have happened, at the very least an equally strong presumption also arises that in this case these very things cannot but have left evidence behind them of their having happened. In a word, then, it is simply impossible to conceive that such an alleged fact of history, regarding Rome, one of such magnitude and pregnant with such a multitude of important consequences, should be true, and at the same time be destitute of an adequate body of historical evidence of its truth. Are you then, it will be said to me, prepared to produce this adequate proof and at the same time to give satisfactory reasons why it has lain so long either undiscovered or at least unnoticed?

To this I must reply, that I subscribe in the most unequivocal manner to the proposition that no conclusion can possibly follow, as regards facts of history, from any *a priori* reasoning. Facts of history are the most stubborn things possible, and not only are they incapable of being established by any *a priori* reasoning, but the greater the real magnitude of the fact, the stronger the reasons become why human history should have preserved the necessary memory and records of the fact. And as it is scarcely possible to name a single fact of history that can bear comparison in point of magnitude, or which is pregnant with the same number of important consequences, as this one in question, viz. that Rome in the beginning obtained the religion of the Lord God of Heaven from the Hebrew nation and established it by law,—if this is one of the stubborn facts of history, we must say “of course there exists ample historical testimony to its truth.” The reason is obvious! Otherwise we are driven to the impossible supposition, that all mankind is involved in one vast conspiracy against itself and its own interests, and that all truth lies hopelessly buried under an immovable mass of mendacity and falsehood.

The above admission then being thus amply made, all further progress with our subject resolves itself into the question where we are to go to look for the evidence we shall require, and how are we to deal with it when it has been found. But as at least one thing must be indubitable here, that the time it would take, and fatigue it would occasion to the reader, if he had to enter upon the study of this body of proof at the present moment would be intolerable, considering the great length which the introduction of the subject has unavoidably required, I must therefore be indebted to the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW for one more paper. Into this I shall do my best to compress the evidence, but I am afraid I must give warning, that, as regards many important branches of the

body of proof, some must be omitted; some will have to be represented, by little more than a meagre epitome, or I should rather say, by a skeleton of what a formal body of proof would require; but nevertheless, in spite of all these drawbacks, a definite purpose will be served by revealing the existence of evidence, about the very existence of which most probably no little scepticism may be prevalent.

It will not be in any way necessary to anticipate the result, but I think those who will carefully examine the following brief synopsis of the line of investigation to be pursued will hardly fail to admit that at least it affords abundant material for arriving in the course of time at a conclusion so decisive and so final, as never afterward to be in any danger of being disturbed.

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*Synopsis of the line of Proof.*

I. The mission of the Prophet Jonas to Ninive, and his reception by this city, at that time mistress of many nations, as a preacher of the religion of the God of Heaven, proves the capacity and willingness of great imperial cities to learn the religion of the God of Heaven from the Hebrew nation, and the readiness of the Hebrew nation to impart its knowledge.

II. The clear testimony of S. Paul, that the city of Rome originally possessed the knowledge of the true God, "but as its citizens did not approve of having God in their knowledge, He gave them up to a reprobate sense."

III. The silence as regards direct testimony of the Roman authors, is the fruit of the reprobate sense to which the city was given over. It is paralleled by the still greater silence of the Gentile historians respecting such facts as the mission of Jonas and others recorded in the Scripture; and in the nation of England, by the silence of its historians on the debt of their country to the See of Rome.

IV. The Christian tradition preserves, in an explicit form, the knowledge that the city of Rome obtained the religion of the God of Heaven from the Hebrew people.

V. If there is an absence of direct evidence in the Roman writers, there is an abundance of every variety of indirect acknowledgment and admission, confirmatory of the Christian tradition.

VI. The truth or falsehood of our alleged fact is capable of being tested by the application of two separate tests, either of which by itself is capable of yielding a decisive result, but the effect of which, in case they both agree, when taken

together, places the question of fact absolutely beyond the reach of dispute.

(1.) If the Christian tradition records an actual matter of fact, viz. that Numa Pompilius, by his code of laws and his ecclesiastical constitution of the city, made Rome to be the Holy City of the Gentile world, giving to it the religion of the God of Heaven borrowed from the Hebrew nation, this character of a Holy City must shine in the public acts of the city and manifest itself plainly in far too numerous ways to elude observation. Here then is a clear and decisive test for the science of the historian to apply to the history of the city. Are the proofs of this character to be collected from its history?

(2.) If it be, secondly, a stubborn fact, that the laws of Rome were framed on the model of the laws of Moses, here is a clear and decisive issue to be determined by the science of the Jurist. Do jurists then, or do they not, find the presence of the Mosaic legislation in the laws of Rome? From this test there can by no possibility be any escape!

HENRY FORMBY.

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#### ART. V.—THE PAST AND PRESENT OF FRANCE.

*De l'Ancien Régime et de la Révolution. PAR A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.*

TO any one conversant with the history of France for the last hundred years, its present state and condition is so extraordinary that we may perhaps consider it as unparalleled in the annals of mankind. If we look to the public opinion of the country, it shows, as might be expected, a general desire for order, repose, and security, as the only means of healing its present wounds and preparing for future prosperity. In such circumstances, it would be natural for an attentive observer to expect a tendency to union and to the appeasement of all the contending factions of former periods. That such is not the case, it is hardly necessary to remark, but it is nevertheless a matter of astonishment and dismay. The why and wherefore are questions which may be partially answered in the following pages.

The history of the last ninety years is certainly one of a most uncommon character. From the period of 1789 the French nation seems intent upon cutting asunder every link by which it was attached to its former laws and constitution,

though it had lived upon and by them for no less than fourteen centuries. The very idea of connecting any one of their present institutions with those of preceding ages of what they call *l'ancien régime*, is enough to inflame many, if not most, Frenchmen with indignation, and to band them together against any form of government so insensate as to conceive such a plan. This striking feature of modern times in France we call unparalleled in history, for we can point to no nation given up to such a singular passion. Most peoples, on the contrary, cling steadfastly to the traditions, modes of thought, and institutions of their forefathers, as a source of pride and glory. Nor does this disposition of the French mind seem to have procured them either happiness or security, if one may judge from their constant oscillating between anarchical and absolute governments.

But, at the same time, as if guided by an instinctive sense of the disastrous results attendant upon such a system of division and contention, every successive party on ascending to power invariably proclaims its intention to put an end to the Revolution. The famous *Assemblée Constituante*, on the eve of closing its labours in 1791, solemnly declared "that the causes which gave rise to the Revolution having ceased to exist, that Revolution must come to an end." At the end of the horrid period which ensued immediately after, when the First Consul issued his first Constitution, he likewise proclaimed the Revolution terminated, as it had firmly established the principles to which it was due. A few years later, after Napoleon's downfall, when the saving principle of hereditary authority seemed to ensure new guarantees to France after so many convulsions, an eminent Frenchman of the Restoration was heard to say: "I feel that I am born to see the end of Revolutions." And then, after 1830, 1848, and 1852, what was the goal which every new government promised to attain? The definitive close of the Revolution. And that promise was hailed with enthusiasm by the whole nation, sick at heart, for the time being, of contentions, uprisings, and tumult. How far success has crowned such promises and endeavours all the world knows; and history, whilst pointing to the bloody characters in which the treaty of Frankfort was written in 1871 against degraded and enfeebled France, can show what have been the melancholy results, in the eyes of the political world; whilst, if we look to the civil condition of the country, we are struck with the universal inertness and discouragement with which her citizens meet each important contingency as it arises.

At such a spectacle you naturally ask, But what is the

cause of these eternal divisions, of this innate want of unity in the nation? And you are immediately assailed, in France at least, by a host of theorists, each of whom proposes his remedy for the disease of the body politic. "Well," says one, "it's easy enough. Do away with the Revolution, restore legitimate monarchy, and the country will soon present a scene of unparalleled peace and prosperity." "No," says another, "the country would never endure such a monarchy. The Revolution must bring forth its utmost consequences; and every Frenchman longs for a definitive form of republican government." So here we have two important parties, to one of which the Revolution represents an absolutely evil principle, while to the other it is absolutely good. Evidently, therefore, the cause of so much division and contradiction must be looked for elsewhere.

The time has come, we believe, when the French Revolution and its consequences may be judged without exciting those passions which raged at former periods. One positive advantage has been gained. All the practical and beneficial results of that revolution are embodied in the very existence of the people. Every Frenchman, whatever may be his political creed, as far as his civil position is concerned, is born, breathes, lives, and dies, in the atmosphere of the Revolution. The laws laid down by that great event govern his whole life, his marriage, his property, his testamentary dispositions, as well as the whole administration of his country. Any one who would dream of altering essentially the present state of things would be deemed a madman.

And this at once brings us to the question, What are we to understand by the ominous word "Revolution"? Of course every Frenchman, as we have stated above, thoroughly believes that it means all the principles, laws, and institutions which gained ascendancy between the years 1789 and 1792, and which now form the birthright of every citizen in France. This has been proclaimed a truth by their most eminent historians, under the impulse of party spirit and passion, so as to become a common-place truism among themselves as well as among other nations. It is only of very late years that a positively opposite truth has begun to dawn upon the public mind, and it is gradually gaining ground in public belief. The celebrated M. de Tocqueville dealt the first blow against the fallacious view of former authors, in his work entitled "*De l'Ancien Régime et de la Révolution*," and last year M. Taine, though starting from principles totally different, has come round to the same conclusions. Those conclusions are, that the Constituent Assembly of 1789 simply and exclusively embodied

in all its reforms the laws, customs, and institutions of preceding ages. In fact, the idea of remodelling and reorganizing a social fabric of old standing after a new fashion, without taking into consideration its secular constitution, is a downright chimera, which the lawgivers of that time never dreamt of. The following retrospective review will sufficiently prove the truth of this assertion.

When the States-General assembled in 1789 the condition of France was exactly the same as that of other European countries, with this important difference, however, that the relics of the feudal system bore far more heavily upon the people among Germanic nations than upon the French. In 1788 Frederic the Great of Prussia published a code of laws in which the arbitrary rights of the feudal lords of his kingdom and the oppressive obligations of their vassals come forth in the most glaring colours. Serfdom was, in fact, the general law, with all its appendages of petty despotism. If we turn to France, we meet with a different order of things. Little by little, and more particularly under the influence of Royalty, the political rights of feudal seigniority had been done away with, and transformed into certain privileges which were little more than rights of precedence. At the same time serfdom itself had gradually disappeared, so that Voltaire could point out, as an extraordinary and invidious fact, that it still continued in those eastern provinces of France which had been recently annexed to the Crown.

Again, the peasantry, throughout the whole of France, had gradually and perseveringly become to a very large amount land-proprietors, and they already showed that avidity for the acquisition of small allotments which still distinguishes them. Turgot emphatically remarks upon this astonishing and alarming increase of the proprietary peasantry, fearing, he says, that their lands will not suffice to support their families. In 1787, Arthur Young visited the whole of France, with a view of studying the state of agriculture. He likewise comments with wonder and admiration on the number and beautiful cultivation of these small estates, all more or less belonging to the peasantry. The celebrated Necker, in his turn, mentions the immensity of allotments (*l'immensité des parcelles*) spreading far and wide over the whole country. So that we are brought, by authentic documents, to the startling fact that in those times, the proportion between the peasant landowners and the aristocratic proprietors was (according to M. de Tocqueville) about the same as at present. The population of the country in those days amounted, however, to only one-and-twenty millions.



If such was the real state of the peasantry in France,—a state which Louis XVI. had greatly contributed to promote,—the reader will naturally ask how it was, that the outbreak of the Great Revolution was universally marked by plunder, devastation, burglary, massacre, and incendiarism of the blackest character. It would seem that a class of peaceful, happy peasantry would have rather been disposed to defend the great landowners than to revel in their ruin. The best answer to this query is to show how the old system worked in other directions.

True, the original landmarks had been changed; the old feudal property had been to a certain amount parcelled out into small allotments, but still there were numerous vestiges of the feudal times, which made the peasant's tenure of his property insecure. He did not possess it *in spiritu domini*. In the first place, the whole of the land-tax fell upon his shoulders, a burden from which the then privileged classes were entirely free, and to this must be added the arbitrary and oppressive mode of collection. On the other hand, after paying the land-tax, the peasant had to meet local taxes of a most vexatious character; three times a week he had to work at the land of the lord of the manor, and several times a year at the roads and thoroughfares, according to the will of the Government inspectors and engineers. Again, when his crops were ready for reaping, he had to pay tithes of every description; tithes on his corn, his vegetables, his vintage, &c. All these burthens created among the peasantry a feeling of insecurity, and by embittering them against the ruling classes provoked the hideous excesses of the Revolution. It is most probable that had the peasants been merely farmers,—had they been obliged to pay all these taxes out of the rent they owed to their proprietors, nothing of the kind would have occurred; for a man can hardly take the same interest in his fellows' concerns as he does in his own. At any rate, the result was, for some years, a system of devastation, which recalled that of the barbarian invasions. As a last proof how real was this state of things, we may point out two facts: 1st, that it is brought out in strong colours in the *Cahiers*, or grievances presented to the States-General, as well as in all the administrative documents of the period; 2nd, that the best means of goading to frenzy the French peasantry is merely to threaten them with the return of the old system. One of the greatest achievements of the Revolution, therefore, was the abolition of every relic of the past, in regard to land, property, and the equalization of burdens upon every class of citizens. A movement in this direction had, how-

ever, been already partially enforced during the eighteenth century.

There is, perhaps, no branch of the body politic in France which Frenchmen are so proud of as their system of administrative centralization. Long ago they declared that it has become an object of envy and admiration in the eyes of all Europe. There may be some truth in this sweeping assertion, since several European Governments have more or less adopted this system, though with other views than the French may generally believe. That it is an excellent tool in the hands of absolute power, no one will deny. But, when a Frenchman boasts that this unique centralization is the offspring of the Revolution, he falls into a gross historical error. It had not only been prepared, but carried into execution long before the close of the eighteenth century; and we might naturally infer, almost from every page of the old *régime*, that such an engine in the hands of government indubitably suits the French character.

Any reader familiar with the mediæval times well knows how thoroughly democratic and active were the municipal corporations, from the largest city down to the most humble village. The municipal freedom and franchise became in some countries the nucleus of national liberties; but, everywhere and in every fief it played a prominent part in the public gatherings of these petty communities. Their rights and privileges were readily acknowledged by their lords, and the burgesses in their turn recognized their obligations in regard to their suzerans; the former thus enjoyed a real power, the latter a real security. This state of things prevailed in feudal France, as elsewhere; but, in France, sooner than elsewhere, the power of the Crown became predominant. At a very early period, it sought for the support of the middle and lower classes against the Barons, and to its appeal those classes responded with zeal which ere long became a strong tide bearing upon its waves an absolute royal power. Thanks to the popular militia of the cities, Philip Augustus was enabled to gain the battle of Bovines in 1214; and many other instances of the kind might be cited.

But this very popular favour enabled the Crown to secure a large body of agents, almost universally chosen among the middle class. These men, otherwise called lawyers, were totally dependent upon the Crown for their own power, influence, and station. They ruled supreme in the courts of justice, where a Baron would have disdained to appear; they were omnipotent in what we may call the rude administration of the times. In the course of ages, the most distinguished

among them formed a body called the King's Council, who acknowledged hardly any other power but that of the king. Little by little the courts of justice or parliaments were confined to lawsuits and cases concerning private individuals, but the King's Council assumed for itself the decision of numberless questions, more or less concerning the practical administration of the country. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this body was empowered to set aside any law in which the king's government might be interested; to prevent any government agent from being brought before the courts of law; whilst, on the contrary, it could summon any citizen before its own jurisdiction. The power of the King's Council was increased still further when Richelieu established the *Intendants* and the *Sub-delegates*, functionaries who exactly corresponded to the prefects and sub-prefects of the present time. Henceforward the new agents ruled all-powerful in their provinces, being responsible to the King's Council alone; and in most cases, they exerted judicial, no less than administrative power. Strange to say, the municipal system itself was totally transformed. It remained nominally elective, but in reality was in the hands of the Crown agents. An Intendant could appoint or displace a mayor, according to his own will or judgment, and he might likewise imprison any mayor who presumed to oppose that will. As for the parish or commune itself, the municipal corporation had not the power to repair a church steeple, a bridge, or a public road, without due permission from the administration. Cases are on record in which a question involving so small a sum as five-and-twenty francs had to be sent up to Paris from the South of France. Under the influence of such a system, the electors took no sort of interest in the appointment of their city corporation, and sunk into a state of apathy which boded no good to the future liberties of the country. The last blow dealt to the municipalities took place in 1692, when Louis XIV. suppressed the elective system; but soon after, learning that several towns still clung to the possession of the franchise, he availed himself of the opportunity to replenish his empty treasury by selling the municipal freedom, as dearly as he could, to the inhabitants of those cities. Such a financial expedient was most contemptible, and, unfortunately, it was renewed by his successor, down to the year 1764, during which period the old town liberties fell into utter disrepute. Such was their condition when, at the close of the eighteenth century, they were handed over to the Revolution.

It would be an easy matter to furnish numerous proofs that

a similar course was pursued in every direction. The parliaments still preserved a sort of independent life, on account of their primitive organization. But the Crown took out of their hands every sort of transaction or case in which the government interest was directly or indirectly concerned, and thus became the sole and supreme arbiter of the national destinies. It will hardly be believed, and yet it is historical truth, that the law of conscription itself existed under the old *régime* as applied to the militia, with a right of exemption or dispensation placed in the hands of government, exactly as was the case before the military law enacted in France a couple of years ago.

Thus we see that the whole fabric of French administration, and the most important institutions were transmitted from the monarchy of olden times to the National Assembly, and were embodied in the new system which arose out of its labours and reforms in the years 1790 and 1791. We can, therefore, understand how easily that system became a national heirloom in the hands of Napoleon I., and of successive governments. We are justified in concluding that, far from having been totally broken up by the Revolution, it has merely been modified for the better, and continues to work in France much as it did in olden times, though under new names and various arrangements. If such be the truth,—and there is no contradicting it,—how could any man in his senses think of altering a civil organization which represents the very genius of France? and if so, what a firm foundation this single fact might become for the establishment of both union and unity among its inhabitants!

The foregoing picture, showing that the different classes of the French nation all agree as to their civil laws, institutions, and administration, the question forces itself upon one's mind: How is it that this same nation is so cut up into so many hostile parties? The only answer that offers itself is the following: Frenchmen disagree on no point, except the form of government; consequently they are all of one mind as to their civic organization; and all disagree more or less as to their political organization. We will endeavour to indicate with what very serious dangers this state of things is fraught.

A mere glance at the history of the country from 1815 to 1852 shows us at once that under every government, whether a Constitutional Monarchy, a Republic, or an Empire, the rules of government were invariably the same. Nay more, it almost always happens, that the victorious faction of the day employs the same agents and the same public officers as its predecessors. Another fact be-

comes manifest. Every opposition party against the reigning government is intent, not upon reforming certain deficiencies in the laws or administration of the country, but upon utterly overthrowing the system invested with power, for the time being, and on preventing its restoration at the head of the nation.

As soon as one faction has achieved a victory by the overthrow of its predecessors, the latter remain with their whole staff of officers and agents, as we may call them, constantly on the battle-field, and constantly plotting a new revolution. The only exception to this rule, as far as concerns a civil war, is to be found in the Legitimist and Orleanist parties, who, though they remain bitterly hostile, nevertheless do not endanger the security of the country at large by secret plots and conspiracies, or by catering to popular passions. On the contrary, as their opposition consists more particularly in declining to support the ruling Government, their social position, added to the talents and generous feelings of their members, makes of the party a sort of reserve for the nation, in cases of urgent need. This was strongly demonstrated in the late fatal war, when both parties combined in shedding their blood for the cause of their country. However, notwithstanding this difference between them and their opponents of the Imperial and Republican parties, their contentions create a great difficulty in the present state of affairs, and form a real obstacle to the resurrection of the country. Another disastrous consequence of this constant political warfare is the effects it produces in the great body of the nation. The latter becomes disgusted with, and indifferent to, any political creed whatever; thus sinking into an apathy and into an utter inability to defend its own interests, which reminds one of the decline of the Roman Empire. In fact the majority of the people stands aloof from all parties.

At present, the Republican form of government is the only legal one; whether it will be definitive is quite another question, and depends upon the conduct of its leaders. So far as the experience of the last two years can inform us, we may be disposed to doubt the issue. Notwithstanding the noisy and insensate manifestations of a Naquet, a Louis Blanc, and a Madier de Monjau, we can hardly believe them to be in earnest. To restore the days of Marat, Robespierre, and the old Convention, is an idea which would be hooted throughout the whole of France, for the simple reason that the passions of the times, in which those men lived, are no more raging, nor indeed is there any fuel to light the fire. We must, therefore, turn to the "Opportunists," as they are called, and to their

chief Gambetta, who is, perhaps, destined to become ere long the prime minister or even President of the Republic.

If we are to judge from appearances, the great object of M. Gambetta, for the last twelve months, has been to soften down and annul the wild tendencies of his adherents. He is evidently a man of talent, and understands the great art of guiding the majority. Unfortunately, his previous career, and the means by which he has risen to power, are a great obstacle to the realization of his present wishes. He is evidently desirous of making the nation believe that it can enjoy peace, and attain prosperity, equally well under a Republic as under any form of monarchy. But, as he rose to eminence through the instrumentality of the Paris rabble, he is as yet bound to serve them, and, like all other demagogues from Catiline downwards, to obey their behests. Hence his declaration in the French Parliament, that he would never cut off his tail (*je ne couperai jamais ma queue*), but hence likewise his difficulties. The Revolution of 1848 was remarkable for its socialistic tendency, a tendency, which does not seem to be the leading feature of the present time; so little so indeed, that Gambetta on one occasion likewise declared that there does not exist at present any social question whatsoever. These words were in direct opposition with the opinions of some of his most influential electors, and made him run the risk of losing a great part of his popularity among them. Indeed, one may say that it was by flattering the greedy propensities of many of his partisans for other people's property, that he had been able to command such an enormous return of votes in his favour. This was a reason for inventing some new war-cry, and for diverting the passions of the radical party towards another object. The reason, indeed, was the more cogent, that by so doing he was sure to dispel the anxiety and fears felt by the monied class on the establishment of the Republic. That war-cry was *clericalism* and the daily encroachments of the Church. The man knew well how quickly the cry would goad into fury the passions of the multitude, and consequently the watch-word was taken up by a hundred papers on the very eve of the last general election.

A French writer of some political importance observed lately that, if a foreigner who had never visited France, and never known anything about its vicissitudes, were landed on her shores, he would necessarily become a victim to the greatest delusion. On reading the daily newspapers, and on attending at the debates of the national Parliament, he would naturally suppose himself to be in presence of a domineering,



all-powerful, all-persecuting State Church. He would no less naturally suppose this Church to be endowed with immense wealth, and with all the means of lording it over the country. He might even expect to behold instruments of torture, if he were to credit the language of some extreme politicians and journalists. What would be his surprise, continues our author, when he found out that the French Church is poor, possesses no endowments, ekes out small salaries dealt with a parsimonious hand by the State, and holds, according to the language of its official organs, that the best thing for the Church is to keep aloof from all parties, and never to meddle with politics, but to support the established laws and government, as far as they agree with the fundamental principles of religion and morality.

The above picture is a true exponent of the real state of things now existing in France. The clergy enjoys no political power; its members have merely the right, like any other citizens, of voting by ballot for any candidate they please, according to their individual preferences. One may even assert, that should they imprudently combine their efforts, as a body, in favour of any man, he would be sure never to be returned at the poll.

To set up the cry of clericalism and encroachments of the Church, when such is the real state of things, is an act of cowardice and of suicidal folly. It is a dastardly act, since it comes so immediately after the numberless acts of heroism accomplished by the French clergy during the late war,—acts which excited the admiration of the Prussians themselves. In 1874, Prince Frederic Charles of Prussia, when answering a toast at a dinner in Rome, added by way of comment on the German invasion: "Had every man in France done his duty like the priests, we should have soon been driven back over the Rhine." Doubly dastardly is the policy of the Radicals in this respect, coming so closely after the massacres perpetrated by the Commune in the very presence of those Prussians who were still in the country.

But it is a suicidal policy likewise, and for the truth of this assertion we have a guarantee in Prince Bismarck himself. On hearing of the new-fangled plan of the French Radicals, he is said to have exclaimed: "God be praised! as long as the French busy themselves with eating up their priests they will let us alone! When that's done, it will be time enough to think about ourselves." We may credit the German Chancellor for discerning at a glance of his keen eye what is the bane of France. But the above policy is suicidal in another direction, and nearer home. Evidently M. Gambetta uses the

word *clericalism* just in the same way as the Spanish Picadores infuriate a wild bull by shaking a red rag before his eyes, and then deftly avoid his dash by bounding aside, whilst they hurl a shaft at the brute. There is this difference, however; that the French bull is a very intelligent animal, and will soon find out that the "clericalism" is merely used as a ruse to divert his attention and mask other views. But there is another peril which many moderate Republicans begin to see and to point out to their own party. Whatever may be the great mass of infidelity which still enfeebles France, every one is aware that real practical Catholics are now to be counted by millions. Their numbers are on the increase, and of course both their votes in the elections and their adhesion or hostility to the Republican form of government is a matter of high importance. These people to a man are conservatives, and as such might greatly contribute to steady and ballast the ship which has been so lately launched on the water. No wise government can despise an element of this kind, for its enmity is sure to gain ground, and to cause serious disturbances, were it only from its very inertness; for if it does not move onward in serried ranks, its very mass is immovable and defies opposition. It is, therefore, bad policy to foment discontent among such a large portion of the French population, and this was forcibly commented upon a few weeks ago by the republican M. Vacherat in an article in the "*Revue des Deux Mondes*," and still more recently by the "*Temps*," which no one, of course, will consider as standing in opposition to the leading views of the present Government. In fact, should that Government persist in their line of policy in regard to Catholicism, it may become a rock upon which they may split. The Chamber of Deputies may more particularly split on this rock, as its general tendency during the two sessions of this year has been to dictate its will to the reigning cabinet. This is done in a way which has excited alarm among all cool minds; take for example its proceedings during the late session. This session, as the reader is well aware, has been devoted to the discussion of the Budget; the different departments were consequently audited by the House, and previously investigated in a financial commission, over which presided M. Gambetta. At the very outset the plea of economy was brought forward, a plea to which no one could object, so long as the necessary expenses of government were supplied. No opposition was offered within the commission in regard to the demands for supplies made by M. Waddington, M. de Marcère, and M. Léon Say. These favourite ministers steered clear of every shoal. The same good fortune

did not attend the other ministers, and we all know how M. Dufaure's cabinet broke down in the debates concerning the department of Public Worship. The facility with which this downfall was brought about is worthy of explanation.

So soon as the Republican party became a Government majority in the present Chamber it established a system of constant communication between the different fractions of that majority, which has enabled it to procure an overwhelming number of votes in favour of any plan whatsoever which might suit its leaders for the time being. One of these plans was to strike off the supplies for certain obnoxious public services, such as the Church, though such a method of proceeding was in direct contradiction with every existing law on the subject. This will make every Englishman stare, for if the system be definitively enforced, it will lead to the following conclusion :— the House is empowered to cut off any supply it pleases, notwithstanding any law to the contrary, or the urgent necessities of the State. The plan is evidently a bold encroachment of the Legislative power on the Executive, and would tend to annihilate the Constitution itself. However that may be, it has already been carried into execution in different ways, but its application to the budget of the clergy borders upon folly. The Minister simply proposed that the petty sum of four pounds a year should be added to the annual stipend of thirty-six pounds paid to the poorest of the country curates. This was sternly refused, as well as another grant of the same kind by which a small number of pupils in the episcopal seminaries received a trifling sum in the form of scholarships or exhibitions, enabling them to prosecute their clerical studies.

Before concluding the present article, it will be proper to show how the actual system of universal suffrage, and the part actually played by the Republicans in and out of Parliament, may endanger the very existence of the Republic itself. Whatever we may think of universal suffrage as an electoral system, we must candidly admit that it has struck deep roots into the French soil. It has now lasted for eight-and-twenty years, and, for the present, at least, no Government, monarchical or democratic, would dream of setting it aside. In fact, if we consider it as a political theory it chimes in with feelings more or less prevalent in every country, where the idea that every citizen is called upon to have a share in the government of his fatherland is daily gaining ground. But the great fault of universal suffrage, as it exists in France, is, on the one hand, its utter want of systematic organization, and, on the other, the wide scope it affords to adventurous politicians and carpet-baggers for ruling the multitude by establishing throughout

the realm a vast network of managing committees. A signal instance of this kind occurred during the general elections of last year. The leaders of the most extreme Radicals immediately proceeded to found these managing committees, who, in their turn, established sub-committees in the most remote parts of the land as well as in the largest cities. It is hardly necessary to add that the supporters of the wildest vagaries were upheld by these committees, and thanks to the discipline of the party, were generally returned; for means were often adopted either to intimidate or delude the population which any honest Conservative would spurn. It may well be said, that these standing committees,—for their staff continues to subsist after the elections are over,—are the real masters of France, and to their influence is due the enormous number of radicals and revolutionists who now figure in the Chamber of Deputies, under the triple appellations of the three Lefts, which now form a Government majority. The result of the system may be summed up in one word,—*Mobocracy*.

The worst of it is, that this politico-mania has made its appearance in the Councils-General of the departments and in the municipal councils. They are both elective bodies and subjected to universal suffrage; hitherto, both the law and the good sense of the people forbade these corporations to meddle with politics, as their members are elected for the sole purpose of discussing the local interests of the departments and of the communes. Consequently, the electors took good care to choose men well known for their respectability and their intelligence in conducting provincial affairs. Generally speaking, the right man was put in the right place, and every party was the better for it. But during the first session of last year the law has been altered, both in regard to the Councils-General and the municipalities, so as to pave the way for those ultra-democratic committees which are doing so much harm in the political sphere. The consequences have naturally been the same, and the nominees of the people, returned exclusively on account of their republicanism, are but too frequently totally ignorant of the duties they have to fulfil. Some, indeed, are little better than vagabonds; others even had been condemned for some misdemeanour before a court of justice; and, at any rate, in scanning the lists of all these honourable councillors, you scarcely meet with one name known either at home or abroad. But they were selected on account of their ultra-democratic tendencies by the ruling committees, and they were returned in consequence. We hardly need to add that this is adding fuel to the fire.

But does there really exist a Government majority, at least

in the sense we attach to those two words? It is already a most singular fact, that a Parliamentary majority should be parcelled out into three different bodies, each having its own divergent views, plans, and methods of application, and yet all professing to support one ruling cabinet. This alone would seem a political riddle, but there is something stranger still. For the last three years it has been impossible to keep any cabinet together for more than a few months. The Duc de Broglie and M. Buffet were attacked and overthrown because they professed to be the champions of moral order, which naturally implies that their opponents were, though perhaps unconsciously, the champions of moral disorder,—a conclusion, alas! but too true in many cases. Then came the Constitution of the 25th of February last, together with its natural concomitant, the Dufaure Ministry. Eulogies were lavished upon the new-comers; they were extolled to the skies by the Paris and provincial press; now was to dawn forth an era of peace, harmony, and prosperity; now the Republic was established definitively, *ἔν ἀλ*, as the old Greek author said; and the numerous political divisions by which poor France has been so long torn asunder were to be lulled to rest and spell-bound for ever. Well, is this a reality at the close of 1876? The new Parliament had hardly met when its internal dissensions became evident. True, Gambetta, with a wondrous faculty for intrigue, succeeded in rallying round it his adherents and non-adherents on every important occasion; but still one great fact is apparent—we mean the growing power of the ultra-Radicals, to which Gambetta himself has been obliged to bend. The best proof of this is, that whenever the Government supported a Conservative measure it would have lost its Republican majority had it not been for those very Conservatives on the other side of the House which now constitute the minority.

The effect of such a state of things soon became visible. The Cabinet, uncertain of an ever-wavering majority, was obliged to live by constant concessions. Its influence on the Parliament dwindled to nothing, and day by day it became more and more dependent upon the beck and will of the Republican leader, M. Gambetta. Matters had come to such a crisis, that people began to ask why the latter should not become the Premier? and also whether the omnipotence of the Chamber of Deputies, as an executive power, should not be at once acknowledged? Such a state of confusion has not been witnessed since the days of the old Convention, when the Committee for Public Safety ruled supreme over France, though most fortunately the consequences have not hitherto

been of such an appalling character. But one immediate result has been forced upon the public attention,—the extraordinary spectacle of a pretended Government majority constantly attacking, and at last pulling down wholesale, a Cabinet which it professed to support and to consider as the constitutional exponent of its own views. We do not suppose that another instance of this kind could be met with in the whole course of history, and we are by no means surprised that it should have raised a feeling of astonishment and alarm in the breast of every moderate Republican.

But what next? is the question by which one is met at every turn, and which we certainly should not venture to answer. One thing, however, is uppermost almost in all minds, a feeling of disgust and discouragement on seeing the country once more jeopardized by the incapacity and incorrigible anarchy of the Republican party. Little by little sober men, and all those who are particularly interested in the welfare of the country, begin to feel the difficulty of restoring anything like peace and order so long as the Republicans are at the head of the government. This disposition is growing. It may not lead to the overthrow by force of the present system, for French Conservatives are more than ever sick of revolutions, but it may lead them ere long to leave totally unsupported by public opinion both the Parliament as it is now constituted and the Government which that Parliament professes to uphold.

And here once more we are met by the question, What next? Is France to be again ruled by an autocrat, or is she to return to the anarchy of 1793?

Perhaps we may gather some insight into the future by recalling to mind what we said and proved in the first pages of this article. The essence of the nation is the same as in former ages; its laws and fundamental institutions are the same; the distribution of property is well-nigh the same; the judicial courts are fashioned after the model of former times; the administration is the same; so that under modern names we discover the image of the antique fabric reared by the patriotism and wisdom of the past. Modern Frenchmen cling, however unconsciously, to this past, now become the present, and to tear it away would be, as it were, to tear their own flesh. It is most remarkable that, in France, the Conservatives of every description are those who are most attached to their civic institutions; from thence we may conclude that they are destined, perhaps after a crisis of long or short duration, to restore permanent peace to their distracted country. They form a minority in Parliament, but still they have an influence



over the revolutionary majority. Whilst that very majority seems already intent on destroying its own influence and credit with the nation at large, the people become daily more fully aware that the Republican party offer a no less fanatical worship to their own political goddess than the ultra-Legitimists do to Royalty by divine right. In fact, both parties justify what we asserted at beginning; the whole is a matter of form, or vulgar ambition, rather than of doctrine and principle. When the country becomes thoroughly convinced of this truth, the star of salvation and rescue will probably dawn on the horizon. Yet, after all, this is the secret of the future.

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ART. VI.—THE CHARACTER OF JULIUS CÆSAR.

1. *History of Julius Cæsar.* By NAPOLEON III. Eng. Transl. London: Cassell, Petter, & Galpin. s. d.
2. *History of the Romans under the Empire.* By CHARLES MERIVALE, B.D. 8 vols. London: Longmans. 1865.
3. *The Commentaries of Cæsar.* By ANTHONY TROLLOPE. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood & Sons. 1870.
4. *C. Julii Cæsaris Commentarii de Bello Gallico.* With Notes by GEORGE LONG. (Grammar School Classics.) London: Whittaker & Co. 1868.

A BOOK has been written on the causes why Julius Cæsar's Commentaries disappoint the reader; and this proves that at any rate they have disappointed some. We know not what causes were alleged by the author of this treatise, and we suspect they might rather be referred to his own deficiencies than to any fault of the Commentaries as such. However that may be, there is one point of view in which every book without exception may be made interesting, and that is, the consideration of the character of the writer as it emerges from his work. Man must always interest man, and in exact proportion to the variety and grandeur of his endowments, intellectual or moral. In some cases—we would instance above all, Homer—this search becomes very difficult from the manner in which self is kept by him in the far background. In the diary of the great Roman general, self of course appears on every page, but it is self curiously projected out of self, and recorded with almost an absolute freedom from those passions that generally animate a man's biography of himself. Hence

to elicit character from it is, here too, far from an easy matter. We propose, notwithstanding, to attempt this task as well as we can, confining ourselves to the Commentaries, with but little illustration from other sources.

Let us briefly mention a further difficulty, common to every analysis of character, small as well as great. Man acts as one indivisible spiritual being. It is true he has intellect, passions, will, but these are not independent agents, and cannot really be taken apart. A man is religious, is merciful, is passionate, is just, is envious, is revengeful, as the case may be; but no one habit he has stands alone, or by itself accounts for any action that he does. And yet our judgment necessarily takes the character to pieces, and seems to examine it in a partial way. We can only correct this defect by continually reverting in our minds to that unity, that personality, in which all the attributes, emotions, faculties, habits, and whatever arrangements moralists have devised, converge as in a common centre. That personality, as it is in itself, can be known to God alone. We only see it in its effects; every word, every action increasing indeed our knowledge of it, yet increasing that knowledge indefinitely, not in such a manner as ever to convey simultaneously the whole. Though taking, therefore, successive aspects of the character of Julius Cæsar, we must recollect that they naturally resulted from the single individuality which made him what he was, for good or for evil.

To consider in the first place the religious element, we may say, on the whole, that in the Commentaries it is conspicuous by its absence. Very different is the corresponding feature in the "Anabasis" and in the "Hellenics" of Xenophon, where religious feeling, deepening into superstition, is one of the most marked characteristics. Dreams, portents, sacrificial omens coloured the mind of the Greek leader, and greatly influenced his actions. As far as Cæsar's own narrative goes, this feeling would not appear to have impelled or retarded him in a single step of his career; nor is it even a subject to which as an historian, he is particularly led. We say this, remembering the very remarkable chapter of the "*de Bello Civili*" \* where he enumerates the prodigies which were said to have taken place in various parts of the eastern world on the day of Pharsalia, the din of arms heard at Antioch and Ptolemais, the sound of drums in the sanctuary of Pergamus, the preternatural growth of a palm-tree in the temple of Victory at Tralles, the spontaneous movement of a statue of Victory in a temple

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\* "*De Bello Civ.*," iii. 105.

of Minerva, in Elis. He recounts all these legends without comment, but with the same kind of pride which led him in his youth to boast in his funeral oration over a relative, of his fabled descent from Venus. He wrote a treatise on *Auspices* which ran to sixteen books; but this was a superstition so interwoven with the whole structure of the Roman constitution, whether of peace or war, that no Roman statesman or general who did not thoroughly understand it, would have been qualified for his business. That others were influenced by impressions of this sort was a fact he had to deal with, and on some occasions, though sparingly, he speaks as if he accepted them himself. Thus, referring to the strange disaster not unlike that of the Caudine Forks, which befell Sabinus and Cotta, through the treachery of the barbarian chief Ambiorix, and to the spirit and bravery subsequently shown by the troops under Q. Cicero, he encouraged the soldiers in a set speech, representing to them that the loss which they had sustained by the culpable rashness of the legate, should be borne with the greatest calmness, because, as *the disaster had been expiated* by the goodness of the immortal gods, and their own bravery, the enemy had not been allowed a lasting exultation, nor they been forced to mourn for any length of time. Further on, he describes the troops quartered in the same fortress which had been held by Sabinus and Cotta, as filled with evil forebodings drawn from their miserable fate. "Most of them imagine new superstitious alarms from the locality, and picture before their eyes the calamity of Cotta and Titurius, who perished in the same fort." \* Many inscriptions of the Roman legionaries witness to their habit of adoring the *genius loci* of the place where they were stationed; and we can easily conceive their despondency when there seemed such good reason to believe that the *genius* of the spot was adverse to them. But in no Greek or Roman writer, except, indeed, Thucydides, is so little importance attached to such notions as in Cæsar. They do not escape mention, and that is all we can say. His most valuable account of the manners and customs of the Gauls and Germans is what might be expected from a very sharp observer who had no special interest in this subject, but who evidently sees at a glance those features of a national religion which have most effect on the national character, and consequently on the actions of the people. Witness the notices, as tantalizing almost as they are important, which he gives us of the Druidical system:—

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\* "De Bello Gallico," vi. 37.

1. Above all they wish to persuade people of this ; that souls do not perish, but that after death they pass from one to another ; and they think that in this is a main inducement to valour, the fear of death being a matter of indifference.

2. Men suffering from severe diseases, or engaged in battles and dangers, sacrifice, or vow that they will sacrifice, men instead of victims, and use the ministration of the Druids for those sacrifices, because they hold that, *unless the life of a man be offered up for the life of a man*, the deity of the immortal gods cannot be appeased.\*

He roughly identifies, as the manner of Roman writers is, the Paganism he witnessed in Gaul with that of his own nation, taking no trouble to ascertain its distinct character, strange as it must have seemed that they made (as he supposed), Mercury their chief god. He is struck with the perfect security of heaps of valuable offerings made to Mars, and left unprotected except by the religious awe of the people. He is careless of investigating the vast physical and theological system taught by the Druids to their disciples, destined, by the way, to a duration of scarcely a century later than his own time in Gaul, for the Emperor Claudius, foolish as he was, had yet the resolution and the power to sweep away the Druids and their system together ; one of the many instances of the great unconscious *præparatio evangelica* that went on in the heathen world about the time that Christianity was dawning on the world. We may be pretty sure that among the motives of action which fermented amongst the Gauls at this period of transition, their religion could not have been less important than the same motive with Turks and Hindoos at the present day ; and yet this is what Cæsar, in hardly a single instance, adverts to. Nowhere, for example, does he mention what we learn from Cicero, that Divitiacus was a Druid, though he does remark, without explanation, that among the reasons for which Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, pleaded to be excused accompanying the expedition into Britain, were his alleged hindrances, in consequence of certain religious obligations. In his own case, it appears that he did not care to conceal the scorn with which he regarded sacrificial omens. On the other hand, as often happens with great men of his class,—Frederick the Great, for example, and Napoleon,—his mind fell prostrate before some superstitions not more absurd than those which he contemned ; as for instance, he never ascended his chariot without repeating a charm. As to more general ideas of religion, such as the divine interference in the conduct of the world, his

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\* "De Bello Gallico," c. 14, 16.

Epicurean views would naturally lead him completely to ignore them. If they appear at all in the Commentaries, it is but in a rhetorical manner, when he is addressing those who did believe in such agency. Thus, in his haughty reply to the aged Helvetian chief Divico, when the latter reminded him of the disastrous defeat the Romans had sustained at the hands of his people a generation before, in the very place where they stood, Cæsar remarked: "The immortal gods are wont, in order that men, whom they wish to punish for their guilt, may feel their changed condition the more acutely, to grant them sometimes greater prosperity and a more lasting impunity." \* Contrast, however, with this, another specimen of the style he indulged in from his tribunal, furnished by the fragment of his speech to the people of Seville, preserved by the writer of the "*De Bello Hispaniensi*." "Did you never reflect, that, if I perished, the Roman people had still ten legions, which could not only resist you, but *pull down heaven?*" †

We proceed to consider the moral character of Julius Cæsar as it comes out in his writings. The first remark we have to make is that here too, the Commentaries are singularly colourless; and this might at first surprise us. Knowing that other evidence witnesses very consistently to his impure life, probably exaggerated, but still, with all allowances on that ground, bad even in Roman society of that age, the explanation is perhaps twofold; resting partly on the consummate good sense that he undoubtedly possessed; and partly on another of his characteristics, his giving his whole mind to that which is immediately before him. What was the object of the Commentaries? A record of political and military transactions. That being the case, Cæsar does not admit into such record even allusions to matters not directly connected with them. Almost the only passion that appears in the Commentaries is pride, and that with Cæsar was so completely a primary motive, that even it could not be expected to be very obvious, for all roots, in the world of mind as of matter, shun the light, whilst fruits court the day, and are visible to every eye.

One is tempted to turn over the Commentaries for the discovery of maxims. All men who act by purpose, and not in the drifting, aimless manner of the majority, have their rules, to which they continually recur; their formulæ, which sum up those observations of life which have most struck them. Many great men abound in such generalizations, but

\* "*De Bello Gallico*," i. 14.

† "*De Bello Hisp.*," c. ult.

the Commentaries yield but few, and those few hardly so striking as we might have anticipated, considering the sagacity of the man, and his vast knowledge of the world. Such as they are, we here bring together those which we have been able to notice in the Cæsarean histories.

1. The suppression of the Servile insurrection showed the good of resolution; for the Romans defeated those enemies in arms and victorious whom, unarmed, they had long causelessly dreaded.

2. It generally happens that those who are obliged to form their plans whilst actually engaged, act timidly, and in such a manner that everything seems to fail them.

3. It happens with most people, that, from depending upon written records, they slacken their anxiety to learn things thoroughly, and weaken their memory.

4. Fortune has great power in military affairs and in everything else.

5. Men's minds are commonly most disturbed by whatever is at a distance. Experience is the master of all things.

6. In war, great disasters often arise from very small causes, false suspicions, sudden panic, or superstitious fancy.

7. It is a general's duty to conquer not less by prudence than by the sword.

8. It is commonly the case, that obstinate and presumptuous men revert to, and eagerly seek what they despised a short time before.

9. There is an excitement and alacrity of mind naturally enkindled in all men by the desire of fighting; and commanders ought not to check this, but increase it.

10. In military affairs, but especially naval affairs, which involve rapid movements on an unstable surface, everything must be done at the given signal and in time.

11. To plead poverty, calamity, or hard times, or difficulty of sale, for the non-payment of debts, shows a poor spirit; but for people to acknowledge debts and still hold property in their hands, what spirit, or rather what impudence, does that show!

12. The recollection of cruelty is a miserable provision to carry with one to old age.\*

These maxims show us an acute, incisive mind, but also, considering the large surface of thought and speech from which they are culled, a mind too much engaged with action to spare time for theory. Nor do we find much speculation, even when it might most naturally be looked for,—namely, in the search for the causes upon which large events depended. The simplest seem to satisfy him; thus, he states the causes of the great Belgic confederation in B.C. 57, as follows:

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\* B. G., i. 40; v. 33; vi. 14, 29; vii. 84. B. Civ., iii. 72; i. 32, 85; iii. 92. B. G., iv. 23. B. Civ., iii. 20. Amm. Marcell., 29, 2.



1. They were afraid that if all Gaul were tranquillized, the Roman armies would be brought to their territory; 2. They were solicited by some of the Gauls who disliked the Roman troops having their winter quarters among them; or who, from their levity and changeableness, wanted a new government; or, who were instigated by powerful men coveting chieftaincies they were less likely to obtain if the Roman occupation continued.\* The movements of barbarian states we may indeed suppose to be governed by simple causes; but Cæsar enters into just as little political analysis when he has to record the commencement of the great civil war with Pompeius. All is personal, all is detail; deep and general causes, as the condition of the various ranks of society, and the rottenness of the constitution, are not even hinted at. "It was unfair," he says, "to ask that Cæsar should leave Ariminum and return to his province, whilst Pompeius himself held provinces and legions that were not his own; to promise that he would go into his province, and not to fix the day on which he would set out; so that if he did not set out at the termination of Cæsar's consulship, he would still not seem to be bound by any obligation touching falsehood."† All these and similar reasons are merely the occasions of that which depended on far deeper causes not alluded to. Not that the latter escaped so penetrating a mind. The remark of his, quoted by Suetonius, that "the republic was a mere nothing, a name without body or form," shows it. But, on the whole, he dealt with facts, with tangible events as they arose, and left all their co-ordination and reduction under the perspective of history, to writers of a very different class from himself. His own powers of generalization, if they may be called such when so applied, would be exercised in having one complete view in his mind of all that was going on in the field of politics. He placed his generals over the map of Gaul, according to their capacities and the circumstances of each place, as the chess-player marshals his pieces. The philosophy of the game was quite another affair.

This, perhaps, would be the place for considering Cæsar's characteristics as a general, but into these it is not within the purpose of the present article to enter; except, so far as they apply to him as a man. The following point strikes us coming out prominently. Extreme rapidity of thought on sudden emergencies, and power of changing dispositions on a vast scale, according to the circumstances of the moment. Napoleon somewhere speaks of the two o'clock-in-the-morning

\* B. G., ii. 1.

† B. Civ., i. 11.

courage as a rare quality. Two o'clock-in-the-morning presence of mind and organizing power is, perhaps, still more rare. It is one, of course, which all generals ought to have, but which Cæsar appears to have possessed in an unusual degree. Further, the study of the *Commentaries* shows a wonderful power possessed by Cæsar of getting work out of men. Terrible and long-continued toil, protracted marches are submitted to by his soldiers without a murmur. The mere ground they got over in a given time is extraordinary. We may also believe that he had very great powers of mechanical invention and engineering skill. The description of the bridge over the Rhine, and of the tower constructed for the siege of Marseilles—those very crabbed passages in books thought to be so easy, are enough to show this, if Cæsar's own account of them be accepted, which claims for himself the credit of their construction. He had no doubt an able prefect of engineers; but to make use of and control even borrowed talent, shows the great man. In keeping with this is the readiness with which he availed himself of his observations even of barbarian arts. Thus the wicker coracles he noticed as used by his half-civilized enemies in Britain, gave him an idea in the campaign against Afranius and Petreius in Spain.

This remark leads us to consider Cæsar's conduct towards his lieutenants and others in his confidence. Does he conceal their merits or not? There is an impression among some writers that he is ungenerous in this respect, and apt to claim all the glory of action for himself. We do not, however, think that this is very obvious. His officers often receive considerable praise. An example of this is the account of the spirited defence of the camp at Octodurus by Galba against the Alpine mountaineers; of the expedition of P. Crassus in Aquitaine, whose soldiers were anxious to show what they could do, independently of the rest of the army, without Cæsar, and with a mere youth to command them; the prudence and resolution of Q. Cicero, whilst suffering from illness, as well as beleaguered by the barbarians in his fortress among the Nervii; the energy of Labienus when, surrounded by hostile tribes near Paris, he helped himself as much by imagining the presence of Cæsar, whom afterwards he deserted, as by his own native vigour of mind. And if Cæsar gives his officers their due meed of praise, he certainly does not fail to record with admiration the gallant deeds both of individual soldiers and of his men generally. It was not a poetical age, and Cæsar was not a Herodotus or a Froissart; but it only needed the brilliant colouring of historians, like the latter, to have made

the self-sacrificing loyalty of Crastinus at the battle of Pharsalia, the lofty spirit of Cotta when brought into a hopeless conflict by the folly of his colleague; the chivalrous rivalry of Pulpio and Varenus, scarcely less familiar to all readers of ancient history than the deeds of Leonidas. There is reason to think that Cæsar had not the generosity to tolerate marked independence of mind in those around him; in fact, such generosity can scarcely be expected where a man's acknowledged aim is to make himself supreme. There is, however, a quality allied to this, which really noble, sympathetic spirits ought to possess, and which is attributed to the great Duke of Wellington, who is said to have been "very patient of the involuntary errors of those under him."\* This too, perhaps, belonged rather to the British general than to the Roman, in whom, no doubt, as with Alexander, the character of commander shades off into that of the despot—a despot by his genius, but still a despot. In certain instances Cæsar speaks with undisguised contempt of officers who had disappointed him, but it is where the failure seemed due to lack of courage. Thus, in the Helvetian war, he describes a vexatious mistake caused by Considius, who, "under the influence of panic, reported to Cæsar what he had not seen as if he had seen it." And he mentions, with little less contempt, the services of Volusenus, who was sent on to explore the coast of Britain, upon Cæsar's first expedition to that island. "Volusenus, after examining all the localities as far as a man could do who did not dare to leave his ship and trust himself to the barbarians, returned on the fifth day to Cæsar, and reported what he had seen." There is a strong touch of irony in his account of the disastrous exit of Sabinus and Cotta. "At daybreak they set out from the camp, with a long train and very heavy baggage, as if they were persuaded that Ambiorix's advice came not from an enemy, but from a person of the most friendly disposition."†

As to his power of influencing others, it may be assumed that Cæsar was at least as extraordinary a man as Frederick the Great or Napoleon, but, unfortunately, we possess no continuous memoirs of him by people who had access to his intimacy. Oppius, or Balbus, or Hirtius, might have left records as detailed as those of Thiébault or O'Meara. As it is, even for the impression which he produced upon others,

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\* "Placability as to the faults and failings of others, evinced by his feelings connected with courts-martial and subordination." (Earl de Grey's *Characteristics of Wellington*.)

† B. G., v. 31.

we are obliged to study his own writings as our best authority. Unpretentious as they are, they still afford some remarkable and evidently truthful examples of that personal influence over masses of men which he possessed in common with all leaders of mankind. Among such examples we may mention the splendid restoration of confidence he effected at Besançon when despair pervaded his army on the march against Ariovistus; the hope and animation his presence gave in the desperate battle with the Nervii, when he took a shield from a private soldier, went to the front, and addressed the centurions by name; and the still more picturesque incident in the lines before Alesia, when his arrival caused a shout on both sides, known as he was from the colour of his dress (alluding probably to the purple cloak of a Roman general) — *quo insigni in præliis uti consueverat* \*—like Nelson decorated with his orders at the battle of the Nile. We may here refer to that suggestive passage in the supplementary eighth book of the Commentaries on the Gallic war, when Hirtius, in describing the siege of Uxellodunum, mentions that it was a grand object to cut off the town from access to a great fountain which supplied it with water. "This was what the rest wished for, but Cæsar alone saw how it could be done"—by the simple means of getting at the source, by digging underground galleries. "When this was done, the perennial spring on a sudden dried up [as sometimes happens, by the way, through the excavations in coal-mines], and caused such despair in the minds of the townsmen that they thought it had been effected not by man's device, but by the will of the gods. So under the constraint of necessity they surrendered." † It is painful to add the well-known trait of studied and deliberate barbarity which followed: "As Cæsar was aware that his clemency was universally known, and was not afraid that his acting harshly would appear to have arisen from a natural cruelty of disposition, and as he saw that his designs could never be carried out if many in various places were to renew the war in this manner, he thought fit to deter the rest by an exemplary punishment. Accordingly, he cut off the hands of all who had borne arms; but granted them their life, that the punishment of these wretches might be the more manifest." Equally ruthless was the massacre at the taking of Avaricum (*Bourges*), not indeed actually ordered by Cæsar, but caused by the fury of the soldiers, whom he does not appear to have attempted to check, perhaps could not. He tells the tale in a few lines (which might summarize a

\* B. G., vii. 88.

† B. G., viii. 41, 43, 44.

modern report from Bulgaria): "Not a soldier thought of spoil. Thus irritated by the slaughter at Genabum and by the labours they had gone through, they spared not infirm old men, nor women, nor infants. Finally, out of the whole number, which amounted to about 40,000, scarce 800 made their way safe to Vercingetorix."\* At Alesia, where the Mandubii, driven out of the city by the garrison with their wives and children to die of hunger, sought food at the Roman lines at the price of submission to slavery, the conqueror writes of himself: "But Cæsar stationed sentries on the rampart, and forbade them to be received."† How sternly he could act towards individuals, might be illustrated by the story of Dumnorix who (it is true, after having been once pardoned) attempted to use his influence with the Gallic chiefs to prevent their following the expedition to Britain, and at length deserted with some of his native cavalry. When this was reported to Cæsar, he at once "stopped the march and postponed everything else, ordered a great part of the cavalry to pursue him and bring him back, with orders to kill him if he attempted resistance, feeling assured that he would do nothing like a man of common sense, if Cæsar were absent, since he had disobeyed his command when present. He did resist when he was summoned, tried to defend himself and appealed to his countrymen, calling out that he was a free man and belonged to a free state. The troops, as they had been ordered to do, surround the man and slay him, but the Æduan cavalry returned to Cæsar."‡ And every Roman history tells how the youthful patriot Vercingetorix was kept in chains by Cæsar for years to grace his triumph, and then put to death as mercilessly as ever Roman commander dealt with his enemies in the most barbarous ages. It still remains true that Cæsar was gentle and merciful; indeed, but for these qualities he might have died in his bed like Sylla, and like Augustus after him. In the hour of his exaltation to the empire of the world, he said: "Let us try if possible to regain the wills of all, and to enjoy a lasting victory. I am not going to imitate Sylla. Let this be a new way of conquering, to fortify ourselves by mercy and liberality."§ But then there were two conditions of his clemency. It was only conceded either to Romans because they were Romans, or to strangers because they humbled themselves to the dust. Cæsar, however, never appears to have delighted in cruelty for its own sake, as Frederick

\* *Ibid.*, vii. 28.† *B. G.*, vii. 78.‡ *Ibid.*, v. 7.§ *Ap. Cic. ad Att.*, ix. 8.

the Great amused himself with wounding the feelings of his courtiers. When the time arrived for the friends whose affections Cæsar thought he had secured, to turn against him, the cause was, that haughtiness which success too great for man makes the character throw out like some baleful lustre. And this would be felt chiefly by those who had once been in a position to compare themselves with him, not by his soldiers nor by those who acknowledged to themselves that they were but his favoured instruments.

We pass on, however, to consider Cæsar's character as a writer, which is also naturally part of his character as a man. First, as an historian, and secondly, as an orator, as to which aspect we are enabled to judge by the abstracts of speeches which he himself has given, and, with some reserve, by that put into his mouth by Sallust, in his sketch of the *Catilinarian war*. His great characteristic is simplicity, and not merely the simplicity of a great intellect, but that which belongs to familiarity with the best society. Now, this we hardly find either in Cicero or in Livy, both, in their way, wonderful examples of the elegance which is imparted by high education, and of the art which is displayed by consummate masters of style, yet not of that rare perfection of art which is able completely to conceal itself, and to appear like nature. There is little of the picturesque in Cæsar, even though he had unusual opportunities of exhibiting it, had that been one of his prominent faculties. There are certainly lively descriptions of battles and negotiations, such as the descent on Britain, and the conference with Ariovistus; scenes touched off in a line, such as that of the supplications of the women and children on the walls of Bratuspantium; but on the whole, the narrative leaves too much to the imagination of the reader to supply, to be called animated. More properly, it is neither animated nor dry. It is but a selection of facts, which might have been expanded into as many volumes as the Duke of Wellington's Despatches. Nor has he any wish, as some historians have had, to give a word-picture of the ground where his battles were fought. His accounts of them are rather, very good plans expressed by the medium of language. We can form an excellent idea of the form of the hills and the direction of the streams, but only so far as is required for military purposes. The account of the thick impenetrable hedges in Belgium; of the Gallic method of building walls; and of the British fortress constructed against previous enemies, which pleased his disciplined eye as, in an earlier age, the Roman camp had pleased that of Pyrrhus, are instances which rather stand out from the generally even surface of the Commentaries.



Those speeches which Cæsar himself has recorded for us are all very much condensed ; but there shines through them all a highly characteristic energy. Take, for instance, one of the first on record in his Commentaries on the Gallic war. His officers and soldiers had got into a state of panic when they were being led against Ariovistus, and the dreaded German enemy, and at the same time there was unexpected delay in the commissariat on one excuse or other ; the officers were asking for furlough ; and many, up and down in the tents, were even drawing up and signing their last wills and testaments from pure despair ; on this Cæsar called together the centurions of all ranks, and rated them soundly, in the first place, because they thought that *they* had to ask or to think either whither or wherefore they were being led. Ariovistus had eagerly courted the friendship of the Roman people in his (Cæsar's) consulate ; why should any one suppose he would so rashly swerve from his duty ? He went on to remind them of the proof Roman generals and soldiers had long before made of their superiority to these barbarians, and said that as for those who pretended to be afraid about the supplies or the difficulties of the march, they acted with presumption, when they appeared either to despair of their commander's fulfilling his duty, or to prescribe to him what he was to do. All that was *his* business ; the Sequani and others would bring in corn ; as for the march, they themselves should judge of it very shortly. It was said the soldiers would not obey him or advance the standards. He cared nothing for the rumour, for an army never failed in obedience to a general, except when he was unlucky or ungenerous, neither of which faults was found in him. He had intended deferring the march to a later day, but, as things were, he would move *the very next night* at ten o'clock, to learn as soon as possible whether duty and honour or cowardly fear influenced them most. And if not another man chose to follow him, he would march on with the tenth legion alone, of whose fidelity he had no doubt, and he would consider that legion in future his own prætorian guard. We cannot be surprised that, after a speech like this, "there was a wonderful change in the minds of all," or that the tenth legion formally thanked him by their tribune for his good opinion of them, and that the rest made their satisfaction by an assurance that they had never either doubted or feared, or thought the conduct of the war was any business of theirs.\* The speech on the surrender of Afranius and Petreius is equally striking in its own way. A stern, cutting representation of the meanness and vacillation of those leaders,

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\* B. G., i. 40, 41.

an impassioned statement of the wrongs he himself had sustained, but a conclusion like Cæsar whenever Romans were concerned, on the side of a mercy his adversaries had neither expected nor deserved. The well-known speech in Sallust is of a different class. The question was, what had to be done with the Catilinarian conspirators under arrest? Cæsar took the side of mercy; (1) as better suiting the dignity of the State, which should never act from passion; (2) the inefficacy of the punishment of death, on the sceptical grounds that, after death, was nothing, either of joy or sorrow; (3) the danger of establishing a sanguinary precedent. He therefore recommended perpetual imprisonment.\* We cannot quote Sallust's report with any confidence as exhibiting more than the arguments of Cæsar, and yet the whole is quite in keeping with all we have made out of his character. A high personal elevation, a self-possession not to be disturbed by the most agitating scenes, the moral and religious indifference which belonged to the Epicurean school. His line reminds us rather of the clement firmness displayed by Lord Canning in the suppression of the Indian mutiny, or once again, still more forcibly, of much in the history of Frederick the Great. This, however, leads us away from the point of view with which we began this part of our inquiry,—viz. Cæsar's characteristics as a speaker. But a habit of mind like this generally finds its corresponding expression in language. We should not expect from Cæsar anything approaching the decorated style of eloquence, but we do find that eloquence which belongs to a speaker who is conscious that every sentence he utters is also an *action*. And this eminently characterizes the four or five letters, or rather notes of his, that have come down to us.

In looking back in general upon the character we have attempted to describe, we ought to remember that, great and commanding as it was, our means of judging of it are very imperfect. Cæsar was cut off, although an elderly man, still at an age when an immense development was open to him, and actually contemplated by him. Who can say how much might have happened to explain him in that portion of time, which was thus denied him? Again, his contemporaries held that, as an orator, he was second only to Cicero. Now of the immense mass of speeches he must have delivered in the Senate and to his troops and in conferences during his whole career, nothing remains but the few abstracts, of which we have noticed one or two of the most striking. So that we can know little more than the outline of this colossal figure

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\* Sall., *Bell. Catil.*, 51.

that stands far back in the vista of nearly two thousand years. Imagination, perhaps, imparts to it much of its supposed grandeur, and much splendour is naturally reflected back to it, from the glories of which it was the initial. But, on the whole, his qualities are those of many of the great men who stand out the most powerfully *in contrast* with the spirit of Christianity, and recall to us the impressive comparison instituted by S. Ignatius in his *Spiritual Exercises*, where the different characteristics of the hostile camps of Christ and of His enemy are depicted. It is not without significance that we find the family of the Cæsars to have been in friendly relations with Herod the Great.

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ART. VII.—CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SONNET.\*

*The Sonnet: its Origin, Structure, and Place in Poetry.* By CHARLES TOMLINSON, F.R.S. 8vo. London. 1874.

*English Sonnets.* A Selection. Edited by JOHN DENNIS. 8vo. London. 1873.

*Light leading unto Light.* A Series of Sonnets and Poems. By JOHN CHARLES EARLE. London. 1875.

*Sonnets.* By SIR AUBREY DE VERE, Bart. A New Edition. 8vo. London. 1875.

*Monographie des Sonnets.* Par M. LOUIS DE VEYRIERES. 2 vols. 8vo. Paris. 1869.

*Le Livre des Sonnets: Quatorze Dizains de Sonnets choisis.* Paris. 1875.

*Sonette der Deutschen: herausgegeben von FRIEDRICH RASSMANN.* 3 vols. 8vo. Braunschweig. 1817.

*Poems.* By EDW. DOWDEN. H. King & Co. London. 1876.

*Songs of Life and Death.* By JOHN PAYNE. H. King & Co. 1872.

*Laurella, and other Poems.* By JOHN TODHUNTER. H. King & Co. 1876.

*The Poetical Works of John Keats,* with a Memoir by Lord HOUGHTON, D.C.L. George Bell & Sons. 1876.

**D**URING the first ten years of the second quarter of this century, the history of the Sonnet in England is almost a blank. These years, indeed, in England produced but little poetry in any of its forms; and of the writers who cultivated

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\* In continuation from October, 1876, p. 430.

poetry at all, although a few amused themselves with the Sonnet, it can hardly be said that any one pursued it as a serious literary exercise, or adhered very closely to the established rules. Winthrop Mackworth Praed, probably the happiest and most accomplished writer of *vers de société* in his age, seems to have left but a single sonnet, addressed "To Ada." It is a highly-finished composition, and exhibits full mastery of all the forms of the Sonnet; and that he was not without challenge to try his power in this line of poetry may be inferred from the sonnets addressed to himself by his friend Henry Moultrie, some of which are printed in the memoir prefixed to the American edition of Praed's Poems, and possess no ordinary merit. David Moir (Delta) has left us a little series of sonnets, pleasing and scholarlike in tone, but by no means realizing the requirements of the stricter forms; and among the remains of the short-lived but gifted Glasgow poet, William Motherwell, are a few which, though full of tenderness and true poetical feeling, are glaringly irregular in structure and rhythm. Nevertheless, this stagnation did not long endure, and even in its dullest time there is enough of spirit to maintain the continuity of the tradition. The sonnets of Hartley Coleridge are acknowledged to surpass those of his father in poetical excellence as well as in regularity of structure. The specimens which Mr. Dennis has selected from Arthur Hallam—the well-known subject of "In Memoriam"; from William Caldwell Roscoe, Chauncey Hare Townsend, Felicia Hemans, Professor Wilson (Christopher North), Laman Blanchard, and the handloomweaver's son, David Gray, may fairly take rank with the classics of the language; and we may name others, not mentioned by Mr. Dennis, whose merit is little, if at all, inferior. This volume contains no specimen of Talfourd's sonnets, which, though not very numerous, are such as might have been anticipated from the author of "Ion"; nor from those of "Delta," already alluded to. Sir Aubrey de Vere, too, who is not named by Mr. Dennis, supplies examples of almost every form. The sonnets of Barry Cornwall (Procter), if not very profound in thought, are at least vigorous and effective; and the most significant amongst the evidences of a revival of the taste is to find an ardent political writer like Ebenezer Elliott indulging in that stirring time in the Sonnet, even as a relaxation. He himself confesses that had it not been for an accidental sight of Mr. Housman's English sonnets, he "would have been the author but of one single sonnet." But he was inspired by this example, and the collected edition of his poetry contains two series of sonnets, "Rhymed Rambles," in three parts, chiefly

descriptive of scenes in England ; and a series of fifty pieces, entitled, "The Year of Seeds" (1848). They are for the most part suggested by the events or by the principles of that memorable time, and are called, in the Dedication, "a cycle of revolutionary sonnets." We shall have occasion to refer again to the structure of Elliott's sonnets ; but for the present it will be enough to say that those who remember him solely or chiefly as "the Corn-law Rhymer," will hardly have been prepared by the rough and ready vigour of that remarkable series for the delicacy and imaginative refinement of the following.

## SPRING.

BY EBENEZER ELLIOTT.

Again the violet of our early days  
 Drinks beauteous azure from the golden sun,  
 And kindles into fragrance at his blaze ;  
 The streams, rejoiced that winter's work is done,  
 Talk of to-morrow's cowslips as they run.  
 Wild apple ! thou art bursting into bloom ;  
 Thy leaves are coming, snowy-blossomed thorn !  
 Wake, buried lily ! spirit, quit thy tomb ;  
 And thou, shade-loving hyacinth be born !  
 Then haste, sweet rose ! sweet woodbine, hymn the morn,  
 Whose dewdrops shall illumine with pearly light  
 Each grassy blade that thick embattled stands  
 From sea to sea, while daisies infinite  
 Uplift in praise their little glowing hands,  
 O'er every hill that under heaven expands.

On the other hand, we notice some remarkable instances of disregard of the Sonnet in this as well as in the former generation. Lord Lytton has left but a single sonnet, "On Jealousy and Art," and his distinguished son seems never to have attempted this form of composition at all. If Charles Lamb had had the true spirit of the craft, he could hardly have wasted his high poetic power in the humorous line, —a department to which the sonnet form is peculiarly unsuited. Characteristic of its author as is the following, it would read infinitely better in Hudibrastic couples or *ottava rima*.

## LEISURE.

They talk of Time and of Time's galling yoke,  
 That like a millstone on man's mind doth press,  
 Which only works and business can redress ;  
 Of divine Leisure such foul lies are spoke,  
 Wounding her fair gifts with calumnious stroke.

But might I, fed with silent meditation,  
 Assoiled live from that fiend, Occupation—  
*Improbis Labor*, which my spirits hath broke—  
 I'd drink of Time's rich cup, and never surfeit,  
 Fling in more days than went to make the gem  
 That crowned the white top of Methusalem ;  
 Yea, on my weak neck take and never forfeit,  
 Like Atlas bearing up the dainty sky,  
 The heaven-sweet burden of eternity.

Lord Macaulay, like Lord Lytton, entirely neglected the Sonnet; nor do we know a single specimen of it from the pen either of Horne or of Bailey. Tennyson, although it might antecedently have been marked out as belonging to his peculiar sphere, and although his brother, Charles Tennyson (now Tennyson Turner), has published three volumes of sonnets, never seems to have cared for it. Archbishop Trench, at the date of his Lecture on the English Sonnet, could only remember of Tennyson "one sonnet of moderate merit"; and observes that "another, which is found in the earlier editions of his 'Lyrical Poems,' has dropped out of the later." This is no longer true. In the volume, "Early Poems," in the latest arrangement of his works, are now to be found about a dozen highly imaginative and finished sonnets. We print one or two of the most characteristic specimens.

As when with downcast eyes we muse and brood,  
 And ebb into a former life, or seem  
 To lapse far back in some confused dream  
 To states of mystical similitude ;  
 If one but spreads or hems or stirs his chair,  
 Ever the wonder waxeth more and more,  
 So that we say, "All this hath been before,  
 All this hath been, I know not when or where."  
 So, friend, when first I look'd upon thy face,  
 Our thought gave answer, each to each, so true—  
 Opposèd mirrors each reflecting each—  
 That though I knew not in what time or place,  
 Methought that I had often met with you,  
 And either lived in either's heart and speech.\*

There is great power and depth in the following, but the imagery is too hard and too material to be altogether pleasing.

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\* The first of Tennyson's "Early Sonnets."



Mine be the strength of spirit, full and free,  
 Like some broad river rushing down alone,  
 With the self-same impulse wherewith he was thrown  
 From his loved fount upon the echoing lea :—  
 Which with increasing might doth forward flee  
 By town, and tower, and link, and cape, and isle,  
 And in the middle of the green salt sea  
 Keeps his blue waters fresh for many a mile.  
 Mine be the power which ever to its sway  
 Will win the wise at once, and by degrees  
 May into uncongenial spirits flow ;  
 Ev'n as the warm gulf-stream of Florida  
 Floats far away into the Northern seas  
 The lavish growths of southern Mexico.\*

It is curious that almost the same scanty measure occurs in Tennyson's American rival, Longfellow. Indeed, it is only in his very last publication that Longfellow has ventured into this field at all. The "Masque of Pandora" ends with a "Book of Sonnets," which (doubtless in designed imitation of the normal number of lines in this form of poem) are just fourteen in number. With Tennyson and Longfellow may not inappropriately be placed the refined and scholarlike author of "Ion," and we know no more fitting specimen among his sonnets than that addressed by him

## TO CHARLES DICKENS.

*On his "Oliver Twist."*

Not only with the Author's happiest praise  
 Thy work should be rewarded ; 'tis akin  
 To deeds of men, who, scorning ease to win  
 A blessing for the wretched, pierce the maze  
 Which heedless ages spread around the ways  
 Where fruitful Sorrow tracks its parent Sin ;  
 Content to listen to the wildest din  
 Of passion, and on fellest shapes to gaze,  
 So they may earn the power which intercedes  
 With the bright world and melts it ; for within  
 Wan Childhood's squalid haunts, where basest needs  
 Make tyranny more bitter, at thy call  
 An angel face with patient sweetness pleads  
 For infant suffering to the heart of all.†

With most of the poets whom we have named, however, the Sonnet was little more than a pastime, without the

\* The third of "Early Sonnets."

† "Talfourd's Tragedies, with a Few Sonnets and Verses." Moxon : 1844.  
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serious and solemn purpose which it subserved in such hands as those of Wordsworth. Much more congenial with Wordsworth in spirit than these, and more closely allied to him in manner than the general body of the sonnet-writers of his time, was his young friend, Sir Aubrey de Vere, a poet who, amidst the political excitement of the Reform period, in which the bulk of his poetry appeared, attracted little notice from his contemporaries, but whose merits have met a more fitting appreciation in the succeeding generation. In the year 1842, Sir Aubrey de Vere published, in a volume entitled "*A Song of Faith*," a small collection of sonnets, which, both in subject and in style, bear the evident impress of the type of the great English master. Like Wordsworth's, they put aside the lighter emotional topics of the Italian school for themes of graver and higher import. The subjects belong to various classes,—personal, historical, political, descriptive, religious, and moral; but the same pure and lofty spirit pervades them all. Those who insist on the inevitable division of the Sonnet into its two groups will take exception to a large number of them, and especially to the Historical and Descriptive ones. They exhibit, too, occasional irregularity of rhyme and considerable variety in the arrangement of the verses of the tercets; but we cannot help thinking that all lovers of genuine poetry will forget these and all similar departures from the minutiae of what is popularly considered the classical form, in the picturesqueness of the language, the vividness of the imagery, the refinement of the thoughts, and, where the subject admits it, the purity and beauty of the moral teaching. Of one of these classes,—the Descriptive, Sir Aubrey de Vere may perhaps be said to be the author, or, at least, he has in it but few companions; but we think that he has fully established the legitimacy of its claim. The Descriptive Sonnet, such as it has come from his pen, is in descriptive poetry what the miniature is in portrait-painting. No painter's pencil could place the scene more strikingly before the eye than Sir Aubrey de Vere's beautiful sonnet on "*Castle-connell*." His "*Rock of Cashel*" is a perfect photograph; and in the majestic lines on "*The Solitudes of Malbay*," we actually hear the roar of the "*white-throated surges*" as they leap and dissolve in air,—

when the storm-steed rushes  
O'er the wild waves tumultuously thronging,  
Smiting their wan crests—scattering as he crushes!

We must make room for one specimen of his more solemn manner, and we do not hesitate to select one, the form of which departs widely from the legitimate types:—

## THE PASSION-FLOWER.

Art thou a type of beauty or of power,  
Of sweet enjoyment or disastrous sin ?  
For each thy name denoteth, Passion-flower.  
O no, thy pure corolla's depth within  
We trace a holier symbol, yea a sign  
'Twixt God and man ; a record of that hour  
When the expiatory act divine  
Cancelled the curse which was our mortal dower.  
It is the Cross ! Never hath Psalmist's tongue  
Fitlier of hope to human frailty sung  
Than this mute Teacher in a floret's breast ;  
A star of guidance the wild woods among,  
A page with more than lettered lore imprest,  
A beacon to the havens of the blest.

We cannot help thinking that this exquisitely beautiful piece will supply its own apology for every technical irregularity against which exception may be taken.

With the school of Wordsworth, or at least with its spirit and traditions, we must also class a somewhat younger poet, Mr. Monckton Milnes, now Lord Houghton. Almost every one of the successive volumes of his poems has contained a series of sonnets, and all alike deserve a place among the English classics in this line. The sonnet "On Happiness" has all the solemn ring of Wordsworth's "deep philosophy."

## HAPPINESS.

Because the few, with signal virtue crowned  
The heights and pinnacles of human mind,  
Sadder and wearier than the rest are found,  
Wish not thy soul less wise or less refined.  
True, that the small delights which every day  
Cheer and distract the pilgrim, are not theirs ;  
True that, though free from Passion's lawless sway,  
A loftier being brings severer cares,  
Yet have they special pleasures, even mirth,  
By those undreamt of who have only trod  
Life's valley smooth ; and if the rolling earth  
To their nice ear have many a painful tone,  
They know, man does not live by joy alone,  
But by the presence of the power of God.\*

It is needless to say that the subjects of Mr. Milnes' sonnets are very diversified, and that their general tone is less pro-

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\* "Poems of Many Years." By Richard Monckton Milnes.

fessedly religious than that of even the miscellaneous sonnets of Wordsworth. But the same profound appreciation of higher things is often observable even in his treatment of topics not primarily bearing upon the supernatural relations of man. Probably the religious sympathies which the sonnet "On Revisiting Cambridge" discloses, are in great part æsthetic, rather than dogmatical; but they will be very grateful to the Catholic reader.

### ON REVISITING CAMBRIDGE,

#### AFTER A LONG ABSENCE ON THE CONTINENT.

Nor few, nor poor in beauty, my resorts  
In foreign climes,—nor negligent or dull  
My observation, but these long-left courts  
I still find beautiful, most beautiful !  
And fairly are they more so than before ;  
For to my eye, fresh from a southern land,  
They wear the colouring of the scenes of yore  
And the old Faith that made them here to stand  
I paint the very students as they were,  
Not the men-children of these forward days,  
But mild-eyed boys just risen from their knees,  
While proud as angels of their holy care,  
Following the symbol-vested priest, they raise  
The full response of antique litanies.\*

But we are warned by the narrowing limits of our space.  
Even a glance at the productions of the sonnet-writers of the

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\* "Memorials of Many Years." London : Moxon. 1844. It may be interesting to compare this sonnet with Father Faber's.

#### ABSENCE FROM OXFORD.

Fair City ! that so long hast been my home !  
When from thy quiet places I depart  
By far-off hills and river-banks to roam,  
I bear thy name about upon my heart.  
City of glorious towers ! whene'er I feel  
The world's rude coldness o'er my spirit steal,  
Then dost thou rise to view, thine elmy groves  
Vocal with hymns of praise, thine old grey halls,  
Where the wan sun of autumn sweetest falls,  
Yon hill-side wood the nightingale so loves,  
Thy rivers twain, of gentle foot, that pass,  
Fed from a hundred willow-girded wells,  
Through the rich meadowlands of long green grass,  
To the loud tunes of all thy convent-bells !"†

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† "Faber's Poems." London : Richardson. 1857.

last thirty years would more than exhaust what remains at our disposal. Most of those who have dealt in fugitive poetry at all have been attracted more or less to this form. Thomas Hood, Aubrey de Vere, Charles Tennyson Turner, Sydney Dobell, Alexander Smith, Arthur Hugh Clough, Coventry Patmore, Westland Marston, Sir Henry Taylor, Alfred Austen, Sebastian Evans, Matthew Arnold, John Charles Earle, James Howel, Westland Marston, are but a few of the names which will occur to readers of modern poetry. Indeed Robert Browning, Morris, Swinburne, Owen Meredith (Lord Lytton), and one or two others are the only prominent writers of poetry whom we can recall as not included in the roll of sonnet-writers. We may notice, among the writers just named, one rather remarkable example,—a joint authorship of the Sonnet, in the case of Alexander Smith and the author of "Balder" and "The Roman,"—Sydney Dobell. This joint effort was an outcome of the patriotic spirit elicited during the Crimean war, perhaps in imitation of Rückert's "*Geharnischte Sonette*," and is entitled "*Sonnets on the War*." The sonnet entitled "*The Army Surgeon*" is worth transcribing, independently of its literary merit, on account of the peculiarity of its structure. It will be observed that the rhyme of the first line does not find its echo until the eleventh line.

#### THE ARMY SURGEON.

Over that breathing waste of friends and foes,  
The wounded and the dying, hour by hour,—  
In will a thousand, yet but one in power,—  
He labours through the red and groaning day.  
The fearful moorland where the myriads lay  
Moved as a moving field of mangled worms.  
And as a raw brood, orphaned in the storms,  
Thrust up their heads if the wind bend a spray  
Above them, but when the bare branch performs  
No sweet parental office, sink away  
With hopeless chirp of woe, so as he goes  
Around his feet in clamorous agony  
They rise and fall; and all the seething plain  
Bubbles a caldron vast of many-coloured pain.\*

It does not appear to which of the joint authors this peculiar structure is attributable; but the sonnets published separately by Alexander Smith, although not quite regular,

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\* "*Sonnets on the Wars*," by Alexander Smith and the author of "*Balder*" and "*The Roman*" (Sydney Dobell). London: David Bogue, 1855.

approach more closely to the Petrarchian than the Shakesperian type. The following is very graceful.

## SONNET.

Beauty still walketh on the earth and air,  
 Our present sunsets are as rich in gold  
 As ere the Iliad's music was out-rolled ;  
 The roses of the Spring are ever fair,  
 'Mong branches green still ringdoves coo and pair,  
 And the deep sea still foams its music old.  
 So, if we are at all divinely souled,  
 This beauty will unloose our bonds of care.  
 'Tis pleasant, when blue skies are o'er us bending,  
 Within old starry-gated Poesy,  
 To meet a soul set to no worldly tune,  
 Like thine, sweet Friend ! Oh, dearer this to me  
 Than are the dewy trees, the sun, the moon,  
 Or noble music with a golden ending.\*

The poetesses of this century, for the most part, have followed the examples of Miss Seward and Charlotte Smith in the last. Miss Landon, Joanna Baillie, and Jean Ingelow are exceptions; but most of the lady writers of this century have made trial of the Sonnet, and if some have been sparing in quantity, the sonnets of Mrs. Hemans are sufficient in number to count for them all. Her sonnets, although often not strictly classical in form, are, like most of her poetry, tender and pleasing; but they are infinitely inferior, not only in correctness of type, but in passionate emotion, in depth of thought, and in picturesqueness of language, to those of Elizabeth Barrett Browning and Christina Rossetti. Eliza Cooke, Adelaide Procter, Mrs. Webster, Miss Alice Thompson, Emily Pfeiffer, Mrs. Bruce, Miss Aitken, the Hon. Mrs. O. N. Knox, and others, have continued the chain of lady sonnet-writers down to the present day.

In religious poetry, too, the Sonnet has been turned to account. Keble's sonnets are not unworthy of a place beside the best pages of his "Christian Year." Those of his friend John Henry Newman are among the most characteristic of his profound and thoughtful "Verses on various Occasions." The author of "The Cathedral" (Isaac Williams) has left a still larger store than either. His "Golden Valley" comprises sixty-three,—the "Country Pastor," forty-one; and in "The

\* "Poems by Alexander Smith." 3rd edition : David Bogue, London, 1854.



Cathedral," the division entitled "The Cloisters" contains a series of twenty-eight ecclesiastical sonnets. The following, on "Prayer," strikes us as a very noble and solemn piece:—

Hidden, exhaustless treasury, heaven-taught Prayer,  
Armoury of unseen aids—watchword and spell  
At which blest Angels pitch their tent and dwell  
About us—glass to bring the bright Heavens near—  
Sea of eternal beauty—wondrous Stair  
By patriarchs seen—Key leading to a cell  
Where better worlds are hidden—secret well  
Where Love with golden chalice may repair,  
And slake his thirst, nursing with fragrant dews  
Heaven's lilies fair, and rose on wildwood spray,  
Calm thought and high resolve! strange instrument,  
Wherewith from spheres serene Music is sent  
Into the mind, throwing o'er all fresh hues,  
And mystic colourings—yet we cannot pray!

It is interesting to compare with this one of Keble's sonnets on the kindred subject, "The Length of the Prayers."—

But Faith is cold, and wilful men are strong,  
And the blithe world, with bells and harness proud,  
Rides tinkling by, so musical and loud,  
It drowns the Eternal Word, the Angelic song;  
And, one by one, the weary, listless throng  
Steals out of church, and leaves the choir unseen  
Of winged guards to weep, where prayer had been,  
That souls immortal find that hour too long.  
Most fatal token of a fallen age!  
Wit ever busy, learning ever new,  
Unsleeping fancy, eloquence untired;—  
Prayer only, dull! The saints' and martyrs' page  
A tedious scroll; the scorn'd and faithful few  
Left to bewail such beauty undesired.\*

Mr. Dennis, too, has given a specimen from the late Dean Alford, "The Master's Call," which is exceedingly touching and beautiful. Frederic Faber's sonnets, whether written before or after his conversion, are at once dignified, tender, and practical; and those of Archbishop Trench, although sometimes plain almost to dryness, are generally distinguished by easy and graceful versification as well as by solemn and elevated thought. Of the Catholic sonnet-writers we shall speak later. The most recent notable collection of sonnets of the

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\* "Keble's Miscellaneous Poems." 1869.

Protestant religious school, is that of the Rev. J. Stone—"Sonnets of the Sacred Year." It may be described as an evangelical "Christian Year in Sonnets."

The American sonnet-writers claim a few words of notice.

Although Bryant left a few specimens, they cannot be said to possess any special merit; and the same is true of the light and versatile muse of N. P. Willis. Poe's efforts are clever, but, for the most part, trifling and fantastic. But Longfellow, scanty as are his contributions, Thomas Bailey Aldrich, and James Russell Lowell, may claim a place in the best school of the modern Sonnet. The following pieces, from Longfellow and Aldrich, will be contrasted with interest:—

#### THE SOUND OF THE SEA.\*

The sea awoke at midnight from its sleep,  
And round the pebbly beaches far and wide,  
I heard the first wave of the rising tide  
Rush onward with uninterrupted sweep.  
A voice out of the silence of the deep,  
A sound mysteriously multiplied  
As of a cataract from the mountain's side,  
Or roar of winds upon a wooded steep.  
So comes to us at times, from the unknown  
And inaccessible solitudes of being,  
The rushing of the sea-tides of the soul;  
And inspirations, that we deem our own,  
Are some divine foreshadowing and foreseeing  
Of things beyond our reason or control.

Bailey Aldrich's "Pursuit and Possession" will remind the reader of Shakespeare's celebrated 129th sonnet on the bitterness of sinful pleasures.

#### PURSUIT AND POSSESSION.†

When I behold what pleasure is Pursuit',  
What life, what glorious eagerness it is;  
Then mark how full Possession falls from this,  
How fairer seems the blossom than the fruit,—  
I am perplexed, and often stricken mute,  
Wondering which hath attained the higher bliss,  
The winged insect, or the chrysalis  
It thrust aside with unreluctant foot.  
Spirit of verse, that still elud'st my art,

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\* From "The Masque of Pandora and other Poems." By Henry Wadsworth Longfellow.

† From "Cloth of Gold and other Poems," by Bailey Aldrich.

Thou airy phantom that dost ever haunt me,  
O never, never rest upon my heart,  
If when I have thee I shall little want thee !  
Still flit away in moonlight, rain, and dew,  
Will-o'-the-wisp, that I may still pursue !

It would be an endless task to follow the history into the later period of American poetry. The strict classical requirements of the Sonnet have been little observed. Still that this form of poetry is not constantly neglected may be inferred even from the specimens which are to be found in the periodicals of the day. We make room for one specimen from the pen of a rather popular lady-writer, H. H., now Mrs. Helen Hunt Jackson :

## SEPTEMBER.

O golden month ! How high thy gold is heaped !  
The yellow birch-leaves shine like bright coins strung  
On wands ; the chestnut's yellow pennons tongue  
To every wind its harvest challenge. Steeped  
In yellow still lie fields where wheat was reaped ;  
And yellow still the cornsheaves stacked among  
The yellow gourds, which from the earth have wrung  
Her utmost gold. To higher boughs hath leaped  
The purple grape—last thing to ripen—late  
By very reason of its precious cost.  
O heart ! remember, vintages are lost  
If grapes do not for freezing night-dews wait ;  
Think, while thou sunn'st thyself in joy's estate,  
Mayhap thou canst not ripen without frost !

The roll of Catholic sonnet-writers may fitly commence with the venerable name already mentioned in connection with the general religious school, that of John Henry Newman,\* although the greater number of Dr. Newman's sonnets were written while he was still an Anglican. They were composed for the most part during that memorable tour in 1833, the occasion and circumstances of which he has feelingly described in the "Apologia." They are all strictly Petrarchian in form, generally following the first, but sometimes also the second, Italian type. Unlike the generality of English sonnet-writers, too, his pieces almost invariably† have the pause at the end of the quatrains, and the division of that member of the sonnet from the tercets. To thoughtful readers, however, this will be their

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\* "Verses on Various Occasions," third edition, 1869.

† We can only recall one departure from this rule.

least attraction. They are chiefly interesting for their personal relation, being an emanation of that wonderful habit of unconscious self-dissection which pervades all the writings of this remarkable man, and bearing in every line the impress of that profound though unspoken subjectiveness which seems never absent from his style. Although hardly a score in number, they contain the germs of whole volumes of thought, and every one of them bears the living stamp of originality and truth. We might instance the sonnets on "Hope," "Memory," "Home," "Perseverance," "Semita Justorum"; or again, on the Scriptural themes, "Abraham," "Isaac," "Joseph," "Melchisedek"; but we prefer to transcribe one which the writer himself specially names, as written just upon the threshold of his journey. "At Whitchurch," he says, "while waiting for the down mail to Falmouth, I wrote the verses about my Guardian Angel, which begin with these words, 'Are these the tracks of some unearthly Friend?' and which go on to speak of 'the vision' which haunted me:—that vision is more or less brought out in the whole series of these compositions."\*

#### ANGELIC GUIDANCE.

Are these the tracks of some unearthly Friend,  
His footprints, and his vesture—skirts of light,  
Who as I talk with men conforms aright  
Their sympathetic words or deeds that blend  
With my hid thought;—or stoops here to attend  
My doubtful-pleading grief;—or blunts the might  
Of all I see not;—or in dreams of night  
Figures the scope in which what is will end?  
Were I Christ's own, then fitly might I call  
That vision real; for to the thoughtful mind  
That walks with Him He half unveils His face;  
But when on earth-stained souls such tokens fall,  
These dare not claim as theirs what there they find,  
Yet, not all hopeless, eye His boundless grace.

"Verses on Various Occasions," p. 69.

In the same page with Dr. Newman may be placed his gifted disciple and friend, Aubrey de Vere, son of the Sir Aubrey already named in this article, and one of the most prolific sonnet-writers of our age. Mr. de Vere dedicates to Dr. Newman the volume of his Poems which contains the largest collection of his sonnets. Our readers are already so fully in possession of our opinion as to the excellence of Mr. de Vere's

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\* "History of My Religious Opinions," p. 32.

poetry generally, that we need only repeat as to his sonnets what we have repeatedly said of his lyrical, his ballad, and his descriptive poetry—that they may claim rank with those of the very highest of his contemporaries. No poet of our time has more fully realized the essential notion of a sonnet, that “it is not a combination of many thoughts, but the development of a single thought so large and fruitful as to be, latently, a poem.” The great characteristic of Mr. de Vere’s sonnets is their oneness of thought; and while this quality is invariably maintained, we never find it purchased at the sacrifice of clearness, dignity, or ease of expression. We shall best render justice to his merits by a specimen:—

#### A CONVENT SCHOOL IN A CORRUPT CITY.

Hark how they laugh, these children at their sport !  
O'er all the city vast that knows not sleep,  
Labour and Sin their ceaseless vigil keep :  
Yet hither still good Angels make resort,  
Innocence here and Mirth a single fort  
Maintain ; and though in many a snake-like sweep  
Corruption round the weedy walls doth creep,  
Its track not yet hath slimed this sunny court.  
Glory to God, who so the world hath framed  
That in all places children more abound  
Than they by whom Humanity is shamed.  
Children outnumber men ; and millions die  
(Who knows not this ?) in blameless infancy,  
Sowing with innocence our sin-stained ground.

To those who are acquainted with Mr. de Vere’s poetry, it is unnecessary to say that on all those momentous subjects bearing on the mysterious relations of Nature to Religion, he is eminently successful. There is another class of subjects upon which he may be less familiarly known—the topics, classical and miscellaneous, suggested by travel. Of these, a large group will be found in his volume of poems, and we commend it most earnestly to all our readers. Those who are not old enough to recollect his charming volumes of “*Picturesque Sketches of Greece and Turkey*” will hardly be prepared for the stores of thought and fancy which are crowded into every line of these sonnets. We can but refer them to the pregnant pages of this volume, but we must not deny ourselves the pleasure of transcribing the following beautiful sonnet:—

## TO A FLOWER ON THE SKIRTS OF MONT BLANC.

With heart not yet half rested from Mont Blanc  
 O'er the small flower, my wearied eyes I bent  
 And rested on that humbler vision long.—  
 Is there less beauty in thy purple tent,  
 Outspread perchance a boundless firmament  
 O'er viewless myriads which beneath thee throng,  
 Than in that mount whose sides with ruin hung,  
 Frown on black glens and gorges thunder-rent ?  
 Is there less mystery ?—Wisely if we ponder  
 There is the mightier marvel. Life in thee  
 Is strong as in cherubic wings that wander  
 Seeking the limits of Infinity ;—  
 Life, life to be transmitted—not to expire  
 Till yonder snowy vault shall melt in the last fire !

(P. 172.)

One of Mr. de Vere's latest and not least felicitous compositions in this line was a little series of sonnets on an occasion of great national and Catholic interest, the laying the First Stone of the new church of the National College of S. Patrick's at Maynooth. We can only find room for the two opening sonnets :—

## I.

## THE PAST.

Not vain the faith and patience of the Saints !  
 Not vain, sad Isle, thy many-centuried woes !  
 Thy day was tempest-cradled ; but its close  
 Is splendour ; and the shattered forest's plaints  
 In music die. No dull repining taints  
 The ether pure of memory's realm, that far  
 Recedes, like some long tract left waste by war,  
 Some tract which eve with peaceful purple paints.  
 Long time thy priests, my country, were thy poor  
 The Cross their book, they raised the Sacrifice  
 In ruined chancel, and on rainy moor :  
 Behold, the great reward is come ! Arise  
 Fane long desired ! Beneath thy roofs of gold  
 Throne the new rites—the creed and worship old !

## II.

## THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE.

False peace, false hopes, no more the nations mock  
 The founts of the great deep up-burst, a flood—  
 O'er it the thunders roll ; the vapours scud :  
 Its cliffs are realms which every watery shock



Drags to the abyss successive, block on block :  
 O'er their own graves the high-built empires nod :  
 Alone, unshaken, stands the Church of God,  
 Sole-throned upon her adamantine Rock.  
 But, lo ! across the gloom a beam shoots forth !  
 Strong watch-tower of old times, that light is thine :  
 Thy woes are past. Lamp of the pagan North,  
 Shine forth again ! 'Tis God Who bids thee shine !  
 Isle of the Saints, thy task is thine once more :—  
 To lands self-doomed Saint Patrick's faith restore.\*

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\* While we write we have before us in the current number of the *Irish Monthly* what must be the very latest of Mr. De Vere's sonnets. The subject is one especially congenial to him,—“Fountains Abbey.” We cannot resist the temptation to print it here in juxtaposition with another very beautiful sonnet on the same subject, by a poet of a very different school, already alluded to,—Ebenezer Elliott, the Corn-law Rhymers. The reader cannot fail to be struck by the contrast.

## SONNET.

BY AUBREY DE VERE.

The hand of time is heavy ; yet how soft,  
 Laid on those flower-decked chancel-walls, it grows  
 The ruin too can “ blossom like the rose ” ;  
 Nor e'er from orchard bower, or garth, or croft,  
 More sweetly sang the linnet than aloft  
 She sings from that green tower ! The sunset glows  
 Behind it ; and yon stream that, darkling, flows  
 From arch to arch, reflects it oft and oft,  
 Humbly consenting 'mid the gloom to smile,  
 And take what transient gladness may befall.  
 Rejoice thou, too, O venerable Pile,  
 With loftier heart answering a holier call :  
 Like those, thy buried saints, make strong thy trust,  
 Waiting the Resurrection of the just.

## FOUNTAINS ABBEY.

BY EBENEZER ELLIOTT.

Abbey ! for ever smiling pensively,  
 How like a thing of Nature dost thou rise,  
 Amid her loveliest works ! as if the skies,  
 Clouded with grief, were arched thy roof to be,  
 And the tall trees were copied all from thee !  
 Mourning thy fortunes—while the waters dim  
 Flow like the memory of thy evening hymn ;  
 Beautiful in their sorrowing sympathy ;  
 As if they with a weeping sister wept,  
 Winds name thy name ! But thou, though sad, art calm,  
 And time with thee his plighted troth has kept ;  
 For harebells deck thy brow, and, at thy feet,  
 Where sleep the proud, the bee and redbreast meet,  
 Mixing thy sighs with Nature's lonely psalm.

Side by side with Dr. Newman and Mr. de Vere we must place the lamented Father Faber. Among the multiform triumphs of the versatile genius of this gifted man may be reckoned remarkable success in sonnet-writing. Father Faber's sonnets are numerous, and of a high order of merit. They are almost all regular in form, and they are free from what is a fault in Father Faber's poetry generally, the tendency to exuberance of language and to excess in illustration. A considerable number of them were composed during the tour in 1841, of which he has left so interesting a record in his "*Sights and Thoughts in Foreign Churches and among Foreign Peoples*;" and the reader of that most brilliant and yet most profound volume will recognize in many of them, which are entitled "*Thoughts while reading History*," a reproduction of the impressions derived from the incidents and scenes which are there presented in prose. We know few more striking poems in the language than the sonnets on the "*Four Religious Heathens*," Herodotus, Nicias, Socrates, and Seneca. But we prefer to extract the following, on account of the deep personal interest which it possesses in connection with the author's well-known history:—

## TWO FAITHS.

BY F. W. FABER.

Oh! pray for me! thou know'st what prayer I need!  
 What is it to be one in whose weak heart  
 Two faiths are lodged, while thought and feeling bleed  
 In the wild war; yet neither will depart?  
 What is it to be one, spell-drawn to stay  
 For the completing of his nature, trembling  
 Between two different characters each day,  
 And seem to his harsh friends to be dissembling?  
 Watch me as thou hast watched Mosella's waves  
 Bringing her clear, sweet waters down from Trèves  
 To Neuendorf along yon southern shore,  
 Breasting with hope the turbulent green Rhine,  
 Till the old flood claims both his banks once more:  
 Pray on—pray on! like fate may yet be mine.

The analogy of subject and circumstance suggests a comparison of this outpouring of Father Faber's mental struggles with a sonnet from the pen of a young writer of great promise, Miss Alice Thompson, author of a volume entitled "*Preludes*." Miss A. Thompson is a sister of the distinguished artist Miss Elizabeth Thompson, painter of the "*Roll-Call*," and, like her, is, in common with Father Faber, a convert to the

Catholic faith. Miss Thompson's sonnets (of which the volume contains thirteen) are very correct in form, and several of them are of a beauty quite remarkable. The following will probably be considered somewhat rugged and obscure ; but it is full of thought and power, and will well repay careful perusal and even study. As a companion for Father Faber's sonnet, we prefer it to several others in his volume which, as regards form, are much more finished and graceful :—

#### A YOUNG CONVERT.

Who knows what days I answer for to-day,  
Giving the bud I give the flower ? I bow  
This yet unfaded and a faded brow ;  
Bending these knees and feeble knees, I pray.  
Thoughts yet unripe in me I bend one way,  
Give one repose to pain I know not now,  
One haven to joy that comes I know not how.  
Oh ! rash ! (I smile) as one, when Spring is grey,  
Who dedicates a land of hidden wheat.  
I fold to-day at altars far apart,  
Hands trembling with what toils ? In their retreat  
I sign my love to come, my folded art.  
I light the tapers at my head and feet,  
And lay the crucifix on the silent heart.

The published "Remains" of Adelaide Procter—like Miss Thompson, a convert to the Catholic Church—contain but a single sonnet, but we think it deserves a place here.

#### THE CHURCH IN 1849.

O mighty Mother, hearken ! for thy foes  
Gather around thee, and exulting cry  
That thine old strength is gone and thou must die,  
Pointing with fierce rejoicing to thy woes.  
And is it so ? The raging whirlwind blows  
No stronger now than it has done of yore :  
Rebellion, strife, and sin have been before ;  
The same companions whom thy Master chose.  
We too rejoice : we know thy might is more  
When to the world thy glory seemeth dim ;  
Nor can Hell's gates prevail to conquer Thee,  
Who hearest over all the voice of Him  
Who chose Thy first and greatest Prince should be  
A fisher on the Lake of Galilee.

There is a great lesson, silently conveyed, in the following sonnet, also by a convert to the Catholic Church, Mr. Wilfred

Mennell, a very regular sonnet-writer in the American periodical the "Catholic World" :—

Death hovering near her couch, a maiden lay,  
And, looking round her chamber, softly smiled  
To think how oft its dear delights beguiled  
Her heart in years the bygone and the gay.  
But most of all her lingering eyes would stray  
To a loved oaken table, where were piled  
The volumes of the poets, who had wiled  
So many an hour in fitful joy away.  
"Ah me!" she sighed, "I listened to your strain,  
And saw Love's arms stretched forth enticingly,  
And looked and longed, and turned and looked again,  
Nor could forget that sight, though I was fain.  
Now tell me, O my Poets, ere I die,  
Did all your joy repay me for my pain?"

We must not pass from the roll of convert sonnet-writers without noticing the Rev. R. S. Hawker, Vicar of Morvenstone, whose conversion to the Church was quite recently made the subject of a very disagreeable controversy. We cannot help thinking the following exceedingly beautiful in its manner, as well as most striking in its thoughts :—

PATER VESTER PASCIT ILLA.

Our bark is on the waters ! Wide around  
The wandering wave ; above, the lonely sky.  
Hush ! a young seabird floats, and that quick cry  
Shrieks to the levelled weapon's echoing sound,  
Grasps its lank wing, and on, with reckless bound !  
Yet, creature of the surf, a sheltering breast  
To-night shall haunt in vain the far-off nest,  
A call unanswered search the rocky ground.  
Lord of leviathan ! when Ocean heard  
Thy gathering voice and sought his native breeze ;  
When whales first plunged with life, and the proud deep  
Felt unborn tempests heave in troubled sleep,  
Thou didst provide e'en for this nameless bird  
Home and a natural love amid the surging seas.\*

Prefixed to some of Gerald Griffin's Tales are a few sonnets which make one regret that he did not more frequently employ his graceful pen in this measure ; but a more appropriate sample of his powers will be found in a sonnet to the Blessed Virgin, which appeared formerly under his name in the Christian

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\* "Cornish Ballads and other Poems," by R. S. Hawker.

Brothers' "Third Book of Lessons," but has disappeared, we know not why, from the later editions. We print this in companionship with a very beautiful sonnet on the same theme by Mr. H. N. Oxenham, and the reader will be interested in comparing both with Constable's sonnet "To Our Lady" printed in a former page:—

## TO THE BLESSED VIRGIN.

BY G. GRIFFIN.

As the mute nightingale in closest groves  
 Lies hid at noon, but when day's piercing eye  
 Is locked in night, with full heart beating high  
 Poureth her plain song o'er the light she loves :  
 So Virgin, ever pure, and ever blest  
 Moon of Religion ! from whose radiant face  
 Reflected streams the light of heavenly grace  
 On broken hearts, by contrite thoughts oppressed ;  
 So Mary, they who justly feel the weight  
 Of Heaven's offended majesty, implore  
 Thy reconciling aid, with suppliant knee :  
 Of sinful man O sinless Advocate  
 To thee they turn, nor Him the less adore ;  
 'Tis still *His* light they love, less dreadful seen in thee.

## THE VIRGIN MOTHER.

BY H. N. OXENHAM.

Ave Maria ! oh ! what vision blest  
 Thy name unveils before the adoring eye,  
 Thou whom alone of Eve's fallen progeny  
 Sin might not harm nor Satan's power molest ;  
 Whose peerless glory Gabriel's lips confessed,  
 The Spirit's bride, the Incarnate God's abode,  
 Daughter of earth and mother of thy God,  
 Since in thy womb the Eternal deigned to rest.  
 Mother and maiden ! with intenser ray  
 Thy path still kindled towards the perfect day,  
 Till He arose, the Dayspring from on high,  
 To crown the gifts of unresisted grace,  
 The love divine, the virgin purity,  
 That made thy bosom His chosen resting-place.

Among Irish poets generally the Sonnet can hardly be said to have been popular. The Poets of the Nation, various as were the forms they followed, hardly dealt in it at all. Even the versatile genius of Clarence Mangan produced not

one.\* Sir Charles Gavan Duffy printed but one, entitled "Literary Leisure," which may lead us to regret that we have so little from the same school.

#### LITERARY LEISURE.

Let my life pass in healthful, happy ease,  
The world and all its schemes shut out my door,  
Rich in a competence and nothing more,  
Saving the student's wealth—"Apollo's fees"—  
Long rows of goodly volumes, to appease  
My early love and quenchless thirst of lore,  
No Want to urge me on the path of Gain—  
No Hope to lure me in Ambition's track;  
Struggles and strife, and all their savage train,  
Still from my tranquil dwelling driven back.  
My only triumphs—if such toys I lack—  
Some subtle nut of science burst in twain,  
Or knot unravelled. Thus be't mine to live,  
And feel life pass like a long summer eve,

Among a few samples printed in the "Remains" of Thomas Darcy M'Gee, there are several which can lay no claim to the name much less to the character of the regular sonnet. Mr. D. F. MacCarthy has done but too little in this form of composition. We know only two sonnets from his pen, but they are enough to exhibit the same mastery of versification, the same depth and delicacy of thought, the same richness of imagery, which constitute the unfailing charm of his poetry. Our Irish readers will expect a specimen from a poet so national and so popular, and we select the following, the Dedication to his wife of the "Bell-founder and other Poems," because it can hardly fail to suggest a comparison with Southey's well-known and beautiful Dedication to Edith. It is impossible not to be struck by the coincidences of thought, although the plan in each is entirely independent:—

#### TO ETHNA.

BY D. F. MACCARTHY.

Ethna, to cull sweet flowers divinely fair,  
To seek for gems of such transparent light  
As would not be unworthy to unite  
Round thy fair brow and through thy dark-brown hair,  
I would that I had wings to cleave the air

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\* We cannot dignify with this name a humorous squib of his, commencing with the following lines:—

My friend Tom Bentley borrowed from me lately  
A score of yellow shiners, subsequently.



In search of some far region of delight  
That, back to thee from that adventurous flight,  
A glorious wreath my happy hands might bear ;  
Soon would the sweetest Persian rose be thine—  
Soon would the glory of Golconda's mine  
Flash on thy forehead like a star—ah ! me,  
In place of these I bring, with trembling hand,  
These fading wildflowers from our native land—  
These simple pebbles from the Irish Sea !

TO EDITH SOUTHEY.

BY ROBERT SOUTHEY.

With way-worn feet, a traveller, woe-begone,  
Life's upward road I journey'd many a day,  
And framing many a sad yet soothing lay,  
Beguiled the solitary hours with song.  
Lonely my heart and rugged was the way,  
Yet often pluck'd I, as I pass'd along,  
The wild and simple flowers of poesy ;  
And sometimes, unreflecting as a child,  
Entwined the weeds which pleased a random eye.  
Take thou the wreath, Beloved ! it is wild  
And rudely garlanded ; yet scorn not thou  
The humble offering, where dark rosemary weaves  
Amid gay flowers its melancholy leaves,  
And myrtle gathered to adorn thy brow.

It is gratifying to add that the father's mantle has fallen upon Mr. MacCarthy's gifted daughter, now Sister Mary Stanislaus, a religious of the Dominican order. Some of Sister Stanislaus's sonnets which have appeared in the "Irish Monthly" and other Catholic periodicals, are of the very highest promise.

Indeed, it is principally to the periodicals of the day that we must look for Catholic contributions to this class of poetry. In the monthly issue of Father Hecker's "Catholic World" may generally be found one or two sonnets, commonly of considerable merit—more than one from a female pen. The "Irish Monthly" a Catholic journal of modest pretensions but very remarkable literary merit, has been of late especially rich in sonnets. We shall cull a few as a sample of the manner of the entire.

We begin with one from the pen of a young Cork poet, Mr. Edward Harding, which we regard as exceedingly good in its own class:—

NIGHTFALL.

BY EDWARD HARDING.

On wood and wave the gathering shadows fall ;  
The trees are whispering in the twilight gray,  
As if one last farewell they fain would say,

Ere darkness shrouds them in her dusky pall.  
 Now, one by one, broad oak and poplar tall  
 Melt into shade ; the golden-mantled day  
 O'er the hushed meadows softly steals away,  
 And solemn night sits silently on all.

But hark ! the East-wind, slowly creeping by,  
 With low, dull moan the brooding darkness fills,  
 And all the night awakes to sympathy ;  
 For, far and near, the oaks and poplars sigh,  
 And floating faintly o'er the distant hills  
 A deep, sad voice comes sobbing from the sea.

We are much struck, too, by a sonnet entitled "My Prayer," by "Alice Esmonde," the *nom de plume*, we believe, of a young lady from one of the southern counties of Ireland ; but the subject is of less general interest than that of the following strikingly beautiful lines, which have the additional merit of strict regularity of form.

#### POVERTY.

BY ROSA MULHOLLAND.

I had a dream of poverty by night,  
 And saw the holy palmer wending by,  
 With pensive face and radiant upturned eye,  
 Drinking the tender moon's approving light,  
 I saw her take the hills and climb the height,  
 While broad below the city murmured nigh,  
 Spangling the dusk with lamps of revelry  
 That made the mellow planets pale to sight.

Yet kept my love her face toward the stars  
 Till broke the dawn against the mountain ridge,  
 And angels met her on the misty way ;  
 Then heaven looked forth on her through golden bars,  
 Then gleamed her feet along a rosy bridge,  
 Then passed she noiseless into eternal day.

But by far the most prolific among recent Catholic sonnet-writers is Mr. John Charles Earle. In 1870 Mr. Earle's volume "A Hundred Sonnets" attracted the notice of those who keep a watch upon the "minor poets" as they wax and wane in the current literature, by the vigour and originality as well as by the remarkable grace and correctness which it exhibited ; and this favourable impression was confirmed by a "Second Hundred Sonnets" published in the following year. The earlier sonnets contain specimens of all the ordinary types, among which the First Italian Type is the most common : but in the later series, and still more in a volume entitled "Light

leading unto Light," published last year, the author has all but confined his sonnet to the Second Italian style, in which the tercets rhyme alternately. No sonnet-writer of the present day appears to us to have acquired so complete a mastery of the forms of the Sonnet, and such a power of casting his thoughts naturally and without an effort into that artificial mould. In his hand it is plastic as the *terza rima* in Ariosto's or Byron's, and the ideas seem to mould themselves into its complicated structure as readily as they flow in the easy forms of ordinary prose. Perhaps, indeed, the familiarity thus engendered is hardly compatible with the stateliness and dignity of the Sonnet; the author's very excess of ease in composition has left its trace in a certain occasional tone of commonplace in some of the sonnets. But this is well compensated in general by the depth and gravity of the thoughts, the dignity of the language, and the solemn ring of the versification.

We take the following examples almost at random out of a host of others, all of equal merit. They are from Mr. Earle's latest volume, "*Light unto Light*." It will be seen that they follow—like almost all Mr. Earle's later sonnets—the Second Italian type:—

#### THE HERE AND THE THERE.

Ye sapphire gateways of the Unseen World,  
Lift up your heads, that we may enter in.  
Without your radiant precincts all is furled  
In shadow, and the withering curse of sin  
Lies on the sands. To you our way we win  
Athirst and weary. We would be impeared  
And garlanded with spirit-gifts; the din  
Of worldly cares, like breakers round us hurled,  
Would change for soothing psalms of souls at rest;  
Would see the aureoles which the blessed wear;  
Would rise each on our guardian-angel's breast;  
Would breathe, though but one hour, supernal air:  
Then turn to homely tasks with holier zest,  
And find our Here united with our There.

We look upon this as a very happy specimen of the Sonnet. Exception will be taken by purists to the want of a break between the two members; but we have already said that we do not regard this as a fault, except where there are two really distinct members, of which the latter is in the Sonnet contrasted with the former, or makes a distinct application of the thought which the former enounces. In sonnets like the above, where there is but one undivided thought carried

through the entire, it would be, in our opinion, the merest affectation to insist upon the pause at the end of the eighth line.

The pause is maintained in the following :—

EVIL ITSELF A GOOD.

There is no evil that is wholly ill.  
 Evil is very good when seen aright.  
 Who made the day, He also made the night—  
 The moral night, His purpose to fulfil,  
 Through freedom, oft abused, of finite will.  
 In sacrifice we hail the dawning light,  
 Through one alone is virtue clothed with right,  
 And but for sin Salvation's bliss were nil.  
 God is the source of all that is, nor need  
 We fear to own a truth so fraught with peace.  
 Through faults and sorrows only would He lead  
 His children on to joy's immense increase.  
 From Him the poison and the cure proceed,  
 The bitter bondage and the blest release.

In our desire to make known to our readers the high rank held by Catholics in this comparatively obscure branch of poetry, we have left ourselves but scant space for the general subject of contemporary sonnet-writers. It is to be regretted that Mr. Dennis, in his otherwise excellent selection, has adopted the principle of excluding living poets; and we should have desired to carry the subject down to the present day by a few remarks on the sonnets, of Alfred Tennyson, his brother Charles Tennyson Turner, Dante Gabriel Rossetti, Christina Rossetti, Robert Buchanan, Coventry Patmore, Philip Bourke Marston, Augustus Taylor, William Bell Scott, John Payne, George Barlow, W. T. Ingham, Rev. J. Stone, and others. Criticism of this kind, however, would have but little interest unless it were illustrated by examples characteristic of their several styles, which is plainly impossible within the limits of an article. We cannot, however, deny ourselves the pleasure of transcribing a few specimens of the contemporary Sonnet, selecting for the purpose a few writers whom we may suppose to be least commonly known among our readers. We may safely dispense, upon this ground, with any further extract from the Poet Laureate or from his brother; nor are we much attracted towards Mr. Robert Buchanan, whose "*Coruiskean Sonnets*" have the same mysterious, not to say obscure, character which distinguishes his "*Book of Orm*." But we are sure our readers will be grateful for the following curious speculations on "*The*"

Colour and Hue of Flowers," from Mr. Augustus Taylor's  
"Garden Sonnets":—

## I.

As when a man has fixed observant sight  
On beds of bright ranunculus or roses,  
And cools not with heaven's blue his eyes, but closes  
His lids awhile, or gazes on pure white,  
Each colour strangely gives its opposite ;  
For purple now pale yellow, and for green  
Red, and for orange violet is seen :  
So when for the last time his eyelids fall,  
Then instantly these flattering scenes will change,  
Portrayed on that strict blackness, or unrolled  
On truth's unspotted snow, and then to gall  
Will turn their dainties, and his eye will range  
O'er paltry cheats which glittered once all gold.

## II.

Lift then thine eyes, and with them lift thine heart,  
Up from these fascinations to that blue  
Where the stars love to move, and whither dew  
Rises with all pure things ! Such holy art  
Will keep thy spiritual eye from smart,  
And save thee from the contrasts of despair.  
That is the colour of the vital air  
And of all depths, and of the cleft where part  
The awful thunderclouds ; it promises  
Calm ; and from yon thatch rising dark it tells  
Of fireside rest to wearied labour given ;  
And on the far-off hills and on the seas,  
And in the river flowers and coppice bells,  
Of hope, of home, of distance, and of Heaven.

Mr. Dante Gabriel Rossetti has written a series of "Sonnets towards the House of Life." We shall not be supposed to have many things in common with this writer's religious or philosophical views ; but we think there is food for thought in the following strange but suggestive piece, which is the fortieth in the series :—

## LOST DAYS.

The lost days of my life until to-day,  
What were they, could I see them on the street  
Lie as they fell ? Would they be ears of wheat  
Sown once for food, but trodden into clay ?  
Or golden coins squandered and still to pay ?  
Or drops of blood dabbling the guilty feet ?  
Or such spilt water as in dreams must cheat  
The throats of men in Hell, who thirst alway ?

I do not see them here ; but after death  
 God knows I know the faces I shall see,  
 Each one a murdered self, with low last breath,  
 " I am thyself—what hast thou done to me ?"  
 " And I—and I—thyself " (lo ! each one saith),  
 " And thou thyself to all eternity !"

We print the following on "Mary's Girlhood," not from any sympathy with its train of thought, but as a contrast with the Catholic sonnets to our Lady printed in a former page. How commonplace it reads by their side :—

#### MARY'S GIRLHOOD.

This is that blessed Mary, pre-elect  
 God's virgin. Gone is a great while, and she  
 Dwelt young in Nazareth of Galilee.  
 Unto God's will she brought devout respect,  
 Profound simplicity of intellect,  
 And supreme patience. From her mother's knee  
 Faithful and hopeful ; wide in charity ;  
 Strong in grave peace ; in pity, circumspect.  
 So held she through her girlhood ; as it were  
 An angel-watered lily that near God  
 Grows and is quiet. Till, one dawn at home,  
 She woke in her white bed and had no fear  
 At all—yet wept till sunshine, and felt awed  
 Because the fulness of the time was come.

Very different from this the tone of these tender and solemn pieces by his sister, Miss Christina Rossetti.

#### IF ONLY.

If only I might love my God and die !  
 But now He bids me love Him and live on,  
 Now when the bloom of all my life is gone,  
 The pleasant half of life has quite gone by,  
 My tree of hope is lopped that spread so high,  
 And I forget how summer glowed and shone,  
 While autumn grips me with its fingers wan  
 And frets me with its fitful windy sigh.  
 When autumn passes, then must winter numb,  
 And winter may not pass a weary while,  
 But, when it passes, spring shall flower again :  
 And in that spring who weepeth now shall smile,  
 Yes, they shall wax who now are on the wane,  
 Yes, they shall sing for love when Christ shall come.\*

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\* From "The Goblin-market and other Poems," by Christina Rossetti.



There is great natural beauty and tenderness in the sonnet entitled "Remember," although it wants the direct religious tone of the lines just quoted.

REMEMBER.

Remember me when I am gone away,  
Gone far away into the silent land ;  
When you can no more hold me by the hand,  
Nor I half turn to go, yet turning stay.  
Remember me when no more day by day  
You tell me of our future that you planned :  
Only remember me ; you understand,  
It will be late to counsel then or pray.  
Yet if you should forget me for a while  
And afterwards remember, do not grieve :  
For if the darkness and corruption leave  
A vestige of the thoughts that once I had,  
Better by far you should forget and smile  
Than that you should remember and be sad.

The same want will be felt in the lines entitled "After Death," but they are profoundly touching.

AFTER DEATH.

The curtains were half-drawn, the floor was swept  
And strewn with rushes ; rosemary and may  
Lay thick upon the bed on which I lay,  
Where through the lattice ivy-shadows crept.  
He leaned above me, thinking that I slept,  
And could not hear him ; but I heard him say :  
" Poor child, poor child ! " and as he turned away  
Came a great silence, and I knew he wept.  
He did not touch the shroud, or raise the fold  
That hid my face, or take my hand in his,  
Or ruffle the smooth pillows for my head :  
He did not love me living ; but once dead  
He pitied me ; and very sweet it is  
To know he still is warm though I am cold.

Mr. William Bell Scott has published some fifty or sixty sonnets. The following is from the series entitled "Outside the Temple."

FAITH.

BY WILLIAM BELL SCOTT.

" Follow Me," Jesus said : and they arose ;  
Peter and Andrew rose and followed Him,  
Followed Him even to Heaven, through death most grim,  
And through a long hard life—without repose  
Save in the grand ideal of its close.

"Take up your cross and come with Me," He said :  
 And the world listens still through all her dead,  
 And still would answer had we faith like those.  
 But who can light again such beacon-fire ?  
 With gladsome haste and with rejoicing souls  
 How would men gird themselves for the emprise !  
 Leaving their black boats by the dead lake's mire,  
 Leaving their slimy nets by the cold shoals,  
 Leaving their old oars, nor once turn their eyes.

Our space only permits us to particularize one other from the roll of English sonnet-writers,—Mr. John Payne, whose merits in general literature have met with full recognition ; but we must be content with a single specimen of Mr. Payne's sonnets. His Dedication of his "*Masque of Shadows*" is a most characteristic and suggestive piece, as well as a highly-finished example of the classic Sonnet.

This is the House of Dreams. Whoso is fain  
 To enter in this shadow-land of mine  
 He must forget the utter Summer's shine  
 And all the daylight ways of hand and brain :  
 Here is the white moon ever on the wane,  
 And here the air is sad with many a sign  
 Of haunting mysteries,—the golden wine  
 Of June falls never, nor the silver rain  
 Of hawthorns pallid with the joy of Spring ;  
 But many a mirage of pale memories  
 Veils up the sunless aisles : upon the breeze  
 A music of waste sighs doth float and sing ;  
 And in the shadow of the sad-flowered trees,  
 The ghosts of men's desire walk wandering.\*

In concluding our notice of contemporary sonnet-literature, it is gratifying to state that Ireland, up to the very latest date, continues to be fully and honourably represented by Mr. Perceval Graves, son of the Bishop of Limerick, author of "*Songs of Killarney*," and Mr. Edmond G. Holmes, of St. John's College, Cambridge; both have written very creditable sonnets. Those of the latter—"Onwardness" and "Inwardness"—are very thoughtful and reverent; and his sonnet "*On the Coast of Clare*" will be read with an interest quite independent of that which arises from local associations. Among the new volumes of poetry just issued as the first-fruits of the season are two contributions of Irish poets, one by Professor Dowden, Trinity College, Dublin, the other by Dr. John Todhunter, both of which contain sonnets of excellent

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\* Payne's "*Masque of Shadows*." London : 1874.

form and of very unquestionable merit. Professor Dowden's "Singer's Plea" will be recognized as bearing the stamp of true poetical grace and delicacy; and Dr. Todhunter, if less profound in thought, must be acknowledged as not inferior in richness of imagination and in picturesqueness of description.

### THE SINGER'S PLEA.

BY EDWARD DOWDEN.

Why do I sing? I know not why, my friend;  
 The ancient rivers, rivers of renown,  
 A royal largess to the sea roll down  
 And on those liberal highways nations send  
 Their tributes to the world,—stored corn and wine,  
 Gold-dust, the wealth of pearls, and orient spar,  
 And myrrh, and ivory, and cinnabar,  
 And dyes to make a presence-chamber shine.  
 But in the woodlands where the wild-flowers are,  
 The rivulets must have their innocent will  
 Who all the summer-hours are singing still,  
 The birds care for them, and sometimes a star,  
 And should a tired child rest beside the stream,  
 Sweet memories would slide into his dream.

We observe in many of Professor Dowden's sonnets a tendency to throw into some of the lines a redundant *short* syllable. The effect is undoubtedly good in some instances, but we cannot help regretting the irregularity, and especially its frequent recurrence.

Dr. Todhunter's sonnets are of very good form. We select a sample of his descriptive style.

### THE FIRST SPRING DAY.

But one short week ago the trees were bare  
 And winds were keen, and violets pinched with frost;  
 Winter was with us; but the larches tossed  
 Lightly their crimson buds, and here and there  
 Rooks cawed. To-day the Spring is in the air  
 And in the blood: sweet sun-gleams come and go  
 Upon the hills, in lanes the wild-flowers blow,  
 And tender leaves are bursting everywhere.  
 About the hedge the small birds fear and dart,  
 Each bush is full of amorous flutterings  
 And little rapturous cries. The thrush apart  
 Sits throned, and loud his ripe contralto rings.  
 Music is on the wind, and in my heart  
 Infinite love for all created things.\*

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\* "Laurella and other Poems," by John Todhunter, M.D. London: Henry King & Co. 1876.

But it is time to draw to a close, although we have left many topics of grave import in the criticism of the Sonnet entirely untouched. Among these is the fundamental controversy as to its legitimate form. For Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese poets the rules, though often disregarded, are sufficiently stringent. The French in this, as in other matters of fashion, have laid down laws for themselves, and the Germans have not scrupled to permit considerable relaxation of the classic rules. Amongst the number and variety of English sonnets, ancient and modern, it is difficult to pronounce decretorially what is to be regarded as the normal type of the Sonnet in our language, or, indeed, whether there is any type which may be considered as accepted by general usage. Mr. Tomlinson has gone beyond all other critics in the rigour with which he insists on adhering to the Italian models. It is universally admitted that the greater difficulty of finding rhymes in English has compelled a departure in the form of the English sonnet, from the strict types of the easy-flowing Italian. The earliest English specimens have hardly anything in common with the Petrarchian sonnet beyond the number and the length of the lines. The sonnet of Surrey, Watson, Shakespeare, and George Herbert is simply a piece made up of four quatrains of alternate elegiac verses, followed by a heroic couplet. That of Sir Philip Sidney, of Constable, and of Spenser only differs from the Shakespearian in having the rhyme of the second quatrain inverted. Drummond returned more nearly to the Italian model. His quatrains are for the more part strictly in form; but he commonly closes the tercets with a rhyming couplet;—a form held in strong reprobation, as imparting to the Sonnet an *epigrammatical character*, by Italian artists, to whose view Hallam\* does not hesitate to assent. Probably owing to the influence of the early masters, these types have become a tradition in English poetry, and traces of them are to be found throughout the whole series of sonnet-writers. The final couplet has been largely admitted, even by writers otherwise quite unexceptionable. Cowper, and several others, down as late as Professor Wilson, adopted, in addition, the modified rhyming quatrains of the Spenserian sonnet, as in Professor Wilson's

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A cloud lay cradled near the setting sun,  
 A gleam of crimson tinged its braided snow;  
 Long had I watched the glory moving on,  
 O'er the still radiance of the Lake below;

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\* "Literary History," iii. 265.

Tranquil its spirit seemed and floated slow ;  
 Even in its very motion there was rest ;  
 While every breath of eve that chanced to blow,  
 Wafted the traveller to the beauteous West.  
 Emblem, methought, of the departed soul,  
 To whose white robe the gleam of bliss is given ;  
 And by the breath of mercy made to roll  
 Right onwards to the golden gates of Heaven ;  
 Where to the eye of Faith it peaceful lies,  
 And tells to man his glorious destinies.

The exquisitely tender and touching sonnets of Julian Fane are a literal reproduction of the type made classical by Shakespeare, as in his last Birthday Sonnet to his mother.

So, like a wanderer from the world of shades,  
 Back to the firm earth and familiar skies,  
 Back to that light of love that never fades—  
 The unbroken sunshine of thy blissful eyes,  
 I come—to greet thee on this happy day  
 That lets a fresh pearl on thy life appear ;  
 That decks thy jewelled age with fresh array,  
 Of good deeds done within the circled year  
 So art thou robed in majesty of grace,  
 In regal purple of pure womanhood ;  
 Throned in thy high pre-eminence of place ;  
 Sceptred and crowned a very Queen of Good.  
 Receive my blessing, perfect as thou art,  
 Queen of all good, and sovereign of my heart.

But the more rigorous forms also have had conscientious cultivators in England. In the older generation, even Mr. Tomlinson is satisfied with Milton. Wordsworth is not careful in maintaining the break and suspension of sense at the end of the quatrains, nor in limiting the rhymes to two, and he ranges somewhat arbitrarily through the several Italian types ; but, nevertheless, we think that there are not many who will acquiesce in the severe exception taken to him by Mr. Tomlinson, in point of regularity of form. Southey and Coleridge are generally regular, although the following of Southey's pieces, (*ab ab, ed ed, ef ef, ef*), is quite peculiar in form.

Stately yon vessel sails adown the tide,  
 To some far-distant land's adventurous bound ;  
 The sailors' busy cries from side to side  
 Pealing among the echoing rocks resound :  
 A patient, thoughtless, much-enduring band,  
 Joyful they enter on their ocean way,  
 With shouts exulting leave their native land  
 And know no care beyond the present day.

But is there no poor mourner left behind,  
 Who sorrows for a child or husband there ;—  
 Who at the howling of the midnight wind  
 Will wake and tremble in her boding prayer ?  
 So may her voice be heard, and Heaven be kind !  
 Go, gallant ship, and be thy fortune fair !

Out of twenty-one sonnets of Keats in the collected edition of 1854, twenty are strictly Petrarchian. His beautiful sonnet, "The Human Seasons," is of the Shakespearean type, and of the additional sonnets collected by Lord Houghton, only six are quite regular. Lord Houghton himself is generally very exact, as is Leigh Hunt, who commonly follows the second Italian style. Of Byron's five sonnets, four have but two rhymes in the quatrains, in the tercets two follow the form *ede, ede*, three are in alternate rhyme. Occasionally we meet some very remarkable varieties. Sir Henry Taylor's beautiful Dedication to Southey is in the form, *ab ba, be be, ded ebb*. In Robert Buchanan we meet with *ab ab, ba ba, edd ede*.

Ebenezer Elliott has some very apposite remarks on this subject in a notice with which he introduces his "Rhymed Rambles," in Three Parts, "I never liked the measure of the legitimate or Petrarchan sonnet. There is a disagreeable break in the melody after the eighth line. That Milton felt this, is proved by the fact that he frequently ran the eighth line into the ninth, contrary to law.

"Nor can I agree with Mr. Housman, that a sonnet ending with a couplet is therefore faulty ; on the contrary, a couplet at the close of a sonnet has often a fine effect. So thought and so proved Cowper, and our elder poets ; and there are in Mr. Housman's collection five most harmonious but not Petrarchan sonnets, by Fitzadam, composed of three elegiac stanzas and a couplet, all disconnected in rhyme but not in metre ; which fully show that the measure of the Sonnet, as he has managed it, is as proper for a long and serious poem as the Spenserian stanza itself.

"The Sonnet, I believe, has become popular in those languages only in which it is more difficult to avoid similar rhymes than to find them. The Spenserian stanza, requiring four rhymes, is quite as difficult as the Petrarchan sonnet, the latter being little more than a series of couplets and triplets ; and I venture to suggest that—preceded by five lines linked to it in melody, and concluding occasionally with an Alexandrine, or preceded by four lines only, if concluding with a triplet—the far-famed measure of Spenser, is the best



which the English sonneteer can employ. Of this the reader may judge for himself; as in these sonnets (if sonnets they are) I have used the legitimate, the Spenserian, and other forms."

He himself ventures to suggest a type for the English sonnet. "After much theory and some practice I venture to propose the measure of this sonnet as a pattern to English sonneteers; for while, to me, the Petrarchan in our language is at once immelodious and inharmonious, the music of this, in its linked unity, is both sweet and various, and when closed by an Alexandrine, majestic."

His proposed model sonnet is the last of the "Year of Seeds," and is, as will be seen, of the form *ab ab, ba ba, ced add*.

And to the Father of Eternal days,  
And fairest things, that fairer yet will be,  
Shall I no song of adoration raise,  
While Passion's world, and Life's great agony  
Are one dread hymn, dread Progresser ! to Thee ?  
Thou, Love, art Progress ! And be thine the praise  
If I have ever loved thy voice divine  
And o'er the sadness of my slander'd lays  
Flings its redeeming charm a note of thine.  
Oh, Gentlest Might Almighty ! if of mine  
One strain shall live, let it thy impress bear ;  
And please wherever humble virtues twine  
The rose and woodbine with the thorns of care,  
Thriving because they love ! Thy temple, Lord, is there !

The first of the fifty sonnets of this "Year of Seeds" runs thus :—

Toy of the Titans ! Tiny Harp ! again  
I quarrel with the order of thy strings,  
Established by the law of sonnet-kings,  
And used by giants that do nought in vain.  
Was Petrarch, then, mistaken in the strain  
That charms Italia ? Were they tasteless things  
That Milton wrought ? And are they mutterings  
Untuneful, that pay Wordsworth with pleased pain ?  
No. But I see that tyrants come of slaves ;  
That states are won by rush of robbers' steel ;  
And millions starved and tortured to their graves,  
Because as they are taught men think and feel ;  
Therefore, I change the Sonnet's slavish notes  
For cheaper music, suited to my thoughts.

The second ends :—

Oh, unborn Year !

Disclose the comings which the past commands,  
The joy, the love, the crime, the hope, the fear,  
That bid the future join the ages gone,  
Still uttering the eternal mandate, "On !"

The most common departure, however, among English writers from strict Italian requirements is the blending, as by Wordsworth, of the two members of the Sonnet. Not even the best writers of the modern schools are entirely free from it. A few recent poets—as Mr. William Bell Scott and Mr. G. D. Rossetti—have adopted a style of printing which, by leaving a space between the quatrains and the tercets, in some sort compels regularity in this particular; but not even they are uniformly regular. We ourselves have already confessed to considerable laxity in this particular; and in sonnets so regular in other respects as the great mass of those written by Dr. Newman, Williams, Aubrey de Vere, Archbishop Trench, J. C. Earle, and Philip Bourke Marston, we willingly condone a little license in the interlacing of the tercets with the quatrains. We can speak in terms of equal praise of the style, as well as of the matter, of the sonnets of Mr. John Payne. Some of them, indeed, in delicacy of finish, in subtleness of fancy, and beauty of versification, are unsurpassed by any sonnets of our time, hardly even excepting those of Mrs. Browning.

The same variety in the use of the several types is observable in the lady sonnet-writers of England. The three of the last century, Miss Seward, Charlotte Smith, and Helen Williams, for the most part wrote in the first Italian form. Mrs. Hemans also generally followed this form, although she occasionally closes with the rhyming couplet. Mrs. Browning, in addition to her other excellences, is a model of regularity; a quality which is the more remarkable in a writer so impassioned, and exhibiting in every line such evidence of tender sensibility, and quick, though suppressed emotion. Mrs. Browning, like Mr. Earle, has commonly written in tercets of alternate rhyme. The sonnets on "Work," "Life," those "to George Sand," and a few others, are composed according to the first type. Most of the other, and the whole of the so-called "Sonnets from the Portuguese," are in the alternate rhyme. Her sonnets are so admirable in themselves, and are so deservedly regarded as determining the character of the modern English sonnet, that we think it right to transcribe specimens of both these classes.

The following is a truly noble piece; and in all things except the interweaving of the two groups, the quatrains and tercets, it is an unexceptionable example of the first Italian type. It will remind the reader of Wordsworth's very happiest jottings of natural incident, with far more of personal emotion than Wordsworth was capable of infusing into his verse.\*

## IRREPARABLENESS.

I have been in the meadows all the day,  
And gathered there the nosegay that you see,  
Singing within myself as bird or bee  
When such do field-work on a morn of May.  
But now I look upon my flowers, decay  
Has met them in my hands more fatally  
Because more warmly clasped,—and sobs are free  
To come instead of songs. What do you say,  
Sweet counsellors, dear friends? that I should go  
Back straightway to the fields and gather more?  
Another, sooth, may do it,—but not I!  
My heart is very tired, my strength is low,  
My hands are full of blossoms plucked before,  
Held dead within them till myself shall die.

The following is after the same type, and, like the last quoted, disregards the pause between the two groups. But we have little sympathy with the petty formalism which could stop to weigh rules and principles amid the rush of rapid but clear and vivid thought which sweeps over this picturesque though melancholy page.

## TEARS.

Thank God, bless God, all ye who suffer not  
More grief than ye can weep for. That is well—  
That is light grieving! lighter, none befell,  
Since Adam forfeited the primal lot.  
Tears! what are tears? The babe weeps in its cot,  
The mother singing; at her marriage-bell  
The bride weeps, and before the oracle  
Of high-faned hills the poet has forgot  
Such moisture on his cheeks. Thank God for grace,  
Ye who weep only! If as some have done,  
Ye grope tear-blinded, in a desert place  
And touch but tombs,—look up! those tears will run  
Soon in long rivers down the lifted face  
And leave the vision clear for stars and sun.

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\* "English Sonnets," p. 165.

We should interpret the writer's thought imperfectly, and should stop short of its true significance, if we were not to add another sonnet, still in the same type. In this we find the first distinct glimmer of Christian hope :—

## COMFORT.

Speak low to me, my Saviour, low and sweet  
 From out the hallelujahs, sweet and low,  
 Lest I should fear and fall, and miss Thee so  
 Who art not missed by any that entreat.  
 Speak to me as to Mary at Thy feet !  
 And if no precious gums my hands bestow,  
 Let my tears drop like amber while I go  
 In reach of Thy divinest voice complete  
 In humanest affection—thus, in sooth  
 To lose the sense of losing. As a child,  
 Whose song-bird seeks the wood for evermore,  
 Is sung to in its stead by mother's mouth,  
 Till sinking on her breast, love-reconciled,  
 He sleeps the faster that he wept before.

The "Sonnetts from the Portuguese" are not, as the name would convey, translations ; they are all original, and in the highest sense the expression of personal emotion and thought. They are all, directly or indirectly, love-sonnets, although they deal chiefly with the metaphysics of that passion. As an outpouring of soul, a revelation of successive phases of thought and emotion, they are not surpassed by anything in the language. They are forty-four in number, and in all, without exception, the tercets are in alternate rhyme. We shall print two of the number, both descriptive of the sentiment, rather than the passion, of love, and both, we cannot help thinking, singularly tender and graceful. In the first the authoress prescribes to her lover the conditions and nature of the love which she desires at his hands :—

## FROM THE PORTUGUESE.

If thou must love me, let it be for nought  
 Except for love's sake only. Do not say,  
 "I love her for her smile—her look—her way  
 Of speaking gently,—for a trick of thought  
 That falls in well with mine, and certes brought  
 A sense of pleasant ease on such a day."—  
 For these things in themselves, Belovèd, may  
 Be changed, or change for thee,—and love, so wrought,  
 May be unwrought so. Neither love me for  
 Thine own dear pity's wiping my cheeks dry,—  
 A creature might forget to weep who bore  
 Thy comfort long, and lose thy love thereby !

But love me for love's sake, that evermore  
Thou may'st love on, through love's eternity.

The second, on the other hand, portrays the manner of her own love :—

## FROM THE PORTUGUESE.

How do I love thee ? Let me count the ways.  
I love thee to the depth and breadth and height  
My soul can reach, when feeling out of sight  
For the ends of Being and ideal Grace.  
I love thee to the level of everyday's  
Most quiet need, by sun and candle-light.  
I love thee freely, as men strive for Right ;  
I love thee purely, as they turn from Praise ;  
I love thee with the passion put to use  
In my old griefs, and with my childhood's faith.  
I love thee with a love I seemed to lose  
With my lost saints,—I love thee with the breath,  
Smiles, tears, of all my life !—and, if God choose,  
I shall but love thee better after death.

We fear we have wearied out the indulgence of our readers by the detail into which the subject, from its very nature and extent, has compelled us ; and we shall relieve the tedium of our long and discursive criticism by a couple of sonnets which are almost unique in their class. The idea of humour seems all but incompatible with the solemn gravity of this form of composition. We believe we are correct in stating that no sonnet has ever graced the pages of our witty contemporary *Punch*.\* But what Mr. Punch himself has never dared, proved no difficulty in the way of poor Thomas Hood's uncontrollable sense of humour. With his laughter-moving pen the Sonnet is a vehicle of puns and comicalities, no less than the lightest form of humorous poetry. Witness his

## SONNET WRITTEN IN A WORKHOUSE.

Oh, blessed ease ! no more of Heaven I ask :  
The overseer is gone—that vandal elf—  
And hemp, unpicked, may go and hang itself,  
And I, untasked, except with Cowper's Task,  
In blessed literary leisure bask  
And lose the workhouse, saving in the works  
Of Goldsmiths, Johnsons, Sheridans, and Burkes ;  
Eat prose and drink of the Castalian flask ;

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\* The spell has at last been broken. Mr. Punch, we learn, has at length joined the rank of sonneteers. His first essay in this line, we believe, appears in the number for June 10th, 1876, three "Sonnets on the Sex," strictly regular and Petrarchan in form.

The themes of Locke, the anecdotes of Spence,  
 The humorous of Gay, the grave of Blair—  
 Unlearnéd toil, unlettered labours hence !  
 But hark ! I hear the master on the stair  
 And Thomson's Castle, that of Indolence,  
 Must be to me a castle in the air.

We are less prepared for an exhibition of humour on the part of the graver Southey, yet we think the severest of our readers will relax over those lines of his

TO A GOOSE.

If thou didst feed on western plains of yore ;  
 Or waddle wide with flat and flabby feet  
 Over some Cambrian mountain's plashy moor ;  
 Or find in farmer's yard a safe retreat  
 From gipsy thieves, and foxes sly and fleet ;  
 If thy grey quills, by lawyer guided, trace  
 Deeds big with ruin to some wretched race ;  
 Or love-sick poet's sonnet, sad and sweet,  
 Wailing the rigour of his lady fair ;  
 Or if, the drudge of housemaid's daily toil,  
 Cobwebs and dust thy pinions white besoil,  
 Departed Goose ! I neither know nor care.  
 But this I know that we pronounced thee fine  
 Seasoned with sage and onions and port wine.

But we must end at last ; and we cannot close more appropriately than with Keats' "Sonnet to a Sonnet." It is a fitting pendant to that of Wordsworth in a former page, and, like that of Wordsworth, is a refutation, both in fact and in argument, of the cavils of those who rebel against "the trammels of the Sonnet":—

If by dull rhymes our English must be chained,  
 And, like Andromeda, the Sonnet sweet  
 Fettered in spite of painéd loveliness ;  
 Let us find out, if we must be constrained,  
 Sandals more interwoven and complete  
 To fit the naked feet of poesy ;  
 Let us inspect the lyre and weigh the stress  
 Of every chord, and see what may be gained  
 By ear industrious and attention meet ;  
 Misers of sound and syllable, no less  
 Than Midas of his coinage, let us be  
 Jealous of dead leaves in the bay-wreath crown ;  
 So, if we may not let the Muse be free,  
 She will be bound with garlands of her own.

## ART. VIII.—THE CLOUD IN THE EAST.

*Le Nord*, Dimanche, 19 Novembre, 1876.*The Times*, Monday, January 22, 1877.

WHEN we wrote on the Eastern question last October, the world was waiting patiently for the Czar's utterance of the word of peace or war; and it had not long to wait. Before the end of the month there came an act of haughty and sinister impulse, the utterance of an ultimatum quite superfluous for the object in view, as it was notorious that the armistice which was thus demanded under threat of diplomatic rupture, to be followed by appeal to arms, had been already virtually if not actually concluded. In this much be-wired age of ours, when the sequence of events hour by hour is flashed across all Europe, this specimen of Cossack bravado staggered all calm politicians. It is easy to believe, as it was announced almost on his own authority at the time, that it needed an absolute order to induce General Ignatieff to present it. But presented it was; and received by the Ministers of the Sultan with that contemptuous phlegm which has marked their relations with their arch-enemy throughout the momentous transactions of the last three months. Napoleon's saying, "Scratch the Russian and you will find the Tartar," was never better illustrated than in that act of wanton and ignoble bluster, upon which the most admirable exegetic commentary is supplied by the speech which General Ignatieff has just made in finally abandoning his "irreducible minimum" at the close of the Conference.

The sovereign's power in Russia can hardly, in this age of the world, recover the loss of dignity and moral influence it has sustained in these transactions. The ultimatum might have passed as the sudden blunder of a tipsy moment, once ordered, not to be revoked. Such accidents have been ere now recorded in the annals of Russian autocracy. But the elaborately-arranged, theatrical demonstration in which the Czar was soon afterwards produced as *Deus ex machinâ* at Moscow attached to that act, and to the words which he then uttered in explanation and defence of it, a very grave and intense solemnity. The unscrupulous party animosity with which every circumstance of these affairs has been treated in this country at once alleged, and still persists in declaring, that the Czar's speech at the Kremlin on the morning of the



10th of November was a direct reply to Lord Beaconsfield's speech at Guildhall of the night before. Even Mr. Gladstone, speaking nearly a month afterwards at the Conference of the 8th of December, did not hesitate to hint his belief in it when he said, "We know what the effect of those words was in Russia." But no one can have read any Russian account of the proceedings at Moscow, and especially the account in that organ which was founded during the Crimean War as the oracle of Russian news, views, and ideas in Western Europe, and which still with much ability and unflagging zeal fulfils its function, the journal *Le Nord*, without clearly discerning that all the proceedings in the solemn *vickhode* held at the Kremlin after Mass on the morning of the 10th of November, had been carefully and artistically arranged long beforehand. The Czar arrived from the Crimea at ten o'clock at night, and found Moscow covered with an immense fleece of fresh-fallen snow suddenly flaring with Bengal lights, and heavily echoing the roar of cannon. "Imagine the thunder," writes the enthusiastic Moscow correspondent of *Le Nord*, "which reverberates and fills all the immense city with its roar. Nor must it be forgotten that Alexander, 'the Liberator' and 'the Reformer,' was born at Moscow, and that if the Russian people in general love him as a father, the people of Moscow see in him the child of its glorious city and the incarnation of Russian patriotism and of all the aspirations of his country. In a moment so solemn from a public point of view as that which we traverse, the enthusiasm could not be less."

The following morning after Mass, in the Kremlin, the palace from which Napoleon looked on Moscow in flames until the fire invaded its precinct, the nobility, the clergy, the corporation, and trades of Moscow were assembled in the great hall of Saint George; and there the Czar, in solemn, well-weighed, and extremely distinct language, committed himself to a policy, and uttered a pledge, which the circumstances in which the Conference has just closed now call upon him in the most precise possible manner to redeem. And to that threat of war, if the Sublime Porte would not give guarantees for the future good government of its so-called Slavonic provinces, it cannot be denied that the addresses of the patriotic people of Moscow gave ready and worthy acclaim. The nobles of the government of Moscow said in their address: "If war is necessary for the dignity of Russia, we will march against our enemies with a profound faith in God and in the justice of our cause, and ready to die for our sovereign and our country. The nobility has always fought in the first rank against the enemy." And the Council of Moscow said: "What-

ever be the issue of the negotiations undertaken under your auspices, the Zemstvo of Moscow remits itself entirely to your will, sire, knowing that the true interests of Russia and of all the Slave world are dear to the Russian monarch." And the address of the city of Moscow said: "Glory be given to you, peaceful sovereign of the most powerful of peoples. We know that your wisdom has already marked the limit of your patience, and has fixed in the future the day when Russia will act." If it were possible to suppose that the Czar had permitted himself to be carried away by an indiscreet passage of a speech of Lord Beaconsfield delivered in London the night before, of which he could not have yet received a correct report, and against which it would, under the circumstances, be the most gross and undignified impotency to bluster immediately after Mass in the hall of the Kremlin, before his people,—if this, we say, were possible, there was at all events one most significant and carefully-prepared accompaniment to the address of the Czar, which was issued on the same day, and which could not possibly have been got ready in such a violent hurry; that was the decree of the Russian Minister of War, which placed six corps of the army on a war footing from the 11th of November, nominating especially the Czar's brother, "His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch, Aide-de-camp General and General of Engineers, Inspector-General of Cavalry and Engineers, Commander-in-Chief of the Guard and of the Military District of St. Petersburg, to be Commander-in-Chief of the Army in the Field, with all the rights, powers, and privileges given to officers commanding armies in time of war, while preserving at the same time his present appointments and dignities." Then follows the long and curious list of the hundred distinguished officers necessary as superintending staff to array such an immense army for the field; and strange it is, as the armed force of Russia thus displays itself, to note, as if its military hierarchy were hereditary, the names of four of the six corps commanders, names that have so often, during the last century, pointed the ridge of war,—Barclay de Tolly and Krudener, Radetsky and Woronzoff. If Lord Beaconsfield's commonplace allusion at the Guildhall to England's capacity to endure one, two, and three campaigns, did indeed force the Czar to lose all decent self-command of himself, and compelled the Russian War-office to mobilize six army corps within the following twenty-four hours, and dispatch all these illustrious officers post-haste to Bessarabia—though the Prime Minister may be blamed by captious critics for producing such a tremendous scare, the British

nation must be consoled by the evidence it affords that England has not altogether lost her influence in the affairs of Europe.

There have been heard in these latter days unfortunately not a few speeches from the throne coloured with the revolutionary sentiment, and breathing animosity against the sacredness of treaties. The late Emperor Napoleon was a master of this style, and he has on occasion been not unskilfully imitated by King Victor Emmanuel. But it may be fairly doubted whether language more revolutionary, and more adverse to the law and order of nations, was ever used by either than that which the Czar spoke at Moscow; and to a people like the Russians, in such circumstances, and at such a moment as he spoke, language of this sort cannot be uttered without the gravest peril. In France and in Italy among people cultivated and sceptical, where the language of revolution has been for a century a vulgar dialect, its effect, even when spoken from a throne, most pernicious no doubt, is still in a great degree transient. But in Russia the Czar is the embodiment of every sort of authority, temporal and spiritual. A "divinity doth hedge" him still in the eyes of the vast mass of his subjects. It may be well now to repeat the words used by His Majesty on the 10th, and which were telegraphed all over the world on the 11th of November—the same day, as we have already observed, that the orders for placing the army on a war footing appeared in the Official Gazette:—

I thank you for the sentiments you have been good enough to express towards me in reference to the present political state of affairs, which has now become more clearly defined than before. I am pleased and ready to receive your address. It is already known to you that Turkey has yielded to my demands for the immediate conclusion of an armistice in order to put an end to useless slaughter in Servia and Montenegro. In this unequal struggle, the Montenegrins have, as on all previous occasions, shown themselves to be real heroes. Unfortunately the same cannot be said of the Servians, notwithstanding the presence of our volunteers in the Servian ranks, many of whom have shed their blood for the Slavonian cause. I know that all Russia most warmly sympathizes with me in the sufferings of our brethren and co-religionists. The true interests of Russia, however, are dearer to me than all, and I should wish to the uttermost to spare Russian blood from being shed. This is the reason why I have striven, and shall still strive, to obtain a real improvement of the position of the Christians in the East by peaceful means. In a few days negotiations will commence in Constantinople between the representatives of the Great Powers to settle the conditions of peace. My most ardent wish is that we may arrive at a general agreement. Should this, however, not be achieved, and should I see that we cannot obtain such guarantees as are necessary for carrying out

what we have a right to demand of the Porte, I am firmly determined to act independently, and I am convinced that in this case the whole of Russia will respond to my summons, should I consider it necessary, and should the honour of Russia require it. I am also convinced that Moscow, as heretofore, will lead the van by its example. May God help us to carry out our sacred mission !

Now, apart from the pledge with which this speech concludes, and which the Czar is already called upon to fulfil, is it possible to conceive, on the part of a Sovereign, more simply scandalous language than that in which he adopts the conduct of the Servian and Montenegrin Governments, applauds the behaviour of "our volunteers in the Servian ranks," declares that they fought and bled for the "Slavonian cause," and invokes the sympathy of all Russia for them, their "brethren and co-religionists"? It is, to be sure, in one sense only a paltry travesty of Louis Napoleon. But there is a daring disregard of even the appearance of truth, of even the consciousness of moral obligation in it, of which Louis Napoleon would have been quite incapable. Anyone who reads the diplomatic correspondence relative to the conduct of Servia and Montenegro will find various declarations on the part of the Russian Government that it had no part in their proceedings, wished to discourage the volunteers who were proceeding to their camps, and believed that the whole movement was one stimulated by secret societies. In regard to Servia, Prince Gortchakow stated to the British Ambassador on the 20th of March last, that the interest of the Russian Government was "to support Prince Milan against the Omladina and the violent revolutionary party who were plotting his overthrow. He had lately drawn the attention of the Austrian Cabinet to the secret workings of this party, not only in Servia, but in the adjoining Austrian provinces. He had recommended that these revolutionary proceedings and elements should be carefully watched, and should be put down with a strong hand." Throughout the communications between the two Governments, the same tone is always maintained by the Russian Ministers and Ambassador; and on the very eve of the declaration of war by Servia on the 29th of June, Lord Derby made a last appeal to the Government of the Czar, apparently in good faith that their previous statements on the subject were sincere. "It may possibly not yet be too late," wrote the Foreign Secretary to Count Schouvalow, "for the Powers, and especially for the Russian Government, whose influence at Belgrade is so apparent, to make a further effort to induce Prince Milan to abandon his policy of aggres-

sion. It is desirable that the Servian Government should be warned that if they attempt to secure territorial aggrandisement under the pretext of Slavonic sympathies, they must not expect to be protected from the consequences of failure and defeat. Her Majesty's Government are convinced that if this were done in a tone which did not admit of misconstruction, and the Turkish insurgent provinces were freed from the instigation to revolution of the Foreign Slav Committees and agitators the work of pacification would be so greatly advanced as to render the completion of it an easy task." Such were the terms of Lord Derby's last appeal to the Russian Government to prevent by its influence the outbreak of war. But, in the Czar's speech, the real policy of the Russian Government all the time is at last revealed with an atrocious candour. Serbia is blamed, not for having gone to war in a way wholly unwarrantable, a first and then a second time, but for not having fought half desperately enough. The dangerous revolutionary agitators against whom Prince Gortchakow takes credit to himself for having warned the Austrian Government re-appear in the Czar's speech as "our volunteers," the martyrs and confessors of "the Slavonian cause" among "our brethren and co-religionists." Language of this kind suggests matter for very grave reflection to the statesmen of Europe. It gives cause to consider how long that very important factor in the policy of the Russian empire, the personal honour of the Czar, can continue to be treated with the great respect it has hitherto obtained.

It is not as if this incident stood alone, a speech spoken in a hurry, in a moment of heat and excitement. On the contrary, the official act which preceded it, the Ultimatum, the one which accompanied it, the Order to mobilise the army, the surroundings of place and circumstance to which we have already alluded, all tend to show that it was spoken with consideration and deliberation to produce a previously-calculated effect. That effect was, no doubt, much miscalculated. The Russian nation, though full of patriotic and religious sentiment, are either unable or have been so far chilled by the treatment "our volunteers" received in Serbia, as to be unwilling to come very largely to the aid of the State in its inevitable financial difficulties. The home loan was not an encouraging success. Nor, again, was the Turkish Government in the least degree intimidated by the brave words at the Kremlin, but only became more courteously or contemptuously stolid. The Austrian Ministry, environed with difficulties, was still so far alarmed at the open adoption by the Czar of that "Slavonian cause" whose emissaries

Prince Gortchakow had warned it in the spring to put down with a strong hand, that it at last took one decided step, and placed a powerful army on its Transylvanian frontier.

Towards the English Government, the Czar had, not many days before his Moscow speech, made an advance under circumstances which again seem to cast a certain reflection on his personal good faith. Having invited the English Ambassador, Lord A. Loftus, to Livadia, he entered very fully into a review of the recent diplomatic proceedings, and then proceeded to expatiate on his policy, and on the general character of Russian policy, in the terms set forth in the following passages from Lord A. Loftus's despatch to Lord Derby:—

His Majesty then said that if Europe was willing to receive these repeated rebuffs from the Porte, he could no longer consider it as consistent either with the honour, the dignity, or the interests of Russia.

He was anxious not to separate from the European concert, but the present state of things was intolerable, and could no longer be allowed to continue, and unless Europe was prepared to act with firmness and energy, he should be obliged to act alone.

His Majesty then referred more especially to his relations with England. He said he regretted to see that there still existed in England an "inveterate" suspicion of Russian policy, and a continual fear of Russian aggression and conquest. He had on several occasions given the most solemn assurances that he desired no conquest; that he aimed at no aggrandisement, and that he had not the smallest wish or intention to be possessed of Constantinople. All that had been said or written about a will of Peter the Great and the aims of Catherine II. were illusions and phantoms; they never existed in reality, and he considered that the acquisition of Constantinople would be a misfortune for Russia. There was no question of it, nor had it ever been entertained by his late father, who had given a proof of it in 1828, when his victorious army was within four days' march of the Turkish capital.

His Majesty pledged his sacred word of honour in the most earnest and solemn manner that he had no intention of acquiring Constantinople, and that if necessity should oblige him to occupy a portion of Bulgaria, it would only be provisionally, and until peace and the safety of the Christian population were secured.

His Majesty here reverted to the proposal addressed to Her Majesty's Government for the occupation of Bosnia by Austria, of Bulgaria by Russia, and of a naval demonstration at Constantinople, where, he said, her Majesty's fleet would have been the dominant Power. This, his Majesty thought, ought to be a sufficient proof that Russia entertained no intention of occupying that capital.

His Majesty could not understand, when both countries had a common object, namely, the maintenance of peace and the amelioration of the condition of the Christians—and when he had given every proof that he had



no desire for conquest or aggrandisement, why there should not be a perfect understanding between England and Russia—an understanding based on a policy of peace, which would be equally beneficial to their mutual interests, and to those of Europe at large.

"Intentions," said his Majesty, "are attributed to Russia of a future conquest of India and of the possession of Constantinople. Can anything be more absurd? With regard to the former it is a perfect impossibility, and as regards the latter I repeat again the most solemn assurances that I entertain neither the wish nor the intention."

His Majesty deeply deplored the distrust of his policy which was manifested in England, and the evil effects it produced, and he earnestly requested, me to do my utmost to dispel this cloud of suspicion and distrust of Russia and charged me to convey to her Majesty's Government the solemn assurances he had repeated to me.

It is not to be expected, we admit, from any Ambassador that he should meet such statements by a direct denial. But if any man in Russia except the Czar had uttered them, surely it is no more than the truth to say that it would have been quite impossible for Lord A. Loftus to have kept his countenance. Mr. Kinglake says in his History, of a similar period in the life of the Czar Nicholas—"The tenor of his previous life makes it right to insist that any imputation on his personal honour shall be tested with scrupulous care; but it is hard to escape the conviction that, during several weeks in the spring of the year, he was giving to the English Government a series of assurances which misrepresented the instructions given by him to Prince Mentschikow during that same period." Who that has read the history of Prince Mentschikow's mission, and of all the circumstances that caused the Crimean War, can believe the policy of the late Czar was so divested of any desire of aggrandisement as his son asserts? The truth of the famous conversations of Czar Nicholas with Sir Hamilton Seymour, in 1853, has never been questioned. In all these conversations the approaching inevitable dissolution and dismemberment of the Turkish Empire was assumed. "If your Government," said the Emperor to the British Ambassador on the 20th of February, "has been led to believe that Turkey retains any elements of existence, your Government must have received incorrect information. I repeat to you that the sick man is dying, and we can never allow such an event to take us by surprise. We must come to some understanding." Again referring more particularly to the occupation of Constantinople, he said—"If England and I arrive at an understanding in this matter, as regards the rest it matters little to me; it is indifferent to me what others do or think. Frankly, then, I tell you plainly that if England



thinks of establishing herself one of these days at Constantinople, I will not allow it. I do not attribute this intention to you, but it is better on these occasions to speak plainly. For my part I am equally disposed to take the engagement not to establish myself there—as proprietor, that is to say, for occupier I do not say; it might happen that circumstances, if no previous provision were made, if everything should be left to chance, might place me in the position of occupying Constantinople.” At the same time he expressed his willingness that England should take definite and permanent possession of Egypt. “As to Egypt I quite understand the importance to England of that territory. I can then only say that if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the Empire, you should take possession of Egypt I shall have no objection to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia; that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession.” Surely no modern European monarch, not even Napoleon the First, has ever used language more profligate and unscrupulous than this. And who can imagine that the sovereign who used it, would, if England had consented to accept the bribe of Egypt and Candia,—would or could have been content merely to occupy Constantinople for a time, and then retire behind the Pruth, with the old Russian ambition achieved one moment only to be baulked the next? It is curious to observe how very differently the two Emperors speak of this fatal and notorious ambition. The Emperor Nicholas said to Sir Hamilton Seymour, “You know the dreams and plans in which the Empress Catherine was in the habit of indulging; these were handed down to our time; but while I inherited immense territorial possessions, I did not inherit those visions, those intentions, if you like to call them so.” On the other hand, the Czar Alexander says to Lord A. Loftus—“All that has been said and written about a will of Peter the Great, and the aims of Catherine II., were illusions and phantoms; they never existed in reality.” These statements of the two Czars cannot be reconciled. One or other of them spoke that which was untrue, knowing it to be so; and, on the whole, we think the statement of Czar Nicholas, though not the whole truth, is more like it than his son’s. Accordingly, we are of opinion that Lord Derby, when, in acknowledging the pacific assurances conveyed by the Czar in the Livadia interview, he allowed himself to be tempted to refer to the extraordinary circumstances of a war loan, and the mobilisation of a great army, which accompanied them, showed a correct sense of the occasional uses of sarcasm in diplomacy. Indeed, the temptation was irresistible,

considering who was the Russian Ambassador accredited to the Court of St. James at the moment, Count Schouvalow, through whom was conveyed the famous message of the Czar to Lord Granville concerning Khiva—thus described by Lord Granville in a despatch to the same Lord A. Loftus, through whom the similar assurances of Livadia were conveyed :—

\* Not only was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the conditions imposed should be such as could not, in any way, lead to a prolonged occupancy of Khiva. Count Schouvalow repeated the surprise which the Emperor, entertaining such sentiments, felt at the uneasiness which, it was said, existed in England on the subject, and he gave me most decided assurance that I might give positive assurances to Parliament on the subject.

Nevertheless, all the Khivan territory on the right bank of the Amour Darya was annexed to the Russian dominions six months afterwards ; and steps have already been taken, it is recently reported, for a further advance of the Russian frontier in the same direction. The incident may be classed with the similar deception practised by Count Cavour regarding Savoy and Nice, but it is of a somewhat baser degree of duplicity, as more wanton and spontaneous.

It is well, we submit, to dwell especially upon this limited, but at the same time crucial, view of the subject at this particular moment, finding as we do, notwithstanding such instances of bad faith as are here related ; notwithstanding all that history records of the systematically unscrupulous character of Russian policy ; notwithstanding the atrociously cruel conduct of the present Czar's Government in Poland and in Central Asia, and its incessant intrigues, attested by the consuls of all other countries, to excite insurrection in the Turkish dominions,—finding as we do, nevertheless, great statesmen and able writers daily insisting on the moral grandeur of the Emperor Alexander's character as a main element of hope in the settlement of the Eastern Question. "I look upon him," said Mr. Gladstone, at the Conference in St. James's Hall, "as a gentleman and a king who has distinguished his reign by some of the noblest acts that are to be found in the annals of civilization." "The present Czar of Russia," writes Mr. Carlyle, "I judge to be a strictly honest and just man ; and, in short, my belief is, that the Russians are called to do great things in the world, and to be a conspicuous benefit, directly and indirectly, to their fellow men." While Mr. Bright, looking to the "efforts that are being made as sincerely by the Emperor of Russia as by the Government of

this country," thinks that if they should fail "our duty is to stand aside and to leave the nations which are the near neighbours of Turkey, and to Russia especially, to do whatever seems possible and whatever they and she may think best to do." We believe the views entertained by Mr. Fox and his friends about the principles of the French Revolution and the character of the first Napoleon were hallucinations innocent and harmless in comparison with such as these.

It is impossible not to admire the calm and steadfast courage, the simple dignity, and the straightforward policy of the Turkish Government in connection with the proceedings of the Conference. Bullied and snubbed in their own capital, observing all Europe apparently leagued against them, tendered, as it were, the very terms of existence in every tone of threat, warning, counsel, appeal, supplication, they have quietly declined all foreign intervention in their affairs, and politely bowed out the plenipotentiaries, with all their full powers intact in their pockets for use on some future occasion. Against the recurrence of such horrors as occurred in Bulgaria last year, they have given what, after all, is the most effectual of guarantees, in the political emancipation of their Christian subjects, and in the establishment of a constitution which it is vain to say exists only on paper, since it is being day by day brought into operation. The Council, which decided on the absolute rejection of the proposals of the Conference, was a practical proof of the sincerity of the Sultan and his Ministers, which it is idle to decry; and also of the loyal confidence with which the representatives of the principal Christian communities have accepted the new institutions. Again, therefore, it has come to be the fate of the Czar to utter the word Peace or War. The guarantees he demanded at Moscow have been point-blank refused. A constitution, such as he could not offer with safety to any part of his empire, has instead been decreed as the future form of the State in Turkey. Not merely Pachas and Ulemas, but Patriarchs and Archbishops, vote for war rather than submission to his behests. He has to choose between a war full of fatality and of a scope impossible to define—or, on the other hand, the wrath and scorn of the people to whom he gave in such vaunting words a pledge so painfully distinct at Moscow. Under the circumstances we apprehend that war is inevitable.

# ART. IX.—AN EXAMINATION OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S "PSYCHOLOGY."—PART III.

(COMMUNICATED.)

IN previous numbers of this REVIEW\*, the first two parts of Mr. Spencer's "Psychology" were examined, and we saw that the teaching contained in the first part of his work might be represented by the phrase: "Motion and feelings are parallelly correlated with nervous structure," while that of his second part might be expressed by the sentence: "Nothing is knowable but feelings, symbols of the Unknowable, presented in the unanalyzable forms, Mind, Matter, and Motion."

His first part was occupied with considerations respecting the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system; his second part with pure subjective psychology.

In his third part, as we shall now see, he reverts to anatomy and physiology, and the various adjustments found in different groups of animals, between their nervous structure and the conditions of their life.

## PART III.

The third part of Mr. Spencer's work is entitled GENERAL SYNTHESIS.

It is an elaborate comparison of Mind with Life, and an endeavour to show how the former, like the latter, is "a correspondence of inner relations with outer ones, this correspondence, that is mind, becoming heterogeneous, extending in space and time and increasing in speciality, generality, complexity, co-ordination, and integration, as we advance from the lowest organisms up to man in his most civilized condition." He also seeks to show how all the highest phenomena of mind arise by imperceptible gradations from primitive vital irritability. He claims (p. 507) to have "traced up the phenomena of psychical life through their objective manifestations," and to have shown that they "progress along with the phenomena of psychical life, in integration, in heterogeneity, in definiteness"; such increasing correspondence, between inner and outer relations in space, time, speciality, generality, and complexity, constituting mental development.

\* See those for October, 1874, and July, 1875.

## CHAPTER I.—LIFE AND MIND AS CORRESPONDENCE.

The contents of the sections of this first chapter may be briefly given as follows:—§ 129. Mind can be understood only by studying its evolution in living creatures. § 130. What then have bodily and mental life in common? § 131. They have in common, a correspondence between internal changes and external ones. § 132. We must therefore begin by examining the lowest animals.

In this chapter Mr. Spencer (p. 291, § 129) premising that, if the doctrine of evolution be true, "mind can be understood only by observing how it is evolved," proceeds (p. 292, § 130) to compare mental with bodily life, and to seek "what is it that mental and bodily life have in common?"

In order to answer this question he refers (p. 293, § 131) to the fourth chapter of the first part of his work entitled, "First Principles of Biology," and reiterates what he has there declared, namely, that life is "the definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external co-existences and sequences."

He then declares that we must proceed to consider the progress of this correspondence as we proceed from the study of the lowest organisms upwards, and predicts that we shall not fail to observe how we pass from the physical to the psychical the moment we rise above the correspondences that are few, simple, and immediate."

Now, on the ground of that distinctness between sensation and intellectual activity which I have before contended for (when examining Mr. Spencer's first two parts), it may well be objected, that it is necessarily vain to seek for manifestations of intelligence in the activity of creatures to which no reasons compel us to attribute the possession of intelligence at all. As it cannot be shown that intelligence exists in any animal besides man, it is only its evolution in him, from birth to maturity, and in the history of human society, that can be profitably studied with the object of investigating the development of mind. Objection may indeed be validly made to the definition of life (above given) as incomplete, referring as it does solely to its phenomenal exhibition. But no objection needs be taken to a statement that life is *accompanied* by "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"; and the consideration of such continuous adjustment as exhibited in animals of different grades cannot fail to be full of interest and instruction.

CHAPTER II.—THE CORRESPONDENCE AS DIRECT AND  
HOMOGENEOUS.

The following is the substance of the several sections of this chapter:—§ 133. Organisms in an environment presenting only co-existence, themselves present only uniform internal changes, the correspondence being *direct and homogeneous*. § 134. In organisms, the motions of which are uniform, we have new internal relations in correspondence with new external relations.

Here the author considers the simplest organisms, such as the yeast plant and *gregarina*, living in an environment so constant as to present continuously the same conditions. In such, he tells us, "the life is as short as it is incomplex."

Yet he does not fail to refer to the formation of spores, "probably determined" by decreasing nutrition. But surely this formation is a very remarkable example of phenomena of succession, and one which seems too singularly positive to result from a mere negative change. Moreover, he is silent as to the germination of spores, another remarkable example of successive, orderly changes. He calls such lives as those of the yeast plant and *gregarina* "incomplex," and, of course, they are so relatively to the lives of higher animals. But they are far from being really incomplex; and though our senses may fail to declare the complexity of process we cannot sensibly perceive, yet reason suffices to make us understand how much, vital complexity escapes our actual vision.

Our author speaks also of *Gregarina* as if it had no life history; but its encystment, its formation of pseudo-navicellæ, &c., constitute a series of actions as essentially heterogeneous as well as vital as are those of higher animals, however less in degree that complexity may be.

Mr. Spencer next (p. 297, § 134) notices organisms which exhibit motion indeed, but do so with remarkable uniformity, such as ciliated animalculæ and sponges. But not only is the life of the sponge really complex (with ova and spermatozoa even, as well as with winter buds), but it seems quite impossible to account, by any mere diversity of surrounding conditions, and of merely mechanical differences as to internal conditions, for the wonderfully complex and diverse skeletons which some sponges (such e.g. as *Euplectella* and *Hyalonema*) form. It is also impossible so to account for the various and elaborate artificial structures formed by foraminifera from the Red Sea of particles of sand—structures which have justly

excited Dr. Carpenter's wonder and admiration in an extreme degree.\*

In spite of what is urged in this chapter it cannot be denied that in nature, life seems to make its appearance, in all its *essential* complexity at once. Nutrition, growth, and reproduction, take place as truly in the yeast plant or the protozoa as they do in man himself.

The apparently homogeneous bath in which the *gregarina* lives is really multiform, and numerous minute vital adjustments, successive as well as simultaneous, must take place to insure this animal's nutrition, in addition to the more conspicuous wonders of its life history.

### CHAPTER III.—THE CORRESPONDENCE AS DIRECT BUT HETEROGENEOUS.

In this chapter Mr. Spencer considers (§ 126) the increasing correspondence between external and internal sequences (§ 137) in plants and (§ 137) in animals of the lower kinds; but remarks (§ 138) that in all such lowly organized creatures such correspondence "extends only to external relations which have one or both terms in contact with the organism," and not to "distant external relations," as in "more highly-endowed forms."

There is little to object to in this chapter, though it may be remembered, by the way, that Mr. Spencer always assumes that when structure and function correspond with this environment, such correspondence must be due to the actions (direct or indirect) of that environment. But the latter would not act on organisms unless innate receptivities and responsive powers lay latent in such organisms, pointing to a much deeper cause.

### CHAPTER IV.—THE CORRESPONDENCE AS EXTENDING IN SPACE.

The contents of this chapter may be summarized thus:—§139. Correspondences taking place at greater distances accompany the development of the senses; §140. The senses are gradually evolved from common vital functions, as (§141) smell (§142), sight, and (§143) hearing; §144. The most complex correspondences are evolved by migrations. Such are intelligence and (§145) civilization.

Then Mr. Spencer proceeds (p. 304, §139) to consider external relations and corresponding organic adjustments

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\* See "Contemporary Review," April, 1873, p. 784.



when distances become greater; and here at once we meet with one of those ambiguities of expression in which our author so often deals—namely, the undefined and ambiguous use of the words “out of.” Thus he says: “There is reason to believe that the susceptibilities to odours, colours, and sounds arise by degrees OUT OF that irritability which animal tissue in its lowest form possesses.” Again he says (p. 305):—“Many facts point to the conclusion that sensibility of all kinds takes its rise OUT OF those fundamental processes of nutrition and waste in which life in its primitive form consists.” Now “out of,” in the sense of “from amongst,” may of course be fully admitted; but “out of,” in the sense of being essentially one and the same, cannot be admitted without proof. Yet unless the expression be used in the latter sense it will not serve Mr. Spencer’s purpose, while, by employing it in that sense without proof, he begs the whole question; and he seems to consider that if the senses arise by the steps he supposes, their origin is *accounted for*!

He refers (p. 304) to the saying of Democritus, “that all the senses are modifications of touch,” which, he says, “modern science goes far to confirm.”

I believe that this is and is not so, according as it is understood, but that, anyhow, it is not so in Mr. Spencer’s meaning. Conceding, for argument’s sake, the truth of the undulatory theory of light, the perception of savours and odours must then all be produced by the innate oscillations of the tasted and smelt substances of which as yet there is no evidence. Again, perception of colour, tone, flavour, and scent are each absolutely *sui generis*. Nor can we conceive how any modifications of minute touches or of the most delicate touching power can transform itself, or be transformed, into the most rudimentary condition of their special faculties. It is all very well to call them touching, but to do so is to develop an apparent explanation and elucidation which is really misleading and quite delusory.

On the other hand, each organ of special sense is supplied with branches of the fifth nerve, and thus can be conceived as (by their aid) so *feeling* the peculiar conditions of certain special acts of sense as to produce e.g. the inference of linear distance, &c. In this way each of the senses, as exercised in each concrete, complex act of perception, is a modification of touch—namely, a special act of touching through the fifth nerve modified by, because exercised upon, the altogether peculiar organic activity of a special sense.

With regard, indeed, to these special senses, so utterly

peculiar are they, that, as Aristotle declared,\* the "form" of every special sense must be innate before the least act of such sense can become actual.

He next† endeavours to trace out the evolution of the special senses, beginning with touch, which he represents as originating in nutritive assimilation, because an *Amœba* process will grasp and dissolve a nutritive particle. But, far from assuming the essential similarity of the faculties, because they are seen to arise simultaneously, and are at first indistinguishable by us, we should, on the contrary, become convinced of the *essential* duality of that primitive undistinguishable process on account of its ultimate development and outcome, which plainly proves to us all that was really latent in that apparent primitive simplicity.

In the same way sight is made to proceed from the action of light on the chemico-vital properties of the lowest animals. He asks, "May we not infer" (p. 310) "that thus the power which the primordial tissue possesses to distinguish light from darkness—a power which forms the germ of the visual faculty—is due to a modification produced by light on the general vital processes?" He adds, that any doubt as to this hypothesis will disappear on remembering the darkening of our own skin on exposure to sunshine. But, surely, thus a sheet of paper prepared for photography might be said potentially to see.

Hearing, again, is reduced to a feeling of vibrations, as when (p. 311) "congenitally deaf persons are acutely affected by sonorous vibrations in the bodies they touch." He adds, "If we infer, as we must, that even in man the whole body is in some degree sensitive to sound, and that the extreme sensitiveness of one part is simply a specialization of this general sensitiveness; we shall have no difficulty in understanding how the humblest zoophytes and molluscoid animals feel the jar of those rapid undulations which constitute objective sound." Of course not! If we commit the absurdity of confounding "hearing" and "feeling" in ourselves, there can be little difficulty in confounding them in mollusks. But the deaf person does not *hear* one bit the more, is not one iota less *deaf*, because he feels the vibrations. What does Mr. Spencer mean by the word "*specialization*"? If he means an intensification of feeling, or grouping of feelings, or any modification of feelings which leave them still feelings,

\* "De Anima." Book II., Lesson xxiv.

† Page 305, §140. In his own words, as expressed in p. 532, he says that "the special senses arise through local modifications of nutrition caused by the special agents responded to."

it will not answer his purpose. If he means such a modification of the living organism as an appropriate stimulation to occasion the exercise of *hearing*, he might as well call it at once (as before said) the development of a proximate potentiality for the exercise of a new faculty—a faculty which, like every other, is of course a faculty of the organism, but which can no more fitly be confounded with some other faculty which may appear earlier in development than the beard of a man can be confounded with his brain because it is a later modification of the primitive epidermal layer of the embryo.

He speaks of a zoophyte being agitated by sonorous undulations, adding, "We have but to suppose that the increased vital activity of each component is accompanied by some change, probably isomeric, which alters its form, to understand how a contraction of the entire creature may result." Good! But such agitation and consequent contraction is not *hearing*!

He concludes (p. 312): "Thus, there is not a little reason to think that all forms of sensibility to external stimuli are, in their nascent shapes, nothing but modifications which those stimuli produce in that duplex process of integration and disintegration which constitutes the primordial life, physiologically considered." I contend that there is not one jot or tittle of reason for so thinking them. All that Mr. Spencer does, is to show that in low forms, or at early stages of development, differences are not apparent, and on that ground deny the essential distinction of later differences, which are apparent enough. I affirm that the distinctness of later differences proves that essential differences must have existed under conditions when our senses cannot detect them. The germ of a dog and a man may, at a very early stage, be utterly indistinguishable by all the scientific resources yet open to us; would any reasonable being on that ground deny that real latent differences existed from the very first, because we happen to be unable to detect them?

After (p. 313, §141) an ingenious speculation as to the differentiation of the sense of smell, Mr. Spencer speaks (p. 314, §142) of "that ability to distinguish light from darkness which characterizes the entire body in sundry of the humblest types," foreshadowing "the rival faculty." Such a faculty, indeed, exists in a potato, but a potato does not even potentially see.

Yet sometimes Mr. Spencer uses expressions which logically imply more than he explicitly admits. Thus (p. 315) he tells us, "an incipient faculty of sight, though the vaguest imaginable in the sensations it gives, and the most limited that can

be conceived in range, implies not only some extension of the correspondence in space, but *a new order of correspondence.*" It does so indeed!

Next (§§ 142 and 143) he traces the gradual improvement of sight and hearing as we ascend the animal scale, and proceeds (p. 316, § 144) to the more remote phenomena of migration, and thence passes to the intellectual action of man as if it was only a slight step in advance. He says: "In Man, this secondary process of extension is carried still farther. Though the correspondences he effects by immediate perception have a narrower range in space than those of some inferior creatures; and though in that species of indirect adjustment just exemplified, he is behind sundry wild and domestic animals; yet, by still more indirect means, he adjusts internal relations to external relations that are immensely beyond the appreciation of lower beings. By combining his own perceptions with the perceptions of others, as registered in maps, he can reach special places lying thousands of miles away on the earth's surface, &c." Now here is no slight jump indeed. "Combining his own perceptions with those of others" is what all races of men do, but which no brutes whatever do at all. Moreover the very facts of the "narrower range" and inferior "indirect adjustment" above spoken of show the decrease of *sensibility* which accompanies the appearance of *intelligence*. He concludes the chapter (p. 318, § 145\*) by pointing out, truly enough, that the facts enumerated will fit another hypothesis (such as that I should adopt) as well as his, and also that in the progress of civilization the same law of the increasing correspondence in space between the organism and its environment is more and more carried out.

#### CHAPTER V.—THE CORRESPONDENCE AS EXTENDING IN TIME.

The contents of the sections of this chapter may be shortly thus expressed. § 146, Only through sense does organic response to external distant change become possible. § 147, The correspondences in time and space increase together, except (§ 148) when non-mechanical, *e.g.*, a dog hiding a bone. § 149, No break occurs between lower and higher intelligence, and (§ 150) the same increasing correspondence goes on with civilization.

Here Mr. Herbert Spencer makes even more manifest the complete psychical divergence between brutes and man.

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\* He says: "its truth is independent of all conclusions as to the modes in which the correspondence is developed."

He begins (p. 321, § 146) with observing that with the occurrence of sense perception, creatures become able to cognize "relations among things or attributes that are in any degree removed from the organism," then, "an organic response to an external sequence becomes possible." He continues (p. 322, § 147) by noting that, speaking generally, the correspondences in time and space increase together. So far as mechanical phenomena are concerned. Not so, however, when (p. 324, § 148) the phenomena are not mechanical merely, as in "a dog hiding a bone in anticipation of the time when he will be again hungry."

But there is no proof that he does anticipate such a time, any more than do most burying squirrels or harvesting ants. Indeed Mr. Spencer himself makes the important admission as to birds flying to the shore to feed at low tide, and cattle going to the farm-yard at milking time. "Even here, however, there is not a purely intelligent adjustment of inner to outer sequences; for creatures accustomed to eat or to be milked at regular intervals come to have recurrences of constitutional states, and the sensations accompanying these states form the proximate stimuli to their acts." And again, "It is anatomically demonstrable that the pairing and nidification of birds in the spring, is preceded by constitutional changes which are probably produced by more food and higher temperature. And it is a rational inference, that the whole series of processes implied in the rearing of a brood are severally gone through, not with any recognition of remote ends, but solely under the stimulus of conditions continuously present."

Next (p. 325, § 149) Mr. Spencer tries to bridge over the "wide gap" between man and brutes in this respect, denying "that the transition is sudden," and saying, "during the first stages of human progress, the method of estimating epochs does not differ in nature from that employed by the more intelligent animals. There are historical traces of the fact, that originally, the civilized races adjusted their actions to the longer sequences in the environment, just as the Australians and Bushmen do now, by observing [!] their coincidence with the migrations of birds, the flooding of rivers, the flowering of plants." But of what brute can it be said that he *observes*, and of what savage can that faculty be denied? He goes on: "It is obvious that the savages who after the ripening of a certain berry travel to the seashore, knowing that they will then find a particular shell-fish in season, are guided by much the same process as the dog who, on seeing the cloth laid for dinner, goes to the

window to watch for his master." This I deny. The dog's action is explicable by that simple inference of sense which consists in the arising of certain imaginations which complete a group of phenomena before experienced. The savage's action we do not so explain, because even if this particular action be so explicable, we know from other actions he has real intellectual power, and properly presume the exercise of that power, otherwise known to be present in him, in the action in question. This action, the "higher order of correspondence," indeed, is but a lower example of that power by which we predict the places of planets at given times. Mr. Spencer says truly enough: "Given a unit of time, and a faculty of registering units, and the internal actions may be adjusted to countless non-mechanical actions going on externally." But the power of perceiving "a unit of time," and of registering such units, is just what rational animals possess and brutes do not.

Mr. Spencer himself admits (p. 326) that we find "this higher order of correspondence in time, scarcely more than foreshadowed among the higher animals, and definitely exhibited only when we arrive at the human race."

These passages, and others to be hereafter referred to (p. 353), tend to bring out forcibly how man is truly the only animal "looking before and after." There is no trace of intelligent self-adjustment in any creature save in man.

He concludes (p. 327, § 150) the chapter by showing, truly enough, that an increasing power of adjustment to more and more remote results is a characteristic of advancing civilization.

#### CHAPTER VI.—THE CORRESPONDENCE AS INCREASING IN SPECIALITY.

Here (p. 329) Mr. Spencer notes (§ 151) the increasing speciality, beginning with the *Amœba* and mere division between stomach and stem up to (p. 331, § 152) the development of the senses, which he *dogmatically affirms* "are gradually evolved" from the "primordial irritability" of "animal organisms in general." He next (p. 336, § 153) considers increasing speciality of response to sensible perception, and then (§ 154) proceeds to the distinctive human powers of correspondence.

Finally, he shows (p. 341) how increase in speciality of correspondence is a necessary condition for more prolonged and more perfect life.

There is nothing beyond the dogmatic assertion or as-



sumption, before noticed, which we objected to in this chapter.

#### CHAPTER VII.—THE CORRESPONDENCE INCREASING IN GENERALITY.

The sections of this chapter may be thus stated, § 156. A higher kind of generality is here referred to, i.e., one more universal (§ 157) implying a power of recognizing and (§ 158) increasing correspondence of this kind is manifested in the progress of civilization.

Here (p. 342) Mr. Spencer refers to a generality "of a different order from that which precedes speciality," showing itself "in the recognition of constant co-existences and sequences common to many classes that have come to be regarded as entirely unlike."

Such an advance in generality he tells us (p. 344) "implies a power of recognizing *attributes* as distinguished from the *objects* possessing them. Before any two properties that are found together under many varieties of size, form, colour, texture, temperature, motion, &c., can have their constant relation of co-existence responded to by the organism, the organism must be able to identify these two properties, as separate from their accidental accompaniments."

Now there is no doubt but brutes have a *material* cognition, by *sensible perception*, of such community of character—i.e. brutes may form an association of the sensible signs of such attributes or properties as those in question, so that given either one, the phantasm of the other will immediately arise in the imagination. But such an action makes no approximation whatever to a *formal* recognition by the intellect. There is no evidence whatever of the exercise of consciousness. Even those extreme generalizations and abstractions "co-existence" and "sequence" must be *materially* felt in the concrete by almost the lowest animals, and more than such material sensibility is not required to account for the actions even of the highest brutes.

He tells us (p. 345): "The property A occurs here along with the properties B, C, D; then along with C, F, H; then along with E, G, B; and so on with each property to a greater or less extent. Hence it must happen, that by multiplication of experiences the impressions produced by these properties on the organism will be disconnected, and rendered so far independent in the organism as the properties are in the environment. Whence must eventually result a power to recognize other brutes in themselves, apart from particular



bodies." Whence must result nothing of the kind; nay more, whence nothing of the kind could by any possibility result. No amount of unconscious organic registration of sensible associations can be conceived as becoming a self-conscious reflex recognition of an attribute as an attribute, although such registration may well form the material of which the self-conscious intellect can make use when such an intellect once appears upon the stage of animal life.

Mr. Spencer's examples (e.g. that of a chemist) are taken from human intelligence; and indeed he admits (p. 348) that "the increase of the correspondence in generality is scarcely discernible in any but the most intelligent creatures." It is true, he says, that "the higher mammals undoubtedly display some generalities of correspondence of the least abstract kind"; but he does not give examples, and I am confident it would be impossible for him to give a single one not explicable without the need of assuming the presence of intelligence.

"Human progression" (p. 348), he tells us, exhibits it; but this is a matter of course. A radically new principle, intellect, being once introduced into organic nature, its continued unfolding in accordance with those conditions into which it is introduced might be anticipated—it might be expected *a priori* to conform to the laws of organic nature generally.

#### CHAPTER VIII.—THE CORRESPONDENCE AS INCREASING IN COMPLEXITY.

The contents of this chapter may be shortly stated as follow:—§ 159. There is a special kind of complexity, (§ 160) when the response is to several simultaneous sensations (e.g. response to distance, velocity, &c.), and (§ 161) when generalizations are applied to special cases. § 162. The ratio between impressibilities and activities is constant. § 163. This is shown by examples amongst animals. § 164. Developed science is the further carrying out of this. § 165. Recapitulation.

Here our author tells us (p. 350) that there is a special kind of advance in complexity, as when a stimulus responded to "consists not of a single sensation but of several, or where the response is not one action but a group of actions," as when "not only colour, size, and shape," but also direction, distance, motion, velocity are responded to as "by a falcon swooping on its quarry."

He next (§ 161) defines this higher order of correspondence

as the application of previously-discovered general laws to particular cases, "the addition of generalities to specialities" (p. 353), though he does not well express this. He tells us that such higher correspondence as is displayed in the actions of an engineer "implies an adjustment of inner relations not simply to the particular outer relations perceived, but to sundry general relations not then perceived, but established by previous experience." But this is not enough unless by "experience" is meant *intellectual* experience; the definition is too wide, and would include many actions of brutes, which all would admit to be non-intellectual, as well as actions of madmen, sleep-walkers, &c. A brute has a material cognition of "sundry general relations not then perceived, but established by previous experience," if experience may mean *sensible* experience.

Again, he tells us that such actions display "what we call rationality." But rationality is really much more, it implies the recognition of the "real" as opposed to the "phenomenal," of the "persistent" as opposed to the "transient," of the "universal" as opposed to the "particular," of the "necessary" as opposed to the "contingent," of the "orderly" as opposed to the "disorderly," of "law" as opposed to "chaos."

Yet Mr. Spencer makes a very notable admission. After speaking of an archer who shoots high according to his distance from the object aimed at, he remarks (p. 353): "It might fairly be said that the Indian fish, which catches insects flying over the surface by hitting them with jets of water, exhibits an adjustment of inner relations to outer relations as special as that shown by the archer; but considering that in the fish nothing more is implied than an automatic connection between certain visual impressions and certain muscular contractions, it cannot be held that there is anything like the same complexity of correspondence." This is well said, but the very same remark may be made of hammering sapajous, or of the elephant, the gorilla, the pointer, or the parrot.

In the next paragraphs (p. 354, § 162, and p. 358, § 163) Mr. Spencer draws attention to the maintenance of "an approximately constant ratio" "between the *impressibilities* and the *activities* of the organism, in so far as their complexity is concerned," and he well draws out how "the evolution of the sensitive or directive apparatus is inseparable from the evolution of the muscular or executive apparatus." An extension of this reasoning would show why an ape-like body is the necessary condition for the composition of a rational

soul with an animal frame. He tells us (p. 360): "Thus the elephant can ascertain the relations of space, both of its own members and of surrounding things, more completely than all other creatures save the *primates*."

Yet certain exceptions may be taken to some of his statements; thus as to extra intelligence being accompanied (p. 361) by extra tactual power, the seals may be cited as a notable exception. Again, "the prehensile and manipulatory powers of the lower kinds" of primates are *not* "as inferior as are their mental powers."

Next (p. 362, § 164) he shows how "developed science" "is lineally descended from the simplest kind of measurement," and how the intellect of man supplies his body with extra organs of various kinds, and with extraordinary power (p. 366).

Lastly (p. 366, § 165) he recapitulates and reinforces his previous statements; but besides an assertion (p. 369) that "in the Australian language\* there are no words answering to justice, sin, guilt," he advances no fresh argument and makes no assertion worth contesting.

#### CHAPTER IX.—THE CO-ORDINATION OF CORRESPONDENCES.

Here (p. 370, § 166) he further supports his view that the degree of life varies as the degree of correspondence by advancing from cases in which the directive stimuli, though heterogeneous, are made up of elements that are simultaneously present to the senses (as an animal pursued, running to its burrow) to cases (§ 167) in which "some of their elements are present to the senses and some not," "and where the responding motions" "are divided by intervals that vary according to their circumstances (as any process which, like the building of a nest, is effected by instalments variously interrupted by other procedures)." He then passes to rational actions, such as sowing, weeding, &c., and ultimately (p. 373, § 168) to the co-ordinations of quantitative science. It seems to me that this chapter serves excellently well to make apparent the absence of any transition between sensible and rational correspondence, though the increase in civilization is no doubt accompanied by an increase in correspondences of a rational character.

#### CHAPTER X.—THE INTEGRATION OF CORRESPONDENCES.

He begins by remarking (p. 377, § 169) that compound impressions and motions continually tend to become simple,

\* That Australians have the conception "justice" is abundantly proved. See "Lessons from Nature" (Murray), p. 98.

and the co-ordinated elements of any stimulus to unite, as also stimuli with their resulting acts—necessary conditions for higher kinds of correspondence. If the period that elapses between the gaze of a young child at a stranger and a fit of crying were habitually paralleled in the perceptions of adults, human life would cease. Thus (p. 379, § 170), as to visible objects, their distances become discerned through integration, so also do the powers of walking and of carrying on mechanical trades become practicable by integration. Here he makes a remark which though not new is very true, and shows the radical distinctness of intellect and mere intuitive action. He says:—"It is notorious that in games of skill, any lengthened consideration or active interference on the part of the higher faculties almost inevitably causes a failure."

He extends (§ 171, p. 333) this process to the highest processes of cognition, "for making a generalization is, in reality, integrating the various separate cognitions which the generalization includes." But if by this Mr. Spencer means *conscious generalization*, he silently introduces an altogether different faculty and process. The unconscious imaginative, material basis for such generalization may be so laid, but the conscious intellectual act is something altogether different.

This once introduced, then it is no wonder that, as Mr. Spencer says (p. 384, § 172), increase of such integrations, i.e. intellectual generalizations accompanies the progress of civilization. Mr. Spencer in this chapter accounts for the direct, material generalization of sense and imagination, but not for an atom of reflex, formal, intellectual generalization.

#### CHAPTER XI.—THE CORRESPONDENCES IN THEIR TOTALITY.

Here (p. 385, § 173) Mr. Spencer insists upon the foregoing correspondences, but herein are certain expressions which must not be allowed to pass unchallenged. Thus he says:—"Regarded under every variety of aspect, intelligence is found to consist in the establishment of correspondences between relations in the organism and relations in the environment." Now in the first place intelligence does not consist in "*action*" but in knowledge, not in "the establishment of correspondences" but in the recognition of "*being and truth*." Secondly, intellect is not confined to "relations in the organism and relations in the environment," it considers also inner relations *inter se*, the relation e.g. of thankfulness to God and self-complacency, of subjective temptation and purely mental volition.

Again he remarks (p. 388):—"The impressions received

by these senses form the raw materials of intelligence, which arises by combination of them." As a fact it may be that it arises through "combination of them" in the sense that such combination forms the occasion for its manifestation, but that is a very different thing. Through a combination of circumstances a mother is safely delivered of a child, but the child is something very different from the combination of circumstances which occasioned its presence.

In the next paragraph (p. 388, § 174) he contends that "intelligence" "has arisen by insensible steps," and is not essentially distinct from sense and instinct, and this because "the other relations increase in number, in complexity, and in heterogeneity by degrees that cannot be marked." "Every act of intelligence being, in essence, an adjustment of inner to outer relations." But, as already said, some of its acts are adjustments of inner relations *inter se*. He adds (p. 389), "The space through which the correspondence gradually extends has no definite boundary up to which a certain order of mind is competent, but beyond which another order is required." This assertion may be met by another, namely, that man forms such definite boundary, and plainly so by his powers of rational speech.\*

But as to this question of "boundaries," it does not follow that decided limits do not exist because we cannot see but can only *infer* them. It is asserted by Haeckel that the lowest organisms are "neutral," neither animal nor vegetable, but here evolution shows us by the event that *some* of them *have* possessed in a latent manner a definite animal nature, just as two allied embryos show by their development the latent natures they always possessed, but were not before in a condition to make manifest to our senses.

Next (§ 175) he reiterates his view of psychology, namely, that it is an investigation not of the connection of A and B in the environment (physics), nor of a and b in the organism (physiology), but as to "what is the connection between these two connections." This seems to me to be rather philosophy than psychology.

Lastly, he (p. 393, § 176) states the need "for a more specific and definite interpretation of that mental evolution which the preceding chapters exhibit in its fundamental form, and for the interpretation of instinct, memory, reason, emotion, and will, as phases and factors in the correspondence between inner and outer relations."

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\* See "Lessons from Nature," especially the chapters Man, the Brute, and Language.

The contents of this third part of Mr. Spencer's work may be summed up as follows:—In it the author, by a comparison of the phenomena of mind with those of organic life, seeks to reinforce the argument already put forward, more or less plainly, in the preceding two parts of the book. He attempts to show that all sense springs from primitive organic sensibility; that all the several senses spring similarly from primitive feeling; that similarly each special sense becomes more and more differentiated; that as sense-response is a correspondence of inner with outer relations, so intellectual response is but a further carrying out of the same process, and is separated from the former by no hiatus.

In reply to this it may, in the first place, be denied that life is a mere series of such correspondences, though of course it *includes* such correspondences. Again, to the argument as a whole it may be replied: (1) that there is of course much analogy between mind and organic life, since in organic creatures with intellect there are not two souls, one animal the other rational, but only one; (2) that organic conditions supply the material substratum of intellectual action; (3) that he has by no means made out that *sense* is but *vital* irritability modified, or that *intellect* is but sense modified. His ignorance of limits is no proof that limits do not exist. Much more than this, his very inability to explain and demonstrate transitions without the silent introduction of the very higher powers to be explained, reinforces the arguments elsewhere derived in favour of the existence of a rational principle.

In the next part Mr. Spencer will try and interpret mental states as phases of the correspondence of inner and outer relations; that is, he will try to bring the adjustments found in different animals between their nervous structure and the conditions of their life, into relation with pure, subjective psychology.

#### PART IV.

The fourth part of Mr. Spencer's work is entitled SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.

Here he carries "further the interpretation of mental development by showing how the advancing correspondence when translated into the more familiar terms of reflex action, memory, reason, feeling, and will, is comprehensible as a continuous process naturally caused." It is an attempt to apply the law of the correspondence of inner to outer relations to the various psychical powers. He begins by asserting that psychical changes are distinguished (though only rela-



tively so) from physical changes by their exclusive seriality, and that their law is, that the *persistence of connection between states of consciousness is proportionate to the persistence of the connection between the agencies to which they answer*. From reflex action, through instinct to memory and reason, emotion and will, he attempts to explain the phenomena objectively and subjectively observed, by different degrees of correspondence and different degrees and kinds of failure in adjustment. In this way he tries to prove from another and fresh point of view that there is no hiatus between the lowest and the highest psychical states, and that the phenomena of mind may, like those of life, be sufficiently described by the phrase "an increasing correspondence of inner to outer relations," though, unlike the physical phenomena, the mental ones are mainly serial and successive instead of being both serial and simultaneous. Hence he claims (p. 507) to have "shown that intelligence has the same nature and the same law from the lowest reflex action up to the most transcendent triumph of reason; and that, from first to last, its growth is due to the repetition of experiences the effects of which are accumulated, organized, and inherited."

#### CHAPTER I.—THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE.

This chapter is made up of the following sections:—§ 177. The successiveness of psychical states as compared with physiological ones is gradually acquired. § 178. As we ascend through the scale of animal life we find surfaces becoming more and more differentiated (as sensations) from substance. § 179. Differentiations of sense necessitate a common centre of sensation. § 180. Many psychical acts are still synchronous, yet psychical changes are relatively distinguished from physical changes by being successive instead of being both successive and simultaneous. § 181. In what order do psychological changes follow one another?

In the first section (p. 395) of this first chapter Mr. Herbert Spencer endeavours to show that, although a main distinction between physiological and psychological actions is that the former are synchronous as well as successive, while the latter are successive almost wholly, yet that there is no absolute distinction between the two, and that the successiveness is *gradually* acquired. But, according to the philosophy which I follow, there is not, and cannot be any such absolute distinction, so that there need be no controversy as to this matter. There cannot be any such distinction, because, according to that philosophy, there is but one soul in each



animated organism, and the soul acts in all the actions of such organism in such actions as deglutition, secretion, and excretion, as well as in the nidification of a bird, or in the mere abstract reasoning of man, the quality of soul being different in different organisms. There is, therefore, no reason why any such distinction should be anticipated to exist as that against which Mr. Spencer contends. There is nothing in the first section of this chapter which militates against the view that self-consciousness and intellect are radically different from sense. We have given (pp. 396, 397) numerous good instances of reflex and instinctive actions, but the evidence afforded by such actions as those of the mutilated mantis, centipede, frog, &c., actually favour the view here advocated, "by making manifest to what complex results the power of mere reflex action may lead."

Next (p. 399) he proceeds to sketch out the gradual rise of seriality in sensitive phenomena, as we ascend through the scale of animal existence. This seriality is represented as brought about at first by the rise of the distinction of surface and interior in each organism; the sense modifications being *surface* ones, the physiological modifications being *internal* ones—a position which need not be contested as a whole, though it may be remarked that our author in speaking of primary differentiation in the very lowest organisms says (p. 400), "in response to this primary unlikeness of conditions, there eventually arise unlikenesses of structure and function." But, it may be asked, why eventually? If there is an innate power in the lowest organisms of appropriate response and determinate self-development, this is as mysterious as anything demanded by the philosophy advocated here, and indefinite, fortuitous variations, naturally selected can hardly be supposed to have brought such innate power in such lowest organisms.

Afterwards (p. 402), in endeavouring to show how *consciousness* must arise from sense, from the growing seriality of psychical changes,—he really very well establishes the necessity of the development in animals of a *sensus communis*, or of the complex association of different kinds of sensation together, though not in the least of a "consciousness." He says:—"For how only can the constituent changes of any complex correspondence be co-ordinated? Those abilities which an intelligent creature possesses of recognizing diverse external objects, and of adjusting its actions to composite phenomena of various kinds, imply a power of combining many separate impressions. These separate impressions are received by the senses—by different parts of the body. If they go no further

than the places by which they are received, they are useless. Or, if only some of them are brought into relation with one another, they are useless. That an effectual adjustment may be made, they must be all brought into relation with one another. But this implies some centre of communication common to them all, through which they severally pass; and, as they cannot pass through it simultaneously, they must pass through it in succession. So that as the external phenomena responded to become greater in number and more complicated in kind, the variety and rapidity of the changes to which this common centre of communication is subject must increase; there must result an unbroken series of these changes; there must\* result a consciousness." But it appears to me that all which need hence result is not a consciousness, but a common sense centre and a *sensus communis*.

The next paragraph (p. 403) is an endeavour to show the gradual evolution of conscious intelligence from pure sense, in order to try and prove that the acts of the mind are not purely serial. Mr. Spencer brings forward a statement of the numerous sense impressions which occur synchronously, as e.g., the indistinct vision of things more or less out of focus, &c. Yet he tells us (p. 405), "though a visual impression makes us nascently conscious of many things, yet there is always some one thing of which we are more conscious than of the rest. And when we so look at this one thing, as to perceive it in the true sense of the word—to *know* it, as *such* or *such*, we are almost exclusively occupied with it." This is most true, yet all he says tells *in favour*, not against, the radical distinction between sensation (multiform in synchronous and serial combinations) and intellect (simply one from instant to instant) which attends to, and selects for its attention, various different sensations.

Lastly (p. 406), he declares the question is, to determine in what particular way, in what order, psychical changes follow one another; and to this consideration he proceeds in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER II.—THE LAW OF INTELLIGENCE.

The following is a short statement of the contents of the several sections of this chapter. §182. The law of intelligence is to be sought in the simplest (or immediate) correspondences. §183. Persistence between mental changes must be persistence of those external changes to which they corre-

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\* As to this "must," see some remarks by Mr. Henry Sidgwick, in the Academy" of April 4th, 1873.

spond. §184. There are countless failures of correspondence in animals. §185. Psychical coexistences can be grouped with successions, because in the former (which must, of course, be subjectively cognized in succession) the order may be reversed. §186. Many mental changes are fortuitous, because external changes are so. §187. Other mental facts may be explained (like the rising of a balloon) as resultants of many tendencies.

The problem respecting the mode of succession of psychical changes, he endeavours to elucidate in the first place (pp. 407 and 408) by declaring that the law must be sought in changes external and internal, which are immediately connected on account of the immense complexity of external changes, whereof many series are synchronous, and a multitude coexistent. Next he tells us (p. 408), that the *persistence* of the connection between mental changes must be proportionate to the *persistence* of the connection between the agencies to which they answer, otherwise the inner order will disagree with the outer order. The acts of animals (p. 409) show countless failures in the adjustment of the internal order to the external order, as in moths, which burn themselves at candles; dogs coming to strangers who call them by their names; savages who attribute natural death to invisible violence, &c. He adds, "the disappearance of discrepancies between thoughts and facts we speak of as an advance of intelligence." But this mixing up of the intellectual activity of savage man with the activities of sensation and motion in brutes is misleading, and especially so when the popular misuse of the term "intelligence" (as when applied to the actions of dogs) is adopted and sanctioned.

The connection between two internal phenomena occurring in succession can represent the connection between two external phenomena not occurring in succession, but synchronous, because the two latter can have the order in which they enter upon consciousness, reversed; coexistent phenomena being distinguished from successive, because they can, while the latter cannot, have the order of their succession in consciousness alternately reversed. Thus what is objectively co-existent is subjectively successive in diverse orders. The apparently incongruous fact (p. 413) that many mental changes appear fortuitously, agrees with the law of intelligence as here given, because many external changes are also fortuitously experienced. Other facts (p. 415), apparently incongruous (such as the tendency persistently to unite mentally a person with a place where he has been met, though there is no persistent external connection between them), may be explained

by the law in the same way that the rising of a balloon may be explained by gravity—the internal change being often the resultant of many tendencies. Mr. Spencer's law of intelligence may therefore, he contends, be seen *a priori*, and reached *a posteriori* (p. 417). "Only by supposing such a law can we explain the facts, that relations which are absolute in the environment are absolute in us; that relations which are probable in the environment are probable in us; that relations which are fortuitous in the environment are fortuitous in us."

To our author's reasoning in this chapter it may be replied, that he gives indeed, truly and ingeniously, the law of sensation and sensitive activity, but that in a rational animal the association of ideas and images is more or less influenced by the free action of the will, which can, more or less, often choose freely between competing solicitations.

Our intelligence can even occupy itself about that which it knows and can recognize, but cannot imagine, as when we try to recall an absent image or idea. It can also think its own annihilation—the presence of pressure apart from extension, and much more. Therefore intelligence, in the true sense of the word, does *not* follow the law which our author has laid down for it, though *imagination* does.

### CHAPTER III.—THE GROWTH OF INTELLIGENCE.

The sections of this chapter are as follow: (§ 188). The fulfilment of the law of intelligence is shown in the increasing perfection of correspondence (§ 189) brought about by frequency of connection in experience. (§ 190). Relations externally associated lead to similar internal associations (Inference).

In this chapter, he begins by telling us, (p. 418), that the ways in which the better fulfilment of the law of intelligence shows itself is by increase in the *accuracy*, *number*, and *complexity* of the inherent states of consciousness answering to inherent complexities in the environment. He then asks: "Is the genesis of intelligence explicable on any one general principle, applying at once to all these modes of advance," and if so, what is it?

He adds (p. 419), that in the environment there are "relations of all orders of persistence"; and, therefore, in a highly-developed creature there must be "all grades of strength in the connections between the states of consciousness." Also, he says that "there are two possible hypotheses" as to how "their various degrees of cohesion are adjusted: (A) pre-established harmony, and (B) frequency of connection in ex-

perience. And he easily shows triumphantly the absence of evidence for the first, and the many instances which can be brought forward to support the second, but he altogether ignores a *third* possible hypothesis (that here supported), according to which the intellect is a special form of force, appearing *de novo* with man, and one with an innate power of perceiving objective truth, and, first of all, (in the order of reflection) its own persistent existence.\* This power, however, being in man subject to the conditions of a material organism, and depending for its exercise on sensation, necessarily follows, to a greater or less extent, the order of sensation.

The reasons and arguments he adduces to support the second hypothesis (such e.g., as that "practice makes perfect," and "use is second nature," &c.), merely support that dependence of intellectual activity in us on preliminary sense, experience which no true philosopher denies. The proof, however, that the power of intellectual conception is not really bounded by experience must be reserved for later consideration. It may be sufficient here to note "pressure without extension," "our own non-existence," and "the existence of both necessary and contingent truth," as examples of conceptions beyond experience, examples of that power of *thinking* what we cannot *imagine*, which is also exhibited when we search for a lost image, which we cannot imagine, but which we none the less know, as is shown by our recognition of it when found. That there are races of men (p. 422) of different emotional tendencies and different degrees of keenness of sensible perception (the material basis in us of intellectual action) must, of course, be most freely conceded, but this by no means invalidates the independence of intellect *per se*. Its connection *per accidens* with experience (owing to its acting in us in an organized body) in no way breaks down that essential distinction between intellect and sensibility which is, on other grounds, apparent.

He further remarks (p. 425), that the law of the growth of intelligence is:—"When two psychical states occur in immediate succession, an effect is produced such that if the first subsequently recurs, there is a tendency for the second to follow it." This law as applied to sensation, imagination, and emotion, need in no way be contested.

Finally, he says he must apply this law to all grades of psychical action (in succeeding chapters), but first he notes a corollary, to the effect that "the psychical relations of each

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\* See "Lessons from Nature," Chapter I. Murray.

kind of creature will be those which recur the oftenest in its experience." This, again, need not be contested, though the instances given are trivial.

He further lays down (p. 426), that if any psychical relation, *a, b*, has been engendered by a persistent relation, *A, B*, in the environment, and similarly the psychical relation, *c, d*, by *C, D* in the environment, then, if externally there exists a relation between the relations *A, B* and *C, D*, a corresponding relation between *a, b* and *c, d* may be generated. The truth of this position may be allowed as regards sensation, imagination, emotion, and sensitive association generally, but it has nothing to do with intellectual action, because it can never rise to the perception of a relation *as a relation*, and it is well to note this here *in limine*, as the position taken up in this section will afterwards be made the basis for Mr. Spencer's theory of ratiocination.

Here (p. 426) he makes also the following important remark:—"The only thing required for the establishment of a new internal relation answering to a new external one is, that the organism shall be *sufficiently developed* to cognize the two terms of the new relation, and that being thus developed, it shall be placed in circumstances which present the new relation." We may reply, "Precisely so! that is just it! You must have your faculty potentially present before you can have one act of such faculty. You must have got your intellectual nature before you can elicit one act of intellect."

#### CHAPTER IV.—REFLEX ACTION.

Here we have first (p. 427, § 191), a statement of the lowest forms of reflex action, from the shrinking of a nerveless zoophyte to the adhesion of the severed sucker of a cuttle-fish's arm. Then he proceeds (p. 428, § 192) to visceral and sensitive reflex actions, such as the rapid movements of a fly's wing.

But if, as is most just, the merely automatic nature of insect locomotive action be admitted, how can a line then be drawn between such actions and the locomotive actions of higher animals?\*

Finally (p. 430) he draws attention to the gradual transition to more complex actions—such as the leaps of a decapitated frog; and rightly so, for there is no real break till we meet for the first time with intellect, in man.\*

Mr. Spencer, as he identifies mind with neural activity, finds a rudimentary action of the mind in intestinal peristaltic

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\* See "Lessons from Nature." Chapter VII. The Brute.



action—the intellect taking no cognizance of such passing change.

#### CHAPTER V.—INSTINCT.

The contents of this chapter may be summarized thus:—  
 § 194. Compound reflex action. § 195. Increasing distinctness, seriality, and speciality in psychical adjustments, as in insects. § 196. Compound reflex actions are developed from simple ones by the agglutination of the latter through reiterated experiences. § 197. The most universal external relations must generate the most universal internal ones. § 198. The more complex external relations are the less constant; hence, increasing imperfection of adjustment with increasing complexity of relations: hence, also, failures of instinct arise, which failures constitute incipient reason.

In this chapter he first (p. 432) defines instinct as “compound reflex action.” But true reflex action is *unfelt*, as in the contraction of a stimulated frog’s leg cut off; and, as H. Spencer well says (p. 434), “There are no instincts displayed by the kidneys, the lungs, the liver.” All *instinctive* actions are compound ones which respond to *felt* stimuli, as when birds (p. 433) just hatched, *seeing* food, immediately peck at and take it.

Mr. Spencer somewhat mends his definition by saying (p. 434): “While in reflex action a single impression is followed by a combination of contractions,” in “instinct a combination of impressions is followed by a combination of contractions.” But instinctive actions are, after all, much more, for they are not only *felt* but also *serial*, and not only serial but *prophetic*, and directed to ends which natural selection in spontaneous variations can never explain, as we shall see.

Next (p. 434) he speaks of increasing distinctness, seriality, and speciality, showing, as we ascend, a “greater differentiation of the psychical life from the physical life”; and no doubt the increasing perfection of animal nature may be looked at from this point of view; but he insinuates a gradual evolution of “intellect,” which the facts by no means warrant. He observes (p. 434): “In its higher forms, instinct is probably accompanied by a rudimentary consciousness. There cannot be co-ordination of many stimuli without some ganglion through which they are all brought into relation. In the process of bringing them into relation, this ganglion must be subject to the influence of each—must undergo many changes. And the quick succession of changes in a ganglion, implying as it does perpetual experiences of differences and likenesses,



constitutes the raw material of consciousness. The implication is, that as fast as instinct is developed, some kind of consciousness becomes nascent."

But this is mere assertion. I deny that anything of the kind is "implied." The argument, if valid, is good indeed for a *sensus communis*, but not for intellect. The co-ordination of stimuli is one thing; the recognizing them for what they are, recognizing their "being" and "order," their relations *as relations*, is something altogether different, which no central ganglion can be conceived as originating, as it is a distinct kind of *power*, though this new faculty make use of this neurosis of *sensus communis* as a *material*.

He next proceeds to inquire (p. 435, § 196) "how, by accumulated experiences, compound reflex actions may be developed out of single ones"; i.e., by their agglutination through the occurrence of reiterated external sequences and natural selection—sight, motor nerve elementation, and muscular contraction, growing with capture of seen prey. But, in the first place, this assertion of agglutination does not show *how* such agglutination takes place, or is even possible without an innate capacity, which, if it exists, is the true cause of this instinct and instinctive action. Moreover, he assumes (p. 436) the genesis of sight from mere touch, and that of muscular withdrawal, from mechanically-accelerated merely vital changes,—positions which I have earlier contested.

Again, he attempts to reinforce his argument by the similarity of muscular contractions of the lowest animals to those of some plants. But an apparent identity—an indistinguishability—often conceals a latent essential diversity only revealed by later results. Again, how could a contractility in regard to tactual impressions in its lowest stage arise accidentally; or how could such stages be developed by natural selection, when only in an incipient, inefficient condition?

Further (p. 440, § 197), "if inner relations are moulded to outer relations by the accumulation of experiences, the simpler must be established before the more complex," as phenomena become less frequent as they are more complex.

Thus (p. 441, § 198) such constant external relations as extension and resistance generate a more universal and primary neural response than do e.g. colour and the presence of some particular kind of animal.

Hence, as instincts augment, they will include less coherent changes, become less automatic, and will "merge into something higher." Thus, according to Mr. Spencer, reason is a negative entity—a *failure of instinct*!

*Mirabile dictu*, he adds, as to this invariable progression of

instinct into "a higher order of psychical action," "that it is just what we find it do in the higher animals." Now it seems to me that the highest animals (dog, elephant, ape) only exhibit excessively compounded and integrated reflex actions accompanied by delicate sensibility and varied nervous and imaginative associations. To such associations the term sensible ratiocination may be applied. A sense presentation, lacking a normal accompaniment or succession, will give rise to the imagination of the lacking factor or segment, and this is serial or associative inference. It is *blind*, and therefore, *toto cælo* different from intelligent self-consciousness, which sees, sees that things are and sees that it sees. More than such sensible and associated inference need not be assumed to explain all the highest psychical phenomena of brutes. More is demanded in order to account for *our* mental acts, whether our own, as revealed by consciousness, or those of other men as made known to us by language.

But Mr. Spencer, as to instinct proper, shirks the real difficulty. He says nothing about ants or the wasp (*sphæx*), or the various storers and egg-layers that provide for a future of which they can have no cognition in any way, by processes which cannot be conceived as having arisen by accidental variation and natural selection.\*

#### CHAPTER VI.—MEMORY.

The contents of this chapter may be summarized thus:—§ 199. Memory is a kind of incipient instinct, (§ 200) appearing as nascent impressions of perceptions formerly experienced, with impressions now present. § 201. As automatic action grows memory fades, (§ 202) and it forms a transitional state.

This whole chapter on memory, while it serves excellently well to explain the sensitive, automatic memory of brutes (and the existence of which in them all concede), does not so much as touch upon real intellectual memory. I have elsewhere† distinguished these two kinds of memory. (1.) Involuntary, unconscious, sensitive memory, to our present possession of which we do not advert; and (2.) Voluntary, active, conscious, intellectual memory, which we recognize ourselves as actually possessing, or as having possessed in the past, or as likely to exist in the future."

He (p. 444) begins this chapter by saying, memory is "a kind of incipient instinct," as instinct is "a kind of organized

\* See "Lessons from Nature," chap. vii., The Brute.

† "Lessons from Nature," p. 196.

memory." A bee organically remembers outer relations to which its cell-building answers.

As long (p. 445) as all is automatic, memory does not appear—it springs up when sense perceptions produce "nascent impressions" formally experienced with such perceptions, and these in turn arouse others, and so on in a succession of ideas.

This would be good if he would use the word "images" for "ideas," and confine the phenomena to unintelligent, sensitive memory.

Next he tells us (p. 450) conversely, that with growing automacy memory fades and ceases; i.e., that the sun shines, &c.,—music, reading, &c. And this is true as applied to mere sensitive memory. But intellectual *memory* fully exists for such things when we *will* to apply it, though the exercise of will destroys the automatic character of the action.

Finally (p. 452), memory "pertains to psychical states in process of being organized," and is thus transitional. I repeat that this whole chapter well explains the sensible memory of reminiscence; but intellectual memory is quite neglected in it. The integration of sensations so that the intellect comes to read them as single is no doubt a noteworthy phenomenon, as is that sensitive memory of which intellectual memory makes use. To show Mr. Spencer's want of adequate discrimination we may (p. 448) quote this sentence: "To remember a motion just made with the arm is to have a feeble repetition of those internal states which accompanied the motion." I reply, Not at all! Such is only sensitive memory. To have true memory we must *will* and *attend* to such feeble repetitions. The act of the will, and of the intellect apart from sense, is shown when we will to seek for an absent idea which we know that we may recal, though we cannot imagine it, and which we recognize when recalled. We are conscious of our absence, of our effort, of our attention, and of the result.

No amount of synchronous and successive reflex action can constitute by itself one act of feeling. We may have the first very highly developed, even in vegetables, as in Venus's fly-trap, &c.

Similarly, no amount of synchronous and successive feelings can constitute by themselves one act of self-conscious, intelligent perception.

M. ●

## APPENDIX TO OUR OCTOBER ARTICLE ON THE RESURRECTION.

THE "Spectator" published on November 18th a short notice of our article on the Resurrection. As that article was avowedly a reply to Mr. Hutton—and as Mr. Hutton avows himself a joint editor of the "Spectator"—we suppose we may, without breach of literary etiquette, treat the notice as a brief comment of Mr. Hutton's on our argument. It ran as follows:—

The DUBLIN REVIEW for October contains an article of considerable interest for Protestants, on "The Gospel Narrative of the Resurrection." The reviewer, while making one or two points of some interest against those who regard the narratives given in the Gospels as rather diminishing than increasing the weight of historical evidence furnished by St. Paul's epistles and the well-known *history* of the Church, seems to us to make fresh difficulties for his case, by assuming that the different Gospel narratives as we have them were all divinely inspired, and divinely inspired for theological purposes. Now, if to inspire faith in man be considered, as we suppose it is, the main object of such plenary inspiration, it surely adds enormously to the difficulties of the case to tell us that four accounts were divinely inspired, only two of which support each other in detail at all; while of these two, one is missing in some of the best MSS.,—in both the Sinaitic and the Vatican,—and has so many words in it which the evangelist never elsewhere uses, that the most candid critics regard it as a later addition, and not as part of the original narrative. Surely the first thing one would expect in histories of the same events, divinely adapted to human need, is that they should, at least, contain as much confirmation of each others' facts as we should find in independent human accounts of events of the truth of which we were convinced. Moreover, we do not think the DUBLIN Reviewer very happy in his suggestion as to the various *motives* of the various Gospels. On one point he does good service,—namely, by pointing out that St. Luke certainly did not intend to describe the intercourse between Christ and his Apostles after his resurrection as crowded into one day, though that would be the first superficial impression derived from his narrative. It is clear that the author of the Acts—whom all the best critics identify by internal evidences with the author of the third gospel—expressly denies this, and it is almost equally evident, on a careful examination of St. Luke's Gospel, that even there the narrative touches on far too many events after the evening is already come, for a period of one day. There is much ingenuity, too, in the reviewer's identification of the manifestation of Christ on the "mountain in Galilee," with the manifestation to above "five hundred brethren at once" mentioned by St. Paul.

It will be seen on careful consideration, that Mr. Hutton and ourselves are far more at one on the subject, than might be inferred from a superficial perusal of the preceding notice. And as Mr. Hutton's authority has deservedly much weight, it is worth our while to show this.

The chief purpose of our article,—except for which indeed we should not have written it—was a reply to infidels. We desired to answer that argument against the truth of our Lord's Resurrection, which infidels so commonly derive, from the discrepancies alleged by them to exist in the Gospel narrative. We pointed out (p. 305, note), that Mr. Hutton himself recognized this infidel argument as legitimately telling against the truth of the Resurrection, though he considered it to be counter-balanced by arguments in the other direction. Mr. Greg,—who published a criticism of Mr. Hutton from the opposite side, almost contemporaneously with our own article, (*"Contemporary Review"* for November)—does not fail (p. 991) to press the same objection.\*

We replied (pp. 306-310) that supposing for argument's sake (what we of course emphatically deny) that the four Gospel narratives were ever so certainly in most flagrant mutual contradiction—such a circumstance could in no way even tend to impair the absolute historical certainty of the Resurrection. The one alleged contradiction, on which the whole body of objectors lay immeasurably more stress than on all the others put together, is this. In their view, the First Evangelist supposes our Risen Lord to have been nowhere seen by the Apostles, except in Galilee; whereas (in their view) the Third supposes Him to have been nowhere seen except in Jerusalem. Now let us suppose it were ever so certain, that there is this discrepancy between the First and the Third Evangelists. Still such discrepancy (we argued) has no tendency whatever to throw the slightest doubt on the truth of the Resurrection, unless the objectors make a further allegation; unless they maintain that there was a parallel discrepancy of belief among the *body of Christians*, in the years *immediately succeeding the Crucifixion*. Certainly if we had to accept this *second* allegation—if we had to concede that, in the years immediately succeeding the Crucifixion, some Christians considered all the appearances of Jesus Risen

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\* We expressed (p. 302, note) our own conviction, that the real disbelief of infidels in the Resurrection arises very far more from their disbelief in miracles, than from any special difficulty in the Gospel narrative of the Resurrection. Mr. Greg curiously confirms this view. In p. 993, he speaks of the Ascension as being to him more incredible even than the Resurrection. Yet there is absolutely no appearance of discrepancy in the Scriptural accounts of the Ascension.

to have taken place in Jerusalem, while other Christians considered Him to have been never seen by the Apostles in Jerusalem *at all*—such a conflict of traditions would most seriously affect the historical evidence of the Resurrection. But we argued that no such conflict of traditions could possibly have existed; that such a supposed conflict of traditions would be more utterly inexplicable on any infidel theory, even than on the Christian. No infidel, we say,—whatever be the special phase of his infidelity—can allege without self-stultification, that there was any conflict of traditions among Christians, in the years immediately succeeding the Crucifixion, as to the scene of our Lord's appearances after His Resurrection. If therefore it were really true, that the alleged discrepancy exists between the First and Third Gospels,—what could reasonably be *inferred* from such discrepancy? An inference might thence very reasonably be drawn, against the trustworthiness of those Gospels, one or both; and the conclusion might ensue, with more or less probability, that they were written at a later date than Christians commonly assign to them. But no inference whatever could without simple absurdity be drawn from their mutual discrepancy, against the truth of the Resurrection itself. Of course, if those Gospels were not trustworthy, they could not be legitimately cited, as part of the historical evidence for the Resurrection. So much we heartily admit. But infidels always speak, as though the untrustworthiness of the Gospels (supposing it to exist) were a positive and even strong argument against the truth of the Resurrection. Our point was, that such a line of argument is violently illogical, and breaks down on a moment's examination.

This was the fundamental and most essential part of our argument. We understand Mr. Hutton as disposed, on reflection, so far to agree with us. He says that "we have made one or two points of some interest, against those who regard the narratives given in the Gospels as diminishing. . . the weight of historical evidence, furnished by S. Paul's Epistles and the well-known history of the Church."

Here however it may be asked, whether the evidence for the Resurrection is not at least importantly *weakened*, if the Gospels are not brought into court as part of that evidence. We incidentally expressed the answer we should give to this question, reserving however to a future article our *vindication* of such answer. We consider that the evidence for the Resurrection is *not* importantly—nay nor even appreciably—*weakened*, by withdrawing the Evangelists from the roll of witnesses. Mr. Hutton refers to "the weight of historical evidence furnished by S. Paul's Epistles and the well-known



history of the Church." We regard this "weight of evidence"—apart from the Gospels altogether—as not only sufficient for legitimately generating absolute certainty, but as even superfluously strong. The reason why infidels do not believe Jesus Christ to have risen from the dead, is not (we maintain) any insufficiency in the *historical proofs* of that event, but its *miraculousness*. Suppose some *non-miraculous* fact were so testified: an educated person, who did not accept such fact as certainly true, would be universally accounted by other educated men to labour under kind of monomania. As we said in October, he might as reasonably deny that Napoleon certainly died at St. Helena, or that Richard II. was certainly murdered at Pomfret Castle. This is to be our thesis in our next article on the subject. The central and fundamental purpose of our October essay, was to prepare our path for the defence of that thesis. We wished to clear the ground for our direct argument, by sweeping away the utterly irrelevant objection which has been so perseveringly urged, from the supposed mutual discrepancies of the Gospels.

But as we *had* to treat those supposed discrepancies in reference to Mr. Hutton's article,—we thought we might do important service if we took the opportunity of going further. We proceeded therefore to maintain against him, that there are really no such mutual discrepancies at all in the Gospels as he supposes. This conclusion is in various ways one of great controversial importance, though of less primary controversial importance to a Catholic than to a Protestant; and our argument in its defence occupied far the larger portion of our space. This argument was entirely confined to the *contents* of the Gospels. We did not in any way treat the question of *extrinsic* evidence: we only *assumed*, as sufficiently established by such evidence, the ordinary Christian belief. We assumed, as so established, (1) that each Gospel is the composition of one author, to whatever extent that author may have availed himself of pre-existing materials; (2) that the Evangelists were specially directed by the Holy Ghost, as to the general course and current of their memoirs; (3) that they were also protected by Him from any substantial inaccuracy in their narratives. The Catholic doctrine on inspiration goes no doubt beyond this. But, throughout the far larger portion of our article we waived this further doctrine, and confined ourselves to what is generally admitted by pious Protestants. What we undertook to maintain was, that—supposing the three above-named propositions to be established by extrinsic evidence—there is no *intrinsic* difficulty whatever in the way of their acceptance. Mr. Hutton holds, that however strong might be the extrinsic evidence for these propositions, they would be



disproved by intrinsic objections. We contended in reply, not only that there is no intrinsic evidence sufficient to *disprove* them, but that there is none sufficient to discredit them in the very slightest degree.

Now the discrepancies, so often alleged as existing between the Gospels, were duly recited by Mr. Hutton, in the passage quoted by us at pp. 304, 5. Even Mr. Greg admits (p. 991), that Mr. Hutton "states them fully and recognizes them freely."\* Now there is not one of these which has even a momentary or superficial appearance of throwing discredit on the substantial trustworthiness and general inspiration of the Gospels, except that which we just now mentioned. Still that one exception is undoubtedly a very grave one. There is certainly a very great *prima facie* appearance of truth in Mr. Hutton's original allegation; viz. that the First Evangelist regarded Jesus Risen as having appeared to the Apostles only in Galilee, while the Third regarded Him as having only appeared to them in Jerusalem. We devoted therefore the larger portion of our article to the task of defending the Gospels against this allegation; and we have now to consider, how far Mr. Hutton accounts our defence satisfactory.

We begin with the Third Evangelist. Mr. Hutton alleged, not only that this Evangelist does not mention or even hint at any Galilean appearance of Jesus Risen, but that he virtually *contradicts* the notion of any such appearance. How so? Because (xxiv. 49) he represents our Lord as having on Easter Day charged the Apostles, not to leave Jerusalem before the coming of the Holy Ghost. We replied (pp. 316, 7), that there is no ground whatever for the supposition, that the Third Evangelist represents those words of our Lord as having been spoken by Him on Easter Day. And we added that—unless this supposition be assumed as true—S. Luke's narrative in no *other* way discredits the existence of Galilean manifestations. Mr. Hutton, with characteristic candour, admits that so far we have proved our point. We have "done good service," he says, "by pointing out, that S. Luke certainly did not intend to describe the intercourse between Christ and His Apostles after His Resurrection as crowded into one day, though that would be the first superficial impression derived from his narrative."

S. Luke then says nothing whatever, to contradict a Galilean manifestation; and the other Evangelists (as we showed)

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\* Mr. Greg indeed says that there is "one important omission" in Mr. Hutton's catalogue: viz. his failing to mention, that the Gospels describe our Lord as often *not at first recognized* by this or that disciple. But this is not a "discrepancy"; for the fact is mentioned by *all* the Evangelists, and we so referred to it in p. 335.

either state or indubitably imply, that there was at least one such manifestation. The First Evangelist—as Mr. Hutton is forward to urge—lays emphatic stress on a solemn appearance of our Lord in Galilee. The Fourth—who in ch. xx. is as profoundly silent as the Third himself on any Galilean manifestation—in ch. xxi. relates one of great significance and importance. The Second again—in that part of his Gospel which Mr. Hutton himself accepts as genuine (xvi. 7)—adds his concurrent testimony. And further S. Paul in effect exhibits the same tradition; because (as we argued in p. 319) the appearance to five hundred brethren at once could not possibly have taken place in Jerusalem. To these various arguments of ours, we may fairly understand Mr. Hutton's "silence" as implying "consent."

We maintained (pp. 319-322), that the Galilean manifestation recorded by S. Matthew was the one sole manifestation made to the whole body of disciples. And if this be so, nothing is more easily intelligible, than that the First Evangelist should have mentioned *it* and no other. "To narrate this manifestation in itself and in its relevant circumstances—was emphatically to exhibit what has been called 'the majesty of the triumphant Messiah'; and this was a task peculiarly congenial to S. Matthew, whose one salient and universally admitted characteristic is the setting forth Christ's regal dignity" (p. 319). We further urged (p. 321), that "he himself implies the fragmentariness of his narrative, by neither mentioning an ascension nor any other termination of our Lord's earthly ministry. And when we consider," we added, "that those who saw Jesus on the mountain were more than five hundred—while those who saw Him otherwise did not at the utmost amount to thirty—we can well understand why the other manifestations, from his stand-point, appeared to S. Matthew of little account."

Mr. Hutton implies, that (with one small exception to be presently noticed) he has no objection to make against this view of the case. We cannot indeed entirely accept his compliment, when he says that "there is much ingenuity in our identification" of the Galilean appearance with the "manifestation to five hundred brethren." This statement certainly shows no ingenuity on *our* part, because the vast majority of harmonists have always said the same thing. The only part of our comment on the First Evangelist, for which we can claim any kind of originality, is our argument in pp. 320, 1. We there maintained—and we are not aware of the circumstance having before been observed—that the First Evangelist's words—taken by themselves and exclusively

altogether of S. Paul's—would suffice to show, that the manifestation which he records was a manifestation to the whole body of "brethren."

There still remains an apparent discrepancy of the Gospels to be accounted for: not however a discrepancy of statement, but of implication. If the Galilean manifestation recorded by the First Evangelist were so singularly prominent a fact as we allege—how can we account for the profound silence on the subject, preserved by both the Third and the Fourth Evangelists? If they knew it, how can they have failed to mention it? If they did *not* know it, how can they be accounted well-informed narrators?

We must not fail to point out that, after his present admission, this is a difficulty which Mr. Hutton has to face as well as we have. He now admits, that "the first superficial impression derived from S. Luke's narrative" would be an entirely mistaken one. He admits that, between our Lord's utterances, recorded respectively in Luke xxiv. 44 and 46, there was an interval of forty days, during which our Lord frequently appeared to His Apostles; and that S. Luke was entirely aware of the circumstance. But certainly—if S. Luke's language is consistent with his knowing that there were many such intervening manifestations—it is no *less* consistent with his knowing that several among them took place in Galilee. Or conversely. If S. Luke's silence is conclusive against his knowledge of intervening *Galilean* appearances, it is no less conclusive against his knowledge of *any* intervening appearances. And Mr. Hutton, no less than our selves, has to give reasons for *not* accounting it conclusive.

Before repeating the solution of this difficulty which we offered in October—there is a preliminary question, which we would submit to those who are more competent than the present writer for its consideration. We would ask them—do not the special literary characteristics of the present time lead a Christian inquirer to imagine a difficulty in the Gospels, which does not exist? Putting aside all reference to *inspiration*—was it an improbable thing, that such persons as S. Matthew, S. Mark, S. Luke, and S. John should each content himself with recording those facts which specially suited his own purpose? Was it an improbable thing, that no one among them should have contemplated the more ambitious project, of exhibiting our Lord's life as a whole, with due proportion of constituent parts? Or conversely. Would their contemporaries have naturally inferred, from the silence of this or that Evangelist on some one even extremely important fact, that he was *ignorant* of that fact? Is not such an inference rather the inference of a modern critic, than the

inference which would naturally have been drawn by a contemporary reader?

The solution however which we suggested in October, of the present difficulty, was founded on the Evangelists' *inspiration*. "There may be a thousand reasons," we said (p. 318), "why the Holy Ghost should thus limit the scope of those, who were entrusted with what in some sense may be called the most sacred commission ever assigned to men." We suggested one or two such reasons as possible: but at last, we said, "the Holy Spirit bloweth where He willeth; and . . . thou knowest not whence He cometh and whither He goeth."

Mr. Hutton is thoroughly dissatisfied with this suggestion. He assumes, that "to inspire faith in man" is admitted by us to be "the main object of" the Evangelists' inspiration. "Surely then," he proceeds to argue, "the first thing one would expect in" inspired "histories of the same event is, that they should at least contain as much confirmation of each other's facts, as we should find in independent human accounts of events, of the truth of which we were convinced." But Mr. Hutton here altogether fails to apprehend the point of our argument. When I am dealing with merely human writers, I can often reasonably derive an argument of strong probability from their silence. I know in large measure the motives which can possibly have influenced them; and I may infer with great probability, that there was no reason which could have induced them to be silent on some given fact, had they known it. But I know no more than an infinitely small portion of the Holy Ghost's possible "motives." And I cannot therefore reasonably draw any conclusion *as even faintly probable, from the mere silence of an inspired writer.*

Mr. Hutton takes for granted, that "the main object," intended by the Holy Ghost in inspiring a writer, must be the making faith easier. But there is nothing ever so slightly incredible in the very opposite supposition: viz. that S. Luke or any other inspired writer was overruled to be silent on some particular fact, for the very purpose of making faith more difficult and therefore more meritorious. Christians believe of course, that Nature and Christianity proceed from the same Author. Now it is a very common objection of atheists, that, had there been a God, He would have written His Existence in the sky, so that ignorance of Him should be absolutely impossible. Theists reply, that doubtless Theism would be unreasonable unless there were conclusive proof of God's Existence; but that many vitally important purposes of probation may well be promoted by the fact, that ignorance of God has not been rendered actually impossible. Precisely

the same thing may be said on Christianity. Doubtless Christian faith would be unreasonable, unless there were conclusive proof of Christianity; but many vitally important purposes of probation may well be promoted by the fact, that such proof is not of a kind which renders unbelief absolutely impossible. It is a purpose therefore entirely worthy of the Holy Ghost, if He intervene occasionally for the express purpose of securing, that the Christian evidence be not so overwhelming as to allow no due scope for probation. We are not for a moment implying an opinion, that such is the case *here*. We express our deepest conviction in saying, that it is wild folly even to *conjecture* what the Holy Ghost may intend in this or that given inspiration, of which the purpose is not mentioned.

We may here add a general remark concerning the Evangelists. There is no reason whatever that we know of for supposing, that S. Matthew, because he was inspired, knew everything which has been recorded by S. Luke; or that S. Luke, because he was inspired, knew everything which has been recorded by S. Matthew. This consideration however has no bearing on the particular case before us; because we cannot for a moment admit, that S. Luke may have been ignorant of the great Galilean manifestation.

Mr. Hutton does not think us "very happy in our suggestion as to the various motives of the various Gospels." There was only one Evangelist however, S. Matthew, of whose peculiarities we spoke. Of him we said (p. 319) that his "salient and universally admitted characteristic is the setting forth Christ's regal dignity." And M. Godet, for whose judgment Mr. Hutton will feel very great respect, makes the same remark, in a volume which has just reached us for notice. "The ruling thought," he says, of S. Matthew's "Gospel is the demonstration of the rights of sovereignty of Jesus over Israel as their Messiah."\*

We must conclude however by once more mentioning, what was the *predominant* purpose of our October article. Its predominating purpose was not to vindicate the trustworthiness of the Evangelists, but to point out that the question of their trustworthiness is entirely irrelevant as regards the vital controversy on the truth of the Resurrection. We hope in a very early number to follow up this preliminary step, by exhibiting as best we can the irrefragable historical evidence, on which that central verity of the Faith reposes.

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\* "Studies on the New Testament," by F. Godet, edited by the Hon. and Rev. W. H. Lyttelton, p. 142.

## Notices of Books.

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*Tractatus de Gratiâ : auctore PATRICIO MURRAY.*  
Dublin : M. H. Gill et Filius.

WE need hardly say that it is quite impossible, within the limits of a notice, to give ever so slight a sketch of all which is contained in this truly admirable treatise. We will only refer therefore to one or two particulars which have struck us as specially noteworthy.

And chiefly of all we would refer to Dr. Murray's whole attitude, in regard to *human liberty*. On this matter we trust we may be permitted to express our own private opinion, without being suspected of disrespect towards those many excellent Catholics who on one or other particular think differently. But according to our notions it is of especial importance, in the present crisis of non-Catholic philosophical thought, that nothing be retained in the exposition of Catholic theology, which can in any way tend to obscure the great and fundamental verity of Freewill. Yet one or two opinions, by no means uncommon among theologians, may perhaps be fairly accounted to have that tendency. Thus firstly, as regards the purely natural order :—we follow Dr. Murray in thinking, that the commonly received doctrine on God's "concursum" requires careful reconsideration. It is involved in the dependence of creatures on their Creator, that they cannot act without a certain divine co-operation or "concursum." But of what kind is this concursum? Imaginably there might be no further concursum of God, except merely that, having given them a power of acting, He unceasingly preserves to them that power, without otherwise inflowing into their individual acts. Such "concursum" is called "mediatus"; and Durandus, always an eccentric writer, considers that there is no other. Theologians in general have repudiated Durandus's doctrine, and Suarez even calls it "erroneous" (p. 236). Yet here a difficulty presents itself. How is it consistent with human freedom, that there shall be any more immediate divine concursum than that recognized by Durandus, as regards those acts which flow from the will's self-determining power? If the will determines *itself*, what room is there for immediate *divine* concursum in the matter? Dr. Murray (p. 243) inclines to consider this objection unanswerable. In regard therefore to "that act wherein a free creature determines itself to action," he holds that the divine concursum with that act is only "mediate." We cannot but think that this is a most important step, both in theology and Catholic philosophy. We do not ourselves see how the doctrine of human liberty can be duly vindicated, if an *immediate* divine concursum



be supposed requisite for the will's self-determining act. At the same time Dr. Murray is careful to explain that, as regards all *other* acts whatever elicited by creatures, he most fully adheres to the received view of concursus. And he also explains (p. 244) that his doctrine in no respect "diminishes the amplitude of the divine power, nor the perfect and essential subordination between the First Cause" and creatures. Indeed, rather the contrary. For just as the efficacy of Christ's merits is exhibited more conspicuously by the circumstance that they cause *human* (supernatural) acts to be also meritorious—so (argues Dr. Murray) God's Omnipotence is exhibited in an especially striking light by the fact, that He can create a soul which shall have the power of acting on certain occasions without any concomitant divine concursus.

So much as regards the natural order. On proceeding to the supernatural, a fresh question arises. A supernatural act is entirely produced by divine grace: what room then is left for free agency of the will? Dr. Murray quotes various striking passages from Molina, in answer to this question. True, says Molina, the whole of any given supernatural act proceeds from grace; but it is true also, that the whole of any given supernatural act (after exciting grace has been given) proceeds from free will. To use a very homely comparison—if two horses are harnessed to a carriage, *the whole* motion—and not merely some part of it—proceeds from either horse: each is an integrating part of the whole motive power. This comparison however halts in a very important particular; because grace is an immeasurably *more powerful* factor of the whole result, than is free will. So far then it is a much apter illustration, which Dr. Murray quotes (p. 207) from Maurus. "Let us suppose that a boy by his own strength, without help from some giant, can only move one pound. If the boy *with* the giant's help moves a thousand pounds, he can truly say, 'It is not I who move it, but the giant with me; insomuch that I myself hardly act and move it at all.'" But free will—proceeds Dr. Murray—without the help of grace can only produce natural acts; which are far less in proportion to supernatural, than is, one pound in proportion to a thousand. Yet free will, elevated by grace,\* acts not only with a simultaneous indivisible influx, but also morally and freely. This Maurus explains by his old illustration: for the giant, in helping the boy to lift the thousand pounds, may entirely submit his co-operation to the boy's free will; so that the latter may (if he please) resist, and thus no motion whatever ensue. Dr. Murray proceeds to show, how singularly this view of the case is confirmed by the words of the Tridentine Council.

It will be at once seen from this, that Dr. Murray is entirely opposed to the tenet of "physical premotion." He does full justice indeed (p. 261) to the entire orthodoxy of the Thomists. They hold the dogma of human liberty—as all Catholics do—with the firmness of divine faith. They also hold an opinion, that grace acts in the way of physical premotion. If they thought—as Dr. Murray and many Catholics think—that this opinion

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\* Elevated, that is, to the power (which it does not possess by nature) of assenting to supernatural grace.



is inconsistent with the Catholic dogma, they would at once as a matter of course renounce the opinion.

It is not only Thomism however that Dr. Murray opposes, but every form of doctrine which tends to obscure the fundamental verity, that this life is in the fullest and most obvious sense a period of *probation*. He protests accordingly with much earnestness against both Augustinianism and Congruism. Both these systems teach, that exciting grace never attains its result—never receives the will's free assent—unless it be grace, either of a certain special kind, or given with a certain special intent. On the contrary, says Dr. Murray, God *always* gives exciting grace with the intent that it may receive the will's assent. Again and again something of this kind happens. The very same grace is given with the very same intent to A and B. A assents to it, while B repudiates it. Why? Simply because A freely uses his will in a good direction, and B freely uses his will in an evil direction. The distinction between A's and B's respective acts in no respect whatever comes from God, but exclusively from the free choice of A and B.

At the same time Dr. Murray by no means denies—but on the contrary expressly affirms (p. 293 et alibi)—that God gives many graces, which *infallibly* obtain their result; gives them in answer to prayer, or for some other providential purpose. Dr. Murray consistently bears this doctrine in mind throughout his treatise. But we are inclined to wish that he had inculcated it with greater emphasis and prominence, as we cannot but account it of very vital importance as regards the whole spiritual life.

Reverting however to Dr. Murray's protest against Thomism, Augustinianism, and Congruism—we must not fail to cite his vigorous appeal to the *sensus fidelium* (pp. 282, 3). If ever there were a doctrine, he says, on which that appeal should have decisive force (*summam et ineluctabilem vim*) it is this. But—putting aside a handful of theological students, and even these only when poring over their studies—"Into no one's mind, cleric's or layman's, did the thought ever so much as enter, that physical premotion or victorious delectation is necessary in order that grace may obtain its effect. . . . Insomuch that a simple and pious Catholic, to whom such doctrine were proposed for the first time, would receive the notion with utter incredulity and even a kind of horror."

Indeed, Dr. Murray does not hesitate to affirm as his deliberate conviction (p. 293), that the doctrine, which he ascribes to Molina and which he throughout earnestly defends, is so certainly true as to be definable of faith.

One cognate matter may here be mentioned. Dr. Murray states expressly (p. 118), how indefinitely weaker is the human will in the good than in the evil direction.\* If this be so, one sees at once how little the

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\* We cannot but think that this fact bears importantly on a question, which Dr. Murray discusses carefully in pp. 41 et seq., on the relation between "*natura pura*" and "*natura lapsa et reparata*." We venture to think that the fact mentioned in the text tells in favour of the theory, that lapsed nature is far weaker towards good than pure nature would have been. Dr. Murray mentions (p. 44) that the Salmanticenses cite

will can be trusted for assenting persistently to grace; and consequently how very important a part in the work of human salvation is played by those graces, which overrule (so to speak) the infirmity and caprice of the human will, and infallibly obtain their result. This is most powerfully urged by S. Alphonsus, in his noble work on "the great means of prayer." It may perhaps be said without exaggeration, that those exercises of free will, on which the salvation of any given person substantially and predominantly depends, are those whereby he prays to God for infallible grace. "Diffidence in self," "confidence in God"—these are placed by ascetical writers as the very foundation of piety.

We have said so much on this particular portion of Dr. Murray's work, that we have left ourselves no space for further comment. But throughout the whole treatise every reader will observe, how thoroughly he gives his mind to each successive point as it arises. His theological reading has been enormous; yet he does not surrender himself to the authority of theologians, but in every single instance masters and weighs their reasoning. He does not scruple to state openly any difficulty which he feels, even though he may not yet see his way to a satisfactory solution. Now and then he plainly says, that he yields to some quasi-unanimous dictum of the theologians, while yet not convinced by the arguments adduced in its defence. The treatise will be most useful to any one who intends to carry his studies no further; and it will be no less useful to any one who uses it as introductory to the folios.

Dr. Murray has appended a brief but very interesting tract, on the absolution of "Recidivi," printed by him a few years back. Its main purport is the great power possessed by any priest of securing that his penitents shall have due dispositions, if he will give himself earnestly and systematically in the Confessional to impressing appropriate motives on their mind.

*The Life of our Life.* By H. J. COLERIDGE, S. J. London: Burns & Oates.

WE think F. Coleridge has been excellently advised to bring out at once these two volumes of Gospel harmony, without waiting for the conclusion of his expository treatise. The three published volumes of that treatise have already done momentous service, in practically exhibiting what has always appeared to us the most profitable method of commenting on the Gospels; and if the worst came to the worst, other writers might now continue F. Coleridge's labours. Meanwhile, it was a pressing need to secure at once a permanent record of the many all-important exe-

nearly twenty ancient authors, for the doctrine that "the strength of lapsed is less than that of pure nature." We incline to think with very great deference, that Dr. Murray, in his treatment of this matter, confuses two distinct questions. The question is surely—not whether *concupiscence* is *stronger*—but whether the *will* is *weaker*, in lapsed than in pure nature.

getical principles, with which the present work abounds, and which have been established in the author's mind by years of patient and devout study. We have received the sheets so late in the quarter, that we have hardly been able to do more than glance at their general contents, and look somewhat more closely at a few more salient features. In doing so we have observed one or two particulars of very minor importance, in which (as at present advised) we cannot follow F. Coleridge. But we say with confidence, that very few works indeed, at once so able and so opportune, have been published by any English-speaking Catholic of our time. We will devote an article in our April number to its careful examination; and we will then incidentally compare its conclusions on one or two points with those advocated in another most useful and maturely-considered recent Catholic work.\* Meanwhile, we most heartily commend these volumes to the reader's study. They are not volumes to be read hastily and superficially; but any intelligent and pious Catholic will be most richly repaid, who devoutly studies and meditates on what they contain.

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*An Inquiry into the Nature and Results of Electricity and Magnetism.*  
By AMYCLANUS. London: R. Washbourne, 18, Paternoster-row.

WE have very greatly to thank the author of this volume for a series of clear and interesting lectures on the theory of electricity and magnetism, which will stimulate thought and perhaps suggest new points of view, even to those who may close his volume without yielding assent to his conclusions. "The writer," he says in his preface, "lays no claim to the merit of having made any original researches into the department of science which is here treated. What he has aimed at doing is this, to collect a number of facts well attested, and bearing upon one another, and to proceed then, with the aid of that which may be looked upon as certain, to clear up as far as possible that which yet remains doubtful and obscure." He "is well aware that some of the conclusions he comes to differ widely from the generally-received doctrine of the present day, and however well grounded they may be, he cannot expect their truth to be admitted until they have passed through the ordeal of a severer examination than they have here been subjected to. He asks for nothing more than that the arguments he has brought forward be candidly considered and impartially weighed."

The principal conclusions arrived at are these:—(1.) There are in the world no physical powers separable from matter. Neither heat, consequently, nor light, nor electricity, are imponderable fluids. (2.) The forces actually existing in inorganic nature are modifications of three distinct and independent powers, which are inherent in every particle of matter. Two of these, gravity and inertia, operate on all other particles of matter

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\* "The New Testament Narrative in the Words of the Sacred Writers, with Notes, &c." London: Burns & Oates.

irrespectively of differences of kind; while the third, the attraction of affinity, or chemical attraction, is that special attraction which each atom of a given kind has to other atoms of given kinds, but not to atoms of any kind indifferently. Heat is believed by the author, as by almost every one else, to be a molecular movement of the particles of which bodies are composed; and as to light, the undulatory theory, with its concomitant, an interstellar luminiferous ether, are accepted. Movements, however, whether of masses or of molecules, would be regarded on this view as mere results of the common attraction, or gravity, of the elective attraction, or chemical affinity, and of inertia, which is, it will be observed, elevated to the dignity of a *force*. The ground of this probably is, that not only are bodies incapable of changing their state of motion or rest except under the action of an impressed force, but they absolutely *resist* such change, which appears to imply more than a merely negative attribute. With respect to electricity, the author tells us that he adopts the opinion of Sir Humphrey Davy that "chemical and electrical attraction is produced by the same cause, acting in the one case on particles, in the other on masses of matter. The same property, under different modifications, is the cause of all the phenomena exhibited by different voltaic combinations." (Davy, Phil. Trans. 1826.) When the elective attractions of the particles of which a body is composed are called into play to such an extent that the arrangement or grouping of the particles is thereby altered, the internal constitution of the body changed, and new physical properties consequently made to appear, we call the action *chemical*; when it does not go so far as this, but the particles are made to exhibit certain elective attractions without the internal constitution of the body being altered, the action is said to be *electrical*. We have an example of this elective attraction every time a positively electrified body attracts certain bodies, and these only—the bodies which are not positively electrified like itself. (3.) It is unphilosophical to assume the existence of electrical repulsion, as all the phenomena which are attributed to it may in reality be referred to attraction. When, for instance, an insulated pith ball moves away from the prime conductor which has been used to electrify it, and is itself positively electrified, the reason need not be that it is repelled from the conductor; it is sufficient to assume that the latter ceases to exert any attractive power over it, while it is, on the other hand, attracted towards surrounding objects. For, if this is so, it will move in the direction of the surrounding objects, and consequently away from the conductor. (4.) The phenomena of thermo-electricity present no obstacle to the reception of the chemical theory of electricity.

The preceding conclusions are enforced and exemplified in the first part (pp. 1–155), which treats of electricity; the second and concluding part (pp. 159–340) deals with magnetism, which the author regards as fundamentally identical with electricity. In this portion of the book, which contains, apart from theory, much valuable information, the following additional conclusions are arrived at:—(5.) Ampère's theory of the magnet is adopted, in so far as it teaches that, in the region between the neutral point, or rather plane (approximately the middle usually), of an

ordinary magnet, and that pole which points towards the north, there circulate currents which curve round the upper surface from west to east, and back again round the under surface from east to west; while between this neutral point and the pole which points to the south, currents move in a contrary direction. A steel rod or needle may, it ought to be remembered, be rendered magnetic by passing an electric current round and round it; and in this case the pole which points to the north will appear in its natural position if the currents are made to circle round the upper side of the piece of steel in a direction contrary to that of the internal currents of the north half of a magnet; *i.e.* from east to west, or as the sun moves. (6.) The earth is an electro-magnet, and currents circle round it from east to west; they may, therefore, be regarded as the cause of its magnetization. (7.) As to the cause of these currents:—There is independent evidence that the sun is charged with positive electricity. This being so, the part of the earth turned away from the sun would, were he at rest, be charged by induction with positive, and that turned to him with negative, electricity. But, inasmuch as the sun is not stationary, but moves from east to west on the side facing the earth, currents of positive electricity continually flow away to the west, while negative currents similarly flow in the contrary direction (p. 225). (8.) The electric influence of the sun is also the cause of the earth's axial rotation. For, as Ampère has shown, a magnet may be rotated on its axis by directing on it a stream of electricity: the earth is a magnet, and a stream of positive electricity constantly flows to it from the sun (pp. 311, 319). "It may be hoped that the discovery, when made, of the physical cause of the rotation of the earth, will lead on to the discovery of the physical cause of the rotation of the sun upon its axis, and so make us more fully acquainted with the physical causes of the revolution of the other planets round their common centre of attraction" (p. 329). (9.) The earth's axial rotation being thus the consequence of an exceedingly feeble cause acting through immense periods of time, would at first be exceedingly slow, becoming more rapid as time went on, until at last the whole additional force imparted had to be expended in overcoming friction. Hence, the first days would be of very great length; and this affords an answer to the objection made with respect to the inadequate length of the "days" of Genesis. The first "days" may have been produced by terrestrial magnetic light. (10.) This same theory of the earth's rotation may be used also to explain the miracle of the sun's standing still at the command of Josue (Jos. vii. 12), if an additional consideration—to which we have not as yet adverted in this notice—is taken into account (p. 336). A magnet made to revolve rapidly above a copper plate, not in any way connected with it, causes the plate to revolve along with it in the same plane. The sun revolves on its own axis, and thus the solar axial rotation causes the earth's axial rotation. Now, Holy Scripture declares neither that the earth's rotation was, nor that it was not, arrested, but that the sun and moon were made to stand still; and it is far simpler and more natural, therefore, to suppose that this was actually the case. But how would this bear on the earth's axial rotation, and the conse-

quent prolongation of the day? The rotation of the sun being the cause of the rotation of the earth, if the sun stood still the earth would be brought to a stop also, though gradually, as the "affinitive powers, which had been exerted by the sun before in such way as to make the earth rotate, would be exerted now in such way as to stop the earth's rotation" (p. 337).

We shall now offer a few remarks on these ten points. As to the first, not only do we find nothing in it wherewith to disagree, but the remarks of the author in protest against the popular view which represents matter and force as two distinct beings or entities—like man and wife, or master and servant—and regards the same force as capable of passing from one portion of matter to another, appear to us to propound a thoroughly true and philosophical account of the question. He says:—

"Many persons take it for granted that there are in the world physical powers separable from matter. . . . It is only in one way, as it appears to me, that the forces belonging to one body impress themselves upon another, viz. as causes producing their effect. Thus, the force of the fire in the furnace of the engine—or, in other words, the molecular motion generated by combustion among the particles of the fuel—does not pass through the boiler into the water which it contains, but it *acts* upon the boiler, and if the boiler be not kept full of water, burns it away. In the same manner the boiler thus acted upon *acts* in its turn upon the water which it contains, which is converted into steam—the expansive power of the steam being regulated by mechanical contrivances so as to propel the engine. The motion of the carriage on the line *produces* friction, and the friction *produces* heat. Thus, from the beginning to the end, the relation which each step in the series has to that which follows is that of cause and effect. . . . The force of the moving train is not *converted into*, but *produces* the molecular motion of heat. . . . Certainly, I do not quarrel with any one who speaks of the momentum of the train being converted into the sparks of fire emitted by the break-wheel, provided it be understood that this form of expression is not intended to convey a scientific explanation of the fact which takes place" (pp. 84–87).

On the chemical theory of electricity in general, it is unnecessary to make any remarks; and to enter on the details of the presentment of it made by the author would lead us too far beyond our bounds. The same may be said of the relation borne by the phenomena of thermo-electricity to that theory: a puzzling subject, which we do not believe to have been *ex professo* investigated, and on which, as appears to us, the reader will find much painstaking thought, and many valuable remarks in the volume before us. We can only regret that the author has not been able himself to experiment: a situation which reduces the sciences of experiment to sciences of observation, and of observation at second hand. The novelty of denying electrical repulsion will at once be noted; and, to the present writer at least, it does not appear to be borne out by the facts. If the body A simply ceased to attract B, the behaviour of B would be as if A had ceased to exist; A would no longer need to be taken into account in predicting the movements of B, which would move indifferently from or towards A, according as the position and proximity of surrounding bodies regulated it. This, as it seems to us, is



by no means the case. Possibly, however, the author's denial of *actio in distans* (p. 208) may have to do with his denial of repulsion.

As to the fifth and sixth conclusions, and the first part of the seventh, Ampère's theory of magnetism is now widely admitted. It explains the interior constitution of magnets, and gives a reason why electricity *appears* only at the surface of bodies; and although handicapped by the implication that electricity is an imponderable fluid, it has the advantage of affording us a means for imagining a *rationale* of the phenomena, and linking them together in our minds. It is scarcely possible to do without the terminology of currents, although we may not really believe that in an electric circle there are such streams of fluid as that terminology implies, but may interpret these currents as in reality redistributions, so to speak, of force. The earth, again, is admitted to have currents (to use the current terminology) circling round it, and it is also admitted that its axial rotation is, either in whole or in part, the cause of these currents. Their origin is not, however, explained in the manner in which the author of the work before us explains it, but they are regarded as due to changes of temperature, and possibly to other kinds of change, produced by the gradual passage of the sun from east to west. But it is quite likely that there may be a much closer connection than this.

With respect to the remaining conclusions, up to those which are theological in character, it appears to the present writer that the author, entering into a very speculative field, offers two inconsistent explanations of the earth's axial rotation. In the first, he regards the earth as an insulated body, standing over against the sun, which is positively electrified. We do not see why, if the axial rotation is produced in this way, the axis of rotation is not perpendicular to the circular electric currents, which it is not. The author, indeed, conceives that the rotation may have had its commencement in intraterrestrial changes:—"If, on the other hand, we should suppose the sun to exert no electric influence upon the earth, we might still presume, I think, that the unsteady action of the different forces battling upon the earth—a vast globe hung in space revolving round its centre of attraction—must eventually turn it round upon its axis, however long it might take to do so" (p. 333). But it is a fundamental principle of dynamics that no interaction of the forces of a system can produce rotatory or translatory motion of that system as a whole. In the second explanation he regards the earth as in electrical connection with the sun, in which case it is not insulated. The sun is conceived as forming a galvanic or electro-magnetic battery, with a cathode and an anode, which are connected with the earth. From the one streams a current of electricity, which returns to the other; and thus, like the magnet in the analogous experiment, the earth turns round. But where, it might be asked, is the evidence of this? Where are the insulated wires which prevent the currents from intermixing before they reach the earth? A third and very interesting explanation is found in the rotation of the sun, which is held to produce that of the earth, as the rotation of a magnet produces that of a copper plate in the same plane. But even granting this, something else must co-operate; for, if not, why, to omit other considerations, do not the earth and the sun rotate in the same plane?



We conclude by touching very briefly on the scientific side of the theological conclusions. It is obvious that if the author's theory of the cause of the earth's rotation were accepted, it would have to be conceded that the first rotations were slower, and the first days longer, than those which succeeded; and it is possible that there may have been light on the earth, due to electrical or magnetic causes, before the particles now composing the sun were aggregated into their present form. It may indeed be plausibly conjectured that the physical causes which produce the *aurora borealis* operated more energetically in past ages than now, and that the light derived from that source may, therefore, have been more abundant. But all this is mere conjecture; it affords no basis for anything stable and reliable. It will, indeed, occur to the reader that if the sun's action on the earth is so energetic that its stoppage arrested in a brief period the earth's axial rotation, which another brief period sufficed to restore, the days of Genesis can have been longer than ordinary days only in the addition of a few hours, or perhaps of merely a few minutes, to the first of them. The author, however, puts this conclusion on one side by supposing that as yet the sun was not, at least fully formed. "If the rotation of the earth be produced by the sun's electric action exerted upon it, we are at a loss to say how long a time may have passed away before the earth accomplished its first rotation upon its axis, when as yet the sun had not begun to exert its electric power and to shed its influence upon the earth. . . . If there were any electric force, however small, exerted by the sun upon the earth, it may be presumed that . . . a rotation upon its axis would in course of time be accomplished" (p. 332). But, passing over the highly-speculative character of this, it does not appear to us that the scientific requirements of the case are by any means satisfied by the supposition of six long periods of light, with intervening periods of darkness. Each of these periods of darkness would have been geologically chronicled, on the part of the earth on which it occurred, by depression of animal life, presence of eyeless animals, such as some trilobites, and absence of higher vegetation.

It does not appear to the present writer to be by any means a natural interpretation of the words "And the sun stood still," to suppose that they refer to an arrest of the sun's axial rotation. Nor does the account commonly given of the miracle really imply a "sudden and instantaneous stopping of the earth" and atmosphere in their rapid rotation, "so as to overturn and dash to the ground everything on the earth." The speed of the earth's rotation at the equator, where it is most rapid, is between twenty and thirty times as great as that of an express train; and it might be stopped in a proportionate time without any greater inconvenience than is experienced by the passengers in their carriages.

We now take our leave of "Electricity and Magnetism." We have not been able in every point to agree with the author; indeed, it is so rare for two people exactly to agree, that he would scarcely expect that we should do so; and we have frankly stated where we differ. Partly, we may be mistaken in the bearings of our objections, and partly, we may have misapprehended the author's meaning; we do not, therefore, propose them as final.

*Hippolytus and Callistus, or the Church of Rome in the First Half of the Third Century.* By JOHN J. IGN. VON DÖLLINGER. Translated by ALFRED PLUMMER, Master of University College, Durham, &c. &c. Edinburgh: Clark.

WE believe there never have been two opinions among competent judges as to the merits of Dr. Döllinger's work upon "Hippolytus and Callistus." We have already expressed our own opinion in a previous number, and had Mr. Plummer confined himself to a translation of Dr. Döllinger's book, we should have been glad to have undertaken the agreeable task of justifying our previous judgment by a review of the book which stands at the head of this notice. Unfortunately Mr. Plummer has compelled us to turn our attention for a little to himself. On a previous occasion, in an attack which he made upon the Catholic Church,\* he spoke of this very work of Dr. Döllinger, and we took occasion to point out that Mr. Plummer showed very great ignorance of church history in general, and complete ignorance of Dr. Döllinger's work on Hippolytus in particular. In his preface to the new translation he makes a show of replying to our criticism. He is well aware that he does not and cannot make any real reply. But he counts, and no doubt rightly, upon the fact that few of his readers ever see the DUBLIN REVIEW, and he goes to work accordingly. He makes some imperfect extracts from our critique. He gives our charges against him, but is much too prudent to append the reasons with which we supported them—and he concludes with an air of triumph.

Our own case is very simple. It is enough for us to quote Mr. Plummer's original statements and confute him out of his new translation. Any person of common sense will be able to judge what reason Mr. Plummer has to assume an air of triumph.

First then, as to Mr. Plummer's ignorance of Dr. Döllinger's book on Hippolytus, of which he wrote in a tone of the most perfect familiarity:—

Dr. Döllinger, says Mr. Plummer in 1871, "published" "Hippolytus and Callistus" "in answer to Protestant writers, who endeavoured to use" the "authority of Hippolytus" for the purpose of throwing discredit on the Church of Rome," and also in answer to Catholics "who sought to weaken the testimony of the author."† Mr. Plummer in 1876 informs us that "Dr. Döllinger (in the same work) tears to shreds the evidence of Hippolytus against (Pope) Callistus." Perhaps in 1877 Mr. Plummer will kindly inform us how Dr. Döllinger contrived to tear the evidence of Hippolytus to shreds, and at the same time to answer those who tried to weaken it.

Next, as to Mr. Plummer's ignorance of church history in general. In 1871 he wrote as follows:—"Zephyrinus during his long pontificate

\* In the Introduction to his translation of Dr. Döllinger's "Papst-Fabln." 1871.

† Introduction to the English translation of Döllinger's "Papst-Fabln." 1871.

had held and taught heterodox and contradictory doctrines respecting the Godhead, sometimes following Noetus, sometimes Sabellius. But his errors were the errors of a confused and ignorant man ruled by the powerful and subtle mind of Callistus.\*

Let us examine this sentences in detail. Each clause contains a gross and individual blunder, as we proceed to prove by the testimony of Mr. Plummer himself.

First. Were the doctrines of Noetus and Sabellius contradictory? So Mr. Plummer assured us in 1871. But in 1876 he publishes the translation of a book in which they are proved identical. We need but quote the headings of Dr. Döllinger's fourth chapter as translated by Mr. Plummer himself. "The heresy of Noetus—Sabellius—His doctrine identical with that of Noetus." This is not new to students of church history, but it was evidently unknown to Mr. Plummer a few years ago.

Secondly. Is it certain that Callistus either taught or prompted Zephyrinus to teach heresy? We must take Callistus for a heretic if we believe Mr. Plummer writing in 1871. We must consider the doctrine of Callistus as perfectly orthodox if we believe Mr. Plummer's translation of Dr. Döllinger published in 1876. The reader need but turn to chapter iv. and he will find abundant proof of our assertion.

Lastly, we asked Mr. Plummer to produce one single ancient authority for the statement that Zephyrinus sometimes followed Sabellius, sometimes Noetus, and we need scarcely say that he has produced none. The charges which Hippolytus brings against the Popes are wild enough, as Dr. Döllinger has shown. This particular charge is, we believe, due not to Hippolytus, but to that inventive writer Mr. Plummer.

But enough of this. It is absurd to deal seriously with a writer who discusses critical questions without the most elementary acquaintance with the facts at issue. Custom in this country allows a wide license of ignorance and confusion to writers against "ultramontanism." We are inclined to think that Mr. Plummer has exceeded it.

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*Essays Theological and Literary.* By R. H. HUTTON, M.A. Second Edition. London: Dalby, Isbister, & Co.

WE noticed these essays immediately on their first appearance, viz. in April, 1872. Just a year later, their theological bearing was treated at greater length, in an article contributed to this REVIEW by the late F. Dalgairns; who was not only most alive to Mr. Hutton's very important services in the cause of religion, but entertained towards him that specially warm personal regard which is felt by so many of his friends. In regard then to a true apprehension and appreciation of Mr. Hutton's theological position,—we will here content ourselves with referring to F. Dalgairns's remarks, in pp. 314—324 of our number for April, 1873.

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\* "Fables respecting the Popes." Introduction, p. 25.

On the present occasion accordingly, our notice shall turn exclusively on Mr. Hutton's preface to this his second edition. He introduces this preface by confessing the painful truth,—which (we fear) is indubitable—that, since his essays were first published, “so far as there has been a change in the temper of English thought,” “it has been almost all in the direction of shaking men's faith in the deepest assumptions both of the Theistic and the Christian creed” (p. viii.). Neither however does this fact in any way lessen Mr. Hutton's abhorrence of the atheistic movement and undoubting conviction of its utter unreasonableness,—nor yet (unhappily) does it attract him more powerfully towards looking for safety to the Catholic Church. We will begin with referring to that part of his twofold position with which we concur; and we will then add a few remarks on that other part from which we dissent.

As illustrating the blind and degrading superstition of antitheists, Mr. Hutton quotes (p. xxi.) a certain ground, taken by M. Rénan in his “*Dialogues Philosophiques*.” One of M. Rénan's interlocutors—and one whom M. Rénan obviously regards as holding a more reasonable belief than the ordinary faith of a Theist or a Christian—accounts it certain, that the universe, “like a vast heart” “goes towards its end with a *sure instinct*”; though “the consciousness of the whole . . . does not seem to exceed much that of the oyster or the polyp.” Mr. Hutton reasonably contrasts this utterly contemptible creed—a creed hardly worthy of the most benighted savages—with the Christian doctrine (p. xxvi.). It is said indeed, that our Lord's teaching contradicts modern science, in regard to the existence of miracles, the power of prayer, and the causation of earthly events by unseen beings. Mr. Hutton however (p. xxvii.) “not only thinks these objections erroneous, but believes that some aspects of Christ's teaching have a meaning for us which they had not in an equal degree for any previous generation.”

Mr. Hutton gives two different illustrations of his meaning in this last statement. Firstly there is no effect of modern science more apparently antichristian, than its tendency to produce in its votaries “a certain mistaken contempt for the ignorant millions by whom the earth is mostly peopled” (p. xxvii.). Yet, contemporaneously with this tendency, there coexists “a very opposite current of feeling, which seems to grow in depth and intensity” (p. xxviii.). This current of feeling “is founded on the advance, *often seen among even fanatical sceptics*, of those deep and inward conceptions of the relations between man and man, of which Christ was the first revealer” (p. xxix.). “It is Christ's teaching (ib.) which is the fountain-head of the Gospel of fraternity, and *which alone justifies and ennobles it*.” Curiously enough, Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, who is by no means enthusiastic for the “Gospel of fraternity,” makes the very same remark from an opposite point of view.

The second illustration of Mr. Hutton's thesis is founded on a particular, “in which it is generally assumed that Christ taught what science has exploded”: viz. His doctrine on preternatural agencies. But on the contrary, belief in *spiritism* is certainly on the increase even among scientific persons (p. xxiii. note). Moreover the growth of modern criticism

has placed in even clearer light than before, the irrefragable evidence on which many miraculous stories rest. Mr. Hutton pursues this theme from p. xxxii. to the end of his Preface; and incidentally (p. xxxviii.) pays an emphatic compliment to the article on "Catholic miracles," which appeared in our number of last January. In connection with this article, he declares it to be "generally admitted among well-informed Protestants, that Rome is really very loath to admit miracles"; "sifting most zealously the evidence alleged" in every particular case.

Indeed there is no unwillingness on Mr. Hutton's part, to admit what tells for the Catholic Church. In p. ix. he says very frankly: "I doubt if there be in any Church in the world, in proportion to the number of its adherents, so much true devotion and piety, so much genuine religious ardour and self-sacrifice, and more than all . . . so much true blessedness in the devotional life, as there is inside the Roman Catholic Church". Nor again is he by any means insensible to the *à priori* probability—supposing a Revelation to have been given—of an infallible Church. "What, we may ask, is the use of God manifesting Himself to man, without making distinct provisions for securing that we shall always have the means of clearly ascertaining what it was that He meant to reveal?" (p. viii.) Why then does he repudiate the Catholic position? For a reason, which rests on so fundamental a misconception of facts, that we are simply amazed how it can have been accepted by so candid and well-informed a writer. "Even Roman Catholics" he says (p. xi.) "are compelled to admit, that their Church has been granted infallibility only in relation to doctrine—that is *in relation to verbal statements*." We admit as heartily as Mr. Hutton asserts, that no infallibility would be sufficient for high spiritual ends, which were confined to "verbal statements." Singularly enough indeed, some ten years ago we had repeatedly to defend that position, first against the unionists, and afterwards against Dr. Pusey. Of the many extracts we might give from our former statements, we will select two in particular; because they include a quotation from F. Perrone, than whom no one can be more safely cited, as an unimpeachable witness of the recognized and traditional Catholic doctrine.

"F. Perrone's lectures," we said in July, 1865, " (whatever criticism may otherwise be made on them), have beyond question a greater value than any other work that can be named, in this respect; viz., in showing what is the view of Catholic doctrine, inculcated at this moment on theological students by the great majority of bishops throughout the world. Now, in his dissertation on the Church, he lays down a certain elementary doctrine on infallibility, as 'held by Catholics, and denied by all others.' He does not speak of it as of one Catholic view among many, but as of the one Catholic doctrine; nor does he so much as hint, that among Catholics any other can possibly exist. We cannot better express this doctrine than in his own words:—'While the Church fulfils the office of teaching, she performs a threefold duty; viz., that of witness, of judge, and of guide (magistræ). Of witness, in proposing those truths of the faith which she has received from Christ; of judge, in deciding controversies which either touch the faith or have reference thereto; lastly, of guide, in that daily ministry whereby *through her oral and practical teaching* (*viva voce et praxi*) she instructs the faithful in all those matters which conduce to

their being trained in pure doctrine and morality, and whereby she *leads them as it were by the hand along the path of eternal salvation*. Catholics contend, all non-Catholics deny, that *Christ has endowed His Church with infallibility for performing each of these duties*" (pp. 121, 2).

"And now let us state as accurately as we can," we subjoined in April, 1866, "the doctrine here expressed and exemplified. Roman Catholics, throughout the world, are instructed in certain *doctrines*; are exhorted to certain *practices*; are encouraged and trained in certain *temper and dispositions*. The Church's office in providing for this is called her 'magisterium;' being that function whereby, as Perrone expresses it, 'she leads them, as it were, by the hand, along the path of eternal salvation.' 'Catholics contend,' he adds, '*all non-Catholics deny, that Christ has endowed His Church with infallibility in this respect.*' Now, firstly, when we say that this magisterium is *trustworthy*,—we mean (1) that the *doctrines* so taught are really truths revealed by God, or legitimate inferences therefrom; (2) that the *practices* thus inculcated are really serviceable for sanctification and salvation; and (3) that the *temper and dispositions* so encouraged are really acceptable to Almighty God. And, secondly, when we further say that this magisterium is not *trustworthy* only, but *infallible*,—we mean that its trustworthiness is guaranteed by God's infallible promise.

"Here, however, certain explanations are necessary. When we say that the Church's magisterium is infallible, we do not, of course, deny that each several priest throughout Christendom falls probably into one mistake or another, on various minor matters connected with religion; for to deny this, would be almost to maintain that each several priest is infallible. Nor yet do we deny, that in one or other portion of the Church most serious doctrinal corruptions and heresies may arise; may affect priests and even bishops; and may give the supreme authority great trouble, before they are finally repressed: for to deny this would be to deny facts, which are on the surface of ecclesiastical history from first to last. But all this being fully admitted and allowed for, it still remains true that, in every part of the Roman Catholic Church, there is a large mass of such practical guidance as we have described, given to the people by their priests, with fullest knowledge and approval of the Church's supreme authority. This constitutes what Dr. Pusey (p. 106) happily calls 'the Church's practical teaching;' and what theologians ordinarily designate as her 'juge magisterium.' We must maintain, as an elementary Catholic doctrine, that she cannot '*recede*' from it as Dr. Pusey wishes (*ibid.*), because she claims for it *infallibility*" (pp. 422, 3).

We entirely agree then with Mr. Hutton, that "a Church which should never indeed use wrong *words* about the Divine Nature, but which for centuries together offered in its public conduct a moral interpretation of those words totally distinct from that given by its Lord, would not be an infallible Church in any useful or intelligible sense of the term." "An infallible Church" we think with Mr. Hutton "means a Church whose authoritative words convey truth, without risk of failure, to the minds of those who take pains to understand" (p. 12). But Mr. Hutton goes on to imply, that when at certain exceptional periods some worldly or wicked man has unhappily been Pope, the Church's "authoritative words" *no longer* practically convey truth. We will venture to affirm, that no private Catholic had ever greater difficulty in understanding the Church's authoritative words and practical teaching under the reign, say, of John XII than under the reign, say, of S. Gregory VII. The point raised by Mr



Hutton is (we heartily admit) of the greatest relevancy and importance; nor, of course, can we treat it within the limits of a notice. But we are surprised that *Mr. Hutton* of all men should have failed to bear in mind the singular prominence, with which the Church of every age has placed before her children *Saints' lives*, as the authorized exemplar of Christian virtue and exhibition of Christian doctrine. No lessons could possibly be more definite, consistent, and intelligible than those so presented. We are surprised, we say, that *Mr. Hutton* in particular can have forgotten the influence necessarily possessed by those lives in practically inculcating Christian doctrine, because he has on various occasions shown keen interest in Catholic hagiology.

In conclusion we will briefly refer to what we must account a serious confusion of thought, in the author's contrast between "infallibility" and "certitude" (p. 20). The relation between infallibility and certitude is drawn out with truly admirable clearness by F. Newman in his "Grammar of Assent" (Fourth Edition, pp. 224, 5); and if *Mr. Hutton* had remembered F. Newman's remarks, we are sure he would have written differently. No Catholic has ever denied, that there are various religious truths, which those may reasonably hold with absolute certainty, who do not nevertheless believe the existence of any external infallible guide. For instance, as to the fundamental truths of natural religion and the first principles of morality—it is the universally received Catholic doctrine, that every adult has full means of knowing them with certitude. Again it is far the more common doctrine among Catholics, that an indefinite number of persons, who are invincibly ignorant of the Catholic Church, may nevertheless most reasonably hold this or that revealed doctrine with the certitude of divine faith.

It is a matter of keen grief to many Catholics, that *Mr. Hutton* is kept aloof by such misapprehensions as we have mentioned from that true home to which at once his moral aspirations and philosophical reasonings would legitimately guide him.

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*On the Clause "and the Son," in regard to the Eastern Church and the Bonn Conferences.* A Letter to the Rev. H. P. Liddon, D.D. By the Rev. E. B. PUSEY, D.D. Oxford and London: Parker & Co. 1876.

ANGLICAN notions on the possible re-union, as they term it, of East and West are as far from practice as might be expected in a Church where the Royal Supremacy is the living rule of faith, and theology no more than the painful anatomy of a skeleton dug out of the past. To suppose that anything, except words, could result from the Bonn Conference argues a want of just views, and a narrowness of practical conceptions, which we think must be hereditary in Anglican clergymen. However, Dr. Pusey has addressed himself to a task not altogether unimportant, and has executed it, on the whole, in a manner to call for some expression of surprise and gratification from the Catholic reader. There is much



more of the tone of an Eirenicon throughout these pages than in the volume to which he gave that honourable title. Dr. Pusey has detected the vagueness, inaccuracy, and general heedlessness which mark the propositions adopted under the directing genius of Dr. Döllinger at Bonn. With a great deal of consideration and a sort of polite affection for his German and English friends of the "re-union" movement, he puts aside, once and for all, their suggestion to surrender the Filioque. He will not allow every preposterous claim which the Eastern schismatics may have chosen to make. Again, the historical learning of Döllinger and Reinkens fares very badly at his hands. He undertakes to prove, and, as of course we should say with confidence, he does prove, that the whole history of the clause has been what Catholic theologians, for instance Franzelin and Scheeben, have described. His view comes to this:—the Nicene Creed, as formulated at Constantinople in 381, did not enter generally into the Eastern liturgies till about seventy years after. It was never *intentionally* altered by the Western Church at all, but the "Filioque" came into the Creed owing to the usage already common of expressing the doctrine on the procession of the Holy Ghost by that word; and the usage itself he derives from the rule of the Catholic Faith, which the Spanish Church drew up, soon after the year 400, against the Priscillianists. He finds another source in the Athanasian Creed, which then had become a part of the Breviary. He defends S. Leo III., and his successors in their conduct regarding the addition of the word, and remarks that Rome was the last place in the West where the Creed thus modified was publicly adopted into the liturgy. But he does not think it necessary to lay stress upon such a point; for he says the Greeks could not condemn the insertion of the clause without crying out upon their forefathers at Constantinople, who had done the like; and moreover, once it had come to be part of the Creed, it could not be removed except at the risk of injury to the true Catholic doctrine. By very numerous and well-selected quotations out of the Greek and Oriental Fathers, he demonstrates that the Roman teaching in the Councils of Lyons and Florence is precisely that which the Universal Church has always held. He believes that this very clause is required to guard the doctrine less clearly put forth in the writings of S. John Damascene and in the customary propositions of the modern Greeks. At the same time he would not oblige the Greeks (because neither he nor any other Anglican has the slightest authority in the matter) to use the Western formula. He would only ask to have it allowed as orthodox, and respected when heard in the churches of Western Christendom.

All this will not please the Russians, nor the Anglicans either. But apart from Dr. Pusey's unfortunate errors on the supreme authority of the Holy See, and his too hasty concessions to the Greek complaints against the Popes—as if *they* had been in fault, and not the proverbial Greek obstinacy and ignorant pride—apart from such defects as these, we think the volume likely to interest the many Catholics who have been attracted by the author's religious tone and disposition. It will give him a real claim upon their earnest wishes that he may unlearn the rest of the Protestant mis-statements, as he has refuted those on the Filioque.

*A Popular History of the Catholic Church in the United States.* By JOHN O'KANE MURRAY, B.S.; Second Edition. Revised. New York: Sadlier & Co.

WE lately received, by the courtesy of the author, the "Centennial Discourse" of the Rev. William F. Clarke, S.J., of Baltimore. In this valuable sermon, worthy of one of the most laborious and successful preachers of the United States, the history of the Catholic religion in that country is narrated with a point and brevity which make it a model, both theological and literary, for compositions of its class. For future writers on the same subject it will remain an historical document, in which the progress of the faith on the American continent is sketched from its inception. "The light of our faith," observes Father Clarke, "was the first to gild with its glory the land which we love; our missionaries the first to preach here the name of Christ; our martyrs the earliest to fertilize with their blood the soil out of which have sprung the thousands of Christian temples . . . in every State and Territory of the Union." In the new world as in the old the Holy Roman faith preceded all its later corruptions and counterfeits, and will survive them all. Its life is from God, and therefore inextinguishable. "Centuries before the great Christopher Columbus had opened the way through mid-ocean from Europe to America, our priests, by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, yes, and our bishops too, had landed on the shores of more than one of the original thirteen States, had preached our faith, offered our sacrifice, administered our sacraments, and died martyrs to their zeal for our religion." It is the history of Christianity in every region of the earth, from the remotest East to the furthest West; everywhere the Roman missionaries, strong in the might of Peter's blessing, have been at once the interpreters of revealed truth, the founders of Christian liberty, and the pioneers of Christian civilization. More than a thousand years ago, as Father Clarke proves by unexceptionable authorities, "Pope Gregory IV. placed Iceland and Greenland under the jurisdiction of Ansgar, Archbishop of Hamburg, whom he appointed his apostolic legate for the north"; and when in the sixteenth century King Christian of Denmark sent Lutheran ministers to deprave the ancient faith of Danish America,—removing one Catholic bishop by force to a prison in Denmark, and beheading another, after the fashion of heretical princes,—"the people protested against the change of religion," effected in every land by regal despotism, and declared, with the spirit which breathes in American Catholics of the present day, "that it belonged, not to the King of Denmark, but to the Roman Pontiff to teach them what they were to believe."\*

The work of Mr. Murray is not a brief and pregnant discourse like that of Father Clarke, but a voluminous narrative which fills six hundred pages. The Catholics of the Western World, he remarks in his introduction, "can be found at all points from Behring Strait to Cape Horn. . .

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\* "Centennial Discourse," p. 12.

For there the glorious title of *Catholic* is no misnomer; they are truly so in faith, in works, and extent of territory. Their present number in North and South America must exceed *fifty millions*." We have no space even to enumerate the multifarious contents of this volume, in which everything relating to the history of the faith in the United States finds a place, including biographies of the most eminent American prelates, the progress of Catholic educational institutions, and the formation of a Catholic literature. One of its most interesting sections is a record of Indian Missions, in which the incomparable heroism and devotion of Catholic missionaries, and the triumphs of their apostolic labours, are contrasted with the final ruin and desolation in which the native race has been overwhelmed by the anti-Catholic frenzy of the English government, and the cruel injustice of American policy. After recounting the successes of the Catholic apostles in the first half of the sixteenth century, in which might be seen a sure presage of the ultimate evangelization of the whole continent, the narrative, hitherto bright and glorious, suddenly changes its character. "At length a change came. England, recently turned apostate, was rapidly planting colonies along the Atlantic seaboard. The deadly foe of Catholicity and the Indian, we need not be surprised to learn that she aimed at the destruction of both. Such was ever her American policy. . . . At the date of our revolutionary war, not a single mission had escaped the destroying progress of England!" (p. 73.) It was the emissaries of that land who, by acts of which the atrocity rivalled that of the unconverted savages, murdered holy men toiling amid privations and sufferings for the salvation of the Indian tribes. "The fierce Mohawk was not more eager and skilful on an enemy's trail than the fanatical and barbarous government of England in search of a Catholic priest. And the humanity of the American Indian compares favourably with that of the Protestant Briton." (p. 87.) Their slaughter of Father Rasels, the apostle of the Abenakis, and the impious acts of sacrilege and profanation which accompanied that crime, still cry for judgment upon a people who applauded them. This race "were the first native Americans to embrace the faith in a body, and neither the changes of time, nor cruel wars, nor the persecutions of England have been able to shake their allegiance to their God and their religion." (p. 97.) As long as England retained power in America, her deep hatred of the faith which she had denied, though it had been for long ages her glory and strength, professed by her noblest sons, and the source of her choicest blessings, impelled her always to the same acts. On one occasion William of Orange wrote from England to Governor Logan to enforce the English penal laws in Pennsylvania. "It has become a reproach to me here," he told him, "with the officers of the crown, that you have suffered the *scandal of the Mass* to be publicly celebrated." (p. 147.) England, from the hour of her so-called reformation, had cast out the most august rite of Christian worship, the Sacrifice of the Altar, and the malignant desire of her clergy and people was that the preternatural darkness which had fallen upon themselves should cover the whole earth.

In the early days of the American Union, which Catholics had a large

share in founding, the cruel bigotry of the English was repudiated, as equally stupid and ungrateful, by the first rulers of the Republic, and notably by Washington. Mr. Murray pertinently remarks that "General Washington's 'Life Guard,' a most choice body of men, was composed largely of Catholics." They were selected "with special reference to their physical, moral, and intellectual character," and "it was considered a mark of peculiar distinction to belong to the Commander-in-chief's Guard." (p. 167.) It was not till a later date that firebrands from England and Scotland kindled the flames of a gross and unpatriotic fanaticism, and strove to suppress the liberty which they had ostensibly quitted their own land of penal enactments to secure and perpetuate. It was not till party spirit, violent and unscrupulous, had made all weapons acceptable as a tool of political warfare, that the same fanaticism was craftily appealed to in our own day by men who do not share it, being indifferent to all religion; and there is reason to believe that the candid and generous temper of the people of the United States has already detected and condemned the sordid imposture. Meanwhile, the progress of the Catholic faith in the new world, by its own inherent life, is one of the most consoling facts of our age. Macaulay shrewdly remarked that as the ablest and most acute minds had, in all times, lovingly professed that faith, it was hard to see what it had to fear from the progress of so-called knowledge and enlightenment. The world is not likely to be adorned with more sublime genius in the future than in the past, and the noblest specimens of our race, morally and intellectually, have been, as Macaulay observed, devout and exulting Catholics. The peculiar and composite structure of American society, and its local traditions and usages, have been no impediment to the peaceful victories of their holy faith. Sixty years ago the number of Catholics in the two States of New York and New Jersey was only 13,000; at this moment it is 1,500,000. In the year 1800 there was in the whole American Union only one Catholic diocese, one bishop, and fifty priests. There are now eighty-six dioceses, including Apostolic Vicariates, about seventy archbishops and bishops, and more than five thousand priests. Mr. Murray adds: "It is the opinion of many well-informed and thoughtful men that there are between *eight and ten* millions of baptized Catholics in the United States." (p. 316.) However impressive these facts may be, there is one which is still more hopeful and encouraging, and which suggests a deeper motive of gratitude to God for the favours which He has conferred on this youthful but mighty nation. Not only are American Catholics conspicuous for solid virtue, generous enthusiasm, and filial devotion to the Holy See, but these qualities are displayed in an eminent degree by *converts* from every rank and class, and notably those who were fed in their younger days on the sour nutriment of that effete Puritanism which once strove to suppress, by barbarous cruelty, the Catholic religion, but only to succumb, especially in the cradle land of New England, in that unequal combat which the human wages with the Divine. A "liberal" Catholic is as rare in the American Republic as a black swan. They are all, by the teaching of the Holy Spirit, what the slang of the day calls "Ultramontanes,"—i.e., insepa-

rably united with the Vicar of Christ, and in harmony with the mind of the Church. It is this, together with their practical devotion and piety, which is the secret of their triumphs in the past, and the guarantee of their success in the future. We can cordially recommend Mr. Murray's volume to all who wish to see the proofs of the one, and to estimate the prospects of the other.

*Frederic Ozanam, Professor at the Sorbonne: his Life and his Works.*

By KATHLEEN O'MEARA. Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas.

THIS book is the record of the life and work of a man who, "great as a savant and an orator," was still greater as a Christian teacher; a man who, as his biographer says, "fought bravely and in a measure successfully for the moral regeneration of his country:" whose "character and individual experience form a study of deep interest, and are a noble testimony to the power of truth:" who "made it his ideal in an unbelieving and money-loving age, to serve truth for truth's sake." Such is the subject which Miss O'Meara has had before her; and although in some few points we cannot unreservedly follow her, we can honestly praise her book as being, on the whole, one of the best specimens of biography which have of late issued from the English press. In our next number we hope to review it at greater length than is possible to us here. Meanwhile we heartily commend it to our readers, and wish for it the wide circulation it deserves. There are few Catholics who could fail to learn much from it, while to Protestants it would be of the greatest service as offering a living demonstration of the truth which they find it so hard to receive, that (in Ozanam's own words) "a man may be a Catholic and have common sense, that he may love liberty and religion at the same time." It is the almost universal habit of the Protestant press of this country to regard Catholics as being bitterly averse to intellectual cultivation and to political freedom. It is in vain to appeal to the history of the last eighteen hundred years as proving that the Church has ever been the nursing mother of true science, and the founder and guardian of political liberty. That will be admitted, more or less fully, perhaps; but the rejoinder will be made that the question is not what the influence of Catholicism was, but what it is: and that, in point of fact, that influence is now everywhere exerted on behalf of parties connected with outworn political theories, and the institutions of epochs which have passed away. For example, it is not too much to say that the popular conception of French Catholicism in this country is, that it is the ecclesiastical aspect of Legitimism. Of course nothing can be further from the fact. The Church is utterly removed from identification with any political party. With the exception of communism and anarchism\* there is probably no form of

\* We use this word, for want of a better, to express the revolutionary doctrine which, as Godard says, "met le suffrage universel de la multi-

political thought in France, which does not count loyal and devoted Catholics among its adherents. Ozanam himself, one of the most pious and dutiful of the children of the Church, was, in political opinions, a strong Republican, and "viewing the past in the light of the present," did not hesitate to record his conviction that he "saw no remedy for this delirious see-saw game between despotism and communism, but to Christianize the people so that they should be capable of governing themselves, and thus pass effectually and for ever from under the unstable rule of kings" (p. 296). But, observes his biographer, "he judged politics like a Christian philosopher, who held a solid grasp of the great moral principles on which governments and politics should be conducted." "In 1836, he wrote to his friend Lallier, the question which agitates the world to-day is not a question of *political* form, but a *social* question: if it be the struggle of those who have nothing with those who have too much, if it be the violent shock of opulence and poverty which is making the ground tremble under our feet, our duty as Christians is to throw ourselves between these irreconcilable enemies, and to induce one side to give in order to fulfil the law, and the other to receive as a benefit; to make one side cease to exact, and the other to refuse; to render equality as general as is possible amongst men; to make voluntary community of possession replace taxation and forced loans; to make charity accomplish what justice and law can never do" (p. 294). "He adhered," adds Miss O'Meara, "to this political creed all his life." And here, for the present, we must take our leave of this most interesting volume.

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*Elementary Education and the Catholic Poor School Committee.* By the Rev. J. B. ROWE, Priest of the Oratory. (Reprinted from the "Month and Catholic Review," with the permission of the Author.) London: Burns & Oates.

**A**N article which appeared last September in the "Month," reviewing in a clear and comprehensive way the important question of the Catholic position in the Education question, has been rightly judged worthy of republication in pamphlet form. It gives a history of the work proposed and done by the "Catholic Poor School Committee," thereby presenting the strongest argument for its claims to our confidence and support, and describes the present state and needs of our Catholic Schools. The Committee was formed in the year 1847, with the threefold object (1) Of being the organ of communication between the Catholic body and the Government; (2) Of collecting funds for the building and support of schools throughout England and Wales; and (3) Of establishing training colleges in which the art of teaching might be taught to both male and female

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tude au-dessus du droit naturel et du droit divin," (Principes de '89, p. 60), and denies the strict, divinely-imposed, obligation of obedience to the civil ruler.

teachers. How far these objects have been kept in view is fairly well known to most of us, or may be learned from this pamphlet, in which it is ably shown. It may be said that each one of the objects proposed by the Committee to itself has had a history of its own. The most striking fact in connection with the first was the opposition raised in 1857, by many Catholics against "(1) The acceptance of State grants for the building and support of elementary schools, and (2) against the Poor School Committee for having fostered and brought to a successful issue the terms of agreement between ourselves and the Government." The opposition was so great as to threaten paralysis, if not death, to the Committee, and it needed the strength of the ablest and highest in the Catholic body to ward off the danger. The importance of the crisis may be judged from the fact that Father Faber—the last of men to step outside the limits of his own ordinary work—felt it his duty to take part in the controversy. Under the title of "An English Gentleman," he ably defended, in a letter to the *Weekly Register*, the line taken by the Committee in accepting State grants for the building and support of elementary schools, the recognition of Government inspection, and the *status* necessarily implied by Government support and inspection. One sentence is worth preserving as showing the foresight of the writer, although, unless we esteem him a prophet, and a very marvellous one, something must be allowed for mere coincidence. He wrote:—

"The object assigned for our withdrawing our schools from Government inspection is to keep ourselves independent of the State. But is not this the very way to enslave us? Is there not a large party striving after a system of compulsory non-religious national education; and is not this to play into their hands? If we isolate ourselves, we shall have no shelter, and if we have no contract with the State, is it our experience that we are likely to have justice done us? *Is it not almost certain that twenty years will see us Catholics educated compulsorily by the State?*" (p. 13).

The words were written in 1857, and in this year, 1877, the compulsory Act comes into full operation.

The second object which the Committee originally placed before itself has lapsed, or rather has given way to another more fitting present circumstances; and the fact is a tribute to the effect of its work. The grants formerly given for the building and support of schools will now be given—at least in the greater number of dioceses—to furnish salaries and travelling expenses for ecclesiastical inspectors. This is a wise provision, and shows the anxiety of the Catholic School Committee that the religious instruction of our children should be efficiently carried out. We are quite sure that we shall be in accord with the wishes of the Committee, in pointing out that the withdrawal to a certain extent, of direct aid from local work, does not mean decrease of expenditure. As far as our own judgment determines, the expenditure will be considerably increased, while—a very important item to be borne in mind—the Committee becomes responsible for the payment of a large and *definite* sum. In the past the grants to local purposes, such as the building and support of schools, could be proportioned to the subscriptions received during the year; but it is very plain that the Com-



mittee, having determined—with the approval of the Cardinal Archbishop and the majority of the Bishops—to transfer their aid to a system of efficient ecclesiastical examination, must be enabled now to rely on a large annual support. Father Rowe says, “The ecclesiastical inspection, although most important, will also be very costly, and consume, we believe, very nearly, if not quite, half of the present income of the Committee” (p. 21). We have before us the latest “Appeal to the Catholic body from the Poor School Committee,” and find in it some information on this point worthy of our serious attention.

“In the system of co-operation between the Managers of Schools and the Government above described, grants are measured by the efficiency of the Secular instruction only. Our bishops have felt that, by this fact alone, a danger might arise that the due regard to Religious instruction might be impaired. They have thought that the time was come for establishing a system of Religious Inspection. The Committee has willingly followed their guidance in the matter by voting a salary to each inspector so appointed, with grants of honour to teachers whom the Inspector shall name for efficiency in the imparting of Religious Instruction, and books to the pupil-teachers of both sexes, in their several years, for proficiency therein. They have likewise promised special rewards to male pupil-teachers who shall distinguish themselves in the double examinations, Secular and Religious.

“The expenditure to which they have thus pledged themselves cannot yet be accurately calculated; but is sure far to exceed the sum which has hitherto been placed at their disposal annually. They are, therefore, desirous largely to increase the number of their annual subscribers. They submit that the account of the work done by the Committee, since it was created by the Bishops, establishes a claim on their part for the particular support which is indicated by an annual personal subscription on the part of all Catholics who have at heart the education of the working-class, that base of the pyramid of human society. That support they consider that they have as yet but very partially received, since their last published report contains a list of no more than 301 subscribers of £1 and upwards, so that the individual contributions from the whole body of clergy, religious houses and laity in Great Britain reached but the sum of £2,011. 4s. In this not merely the amount subscribed, but the very limited number of those who indicate, by the mode of their support, that they take a personal interest in what is so absolutely vital to education as a supply of efficient teachers, is greatly discouraging.”

The reference made above in the words, “the account of the work done, &c.” will not be understood by those who have not a copy of the “Appeal” before them, unless we mention that a summary of the Committee’s work in establishing training colleges has preceded. The establishment of training colleges, in which the art of teaching should be imparted to both male and female teachers, was recognized from the beginning as a point of vital importance, and was the third object proposed to itself by the Committee. That teaching is an art is a fact that must be recognised, and it cannot be entrusted to the *failures* or the unemployed in other ways of life. It does not always accompany knowledge, nor, though we say it timidly, is it a necessary adjunct—a sort of *gratia gratis data*—to a religious vocation. When other reasons fail, however, it may be well to give prominence to

the fact, that teaching by trained or professed teachers, is a condition for the support given by the Education Department. We quote again from the "Appeal" :—

"The result of our Training work is this, that in our schools in Great Britain, under inspection by the Government, we had 1,435 certificated teachers and 2,012 pupil-teachers in the year 1875.

"What is the meaning of these figures? Their meaning is this—

"When the Committee began its work Catholics had to support the whole cost of Education in such Schools as they possessed. There was no standard of efficiency in Secular instruction in them : there was no body of professed teachers. By the terms of co-operation established by this Committee soon after its foundation between the managers of Schools and the Education Department, very large assistance is now obtained from the Public Educational grant. This is given on condition of certificated teachers being employed after the examination of the scholars, and according to the result obtained. Such examination is the only one, with regard to their efficiency in secular instruction as Schools, which our Schools possess. By means of it a standard of efficiency is set up and maintained. The grant to day and night Schools in Great Britain so obtained in the year ending 31st August, 1875, was £81,058 11s. 2d."

These figures bear eloquent evidence for the work, and the importance of the work, done in the establishment and support of the training colleges ; and that it may be carried on, and yet more efficiently be carried on, the Committee urgently claims increased support. If its case is widely known and thoroughly realized, it will not, we feel sure, appeal in vain. As Father Rowe is careful to point out, the ordinary mission schools have the first claim on us ; and next to them, diocesan institutions, such as industrial and reformatory schools ; but, although in the third place, yet not without a plea of the strongest kind, "the Catholic Poor School Committee may fairly ask all to enable them to continue, and to bring to ever-increasing perfection their great work of training teachers for us, on whom more than upon any other means the future efficiency of our schools really depends" (p. 26). We fear that the withdrawal of local support in order to carry out the system of ecclesiastical inspection, although a wise and beneficial change, will tend to act injuriously on the pecuniary prospects of the Committee : it will be less adverted to. People usually think less of the river's source than of the current that flows by their own doors ; and it will need great efforts to make them feel that it is impossible to have the healthful and vigorous supply of efficient Catholic education which they have at present, unless they encourage efficiency in the source—the training colleges. It is somewhat humiliating, when we reflect on the importance of the work of education at the present time, and for whom the effort is being made—the poor, that is, six out of seven in the whole Catholic population—that the support given the Committee has been only what we have stated above. We trust that the circulation of the "Appeal" will draw attention to the work. Father Rowe's clear and comprehensive pamphlet will certainly aid it ; but we suggest, that if there is a further publication of the pamphlet, its utility will be increased by the addition, in an appendix, of extracts from the Education Bill and Code to which reference is made.

We find that the passage referring to the Education Bill of 1876 (p. 25) as obscure, even to those whose information on questions of education is of an exceptional kind.

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*Albert the Great. His Life and Scholastic Labours.* By Dr. J. SIGHART.  
Translated from the French edition by the Rev. Fr. T. A. DIXON,  
Ord. Præd. London: R. Washbourne. 1876.

A TRANSLATION of Dr. Sighart's *Albertus Magnus* will be welcome in many quarters. The original is a good specimen of German biography, being not only full of facts, but charmingly written. Its defect is, that it is too vague and indiscriminating in its panegyric. Albert the Great was a saintly man, and has been formally beatified; and therefore it is right to praise him. But the facts of his spiritual life, and the reflections founded thereon, would not fill a large book. His name is interesting to students of Church history and of sacred science as that of the immediate predecessor of S. Thomas of Aquin, whom he taught, and to whom he handed over the enormous mass of material which his unwearied labours had gathered together. To define his influence upon the *Summa Theologica*, and to fix his place as a founder and builder of scholastic theology, would be a task of surpassing usefulness. Nothing enlarges the mind on theological matters so effectually as the history of theology. But Dr. Sighart defines very little. He praises the Blessed Albert for his preaching, his Scripture-interpretation, his chemistry, his mechanics, and many other things, quite as loudly as for his studies on Aristotle. Albert the Great is said to have been a great preacher, but we have no real specimens of his sermons; he has left much commentary on Scripture, but it is valueless, except for its mysticism; his knowledge of the natural sciences was prodigious for his day, but it now forms only a chapter of curiosities. But there are still stones of his shaping to be recognized in the great building of scientific theology. No one who had not a first-hand acquaintance with his remains—and a first-hand acquaintance with twenty-one folio volumes cannot be acquired in a day or a year—would be able, briefly and effectually, to tell us where those stones lie.

The present translation has been made from a French version of the German original. It seems ungracious to speak in depreciating terms of a labour which must have cost much time and trouble. But it is a pity that this English life of so great a man is not more worthy of its subject. The translation of the French is, in many places, absolutely wrong. For instance: (p. 104, n.) the words "on trouve encore dans chaque nouveau manuel que l'église a défendu l'étude d'Aristote," is rendered "(finding) in each new manual that the Church upheld the study of Aristotle." A long sentence (p. 119) about Albert's manner of treating moral theology is made nonsense by the words, "(il) ne s'est encore placé sur un terrain aussi difficile . . . que par charité chrétienne," being translated

"he is not placed on such delicate ground, but that he can afford, in his charity," &c. ; (p. 133 n.) "dont l'Allemagne avait offert un exemple de son temps," is "of which the German afforded an example of his own time ;" (p. 297) a maxim which the French calls a "remarquable cachet d'une âme fortement trempée," the English makes out to be "remarkably concealed in," &c. ; (p. 305) a sentence about the Twelve Tables and the Pandects becomes a chaos because these ancient laws, instead of "proving" something which had been asserted ("le font voir") "enable" some people "to see," a word in the nominative case ; (p. 451) Sixtus of Siena, instead of being called a Dominican, is called "a religious preacher ;" (p. 458) "un spirituel panégyriste" is turned into a "spiritual panegyrist ;" and the Society of Artists, who decreed (arrêta) B. Albert a shrine, are stated to have "delayed" it (Appendix, 469). "La critique" is translated "the critic," and, as far as we have observed, "la scholastique" is throughout rendered "the Scholastic," and treated as a gentleman, apparently with some confused notion that it refers to Albert himself. We have noted down some two dozen more such instances, in which F. Dixon has forgotten to look over the MS. of his assistants. In one or two cases the French version is itself to blame. At the top of p. 26 of the English edition we have a description of B. Albert's personal appearance which Dr. Sighart would scarcely acknowledge. A mysterious sentence (p. 15) which attributes to the universities of the Middle Ages the cultivation of the "industrial" sciences, turns out to mean "special" sciences only. The French and the English authorities may dispute the credit of translating "das allgemeine Studium" (studium generale) by "les études générales" and "general studies," respectively. And there is a curious example (not the only one) of the way in which a translation of a translation is apt to diverge from the original. In a note to Chapter I., Dr. Sighart says that, according to Peter of Prussia, Albert, at sixteen years of age, was still at home, and there had *the apparition* of the Blessed Virgin—referring to the celebrated legend related in Chapter III. The French translation carelessly changes *the apparition* into *an apparition*, and so destroys the point of the sentence. The English converter, not seeing any point, has rashly attempted to provide one ; he says, entirely out of his own head, that Albert "was doubtless at that time endowed with a tender love of the Mother of God" (p. 17). To find fault is an unpleasant task, but it is more unpleasant to meet with such unscholarly and clumsy reproductions of good work as we have in this translation. Nevertheless in the absence of anything better, the book is worth reading. In 500 pages there must be a large amount of interesting reading when the subject is Albert the Great. The volume is admirably printed and beautifully got up, and the frontispiece is a valuable engraving of B. Albert's portrait after Fiesole.

*Questions Egypto-Bibliques. Difficultés Géologiques—Difficultés Chronologiques—Difficultés Historiques—L'Exode et ses Suites d'après les Monuments.* Par le R. P. PHILPIN DE RIVIERES, Prêtre de l'Oratoire de Londres. Paris : René Haton, 33, Rue Bonaparte. Librairie des Lieux-Saints, 16, Rue des SS. Peres. London : E. Dillon, 12, Fulham-road, S.W.

SINCE the beginning of this nineteenth century, vast discoveries in matters Egyptological have undoubtedly taken place. The first and hasty use made of these discoveries has been the manufacture of fresh weapons either for or against the Biblical records. With these new weapons, old battles have been fought over again ; and, as might be anticipated from the hurry and impatience, both attack and defence have proved weak or irrelevant, and apologetical studies must accompany the advance of science, correcting errors which more prudence and patience would have averted.

It was natural that the author of "Holy Places," reviewed by us last year, should watch the course of the discoveries made in the land of Egypt ; and it is from an evidently keen interest in the whole subject that he has given these concise and suggestive solutions of the difficulties which make it still a land of darkness to the most indefatigable student. The remoteness of antiquity, and the obscurity of a science which is still in its dawn, have been a cover to tempt forth free-thinkers enough to form another forlorn hope of infidelity ; and we learn with great satisfaction from the talented Father of the Oratory that he has resorted to British arsenals for weapons against these desperadoes of darkness. His use of English masters in Egyptology is not only a valuable compliment to their excellence, but draws attention, we are pleased to think, to another instance of the consolatory fashion in which England is now perpetually making reparation for old wrongs and rectifying old errors. Still, although Father de Rivières' book is a homage to English scientific writers, the working up of materials, the reasoning, the conclusions, are his own, as is the vigorous and sily-sarcastic style in which he indulges when contemplating that character which must ever be funny in the eyes of all Frenchmen—the Briton, soberly superstitious in his worship of The Book, and wildly rationalistic in his disregard of its inspiration.

Father Philpin's *Questions* have been much appreciated in France : here, even more than there, they will be found useful. And we propose to give our readers an account of the work. The discoveries of Mr. George Smith and his recent untimely death have caused throughout the country unusual interest in the whole subject of antiquarian researches.

Our author deals first with the geological difficulties.

It is asserted that thousands of years more than those given by the Bible must have been needed for the formation of the Mokattam table-land near Cairo, and also for the accumulated thickness of the Nile's annual deposits in the Delta.

Father Philpin replies that, according to the most trustworthy geologists,

silicious petrification is a simple and quick process which may be actually witnessed in operation in Iceland and in the Azores. It takes place also in our Lough Neagh, though more slowly on account of the low temperature and the poverty of silicious principles in the waters of that lake. Such might be the history of these Mokattam fossils. Carried away from their native forest by inundations like those of the Mississippi, and deposited at the mouth of the river on submarine sandstone of the tertiary period, the shattered trees have been saturated with silicious waters till the time when they were uplifted on their actual site, together with the substratum on which they are found lying, the first mummies of that land of imperishable sepulchres.

The chronological difficulties are shown by him to rest on a series of assumptions devoid of any great solidity.

Firstly, some falsely imagine the chronological system of the Holy Scriptures to be less elastic than it really is. Usher's opinion, assigning the year of the world 4004 as the date of the birth of our Saviour, was enthusiastically received by the learned of the seventeenth century and was established, like the national religion, by Act of Parliament. But modern science has no right to blame either Scripture or the Church for the strait-waistcoat thus provided for her. The Chronologies, as quoted by the *Art de vérifier les dates*, differ from 3483 to 6984 years, making a discrepancy of 35 centuries. All that we hold for certain is that there are limits either way beyond which scriptural texts may not be strained.

The marvellous Egyptological discoveries of our age have not removed the Royal lists of Manetho from their rank as first among the chronological monuments of the land. Modern science may correct them and reduce them to more modest proportions, but without them we should have no clue in this vast labyrinth where progress and hieroglyphical interpretation are still bewildered by the Sphinx with reckonings and riddles. For instance, in the first dynasties, the length of the reigns would give three kings to a century, which implies an average of years as much too high as the average of other categories is too low, and the differences are too regular to be accounted for as the effect of chance or the work of trickery.

According to our author, the explanation of the average in excess is that Manetho and others before him found themselves in the presence of mortuary monuments which, like official documents, merited some confidence, but they overlooked the fact that the reigns might be simultaneous or overlap each other. Even Eusebius had claimed this simultaneity or parallelism for whole dynasties. We now have evidence that the same thing must be said in individual cases.

How many such blendings occur in the lists? How far do they affect the whole chronology? . . . "To have some idea of this, says our author, let us form a list of all the French monarchs or princes who since 1793 might have been entitled to the royal escutcheon on their tombs. . . . Four Bourbons might be found, half-a-dozen Bonapartes, one Orleans, one Bernadotte, one Orelie—to leave out queens and empresses. Now, if we put together all the years of their more or less nominal or real reigns, we

should have some four or five hundred years instead of the actual eighty-three."

He describes with great spirit a curious instance of simultaneity made known both by the cuneiform cylinders translated by the late Mr. Smith and by the inscriptions on the monuments of a certain Ethiopian king Piankhi, not greatly honoured by the Egyptians and unmentioned by Manetho. Kings and generals, destroyers and deliverers, appear and disappear, reign, are dethroned, and again are reinstated, and doubtless the annalists of Egypt are not very anxious to remember them and the ingloriousness they reveal. He concludes that the chronological difficulty remains, and probably will remain, like many other things, a secret of Providence. *Tradidit Dominus mundum disputationi eorum.* The dispute is not likely to end, but nothing in the course of it has yet been discovered damaging to Biblical statements.

Neither does he admit that astronomy, or the auxiliaries of astronomy, compel any modification of this conclusion. Wherever you find a commentary on the astronomical records or monuments of the Egyptians you see assumption among the elements of the calculations, and so far, therefore, they remain doubtful.

With Dr. Birch and others, F. Philpin reckons among systems founded on assumptions the novel and romantic theory that the Great Pyramid is nothing less than a mysterious monument of natural and supernatural revelations. Its measurements have suggested this idea. And yet even here, between the different dimensions ascribed to it by the learned, there is a discrepancy of more than 60 feet, one-eighth of the whole height, arising from the fact that some measure the actual ruin, others, by guess-work, reconstruct it as they conceive it to have been at first. But this same fact is fatal to the theory. Let us admit fully that Piazzi Smyth was more accurate than any other in making use of the slightest indication which might tell in his favour; nevertheless, his statements rest on ingenious surmises. But can guesses justify him in bringing Melchisedeck to the Pyramid, in affirming that the bricklayers of Cheops were qualified to find the true arc of the meridian, the earth's diameter, the revealed unit of measure, the exact rise of the old polar star  $\alpha$  Draconis, and other points of cosmic or mathematical knowledge? It would be as easy to swallow the Pyramid itself as to believe all this—to believe that any revelations were to be made by means of this gigantic extinguisher, and for no other purpose but the gratification of the conceits of some pedants of our age. An execrable tyrant built it; thousands of poor slaves perished beneath the rod of his overseers. We indignantly reject its pretended revelations.

*Nec Deus intesit, nisi dignus vindice nodus.*

And we agree with our author in considering that the boasted coincidences of these discoverers of marvels prove only the necessary and harmonious connection between the elementary rules of astronomy and physical and mathematical laws.

Piazzi Smyth's system would be as harmless as Jules Verne's scientific



novels, were it not that the sincerity of his religious enthusiasm has carried away his sympathisers, and made them accept as demonstrated truth a whole catena of assertions about the state of science at the beginning of the fourth dynasty.

We will not follow our author in the details of his treatment of the historical difficulties. In his opinion we can hardly expect to find the tale of the oppression of the Hebrews and the disaster of the exodus inscribed on monuments. These are generally used to commemorate glorious deeds. But if direct records of the passing Hebrews are doubtful and scanty, indirect evidences are clear and abundant.

Among other curious investigations of Father Philpin we may select his commentary on the "Speech from the Throne" of Ramses III., which is the gem of the Great Harris Papyrus. It may also serve as a rectification to an interesting page of Rohrbacher, who, when he wrote the first volume of his History, was under the charm of the discoveries and the enthusiasm of the two Champollions. The plausibility of their Biblical adaptations might easily render even him incautious. But it is quite irreconcilable with true Scriptural interpretation, as F. Philpin justly remarks, to hold that Amenophis or Merneptah I., the Pharaoh of the Red Sea, escaped the catastrophe and survived it seventeen years. It is a curious blunder to take Sethos, his successor, for Sesostris the Great, alias Ramses the Great, alias Egyptus. This three-named hero of Rohrbacher is supposed by him to have saved Egypt, and, as if by magic, to have collected armies and overrun Palestine, Scytho-Bactria, and Asia Minor—the Hebrews being huddled away meanwhile in some corner of the Sinaitic desert—and at last to have returned and amused himself "by covering the land with splendid monuments."

. . . *Quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus.*

Rohrbacher forgot the extent and the results both of the Ten Plagues and the Exodus—the entire destruction of vegetation, the death of fishes in the waters and beasts on the land, the losses caused by insects, ulcers, and the slaying of the first-born; the drowning of the whole host and the king in the Red Sea; and, lastly, the withdrawal of the Israelites, of millions, of the entire active and industrious population of the Delta, with their own goods and the spoils of Egypt.

The boastful speech of Ramses III. is in direct evidence against the opinion of Rohrbacher. The king admits, however unwillingly, that his country had been desolated and ruined until his father, Seti-nekt, began the work of regeneration, in which he himself was associated by being raised to a share of the throne, till Seti-nekt "went to rest in his double-dawn," and left him sole monarch. Swarms of Greeks or Dani, Pelasgians, Sardinians, and other seafarers of the Mediterranean throng the Delta. West of Memphis the tribes of Lydia pour in. And until a new generation of Egyptians are grown to manhood and importance, they have to be borne with, and then are dealt with by stirring up their rivalries, and opposing tribe to tribe.

The Nile valley is confessedly now no longer the vast garden, like the

country which Lot beheld, rich and well watered "as the Paradise of the Lord." Ramses III. is fain to boast of the costly tree-planting, with which he strives to make head against the desert sands. He boasts also of driving out the children of the wilderness, the Arab marauders who threaten the very cities, and he claims that, thanks to himself, men, women, and children are again in safety as in the days when Pharaoh's daughter and her maids went without escort to their sports in the waters of the Nile.

Vain boasts! What came of the crafty policy which contrived the mutual destruction of Sardinians and Pelasgians, Kahaks and Lybians? What use were a few thousands of imported trees against the encroaching desert? Is not Gessen the delicious changed into arid gravel or brackish marshes?

His exploits were but the last efforts of Egypt's failing vigour. Henceforth she enters into a phase of decay, to be followed by one of servitude. Soon she will wear the yoke of the Assyrian and the Ethiopian. Then will come the turn of the Persian and the Greek. The prophets of Juda foretell her doom. She is that *gigantic crocodile that is to be drawn out of the midst of his rivers, cast forth into the desert, and given for meat to the beasts of the earth and the fowls of the air*. A few years more and she will be a mere province, plundered by Roman pro-consuls. The Blemongians and the Arab lurk in the horizon, and like vultures watch her agony. Now and then she may give some sign of life, but she lingers on—the last among kingdoms, powerless to protect even her ancient tombs.

Our author concludes—"The priests of Diospolis and Memphis are no longer there, but to those who contend for the shreds of their errors as if for a priceless heirloom, we say: "Look at the Egypt of the Pashas. Has not Holy Scripture truly foretold her condition? . . . Why, then, should the same Scripture err in recording her obscure origin?"

The work of F. Philpin is full of valuable hints and timely suggestions to over-eager Egyptologists. Otherwise, we think that he would say with us of this land of tombs and mummies, this dusthole of an idolstrous antiquity, *Non mortui laudabunt te, Domine*.

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*Lydiate Hall and its Associations.* In Two Parts. Antiquarian and Religious. By the Rev. THOMAS ELLISTON GIBSON, Priest of Our Lady's Church, Lydiate. Printed for the Author by Ballantyne, Hanson, & Co. 1876.

**E**XCEPT to readers who know the district well, or to ardent lovers of antiquity, a local history is generally a very dreary book to read. Mr. Gibson's work on "Lydiate Hall and its Associations," is, however, a very marked exception to this rule, otherwise we should not have noticed it. It possesses, of course, a strong local interest. To the clergy and Catholic gentry of Lancashire it will be a book to read not once but many times. But, apart from this purely local value, it is a work which

deserves a place in Catholic libraries amongst the records of the dark days of the English persecution, for the chapters on the state of religion in Lancashire in the period immediately after the Reformation, contain a large amount of hitherto unpublished information on the conflict in the great northern shire which still claims to be the most Catholic county in England. Originally, it was Mr. Gibson's intention to write only the history of his own district of Lydiate, a village of the Fylde about ten miles from Liverpool, remarkable for its old timber-built Hall and ruined Gothic chapel of St. Katherine; but he soon found that the history of the mission of Lydiate was closely involved in that of the Hall, where the priests resided in the days of persecution, and the development of his subject led him to relate the history of the various families who have possessed the manor,—the Blackburnes, Irelands, Andertons of Lostock, Blundells, and Weld-Blundells, all honoured Catholic names,—and thus he was led to add much to what we possess of the history of Catholicity in Lancashire, drawing for this purpose on the records of the Hall, and the original MSS. and transcripts collected by the late Right Rev. Dr. Goss, for the archives of the new diocese of Liverpool. Mr. Gibson is evidently a skilful antiquary; his beautiful quarto volume of nearly 300 pages is crowded with interesting details on the Catholic families and the missionary priests of Lancashire, and we can answer for it that throughout he is marvellously accurate. That such a work should have been absolutely free from all error would be a miracle. There is a slight mistake in the account of the acquisition of Stonyhurst by the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, as it does not place the generosity of the Weld Family in its true light. The old mansion which now forms the main portion of the college buildings was not purchased by the Jesuits, but received by them as a gift from Mr. Weld. On the building of Stonyhurst Mr. Gibson gives us some very interesting information (p. 146). It was founded by Sir Richard Sherburne, who was one of the commissioners to receive the surrender of monasteries in the reign of Henry VIII., and in the following reign "was employed in collecting for the king's use the spoils of the Chantries, a lesser plunder which had escaped the sacrilegious hands of the father." Doubtless, his private fortune was not decreased by the discharge of these offices, and it is curious to note that this receiver of the spoil of the monasteries was the builder of the future Jesuit college. Under Elizabeth he was on the Ecclesiastical Commission for the North, and often had to sit in judgment on the adherents of the old faith, in which, nevertheless, his children were privately educated. In the reports of 1591, on the conduct of certain justices in Lancashire, given by Mr. Gibson at p. 257, it is noted of Sir Richard that—

"His wief, children and famylie, for the most parte, seldome come to the churche, and never communycate, and some of his daughters married, and not known by whom, but suspected by masse preists; an intelligencer to the Papists of Lancashire, as apperith by a letter lately delivered over to their lordships."

Of similar reports our author gives us a large collection in his second part. They prove that the Government of Elizabeth and her immediate

successors kept a close watch on every family of note in Lancashire from year to year. In many cases the head of the family affected conformity to save his estate, while his family remained secretly Catholic; but nobler-minded men refused to thus play fast and loose with their faith, and their names appear in the most honourable place—namely, in the lists of recusants who are suspected of harbouring “seminaries and Jesuits,” and are accordingly to be punished with fines or forfeiture. Many of these fine old Lancashire houses gave martyrs and confessors to the faith. Amongst them is the well-known name of Richard Blundell, who died in Lancaster Castle, a prisoner for the faith, having been committed for receiving into his house at Crosby, a seminary priest. In the reports of 1592 we have a long list of families in Lancashire who employed as the tutors of their children recusants, who were at times priests, who in this way obtained a fixed residence in the midst of their missionary district. In the following year we have warrants for the arrest of fourteen Catholic gentlemen and three ladies, and year after year come lists of fines and contributions to be exacted from their co-religionists; again, we have lists of priests with the places which they visit, and the names of the informers. The system of espionage seems to have been perfect, but very often the warrants issued on this information remained unexecuted, and we remark in the reports of the commissioners frequent complaints of the remissness displayed by the Lancashire justices in putting into force the laws against recusants. That they should often be negligent in this respect was only natural. Few of them cared to assist in persecuting and gradually impoverishing their Catholic neighbours, especially as very often their wives and children were Catholics, and all their own sympathies were for the faith they had not the manly courage to profess themselves. Amongst those who were active in the pursuit of recusants were Sherburne, and Henry Stanley, Earl of Derby. Mr. Gibson gives us (p. 231, *et seq.*) a transcript of the Earl’s report to Walsingham on the arrest and examination of “Sir Jeames Stonnes, Priest, otherwyse called Unkle Jeames,” in November, 1585. The record is a touching one. Derby had heard of this “old massinge prieste,” and “laide dyligente waite for hym and such lyke badd fellows of his blinde profession,” and on the information of one of his spies he seized him late one night in a poor man’s house, “together with his massinge attire whereof he was thorowly furnished.” On his examination it was found that he was 72 years of age, and “neither Jhesuite nor Seminaire,” but ordained forty-six years before by Tunstall, Bishop of Durham, in the reign of Henry VIII. He was, in fact, one of the last of the old English clergy. The schedule of the “massinge attire” found with him runs as follows:—

“Imprimis, An Albe. Item, A Serplesse or Amesse. It. A girdle of Thread. It. A Vestmente. It. A Stoele. It. A phannell. It. A corpus and a corpus case. It. A Supalter. It. A Challis of Tine and a cover. It. Three little Pewter Boxes in a lether casse for oyle and creme (chrism). It. One Crewete. It. two little pewter bottles for wyne. It. two little boxes for singinge bread. It. three Crucifixes. It. One Agnus Dei. It. A porthouse with the Pope’s name in the Callender

in many places. It. A pece of an owld prymer in p'chmente. It. A pece of an owld boocke of sermoundes. It. an owld Masse Boocke."

"This intrepid confessor of Christ," says our author, "who had witnessed the ruin of monasteries, the destruction of all that was holy in churches, and the defection of so many from Catholic unity, remained faithful in the midst of a perverse generation. Persecuted and hunted from place to place, he wanders about, dwelling with the very poor, and carrying with him his sole earthly treasure—his chalice of tin, his single vestment, the old Masse book, and the pewter oil-stocks."

With all this persecution the people stood firm—the old faith was so rooted in their lives that for many years custom, if nothing else, kept many of them Catholics. In 1574 the Vicar of Preston complained bitterly that his congregation were papists so accustomed to receive the Catholic communion that they opened their mouths when they came to take the Sacrament from him, and about the same time the Bishop of Carlisle reported of Lancashire—"On all hands the people fall from religion, revolte to poperie, refuse to come at church, the wicked popishe preests reconcile them to the church of rome, and cause them to abjure this Christ's religion."

We might quote much more, but this must suffice to show the scope and interest of Mr. Gibson's work. Externally it is a handsome quarto, well bound, and well illustrated; a book that will be as welcome to the drawing-room table, as to the bookshelves of a library.

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*Spiritualism, and Allied Causes and Conditions of Nervous Derangement.*

By WILLIAM A. HAMMOND, Professor of Diseases of the Mind and Nervous System in the Medical Department of the University of New York, &c. London: E. K. Lewis. 1876.

DR. HAMMOND is an American physician of considerable repute, a pupil, the present writer believes, of M. Charcot. He is, like his master, known especially with reference to diseases of the nervous system, on which he has published a substantial and very excellent treatise, enriched by many personal observations. He appears, however, to be a materialist; and like other of the pupils of Charcot, he has undertaken to apply his physiological and pathological knowledge to the explanation of alleged preternatural and miraculous occurrences. Taking the phenomena of spiritualism for the occasion of writing, he includes in the subject-matter of the book at the head of this notice an indiscriminate multitude of other phenomena, which he refers to the same causes—trickery, disease, and over-credulity. The detection of trickery, however, and the investigation of over-credulity are beyond the province of the physician as such; and as, among the phenomena to which we have referred, Dr. Hammond includes, without much discrimination, a multitude of facts in ecclesiastical history, such as real or supposed miracles, ecstasies, visions, revelations, stigmatizations, &c., his book has an interest for, and may be expected to have an influence

with, a wider than the purely scientific public. It is for this reason that we notice it.

It is one of the common-places of Mystical Theology that there may be, and have often been, purely natural ecstasies, visions, strange effects of mental or bodily states, and the like ; so that no properly-instructed Catholic will be puzzled—he will not even be surprised—at meeting with examples of these curious classes of phenomena. The contented, because profound, ignorance of non-Catholic writers, who imagine that they and theirs have for the first time recognized and seriously investigated such phenomena as natural ecstasy, is something almost ludicrously curious to witness. At the same time it will be admitted on all hands that the new start which Mental Physiology and Pathology has taken since the time of Pinel and Esquirol, under the guidance of improved methods of investigation and the greater knowledge which has been acquired, especially of hysteria and cognate diseases, has added very largely to the store of facts and principles by aid of which the study of the borderland of the supernatural may be undertaken. There is, therefore, abundant room for a work on the subject on which Dr. Hammond has applied himself to write. Of the three causes of delusion which he enumerates, human credulity neither increases nor decreases to any considerable extent ; it only changes its venue. The power of deceiving increases with the advance of knowledge, which furnishes additional means of deceit. But where older writers were able to say only that such or such a phenomenon was the result of disease, without being able to specify the disease, or to say how and under what circumstances it would produce this effect, a competent writer of the present day would often be in a position to fill in these details ; where they had to hesitate in determining whether the powers of nature could or could not produce this or that result, he would be better able to decide the question ; and, speaking in the language of the age, would have a greater chance of being appreciated and consequently attended to.

The writer of such a work would have to unite two fundamental characteristics : he would have to be fair, and he would have to be thorough. When any one presents us with a treatise evaluating the evidence for or against a given conclusion, derivable from facts which he has made the subject of close and minute examination, what we want to know from him is, *how these facts tell* ; and we want their bearings, and *not* the bearings of something else on which we probably consider ourselves as competent as the author to pronounce a judgment, reasoned out and exhibited in detail. Whether we agree with the author's general opinions or not, it is an impertinence in him to colour his interpretations of his facts by them. Everybody knows how people's general opinions colour their facts ; nobody needs to read a quasi-scientific treatise to find that out. It is the author's business to show how far certain facts are the consequences of certain specified diseases, of specified and proved physiological laws, of given appliances of deception, or of human credulity such as *de facto* exists, and acting under known laws of human nature. To supplement these by idle conjectures, or by one's own personal opinions, is merely special pleading, and ought to be rigidly treated as such. Again : he must be thorough.



He must not be afraid either of technicalities or of polysyllables. Popular expositions are too often the *opprobria* of science ; they resemble an attempt to give an elegant curve to a straight line. Now the adverse criticisms we have to make on Dr. Hammond's book are that it is certainly not thorough, and that it is certainly not fair. For instance, our author undertakes (p. 105, sqq.) to explain the results of the experiments made by Mr. Crooks with Mr. Home. Now, whether these results can be explained or not is another matter ; what is quite certain is, that Dr. Hammond's explanation is ridiculously *mal-à-propos*. Mr. Home apparently depressed the indicator of a spring balance by placing his hands *on* a part of a lever attached to the balance, but not nearer to the balance than the fulcrum was.

Dr. Hammond's explanation consists of two parts. In the first he gives a number of instances in which bodies were made to appear heavier than they were in reality, by influencing the imaginations of the persons who were set to lift them. It is scarcely necessary to inform the reader that an attempt to work on the imagination of a spring balance would scarcely have been attended with positive results. This part of the explanation not being *ad rem*,—and, in fact, tending only to confound things different—the second part consists of a description of the results obtained by Dr. Hammond himself with an apparatus in which a much more delicate spring balance was connected with a lath having its fulcrum in the middle. Having charged himself with electricity—he appears to be one of those persons in whom large evolution of electricity takes place—he found that when his finger was approximated to the lever thus formed, either *under* the part nearer the balance, or *over* the part further from it than the fulcrum, the lath was attracted by the finger, and the balance was consequently depressed. This was, of course, precisely what might have been expected, —what, in fact, would certainly happen if the electrical state of finger and balance differed. The puerile nature of the experiment speaks volumes against the thoroughness of the book. The treatment of the alleged apparition of the Blessed Virgin at Lourdes, and of the subsequent cures, is another example of the same defect. Two clever remarks are made :—"As to Bernadette, let the reader recall the circumstances under which she first saw the vision. (1.) She was stooping down in the act of taking off her stockings. The position was one calculated to accelerate the flow of blood to her brain, and to retard its return. A temporary cerebral congestion was \*thus induced, a condition particularly favourable to the production of hallucinations, as has been already pointed out. (2.) The roaring sound in the ears when there was no wind, was\* also the result of the augmented flow of blood in the cerebral vessels" (p. 316). Dr. Hammond might have added that the apparition seems to have been used gradually to develop itself out of a general luminosity,† and that some doubt is left by M. Las-

\* "Might have been," the author ought to have written, instead of "was." The choice of the "was" is one of those little tricks of style which indicate special pleading to a reader who keeps his eyes open.

† "When the vision takes place," M. Lasserre quotes Bernadette as saying, "I behold the light at first and then the 'Lady' ; when the vision ceases, it is the 'Lady' who disappears first and the light afterwards."



serre's account as to the precise character of the first visions.\* In fact, if the visions at the grotto had stood alone, the more reserved part of the inhabitants of Lourdes would probably have remained of the opinion of the father and mother of Barnadette, that they were "the imaginations," or rather hallucinations, "of a little girl." What would have struck an impartial investigator as at least an exceedingly odd coincidence, was the appearance in the grotto of a fountain pouring forth, if M. Lasserre is to be believed, upwards of one hundred thousand litres a day, while such an investigator would at once perceive that the subsequent cures, effected by the non-medicinal waters of this fountain, were the central point of the whole inquiry, and would consequently direct to them his chief attention. Some of them are described by M. Lasserre; they include his own case; the restoration of an organically-injured eye† (Bourriette's case); the sudden healing of a scrofulous ulcer, with concomitant removal of glandular obstructions (Busquet's case); and many others.‡ Now what, under these circumstances, is the position taken up by Dr. Hammond? It is this very characteristic attitude:—He expends his arguments chiefly on the question of the ecstasy. On the appearance of the fountain he says nothing whatever; so that any one who knew of Lourdes only from reading his book would suppose that it had always existed.‡ The cures are shuffled over in these words:—"That thousands have been cured by the water of Lourdes admits of no doubt. Such facts are, however, only another group to be added to those embracing the results of the royal touch, the powder of sympathy, the metallic tractors, mesmerism, the acts of the Zouave Jacob, and of Dr. Newton, and the bread pills and coloured water, which, when taken in faith, are fully as miraculous as the water of Lourdes." Are they? This is precisely what a fairly-minded person, who took an interest in the subject, would want to see either proved or disproved by an intelligent comparison of the cases. And here, in the very central point of the whole question, Dr. Hammond entirely and unexpectedly fails him. A circumstance which indicates a certain amount of forgetfulness on the part of Dr. Hammond as to the asserted parallel instances is that, on turning back to the chapter§ in which the royal touch, &c., are discussed, the reader will find no instance of cure, and a certain amount of evidence of its inefficacy; a single instance of the effects of Digby's treatment, which can be explained partly by coincidence, and partly as the result of the simpler applications made to the wound; no instance of cure by the metallic tractors, the Zouave Jacob, bread pills, or coloured water; while the instances of healing by mesmerism are, with three exceptions, exclusively of nervous disorders. The three exceptions are—(1) the case of Harriet Martineau's cow, which was probably partly coincidence and

\* This, however, may be denied. Let the reader carefully examine "Our Lady of Lourdes," by Lasserre, book i, 9—11.

† It would have been more satisfactory if the ophthalmoscope had been used in the eye cases. The word "amaurosis," also, used in describing the nature of the malady, is extremely vague.

‡ Pp. 312—314.

§ "Curing Mediums," pp. 141—180.

partly due to the calming powers of hypnotism ; (2) a case of "excruciating rheumatism," which is only a *doubtful* exception, as the pain may, for anything that is stated to the contrary, really have had a neurotic cause ; and (3) a case of polypus, where Dr. Hammond, on symptomatic grounds, thinks there was a failure of diagnosis. When we say that no cures by bread pills, &c., are reported, we do not mean to imply that bread pills and the like are incapable of effecting apparent and temporary, or even in some cases, real and permanent cures ; but an adequate exposition of the cases would have shown *what kind of maladies* they are capable of removing, and would thus have given a standard for comparison with the effects produced by the asserted preternatural or supernatural—a standard which, under the author's confused and inadequate method of treatment, is almost entirely wanting. Neither in implying that a contrast would certainly be found by an unbiassed investigator to exist between the phenomena producible by merely natural, and those due to other than natural causes, do we intend to imply that natural causes would not be found conjoined with the ultra-natural. Persons whose ailments were of hysterical origin would equally present themselves at Lourdes, whether or not a miraculous power were manifested there ; and that they presented themselves and were cured by natural causes would, therefore, afford no presumption against the hypothesis of miracle in other instances. The same bodily changes produced by emotion or concentration of thought, resulting from natural causes, might be expected to accompany emotion or concentration due to other influences. It is quite possible that a more sensitive constitution of the nervous system, while it predisposes on the one hand to natural visions and ecstasies, may also, on the other hand, render the subject of it more susceptible to the finer and more delicate influences which come from the unseen world.

Another fault in Dr. Hammond's book is his extreme and unwarrantable exaggeration of so-called parallel instances. Of this the following passage, in the context of which he is contending that the pretended supernatural or preternatural may be to a large extent explained by conjuring and sleight of hand, affords an example :—

In the way of conjuring, nothing can exceed the skill of the East Indian jugglers, some of whom have recently been giving the Prince of Wales exhibitions of their powers. Two hundred and fifty years ago, if we may believe the accounts which have come down to us, they were even more expert than now. Thus Sir Thomas Rowe, who visited India in 1615, charged with a mission from the East-India Company to the emperor Jehangire, saw many magical performances, but his time and attention being otherwise occupied, he gave little heed to such matters. But the emperor relates that he once witnessed the feats of some Bengalese conjurers and jugglers, the astonishing character of which throws the performances of Mr. Home and all other accomplished mediums in the shade. . . . One night, continues Jehangire, and in the very middle of the night, when half the globe was wrapped in darkness, one of these seven men stripped himself almost naked, and having spun himself round several times, took a sheet, with which he covered himself, and from beneath the sheet drew out a splendid mirror, by the radiance of which a light so powerful was pro-

duced as to illuminate the hemisphere to an incredible distance around ; to such a distance indeed, that we have the attestation of travellers to the fact, who declare that on the night on which the exhibition took place, and at the distance of ten days' journey, they saw the atmosphere so powerfully illuminated as to exceed the brightness of the brightest day they had ever seen. . . . They produced a chain fifty cubits in length, and in my presence threw one end of it towards the sky, where it remained as if fastened to something in the air. A dog was then brought forward, and being placed at the lower end of the chain, immediately ran up it, and reaching the other end, disappeared in the air. In the same manner a hog, a panther, a lion, and a tiger were successively sent up the chain, and all disappeared at the upper end. At last they took down the chain, and put it into a bag ; no one ever discovering in what way the animals were made to vanish into the air in the mysterious manner described (pp. 45—48).

Now, if Dr. Hammond does not believe these phenomena to have occurred (the supposition that he believes them to have occurred, but not by natural causes, may be dismissed), he cannot cite them as parallel to those experienced by persons present at Home's séances, to the raising of the bodies of saints from the ground, &c. ; and if he does believe them to have occurred, and as the result of natural causes, he certainly much exaggerates the effects which such causes are capable of producing.

With these observations we take our leave of Dr. Hammond's "Spiritualism." The reader will find in it an interesting and very full collection of facts, and much valuable information with respect to the influence of imagination and expectant attention, and with respect to hallucinations hysteria, and the hysteroid affections ; but he will discover that there is not a little inaccuracy and mis-statement ; and that scarcely anything is sifted to the bottom.

*The Science of the Spiritual Life.* By FATHER FRANCIS NEUMAYR, of the Society of Jesus. London : Burns & Oates. 1876.

WE can hardly bring ourselves to say anything that may seem to detract from the value of this useful work ; and, therefore, what we must say of that kind we shall say at first and quickly. The preface, which was written evidently to be read, and as introductory to the rest of the work, contains almost all the blemishes that strike us, and, if it did not seem to us in one part somewhat misleading, we should shut our eyes to its existence. It reads somewhat pretentiously, and, in aiming to carry out the idea of ascetical theology being a science, unduly strains the subject. Ascetical theology is a "supernatural science, which leads the soul to the highest perfection of which it is capable in this life" ; it forms the saint ; and hence is the *Science of the Saints* or the *Art of Holiness*. So far our intelligence goes with the author ; but when he proceeds to distinguish between "the principal *finis cui*" (the will, not the understanding), "the *objectum materiale*" (every power of the soul), "the *objectum formale*" (the supernatural perfectibility of the powers of the

soul), and "the *objectum attributionis*," or *finis qui* (the end, that is, perfection itself), we believe, on consideration, we understand him (although many of the readers, for whom the book is intended will not), but the well-known words of St. Ambrose rise up in our minds, "Non in dialecticâ complacuit Deo saluum facere populum suum." We are very conscious of the importance of clear and precise definitions, for there are a few that we have been vainly seeking in spiritual works for years ; but we think that the examples given above, show a torturing almost of the subject to a Procrustean bed of scientific form, that is not to be admired. If the rest of the work had been written with the same ruthlessness of scientific precision, and without an appreciation of the many delicate powers and senses and feelings which, coming under the term "human nature," logic knows nothing of, the "Science of the Spiritual Life" would not be the excellent manual it is. In the body of the work the "scientific" element behaves itself, and hardly breaks out more than once. It may serve as an occasion for some good souls to make an act of mortification and pass on as they read,—“The heathens themselves were ashamed of such unbecomingness (‘acting from impulse’) and considered such an one to have in him more of the *genus* than of the *differentia* of the definition of a man” (p. 53).

Any blemishes we have observed are, with the one exception, *in limine*. The little volume is an excellent manual of ascetical theology admirably thought out and vigorously expressed. It contains no more than a hundred pages, of which, seven treat of general principles of the spiritual life ; the last two explain briefly, as may be judged, the beginning, progress, and end of the "Unitive way" ; leaving the main part of the treatise equally divided between the principles of the purgative and illuminative ways. We commend the study of this latter part—"Principles of the Illuminative Way"—to all who seek a knowledge of the questions falling under it. Confessors may find it useful. It demands a very slight knowledge of ascetical theology—indeed an ordinary acquaintance with moral theology will suffice—to understand the state and wants of one ordinarily termed a "sinner" ; plain evils burden the conscience ; a rank growth that must be cut and burnt down. But, when mortal and habitual venial sin have disappeared, a higher knowledge and skill is demanded for the cultivation and development in the soul of that piety of which the soul is indefinitely capable. It is a very inadequate conception of the spiritual life that apprehends it merely, as freedom from sin, although in practice that may be oftentimes with difficulty attained ; there is a limited range of perfection beyond. God did not create man *not* to sin as the end of his existence, but for a *positive* purpose of giving Him glory by a supernatural life and by a constant growth in holiness. It is evidently no accidental part of a director's office to help a soul in this positive aim of its existence. We are sure that careful study of this part of the "Science of the Spiritual Life"—for instance, *To live by Faith, To do with Affection what is done by Faith, Rules for praying well*—will be found of great use. We shall not say that the work is as valuable to ordinary readers, or, as the author puts it, to "those candidates for perfection who are without a director," as it is

to those who have some acquaintance with the subject. To such candidates we should say, "Find a director, if possible," and it is rarely that it would be impossible. But its utility is unquestionable for those who have the power and knowledge to develop the principles, and to fill up from other sources the outlines, which are given. We may add that the size of the manual is no test of its value. Although a large subject is treated of in a very small compass, it is well called "a synopsis of ascetical theology." The sentences are short and vigorous; the ideas very suggestively expressed; and the drift of an argument, or the force of an illustration, so strikingly shown by a judicious use of *italics*, that the reader finds himself thinking, evolving, and mentally emphasising as he peruses. Any extract we give from the work will be a sample of the whole. The following is under *Rules for Labouring well* :—

"At the appointed time—*Rise, resolutely, quickly, devoutly. Resolutely* without excuses, such as, '*It is cold; I couldn't sleep; I do not feel well.*' These are frivolous: if any sort of excuse is to be adopted, nothing will ever be well done. *At the time of rising be not slack* (Eccles. xxxii. 15). A slight good action merits great praise through constancy; the body is like an idle servant, whom we do not readily believe. *Rise!* If, afterwards you find that you are really unwell, then go back to bed; and thus you will take care both of body and soul, and you will learn not rashly to change your purpose, like those who vary with the moon.

*Quickly*, without delay. *Now is the time to rise from sleep.* Therefore imagine yourself called like Peter. *Rise up quickly!* or, like Lazarus, *Come forth!* For your bed is a prison, wherein you are bound; and it matters little whether it be death, or the brother of death that keeps you in the sepulchre.

*Devoutly*, with a good determination, as though coming again out of nothing, and having this day alone to live; or as though this day were to be the first and last of your life, like the day of a flower. If the first day, how fervently would you act; if the last, how cautiously! Do what you may believe Adam did when just created. Give thanks, offer yourself up, pray. I do not give you any method for your morning prayer, you have used one from your childhood. But one thing I advise—use it with *pauses*, like the little birds. So will you pray devoutly" (p. 73).

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*Les Esclaves Chrétiens depuis les premiers temps de l'Eglise jusqu'à la fin de la domination Romaine en Occident.* Par PAUL ALLARD. Paris : Didier et Cie. 1876.

THE gradual abolition of slavery and serfdom under the influence of the Church has always been a favourite subject with Christian students of history. In recent years it has been fully treated by more than one eminent writer, and the works of Wallon, Yanoski, Cochin, Moehler, Edouard Biot, and Mgr. Pavy might be said to have exhausted the subject, were it not that error is Protean in its forms, and that even the best-established results of historical research are being daily assailed by a school whose first object it is to eliminate all that is not of the earth earthy

from the history of mankind. Amongst the leaders of this school in France is M. Havet, who in his brilliant work on "*Le Christianisme et ses Origines*," has boldly maintained that the idea that to Christianity and to the Church belongs the honour of having been the chief agent in the abolition of slavery "is the most striking example of the erroneous theories with which believers delude themselves." Slavery, he alleges, flourished as freely when the Roman world was Christian as in the days of its darkest heathenism ; and its abolition he attributes to other agencies—to free thought, to human progress, and to rationalistic enlightenment. To M. Havet's strictures upon the received account of the Church's position with regard to slavery, we owe this work of M. Allard. It may be fairly ranked with those of his predecessors in the same branch of historical research. It is a handbook of the subject. He traces for us a fearful picture of Roman slavery ; then he gives us the history of the Church's action in procuring its gradual abolition, and in substituting free for servile labour. The work extends to a period of about one hundred years after the downfall of the Empire of the West, and thus we have in M. Allard's pages a succinct view of the various phases of Roman society during more than seven hundred eventful years.

It is difficult for us to realize what Pagan Rome must have been in the days of her Imperial power. Looked at from without, what could be more glorious than this city, of which her poets sang, with no empty boast, that the sun in his daily round saw nothing greater than Rome !\* A city of palaces and temples, she was the mistress of the world, her sword had imposed peace upon the nations, and while she raised them to her own level of culture and material prosperity, she held back with her strong arm the barbarian tide that ever threatened to overwhelm them. But beneath this external greatness, concealed as it were by the beauty of the surface, lay a mass of misery and corruption such as probably is now nowhere to be seen on earth. Never was vice organized to such a hideous perfection, never was there a social system which inflicted such widespread misery on all below a certain level, and so fearfully demoralized all above it; and the source and centre of this misery and corruption was Pagan slavery—destined to give place in the course of four centuries to Christian liberty. The free population of Rome was a minority compared to the multitude of slaves in the days of the Empire. A rich man's house was inhabited by an army of men, women, and children, whom he counted as much his property as his horses ; free labour was almost unknown ; every trade was carried on by bands of slaves ; physicians, notaries, accountants were for the most part the slaves of men who allowed them to exercise their professions on sharing their earnings ; even the civil service of the State was largely in servile hands. Labour had become to such an extent the work of the slave, that the poor freeman or freewoman was driven out of

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\* *Alme sol, curru nitido diem qui  
Promis et celas, aliusque et idem  
Nascere possis nihil urbe Roma  
Visere majus.*



the market. To the poor, therefore, the chief employments were those which ministered to the vicious pleasures of the rich : they became comedians, gladiators, dancers ; and a worse fate still awaited the women. The wealthy Roman lived in an atmosphere of slavery from his birth to his death ; the nurse, the schoolmaster, were slaves ; slaves waited upon him, each fulfilling his office, one offering the wine-cup, another washing his hands, another assisting him at the bath, another trimming his lamp ; for labour was so far divided that the life of the slave was often not one of healthful industry, but of idleness, interrupted from time to time by some trifling task. But the least failing in that task was severely punished ; an accidental stumble, a word spoken in the presence of a guest, an impatient look, might doom the slave to the scourge or cross. Cruelty was deeply ingrained in the Roman character. Even ladies would stab their attendants or hand them over to the torturer and the executioner, for a moment's carelessness. Marriage amongst the slaves was seldom permitted, the unions between man and wife could not exist when it was being continually broken, as the master exchanged or sold some of his slaves. The slave had no property in his children, it rested with the master or mistress to decide whether they should be allowed to live, and whether they should be kept or sold. That the slave should refuse to sacrifice his or her virtue at the bidding of master or mistress was undreamed of. To a superficial survey, it would seem that the Roman law protected the purity of the wives and daughters of its citizens by the *Lex Julia*, but it applied neither to the slave nor to the freedwoman. It was a hypocritical, selfish enactment, which left these poor wretches at the mercy of unbridled Pagan passions, till the name of *libertina* became a word of reproach. As for the women slaves, we cannot even refer to the hideous traffic in which men of the first families of Rome were often openly engaged. M. Allard deals with this dark part of his subject at some length ; it is necessary to the completion of his argument, and he treats it in a judicial spirit. Much he refuses to do more than refer to, yet even what he is obliged to say presents a picture of unblushing, systematic vice, forming, we may almost say, the life of a nation ; so that his study of Roman slavery is a work indispensable to the student of the subject, but not a book for the general reader.

In the country was found another class of slaves, who tilled the lands of their masters. The free peasantry had become almost extinct ; whole provinces were parcelled out among a few proprietors. Italy was inhabited by two classes of men—the slaves and the freemen. Seventy years before the Christian era the gladiator Spartacus, at the head of 120,000 slaves, had shaken the power of Rome. It was only a system of terror that kept the immense servile population in subjection. If a master was assassinated, every slave in his household was doomed to death, unless it could be shown that, not only had they had no part in his murder, but that they had endeavoured to protect him at the peril of their lives. In A.D. 61 the prefect of Rome, Petronius Secundus, was slain by one of his slaves. The matter was discussed in the Senate. *Colluviem istam non nisi metu coercueris*, "only by terror can you hold down this mass of men," said



one of the orators. The law was enforced. The 400 slaves of Petronius were executed, probably by the lash and the cross.

To break up this system some external power was needed, and this was a portion of the mission of Christianity. The day came when, to the astonishment of their pagan masters, slaves refused to share in the worship of the gods, or to minister to the vices of their owners, and among these slaves a host of valiant men and women (many of whose names are now inscribed in the martyrologies of the Church) became the martyrs of faith or of chastity. It was Christianity first gave to the slave the power of saying *No*, that told him his soul and body were his own, that he owed his master only faithful service in all lawful things; and thus the Church began the work of emancipation. In this great work there were two well-marked stages. First the emancipation of the person of the slave, then the organization of free labour. Under the influence of the Church the slave gradually ceased to be a mere chattel. From the very outset he was endowed with equal rights with the freeman within the walls of chapel and basilica; in civil society he received them gradually. From the first the Church asserted the principle of freedom; she could not, however, have enforced its adoption at once; it had to be done by degrees. Any precipitate attempt in this matter would have produced a servile rebellion more formidable than that of Spartacus. The emancipation of the slave was effected at once in the Church, but in civil society it was the work of time under the Church's influence.

"The barriers," says M. Allard, "which everywhere else separated the slave from the freeman, did not exist in the Church. There was but one baptism, *unum baptisma*, by which both were admitted to the same name and the same rank. Religious instruction was given to them without distinction of persons. The sacred mysteries were celebrated for all alike. The slave knelt, like his master, to receive the Eucharist, and sat with him at the table of the *agape*, and in the Christian cemetery slave and freeman were buried side by side in tombs of the same kind."

More than this, in the Church the slave held often a higher rank than the master. The baptized slave witnessed the sacred mysteries from which the master, if still a catechumen, retired. Slaves were even raised to the priesthood. The Church boldly placed itself in opposition to human law, and set the sacramental seal of marriage on those unions of slaves which the State refused to recognize. In the days of persecution the slaves proved themselves worthy of the Christian name. They poured forth their blood as lavishly as the freemen in the arena of martyrdom, and as the anniversaries of their triumph came round, bond and freeman knelt together while the mass was said upon the altar-tomb of the martyr-slave. Throughout, the Church encouraged the emancipation of the slave. It was held up as an act of virtue to be performed in thanksgiving for the divine favours, in atonement for sin, or in suffrage for the faithful departed. It was a common thing for a dying man to free all his slaves, and not unfrequently men did so during life, and thus voluntarily deprived themselves of the most valuable portion of their property. At the same time the Church proclaimed the dignity of labour, its obligation on

all men, the example of Jesus Christ, who had sanctified it. Men began to understand that there was no disgrace in toil, and as the number of freemen increased, free labour became a possibility. From the date of the conversion of Constantine we have a series of edicts published by the emperors, which, beginning by securing humane treatment for the slave, and facilitating his emancipation, ended by practically putting an end to lavery in the cities. All these edicts were inspired by Christianity, many of them were published at the request of provincial synods, or addressed to the bishops. Under Justinian this legislation reached its highest development, and his laws and those of Theodosius were not only obeyed within the limits of the empire, but were accepted as the basis of their legislation by provinces then in the hands of the barbarians. Undoubtedly the barbarian invasion had much to do in destroying the last remains of slavery, but the system was already broken up by the Church. For some centuries serfdom prevailed in the country districts. But the position of the serf was superior to that of the slave. He owed his master his labour, but he could not be sold, exchanged, or separated from the estate to which he was attached; and thus he had a fixed home and a family, and enjoyed privileges of which the "country slaves" of Roman days knew nothing. Serfdom, in its turn, disappeared in the break-up of the feudal system; but the serf and the slave could never have been classed together, and slavery had disappeared from the Roman world by the end of the sixteenth century. No edict proclaimed the downfall of slavery, but under the influence of Christianity the slave saw his lot gradually ameliorated and the way to freedom opened to him, till slavery became a thing of the pagan past.

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## ROMAN DOCUMENT.

[We take from the "Tablet" the following translation of an important Pontifical Letter]:—

### PIUS PP. IX.

"Venerable Brother, health and Apostolic Benediction.

"We have learnt with the greatest satisfaction, Venerable Brother, that you had already disapproved the conduct which We Ourselves subsequently thought it Our duty to blame; and although We well know that the peculiar circumstances arising from the laws, the times, and the discussions on religion introduced into public assemblies have made a beaten track to error, yet We have judged it useful to warn those that have been led astray whenever a favourable opportunity might offer.

"But what is still more grievous to Us is the report that reaches Our ears concerning certain priests of the German clergy, who, after having deferred for a long time to make their public adhesion to the dogmatic Definition of the Œcumenical Council of the Vatican touching the infallible *magisterium* of the Roman Pontiff, have at last made profession of their acceptance of it, but have at the same time declared either that they took that step because they saw that those of the German Bishops who had maintained the opposite opinion in the Council had accepted the Definition, or else because they admitted the truth of the dogma as defined, but without admitting the opportuneness of the Definition.

"Now, as the Definitions of General Councils are infallible because they emanate from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who assists the Church according to the promise of Jesus Christ, they cannot but teach the truth; but the truth they teach does not derive either its force or its character from the assent of men; much more does it, inasmuch as it proceeds from God, require a full, entire, and unconditional assent. And assuredly no heresy down to the present time could ever have been effectually condemned if the faithful had been allowed, before submitting to the Definition of the truth, to await the assent of those who had opposed such definition, and found themselves condemned by it.

"This doctrine, which is the same for the definitions of Œcumenical Councils as for the definitions of Sovereign Pontiffs, was clearly formulated by the Council of the Vatican, when it taught, at the termination of its Definition, that 'The Definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable in themselves, and not in virtue of the Church's consent thereto.'

"But it is even more absurd to accept the Definition and to persist, notwithstanding, in holding it to have been inopportune. Certainly the vicissitudes of the present age, the errors, which are as numerous as all

those which have ever existed, and the fresh errors which hell daily vomits forth to the Church's ruin, the deprivation of the liberty of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, the withdrawal from the Bishops of the faculty not only of meeting together, but even of teaching, attest with how much opportuneness Divine Providence permitted the Definition of the Papal Infallibility to be proclaimed then, when the right rule of belief and of conduct, amidst such manifold hindrances, was about to be deprived of all other support. And putting this aside, if the definitions of Œcumenical Councils are therefore infallible because they flow from the wisdom and from the counsel of the Holy Ghost, nothing, assuredly, is more absurd than to suppose that the Holy Ghost teaches indeed true things, but that He may also teach them inopportunately.

"If, then, there be any of those priests in your diocese, warn them seriously that it is not in any wise permitted them to narrow their assent within those limits, nor to make it conditionally dependent on the action, however laudable, of this or that Bishop, rather than on the Church's authority; warn them, too, that it is absolutely necessary that they adopt the Definition with full and entire consent of the understanding and the will, if they do not desire to err from the true faith.

"And now, supplicating for you the ever more and more abounding and more effectual succour of Divine Grace, as an earnest of heavenly favour, and in testimony of Our especial benevolence, We accord with affection to yourself, Venerable Brother, and to your whole diocese, the Apostolic Benediction.

"Given at Rome, at St. Peter's, this 6th of November, 1876, of Our Pontificate the 31st year.

"PIUS PP. IX."

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